Fourth Court of Appeals San Antonio, Texas MEMORANDUM OPINION
No. 04-25-00291-CV
Agueda Nevares ARELLANO and Blanca Rosa Nevarez Arellano, Appellants
v.
Miguel Angel ARRELLANO, Jr., Ismael Arellano, Rebeca Jasso, and Alice Arellano, Appellees
From the 293rd Judicial District Court, Maverick County, Texas Trial Court No. 23-10-42692-MCV Honorable Maribel Flores, Judge Presiding
Opinion by: Lori Massey Brissette, Justice
Sitting: Irene Rios, Justice Lori Massey Brissette, Justice Adrian A. Spears II, Justice
Delivered and Filed: April 15, 2026
AFFIRMED IN PART, REVERSED IN PART, AND REMANDED
Appellants Agueda Nevares Arellano (“Agueda”) and Blanca Rosa Nevarez Arellano
(“Blanca”) appeal the final judgment rendered by the trial court in favor of appellees on their
declaratory judgment claim against Agueda. After reviewing the record and the parties’ briefing,
we affirm the trial court’s judgment in part, we reverse the judgment in part, and we remand for
further proceedings on the request for attorneys’ fees. 04-25-00291-CV
BACKGROUND
Blanca and Decedent Miguel Angel Arrellano were married from 2010 until Decedent’s
death in 2023. During their marriage, the couple acquired the “Las Brisas property” located at 645
Las Brisas Drive, Eagle Pass, Texas. A few months after Decedent died intestate, Blanca’s sister
Agueda filed a lien affidavit asserting that she is owed $75,000 by Decedent and Blanca for
materials she furnished for improvements to the Las Brisas property. Several months later, seeking
to sell the Las Brisas property, appellees Miguel Angel Arrellano, Jr., Ismael Arellano, Rebeca
Jasso, and Alice Arellano, who are Decedent’s children from a prior marriage, (“Decedent’s
Children”) filed their original petition against Agueda seeking in their sole cause of action a
declaratory judgment voiding Agueda’s lien affidavit. Their petition also requested attorneys’ fees
under the Declaratory Judgments Act. See TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE § 37.009.
Blanca, who had previously agreed with Decedent’s Children to sell the Las Brisas
property, then filed a plea in intervention in which she argued the Las Brisas property is her
homestead and she will be irreparably injured if the property is sold. In her plea, Blanca sought,
inter alia, a declaratory judgment that she has a homestead and life estate interest in the property.
Thereafter, Agueda filed an affidavit removing the lien from the Las Brisas property. Decedent’s
Children then filed their motion to strike Blanca’s plea in intervention, attaching Agueda’s
affidavit removing the lien as an exhibit. The following week, the trial court held a hearing on the
motion to strike Blanca’s plea in intervention and took the matter under advisement. Later that
day, the trial court issued its order granting the motion to strike Blanca’s plea in intervention and
striking and dismissing Blanca’s plea.
The following month, the trial court held an evidentiary hearing on attorneys’ fees. At the
conclusion, the trial court orally awarded Decedent’s Children attorneys’ fees and costs totaling
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$13,594.88, the full amount sought, against both Agueda and Blanca, jointly and severally. Over
six months later, the trial court held a hearing for entry of a final judgment. A few days later, the
trial court signed its final judgment. The judgment declared Agueda’s lien affidavit void and
declared Blanca has no homestead interest in the Las Brisas property. Lastly, the judgment ordered
that Agueda and Blanca are jointly and severally liable for $13,594.88 in attorneys’ fees owed to
Decedent’s Children. Agueda and Blanca timely appealed.
On appeal, Agueda and Blanca raise four issues. First, they argue the trial court lost plenary
jurisdiction over them once Blanca’s plea in intervention was struck and therefore exceeded its
authority when issuing a final judgment regarding the merits of their claims and awarding
attorneys’ fees against them. They further argue the trial court abused its discretion by ruling on
the merits of Blanca’s homestead right and by declaring the lien void in the final judgment. Finally,
they contend the trial court did not have the power to award attorneys’ fees against them and that,
even if it did, the evidence presented was insufficient to prove the fees were reasonable and
necessary and the award was equitable and just.
THE TRIAL COURT’S PLENARY JURISDICTION
Blanca first argues that the trial court’s plenary power over her expired thirty days after the
trial court issued its interlocutory order striking her plea in intervention. We disagree.
Whether a trial court acted outside its plenary power is a legal question we review de novo.
