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Florida Attorney General Reports·Decided April 21, 1986·Published

Opinion

Mr. Gary Alan Vorbeck County Attorney Hardee County Room A-204, Courthouse Annex 412 West Orange Street Wauchula, Florida 33873-2867

Dear Mr. Vorbeck:

This is in response to your request for an opinion on the following questions:

1. CAN A COUNTY ASSIGN A DELINQUENT LIEN FOR SPECIAL ASSESSMENTS TO THIRD PARTIES?

2. IF SO, WILL THE ASSIGNEES HAVE THE SAME RIGHTS AND POWERS AS THE COUNTY FOR THE COLLECTION OF SAID SPECIAL ASSESSMENT LIEN?

3. CAN A COUNTY ADVERTISE THE NAMES OF OWNERS OF PROPERTY ON WHICH A SPECIAL ASSESSMENT PAYMENT IS DELINQUENT IN THE SAME MANNER AS FOR AD VALOREM TAXES?

QUESTIONS ONE AND TWO

According to your letter of inquiry, Hardee County has created a municipal service taxing unit for the purpose of fire protection. Such municipal service taxing or benefit units are expressly authorized by s. 125.01(1), F.S., which provides in pertinent part:

(1) The legislative and governing body of a county shall have the power to carry on county government. To the extent not inconsistent with general or special law, this power includes, but is not restricted to, the power to:

* * *

(q) Establish, and subsequently merge or abolish those created hereunder, municipal service taxing or benefit units for any part or all of the unincorporated area of the county, within which may be provided fire protection . . . and other essential facilities and municipal services from funds derived from service charges, special assessments, or taxes within such unit only. It is declared to be the intent of the Legislature that this paragraph is the authorization for all counties to levy additional taxes, within the limits fixed for municipal purposes, within such municipal service taxing units under the authority of the second sentence of s. 9(b), Art. VII of the State Constitution.

Cf., AGO's 85-83; 84-52. The municipal service taxing unit referred to in your letter is funded by special assessments on benefited property within said unit. The special assessments are not collected in the manner of ad valorem taxes as authorized in s. 197.363, F.S., but are sent out by separate billing by the board of county commissioners.

Special assessments are charges assessed against the property of a particular locality because that property derives some special benefit from the expenditure of the money collected by the assessment in addition to the general benefit accruing to all property or citizens. See, 48 Fla.Jur.2d Special Assessments s. 1 and AGO's 84-48; 82-103. Special assessments are levied under the taxing power and are considered a "peculiar species of taxation." State ex rel. Board of Supervisors of South Florida Conservancy Dist. v. Warren, 57 So.2d 337, 340 (Fla. 1951); State ex rel. Board of Supervisors of South Florida Conservancy Dist. v. Caldwell,35 So.2d 642 (Fla. 1948); Jackson v. City of Lake Worth, 23 So.2d 526 (Fla. 1945); Anderson v. City of Ocala, 91 So. 182 (Fla. 1921).

Although the legislative and governing body of a noncharter county is granted broad home rule powers by s. 1(f), Art. VIII, State Const., as implemented by s. 125.01, F.S., and as construed in Speer v. Olson, 367 So.2d 207, 211 (Fla. 1978), the taxing power of such county is derived from Art. VII, State Const., not Art. VIII, State Const. Thus, a noncharter county possesses no home rule power to levy taxes and assessments. See, AGO 85-90. Cf., City of Miami v. Brinker, 342 So.2d 115 (3 D.C.A. Fla., 1977) (municipality has no inherent power to levy assessments); AGO's 82-9, 80-84. Section 1(a), Art. VII, State Const., provides that "[n]o tax shall be levied except in pursuance of law." The term "law" as used in the constitutional sense means a statute passed by both houses of the state Legislature. See, Broward County v. Plantation Imports, Inc., 419 So.2d 1145 (4 D.C.A. Fla., 1982); Grapeland Heights Civic Association v. City of Miami,267 So.2d 321 (Fla. 1972); Advisory Opinion to Governor, 22 So.2d 398 (Fla. 1945).

Pursuant to s. 197.363(1), F.S., special assessments authorized by general or special law or the State Constitution may be collected as provided for ad valorem taxes under Ch. 197, F.S., if 1) the entity imposing the special assessment has entered into a written agreement with the property appraiser, at his option, providing for reimbursement of administrative costs; 2) a resolution authorizing use of the ad valorem method for collection of special assessments is adopted at a public hearing; 3) affected property owners have been provided with prior notice of both the potential for loss of title that exists with use of this collection method and the time and place of the public hearing by first-class mail; 4) the property appraiser has listed on the assessment roll the special assessment for each affected parcel; 5) the dollar amount of the special assessment has been included in the notice of proposed property taxes; and 6) the dollar amount of the special assessment has been included in the tax notice issued pursuant to s. 197.322, F.S. When collected by using the method provided for ad valorem taxes, special assessments are subject to all collection provisions of Ch. 197, including provisions pertaining to discount for early payment, prepayment by installment method, penalty for delinquent payment, and issuance of tax certificates and tax deeds for nonpayment. Section 197.363(2), F.S. If the requirements of subsection (1), supra, are not met, the collection of special assessments must be by the manner provided in the ordinance or resolution establishing such special assessments and must comply with all general or special laws authorizing the levy of such special assessments; in no event, however, may the ordinance or resolution provide for use of the ad valorem collection method. Section 197.363(3), F.S. This office has been advised that the conditions specified in s. 197.363(1), have not been met. Therefore, Hardee County is precluded from utilizing the ad valorem method as provided in Ch. 197, for the collection of its special assessments.

As a general rule, in the absence of specific statutory authorization, a lien for a special assessment cannot be assigned. See, 48 Fla.Jur.2d Special Assessments s. 42; 84 C.J.S. Taxation s. 598; 63 C.J.S. Municipal Corporations s. 1609(b); 14 McQuillin Municipal Corporations ss. 38.162 and 38.174; and Annot., 55 A.L.R. 662 (1928). In Marshall v. C.S. Young Const. Co.,113 So. 565, 567 (Fla. 1927), the Court held that a town had no right or power to assign a special assessment lien because the amount assessed upon certain land was not an ordinary debt arising out of contract, express or implied, but a charge upon the land, growing out of the state's sovereign power to levy taxes and assessments which power was delegated to the municipality. But see, Campbell v. Daniell, 67 So. 90 (Fla. 1914), wherein the Court in obiter dictum stated that a lien for a municipal sidewalk assessment could be assigned to a third party. The Court in Buffum v.

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Speer v. Olson
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Campbell v. Daniel
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Anderson v. City of Ocala
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Hubbard Const. Co. v. City of Orlando
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419 So. 2d 1145 (District Court of Appeal of Florida, 1982)