Agristor Leasing v. Kjergaard

582 F. Supp. 39, 1983 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 10819
CourtDistrict Court, D. Minnesota
DecidedDecember 14, 1983
DocketCiv. 4-83-756
StatusPublished
Cited by3 cases

This text of 582 F. Supp. 39 (Agristor Leasing v. Kjergaard) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, D. Minnesota primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Agristor Leasing v. Kjergaard, 582 F. Supp. 39, 1983 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 10819 (mnd 1983).

Opinion

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND. ORDER

DIANA E. MURPHY, District Judge.

Plaintiff, AgriStor Leasing (AgriStor), brought this action for money damages, injunctive relief, a writ of replevin, and attorney’s fees and costs against defendants, Steven Kjergaard and Cheryl Kjergaard, alleging breach of lease and wrongful detention of property. Jurisdiction is alleged pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1332. This matter is now before the court on the motion of AgriStor for pre-judgment seizure of personal property pursuant to F.R.Civ.P. 64 and Minn.Stat. § 565.23, subd. 3 and on the motion of defendants for stay or dismissal.

Facts

AgriStor is in the business of leasing farm equipment to individual farmers. Defendants are farmers who entered into an Agricultural Equipment Lease Agreement (Exhibit A of Complaint) with AgriStor on September 13, 1981. Under that lease, defendants leased a “2588 Harvestore” and a “Goliath Unloader with 200' with 16" belt feeder” and agreed to pay rent to AgriStor in eight consecutive annual installments of $25,279.29 commencing on January 1, 1983.

AgriStor has made demands on defendants to pay the amount due on January 1, 1983, but defendants have refused to comply with these demands. Moreover, defendants have retained the equipment and continue to use it.

On or about July 21, 1983, AgriStor was served with a complaint by the defendants, *40 venued in the District Court of Lincoln County of the State of Minnesota. Also named in the state court action as defendants are A.O. Smith Harvestore Products, Inc. (AOSHPI), A.O. Smith Corp. and Hawke and Company Harvestore, Inc. (Hawke). (AgriStor’s general partners are Steiner Financial Corp. and AgriStor Credit Corp. The latter is a subsidiary of A.O. Smith Corp. which is the parent of AOSHPI, the manufacturer of Harvestore equipment. Hawke is a dealer of Harvestore equipment.) Apparently, defendants assert in this state court action that defects in the leased Harvestore constitute breach of contract and failure of consideration that false representations were made to them by Jerry Teigland of Hawke. As of November 8, 1983, AgriStor claims that there has been no discovery or other proceedings, save the exchange of pleadings, in the state court action brought by defendants in this action. Discussion

A. Defendants’ Motion to Stay or Dismiss

Defendants argue that this court should stay or dismiss this action because there is a related state court proceeding. The case law indicates, however, that the court should not decline to exercise its jurisdiction.

Abstention from the exercise of federal jurisdiction is the exception, not the rule. “The doctrine of abstention, under which a District Court may decline to exercise or postpone the exercise of its jurisdiction, is an extraordinary and narrow exception to the duty of a District Court to adjudicate a controversy properly before it. Abdication of the obligation to decide cases can be justified under this doctrine only in the exceptional circumstances where the order to the parties to repair to the state court would clearly serve an important countervailing interest.” County of Allegheny v. Frank Mashuda Co., 360 U.S. 185, 188-89, 79 S.Ct. 1060, 1063, 3 L.Ed.2d 1163 (1959).

Colorado River Water Conser. Dist. v. U.S., 424 U.S. 800, 813, 96 S.Ct. 1236, 1244, 47 L.Ed.2d 483 (1976). In that case the Court outlined three categories which justify abstention. 1 Defendants have made no showing that this case falls into any of the exceptions to the exercise of federal jurisdiction. Moreover, the pendency of a state court action which involves similar or identical issues and parties is insufficient to justify even a stay. United States v. Bunkers, 521 F.2d 1217 (8th Cir.1975).

Defendants also made several arguments in their written materials apparently based on the position that other parties (the other defendants in the state court action) are indispensable and that they cannot be brought into this suit for jurisdictional reasons, thus resulting either in piecemeal adjudication or unfair results. Defendants did not mention the arguments at the hearing and have perhaps abandoned them. In either case, they are without merit. Agri-Stor properly points out that, even assuming these parties are indispensable, the solution would appear to be joinder under F.R.Civ.P. 13(h) or 14. Ancillary jurisdiction may be exercised over compulsory counterclaims. See 3 Moore’s Federal Practice ¶ 13.39, at p. 13-236-7 (2d ed. 1983) and cases cited therein. Similarly, under Rule 14 there is substantial authority that diversity is not required between the defendants and the impleaded parties. See 3 Moore’s Federal Practice ¶ 14.26, at p. 14-108 (2d ed. 1983); Waylander-Peterson Co. v. Great Northern Railroad, 201 F.2d 408 (8th Cir.1953).

There also appears to be no merit to defendants’ argument that this court lacks personal or subject matter jurisdiction. There clearly is diversity jurisdiction between plaintiff and defendants. Defend *41 ants fail to claim or show that minimum contacts are lacking for personal jurisdiction, and in fact sufficient contacts do exist.

B. AgriStor’s Motion for Pre-judgment Seizure

Pursuant to Rule F.R.Civ.P. 64, this court must look to the remedies provided by Minnesota law for pre-judgment seizure of personal property. 2

Minn.Stat. § 565.23, subd. 3 provides that a claimant is entitled to such seizure if it demonstrates a probability of success on the merits, unless the court makes the following findings:

a. Respondent has shown a defense to the merits of claimant’s claim, the defense is a fair basis for litigation and the defense would, if established at hearing on the merits, entitle Respondent to retain possession of the property;
b. The interest of respondent cannot be adequately protected by the bond filed by claimant pursuant to § 565.25, subd. 1 if the property is delivered to claimant pri- or to final decision on the merits; and
c. The harm suffered by the respondent would be substantially greater than the harm which would be suffered by claimant if the property were not delivered to the claimant prior to final decision on the merits.

It is undisputed that defendants failed to make the rental payments due on January 1. 1983, but they appear to argue that alleged defects and failure of consideration, etc., constitute a defense to the merits of AgriStor’s claim for replevin.

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Related

Krank v. A.O. Smith Harvestore Products, Inc.
456 N.W.2d 125 (North Dakota Supreme Court, 1990)
Agristor Leasing v. Farrow
826 F.2d 732 (Eighth Circuit, 1987)

Cite This Page — Counsel Stack

Bluebook (online)
582 F. Supp. 39, 1983 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 10819, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/agristor-leasing-v-kjergaard-mnd-1983.