Tex. Dep’t of Parks & Wildlife v. Miranda, 133 S.W.3d 217, 226 (Tex. 2004); In re CIT Bank,
N.A., No. 14-19-00884-CV, 2020 WL 1528162, at *2 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] Mar. 31,
2020, no pet.). “A trial court has plenary power over its judgment until it becomes final. The trial
court also retains continuing control over interlocutory orders and has the power to set those orders
aside any time before a final judgment is entered.” Lacy v. Castillo, 580 S.W.3d 830, 834 (Tex.
App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2019, no pet.) (quoting Fruehauf Corp. v. Carrillo, 848 S.W.2d 83,
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84 (Tex. 1993) (per curiam)); see Callaway v. Martin, No. 02-16-00181-CV, 2017 WL 2290160,
at *3 n.3 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth May 25, 2017, no pet.) (mem. op.) (“A trial court has plenary
power—power that is full, entire, complete, absolute, perfect, and unqualified—over, and therefore
the jurisdiction and authority to reconsider, not only its judgment but also its interlocutory orders
until thirty days after the date a final judgment is signed or, if a motion for new trial or its equivalent
is filed, until thirty days after the motion is overruled by signed, written order or operation of law,
whichever first occurs.”); Flagstar Bank, FSB v. Walker, 451 S.W.3d 490, 504 (Tex. App.—Dallas
2014, no pet.) (“[A] trial court has the inherent right to change or modify any interlocutory order
or judgment until the judgment on the merits of the case becomes final.”).
When a trial court issues an interlocutory order striking a plea in intervention, the
intervenor cannot bring an interlocutory appeal. Kenneth D. Eichner, P.C. v. Dominguez, 623
S.W.3d 358, 360 (Tex. 2021). Instead, the intervenor must wait until the trial court issues its final
judgment, at which point the interlocutory order merges with the final judgment, and the intervenor
can appeal that judgment, not the prior interlocutory order. Id. An intervenor whose plea has been
struck is a “party” to the final judgment “because that judgment is binding on the intervenor.” Id.
at 362; see De Los Santos as Next Friend of C.D.L.S. v. Superior Shuttle, LLC, No. 04-21-00306-
CV, 2022 WL 16541909, at *2 (Tex. App.—San Antonio Oct. 31, 2022, no pet.) (citing Eichner,
623 S.W.3d at 362).
Thus, the trial court retained continuing control over its order striking Blanca’s plea in
intervention and had plenary power to set it aside, reconsider it, modify it, and to reaffirm it in the
final judgment. See Castillo, 580 S.W.3d 830 at 834; Callaway, 2017 WL 2290160, at *3 n.3;
Flagstar Bank, 451 S.W.3d at 504. We overrule this issue.
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TRIAL COURT’S RULING ON THE MERITS OF BLANCA’S HOMESTEAD RIGHT
Blanca further contends the trial court exceeded its authority by adjudicating the merits of
her plea in its final judgment because the trial court lacked jurisdiction to do so. Blanca argues the
trial court ruled on the merits of her plea in that it declared she does not have a homestead right to
the Las Brisas property.
Jurisdiction is a question of law we review de novo. Tex. Disposal Sys. Landfill, Inc. v.
Travis Cent. Appraisal Dist. by & through Crigler, 694 S.W.3d 752, 757 (Tex. 2024). A trial court
always has jurisdiction to determine whether it has jurisdiction. Dolenz v. Vail, 200 S.W.3d 338,
341 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2006, no pet.); Perry v. Del Rio, 53 S.W.3d 818, 824 (Tex. App.—Austin
2001), pet. dism’d, 66 S.W.3d 239 (Tex.2001). The trial court may “consider relevant evidence
submitted by the parties when necessary to resolve the jurisdictional issues raised.” City of Austin
v. Powell, 704 S.W.3d 437, 447 (Tex. 2024) (quoting Tex. Dep’t of Parks & Wildlife v. Miranda,
133 S.W.3d 217, 227 (Tex. 2004)). However, a “court may not reach the merits if it finds a single
valid basis to defeat jurisdiction.” Rattray v. City of Brownsville, 662 S.W.3d 860, 868 (Tex. 2023).
“In such an instance, we must vacate the portions of the judgment that addressed the merits of the
parties’ claims.” Good Shepherd Med. Ctr., Inc. v. State, 306 S.W.3d 825, 838 (Tex. App.—Austin
2010, no pet.); see Stamos v. Houston Indep. Sch. Dist., No. 14-18-00340-CV, 2020 WL 1528047,
at *4 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] Mar. 31, 2020, no pet.) (mem. op.) (citing Curry v. Harris
Cnty. Appraisal Dist., 434 S.W.3d 815, 820 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2014, no pet.)).
