Aguero v. Calvo

District Court, D. Guam·Decided March 16, 2016·No. 1:15-cv-00009·Unknown

Opinion

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF GUAM

KATHLEEN M. AGUERO and CIVIL CASE NO. 15-00009 LORETTA M. PANGELINAN, Plaintiffs, DECISION AND ORDER vs. RE: PLAINTIFFS’ MOTION FOR AWARD OF ATTORNEYS’ FEES EDDIE BAZA CALVO in his official capacity AND EXPENSES as Governor of Guam and CAROLYN GARRIDO in her official capacity as Registrar in the Office of Vital Statistics, Defendants. Before the court are the following motions: Motion for Award of Attorneys’ Fees and Expenses, filed by Mitchell F. Thompson, R. Todd Thompson, and Joephet R. Alcantara of Thompson Gutierrez & Alcantara, P.C.1 (ECF No. 43), and Joinder Motion for Award of Attorneys’ Fees and Expenses, filed by William D. Pesch of the Guam Family Law Office (ECF No. 51). After having reviewed the parties’ briefs, affidavits, declarations, relevant cases and statutes, the court hereby GRANTS said motions in part.

1 As of June 16, 2015, subsequent to the June 8, 2015 Judgment in this case, Thompson Gutierrez & Alcantara, P.C., has changed its name to Thompson Thompson & Alcantara, P.C. See ECF No. 44, at 2. For purposes of this order, the court will refer to the law firm’s name of Thompson Gutierrez & Alcantara, P.C., as that was the firm’s name at the time of the commencement of this civil action. However, reference to Thompson Thompson & Alcantara, P.C. will be made at the conclusion of this order. Plaintiffs Kathleen M. Aguero and Loretta M. Pangelinan brought this action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, challenging Guam laws that defined marriage as a legal union of persons of opposite sex. See ECF No. 1. Along with the Complaint, Plaintiffs also filed a motion for summary judgment and a motion for preliminary injunction. See ECF Nos. 2 and 5. On June 5, 2015, the court heard argument on said motions and orally ruled in favor of the Plaintiffs. See ECF No. 34. On June 8, 2015, the court issued its written decision. See ECF No. 39. Pursuant to FED. R. CIV. P. 54(d), Plaintiffs timely moved for an award of attorneys’ fees

and related expenses within 14 days of the court’s entry of judgment. See ECF Nos. 39, 40, 43 and 51. Plaintiffs request a total fee award of $82,955.00, consisting of $66,462.50 in attorneys’ fees to the law firm of Thompson Gutierrez & Alcantara, P.C.; and $16,492.50 in attorney’s fee to the law firm of Guam Family Law Office. See ECF Nos. 43 and 51. Plaintiffs also request an award of costs in the total amount of $2,575.17, for computer legal research, court filing fee, service of process fee, photocopy expenses, enlargement of chart for the motions hearing, and audio/video fee. See ECF Nos. 43 and 46, at 18-19. Pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1988, in actions under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, “the court, in its discretion, may allow the prevailing party . . . a reasonable attorney’s fee as part of the costs[.]”

42 U.S.C. § 1988(b). A. Prevailing Party “A plaintiff prevails for purposes of [Section] 1988 when actual relief on the merits of his claim materially alters the legal relationship between the parties by modifying the defendant’s behavior in a way that directly benefits the plaintiff. Relief on the merits occurs when the material alteration of the parties’ legal relationship is accompanied by judicial imprimatur on the change.” Higher Taste, Inc. v. City of Tacoma, 717 F.3d 712, 715 (9th Cir. 2013) (internal quotations and citations omitted) (emphasis in original). Judicial imprimatur can come in the form of an enforceable judgment. Buckhannon Bd. & Care Home, Inc. v. W. Va. Dep’t of Health & Human Res., 532 U.S. 598, 609 (2001). In this case, there is no question that Plaintiffs are the prevailing party.2 The court granted Plaintiffs’ motion for summary judgment and the relief requested, which was to permanently enjoin Defendants from enforcing 10 G.C.A. §3207(h) and any other laws or regulations to the extent they prohibit otherwise qualified same-sex couples from marrying in Guam. See ECF No.

39. In accordance with the court’s written decision, judgment was entered in favor of the Plaintiffs and against the Defendants. See ECF No. 40. B. Standard for Attorneys’ Fees Because the Plaintiffs are the prevailing party in this Section 1983 suit, the court must now determine whether the requested attorneys’ fees are reasonable. The Supreme Court has found that “[t]he most useful starting point for determining the amount of a reasonable fee is the number of hours reasonably expended on the litigation multiplied by a reasonable hourly rate.” Hensley v. Eckerhart, 461 U.S. 424, 433 (1983). This is referred to as the “lodestar figure,” which is a “presumptively reasonable fee” under Section 1988. Gonzalez v. City of Maywood, 729 F.3d 1196, 1202 (9th Cir. 2013) (internal quotations omitted). The court may then adjust the

lodestar figure upward or downward based on factors set forth in Kerr that are not subsumed in

2 In their response to Plaintiffs’ motion for award of attorneys’ fees and expenses, Defendants stated that “[t]he Court did not yet rule upon whether Plaintiffs successfully met the elements of a 1983 action as opposed to their successful constitutional challenge and the Court’s resulting remedy (injunction following Court holding 10 G.C.A. Section 3207(h) ‘unconstitutional’).” See ECF No. 56, at 2, citing to Ngiraingas v. Sanchez, 495 U.S. 182 (1990). It is unclear to the court as well as to Plaintiffs (see ECF No. 57, at 2) what Defendants are intending to argue here. The court will not speculate as to Defendants’ arguments, but it will note that Plaintiffs are the prevailing party in this case. the lodestar calculation. Id. The party applying for fees “bears the burden of establishing entitlement to an award and documenting the appropriate hours expended and hourly rates.” Hensley, 461 U.S. at 437. The party opposing the fees “has a burden of rebuttal that requires submission of evidence to the district court challenging the accuracy and reasonableness of the hours charged or the facts asserted by the prevailing party in its submitted affidavits.” Gates v. Deukmejian, 987 F.2d 1392,

3 The Kerr factors are as follows: (1) the time and labor required; (2) the novelty and difficulty of the questions; (3) the skill requisite to perform the legal service properly; (4) the preclusion of other employment by the attorney due to acceptance of the case; (5) the customary fee; (6) whether the fee is fixed or contingent; (7) time limitations imposed by the client or the circumstances; (8) the amount involved and the results obtained; (9) the experience, reputation, and ability of the attorneys; (10) the “undesirability” of the case; (11) the nature and length of the professional relationship with the client; and (12) awards in similar cases. Kerr v. Screen Extras Guild, Inc., 526 F.2d 67, 70 (9th Cir. 1975).

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