Any person “may intervene by filing a pleading, subject to being stricken out by the court
for sufficient cause on the motion of any party.” TEX. R. CIV. P. 60. Rule 60 authorizes a party with
a justiciable interest in a suit to intervene as a matter of right. Nghiem v. Sajib, 567 S.W.3d 718,
721 (Tex. 2019). The party opposing the intervention bears the burden to challenge it by a motion
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to strike. Id. Once such a motion is filed, the intervenor bears the burden to show a “justiciable
interest” in the pending suit. Id. If the intervenor fails to meet this burden, the trial court has “no
discretion to deny” the motion to strike. In re Union Carbide Corp., 273 S.W.3d 152, 156 (Tex.
2008).
Consequently, “the ‘justiciable interest’ inquiry in the context of intervention is a question
of jurisdiction.” Triple P.G. Sand Dev., LLC v. Nelson, 651 S.W.3d 491, 497 (Tex. App.—Houston
[14th Dist.] 2022, no pet.) (citing Union Carbide, 273 S.W.3d at 156); see also, e.g., Compton v.
Port Arthur Indep. Sch. Dist., No. 09-15-00321-CV, 2017 WL 3081092, at *5 (Tex. App.—
Beaumont July 20, 2017, no pet.) (“Issues of justiciability” are “threshold issues that implicate
subject matter jurisdiction.”) (citing Heckman v. Williamson Cty., 369 S.W.3d 137, 162 (Tex.
2012)). If the trial court has ruled the intervenor lacks a justiciable interest in the suit, the trial
court has determined it lacks jurisdiction over the intervenor’s plea in intervention, and the trial
court resultingly “cannot rule on the plea[.]” Triple P.G. Sand Dev., LLC v. Del Pino, 649 S.W.3d
682, 698 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2022, no pet.) (emphasis in original); see Nelson, 651
S.W.3d at 497 (explaining “the trial court ha[s] no discretion to act in the absence of a justiciable
interest.”).
Here, Blanca’s plea sought, inter alia, a declaratory judgment that she has a homestead
right to the Las Brisas property. The final judgment twice addressed Blanca’s assertion of this
right. First, in what we will refer to as “Part A” of the judgment, the trial court explained its
granting of the motion to strike Blanca’s plea. The judgment stated:
In granting Plaintiffs’ relief to strike the intervention, the Court recognized and held that a surviving spouse’s homestead is determined at the time of decedent’s death. The Court held that at the time of decedent’s death, Intervenor’s official homestead was the property at 1601 Timber Valley Drive. The Court further held that Intervenor divested her homestead right by her own consent by agreeing with Plaintiffs and electing to sell the 1601 Timber Valley Drive property. The Court
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further held that Intervenor could not claim both properties as homestead and since Intervenor had no homestead interest to 645 Las Brisas Drive, she had no justiciable interest in the suit.
Thus, in Part A the trial court explained that because it determined Blanca has no homestead right
to the Las Brisas property, Blanca had no justiciable interest in the suit. For these reasons, the trial
court struck and dismissed Blanca’s plea in intervention. But, later in the judgment, the trial court
went further than merely explaining why it struck Blanca’s plea. The final paragraph, which we
will refer to as “Part B,” stated the trial court “ordered, adjudged and decreed . . . that Intervenor’s
homestead was determined at the time of decedent’s death with that being the property at 1601
Timber Valley Drive; that Intervenor divested her homestead right to the Timber Valley property
by her own consent and election to sell the Timber Valley property; that this action by Intervenor
caused her abandonment of her homestead; and that Intervenor had no homestead interest in 645
Las Brisas Drive[.]”
The judgment’s initial explanation in Part A did not adjudicate the merits of Blanca’s plea,
as it merely provided the trial court’s reasons for concluding Blanca failed to meet her burden to
establish a justiciable interest in the suit. See Del Pino, 649 S.W.3d at 698; Dolenz, 200 S.W.3d at
341; Powell, 704 S.W.3d at 447. 1 However, Part B of the judgment did adjudicate the merits of
Blanca’s plea, specifically making judicial declarations relating to Blanca’s homestead right. Once
the trial court reaffirmed its striking of Blanca’s plea for lack of a justiciable interest, the trial court
had no discretion to rule on the merits of her plea. Del Pino, 649 S.W.3d at 698; see Nelson, 651
S.W.3d at 497. We therefore sustain Blanca’s issue to the extent that we reverse and vacate the
1 Blanca does not argue on appeal that the trial court erred in granting the motion to strike, so we do not opine on this issue. We also express no opinion on other related issues that have not been briefed, such as whether there was sufficient evidence that Blanca does not have a homestead right to the Las Brisas property, whether the trial court erred in concluding Blanca lacks a justiciable interest in the suit, or whether the homestead inquiry is dispositive to the justiciability inquiry. These issues are waived. See TEX. R. APP. P. 38.1(f), (i); see also, e.g., Valadez v. Avitia, 238 S.W.3d 843, 844–45 (Tex. App.—El Paso 2007, no pet.) (the reviewing court’s duties do not include performing an independent review of the record to ascertain whether error exists).
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following declarations from Part B of the final judgment about Blanca’s assertion of a homestead
right:
. . . that Intervenor’s homestead was determined at the time of decedent’s death with that being the property at 1601 Timber Valley Drive; that Intervenor divested her homestead right to the Timber Valley property by her own consent and election to sell the Timber Valley property; that this action by Intervenor caused her abandonment of her homestead; and that Intervenor had no homestead interest in 645 Las Brisas Drive[.]
See Good Shepherd, 306 S.W.3d at 838; Stamos, 2020 WL 1528047, at *4; Curry, 434 S.W.3d
815 at 820.
THE TRIAL COURT’S DECLARATION THAT THE LIEN AFFIDAVIT IS VOID
Agueda argues the trial court erred by declaring the lien affidavit void in the final judgment.
Specifically, she argues that once she filed her affidavit removing the lien, the Decedent’s
Children’s declaratory judgment claim was rendered moot.
Mootness implicates subject matter jurisdiction, which is a legal question that we review
de novo. Ibarra v. City of Laredo, No. 04-11-00035-CV, 2012 WL 3025709, at *2 (Tex. App.—
San Antonio July 25, 2012, pet. denied); In re Smith Cnty., 521 S.W.3d 447, 453 (Tex. App.—
Tyler 2017, no pet.); see also Sw. Elec. Power Co. v. Lynch, 595 S.W.3d 678, 682 (Tex. 2020)
(appellate courts review de novo legal question of subject matter jurisdiction). A case becomes
moot if a controversy ceases to exist or the parties lack a legally cognizable interest in the outcome.
Allstate Ins. Co. v. Hallman, 159 S.W.3d 640, 642 (Tex. 2005). To decide whether the case is
moot, we ask whether a party seeking judgment retains “a ‘personal stake in the outcome of the
lawsuit,’” or, in other words, a “concrete interest, however small.” Tex. Dep’t of Family &
Protective Services v. Grassroots Leadership, Inc., 717 S.W.3d 854, 875 (Tex. 2025) (quoting
Campbell-Ewald Co. v. Gomez, 577 U.S. 153, 161 (2016)).
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A case is not rendered moot simply because some of the issues become moot. In re Kellogg
Brown & Root, Inc., 166 S.W.3d 732, 737 (Tex. 2005) (orig. proceeding); In re E.A.C., 665 S.W.3d
763, 768 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 2023, no pet.). “If only some claims or issues become moot,
the case remains ‘live,’ at least as to other claims or issues that are not moot.” State ex rel. Best v.
Harper, 562 S.W.3d 1, 6 (Tex. 2018). A plaintiff’s remaining interest in obtaining attorneys’ fees
“breathes life” into declaratory judgment action, preventing it from being moot. Hallman, 159
S.W.3d at 643 (quoting Camarena v. Tex. Employment Comm’n, 754 S.W.2d 149, 151 (Tex.
1988)). “[A] case under the Declaratory Judgments Act remains a live controversy, even if all
requests for substantive declaratory relief become moot during the action’s pendency, as long as a
claim for attorneys’ fees under the Act remains pending.” Hansen v. JP Morgan Chase Bank, N.A.,
346 S.W.3d 769, 774–75 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2011, no pet.) (citing Hallman, 159 S.W.3d at 643;
Camarena, 754 S.W.2d at 151–52).
It is true that, by filing her affidavit removing the lien, Agueda “extinguished” the lien,
rendering it void. Lyda Swinerton Builders, Inc. v. Cathay Bank, 409 S.W.3d 221, 230 (Tex.
App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2013, pet. denied). The trial court was consequently precluded from
declaring the lien void. Devon Energy, Prod. Co., L.P. v. KCS Resources, LLC, 450 S.W.3d 203,
210 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2014, pet. denied). But, in addition to a declaratory
judgment rendering Agueda’s lien void, the Decedent’s Children also sought attorneys’ fees under
the Declaratory Judgments Act. That aspect of their claim was not rendered moot by Agueda’s
actions. See Kellogg Brown & Root, 166 S.W.3d 732 at 737; E.A.C., 665 S.W.3d at 768.
Thus, while we hold the trial court retained jurisdiction to determine the Decedent’s
Children’s pending request for attorneys’ fees under the Declaratory Judgments Act, we reverse
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and vacate the trial court’s declaration that the lien is void. See Hallman, 159 S.W.3d at 643;
Hansen, 346 S.W.3d at 774–75; Camarena, 754 S.W.2d at 151–52.
THE TRIAL COURT’S ATTORNEYS’ FEES AWARD
Finally, both Agueda and Blanca argue the trial court abused its discretion when it awarded
$13,594.88 in attorneys’ fees against them, jointly and severally.
Attorneys’ Fees Award Against Blanca
Blanca argues the trial court erred by awarding fees against her under the Declaratory
Judgments Act because she was not a party to the declaratory judgment action and Decedent’s
Children did not seek attorneys’ fees in their motion to strike her plea in intervention. We agree.
Texas adheres to the American Rule of attorney’s fee awards, prohibiting recovery of
attorneys’ fees in legal proceedings unless authorized by statute or contract. Tucker v. Thomas,
419 S.W.3d 292, 295 (Tex. 2013). The only basis for an award of attorneys’ fees presented to the
trial court was the Decedent Children’s declaratory judgment claim. But because Blanca’s plea in
intervention was struck for lack of a justiciable interest, she was by definition not a party to the
declaratory judgment claim for which Decedent’s Children sought fees. 2 See Triple P.G. Sand
Dev., LLC v. Del Pino, 649 S.W.3d 682, 698 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2022, no pet.)
(striking or dismissing plea in intervention for lack of justiciable interest constitutes determination
that trial court lacks jurisdiction over plea); see also Massachusetts Bay Ins. Co. v. Adkins, 615
S.W.3d 580, 602 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2020, no pet.) (explaining intervenors are not
2 “An award of attorneys’ fees is proper against only the parties to a claim for which attorneys’ fees are available.” In re Z.O.M., 613 S.W.3d 638, 643 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 2020, no pet.) “Attorneys’ fees may not be awarded against a person who is not a party to the claim for which attorneys’ fees are available.” Id. (citing Satellite Earth Stations E., Inc. v. Davis, 756 S.W.2d 385, 387 (Tex. App.—Eastland 1988, writ denied)).
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“parties to the lawsuit” once trial court grants motion to strike); Ctr. Rose Partners, Ltd. v. Bailey,
587 S.W.3d 514, 531 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2019, no pet.) (explaining same). 3
The trial court therefore abused its discretion in awarding attorneys’ fees against Blanca.
We, therefore, reverse the award of attorneys’ fees against Blanca and render judgment that the
Decedent Children take nothing against her.
Attorneys’ Fees Awarded Against Agueda
Agueda argues the trial court erred by awarding fees against her, as a party to the
declaratory judgment action, because it awarded the full amount of attorneys’ fees incurred by the
Decedent’s Children, which included fees relating to their motion to strike Blanca’s plea. We
agree.
Awards of attorneys’ fees under the Declaratory Judgments Act are reviewed for an abuse
of discretion. Teal Trading & Dev., LP v. Champee Springs Ranches Prop. Owners Ass’n, 534
S.W.3d 558, 595 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 2017), aff’d, 593 S.W.3d 324 (Tex. 2020). If some
evidence reasonably supports the trial court’s decision, the court has not abused its discretion. Id.
(citing Indian Beach Prop. Owners’ Ass’n v. Linden, 222 S.W.3d 682, 706 (Tex. App.—Houston
[1st Dist.] 2007, no pet.)). If the trial court misinterprets or misapplies the law or acts arbitrarily
or unreasonably, it has abused its discretion. Id. (citing Tanglewood Homes Ass’n v. Feldman, 436
S.W.3d 48, 69 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2014, pet. denied)).
In an action under the Declaratory Judgments Act, “the court may award costs and
reasonable and necessary attorneys’ fees as are equitable and just.” TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE
§ 37.009. A trial court abuses its discretion by awarding fees under the Declaratory Judgments Act
3 Blanca was a “party” to the final judgment only in the sense that the trial court’s order granting the motion to strike Blanca’s plea merged into the final judgment, and Blanca had a right to appeal the striking of her plea. See Kenneth D. Eichner, P.C. v. Dominguez, 623 S.W.3d 358, 362 (Tex. 2021). This makes her a party to the appeal, not a party to Decedent’s Children’s declaratory judgment claim. See id.
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when (1) there was insufficient evidence that the fees were reasonable and necessary or (2) its
determination that the fees awarded were equitable and just was made arbitrarily, unreasonably,
or without regard to guiding legal principles. Courtade v. Gloria Lopez Estrada Family Tr., No.
02-14-00295-CV, 2016 WL 1164159, at *5 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth Mar. 24, 2016, no pet.) (citing
Bocquet v. Herring, 972 S.W.2d 19, 20–21 (Tex. 1998)). “Whether it is ‘equitable and just’ to
award attorneys’ fees depends, not on direct proof, but on the concept of fairness, in light of all
the circumstances of the case.” Kartsotis v. Bloch, 503 S.W.3d 506, 520 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2016,
pet. denied) (quoting Austin Jockey Club, Ltd. v. Dallas City Limits Prop. Co., L.P., No. 05–14–
00114–CV, 2015 WL 3549645, at *8 (Tex. App.—Dallas June 5, 2015, pet. denied) (mem. op.)).
Here, Agueda filed her affidavit rendering her lien void before the motion to strike, had no
involvement in the filing of Blanca’s plea in intervention, and did not make any arguments
opposing Decedent’s Children’s motion to strike the plea. Thus, we conclude there was no basis
for awarding against Agueda the attorneys’ fees incurred in filing and litigating the motion to strike
that was filed against Blanca. By doing so, the trial court abused its discretion. See Courtade, 2016
WL 1164159, at *5 (trial court abuses its discretion if insufficient evidence fees were reasonable
and necessary or if determination that fees awarded were equitable and just was unreasonable).
Therefore, we reverse the trial court’s award of attorneys’ fees against Agueda and we
remand for further proceedings on Decedent’s Children’s request for attorneys’ fees against
Agueda. See Teal Trading, 534 S.W.3d at 596; Geter, 620 S.W.3d at 712. 4
4 Agueda also argues Decedent’s Children were not entitled to any fees at all because they were not prevailing parties in that Agueda’s filing of the affidavit removing the lien resolved the case without the trial court declaring the initial lien affidavit void. However, Decedent’s Children need not be prevailing parties to secure fees under the Declaratory Judgments Act. See Teal Trading, 534 S.W.3d at 596. Furthermore, as explained supra, the case was not mooted by Agueda’s filing of the affidavit removing the lien, since the claim for attorneys’ fees was pending. Hallman, 159 S.W.3d at 643; Hansen, 346 S.W.3d at 774–75. Finally, we need not address Agueda’s argument that the fees should have been segregated. See TEX. R. APP. P. 47.1; RSL Funding, LLC v. Metro. Life Ins. Co., 728 S.W.3d 194, 221 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2025, no pet.), reh’g denied (Nov. 18, 2025) (complaint of failure to segregate fees waived if no objection in trial court).
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CONCLUSION
We reverse and vacate the declarations from the final judgment determining Blanca’s
homestead right because these declarations constituted an improper ruling on the merits of
Blanca’s plea in intervention. See Good Shepherd Med. Ctr., Inc. v. State, 306 S.W.3d 825, 838
(Tex. App.—Austin 2010, no pet.); Curry v. Harris Cnty. Appraisal Dist., 434 S.W.3d 815, 820
(Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2014, no pet.)). Furthermore, we vacate that portion of the final
judgment that made a judicial determination that Agueda’s lien is void. See Premier Towers, LP
v. Carmichael, 665 S.W.3d 912, 918 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2023, no pet.). We reverse
the final judgment’s award of attorneys’ fees against Blanca and render judgment that Decedent
Children take nothing against her. See Z.O.M., 613 S.W.3d at 643. Finally, we reverse the final
judgment’s award of attorneys’ fees against Agueda and remand for further proceedings on
Decedent’s Children’s request for attorneys’ fees against Agueda. In all other respects, we affirm
the trial court’s judgment.
Lori Massey Brissette, Justice
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