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Florida Attorney General Reports·Decided May 6, 1986·Published

Opinion

Mr. G.R. McClelland City Attorney City of Largo Post Office Box 296 Largo, Florida 34294-0296

Dear Mr. McClelland:

This is in response to your request for an opinion on substantially the following questions:

1. WHETHER s. 163.3187, F.S., LIMITING THE NUMBER OF TIMES PER YEAR A LOCAL GOVERNMENT MAY AMEND ITS COMPREHENSIVE PLAN APPLIES ONLY TO PLANS OR AMENDED PLANS ADOPTED PURSUANT TO THE 1985 ACT?

2. WHETHER THE 1985 ACT PREEMPTS THE SUPERVISORY AUTHORITY OF THE PINELLAS COUNTY PLANNING COUNCIL OVER COMPREHENSIVE LAND USE PLANS ADOPTED BY MUNICIPALITIES IN THE COUNTY AS PROVIDED BY SPECIAL ACT?

QUESTION ONE

The 1985 Legislature extensively amended the Local Government Comprehensive Planning Act of 1975, Part II, Ch. 163, F.S., and renamed it the "Local Government Comprehensive Planning and Land Development Regulation Act," (hereinafter the 1985 Act). See, Ch. 85-55, Laws of Florida; AGO 85-56. As stated in AGO 85-56, "[t]he amendments to the [former] act generally strengthen the role of comprehensive planning for local governments and modify the requirements and elements of the plan."

Section 163.3187(1), F.S., in pertinent part, now reads:

Amendments to comprehensive plans adopted pursuant to this part may be made not more than two times during any calendar year, except, in the case of an emergency, comprehensive plan amendments may be made more often than twice during the calendar year if the additional plan amendment receives the approval of all of the members of the governing body. (e.s.)

The issue in question is whether the phrase "adopted pursuant to this part" applies only to comprehensive plans adopted pursuant to the 1985 Act. It is my conclusion that this phrase cannot be given this restrictive interpretation. The cardinal rule of statutory construction is that a statute should be construed so as to ascertain and give effect to the intention of the Legislature as expressed in the statute. City of Tampa v. Thatcher Glass Corp.,445 So.2d 578 (Fla. 1984); Parker v. State, 406 So.2d 1089 (Fla. 1981). That legislative intent when expressed with words of common usage must be determined by construing those words in their plain and ordinary sense. Citizens of State v. Public Service Commission, 425 So.2d 534 (Fla. 1982); Milazzo v. State,377 So.2d 1161 (Fla. 1979); Thayer v. State, 335 So.2d 815 (Fla. 1976). Finally, a statute, as amended, is to be construed as a consistent whole, in harmony with common sense and reason, and every part should be given effect if possible. Villery v. Florida Parole and Probation Commission, 396 So.2d 1107 (Fla. 1980); Tower Credit Corporation v. State, 187 So.2d 923 (4 D.C.A.Fla, 1966); 82 C.J.S. Statutes s. 384.

Applying these fundamental rules of statutory construction, it appears that the Legislature intended that the two amendments per year limitation contained in s. 163.3187, F.S., apply to all comprehensive plans adopted pursuant to Part II of Ch. 163, F.S. The phrase "this part" clearly applies to Part II of Ch. 163. The comprehensive plan provisions of Florida law have been contained in this same part since the original mandatory comprehensive planning law was enacted in 1975. The title to Ch. 85-55, Laws of Florida, the 1985 Act, clearly provides that the act is "amending part II of chapter 163," not creating a new part. To interpret the limitation as applying only to comprehensive plans adopted pursuant to the 1985 Act would create the anomalous result of limiting local governments which expeditiously bring their comprehensive plans into compliance with the 1985 Act to amending their plans only two times per year, while allowing other local governments to amend their plans without limitation. This interpretation would obviously operate to thwart the state legislative intent of the 1985 Act, "to protect human, environmental, social, and economic resources; and to maintain, through orderly growth and development, the character and stability of present and future land use and development in this state." I can ascertain no legislative intent which would permit the disparate application of the amendment limitation contained in s. 163.3187 to comprehensive plans adopted before and after the 1985 amendments.

I am therefore of the opinion that the provisions of s.163.3187(1), F.S., limiting the amendment of comprehensive plans to two times during any calendar year, except under the conditions specified therein, apply with equal force and effect to plans adopted pursuant to Part II of Ch. 163 prior to its amendment in 1985 as well as to plans adopted under the amended Act.

QUESTION TWO

You question whether the 1985 Act preempts the supervisory authority of the Pinellas County Planning Council (hereinafter PPC) over comprehensive land use plans adopted by municipalities in the county.

The PPC was created by special act, Ch. 73-594, Laws of Florida, as a countywide planning and coordination council. The Legislature, recognizing that individual plans and decisions heretofore made by local governments within Pinellas County affected the welfare of the entire county, established the PPC to provide a means for the formulation and execution of the objectives and policies necessary for the orderly growth, development and environmental protection of Pinellas County as a whole. Section 2, Ch. 73-594, supra. Section 5 of the special act, as amended, provides that the specific powers and duties of the council, include, among other things, the power to develop a countywide comprehensive plan and over-all development policy document, taking into consideration existing plans, development policies and proposals of the various local units of government.

In addition, the PPC has the power to adopt plans, codes and regulations for the provision of countywide water, sewerage and solid waste disposal systems; these plans, codes and regulations are effective countywide upon ratification by the board of county commissioners and by three-fourths (3/4) of the governing bodies of the municipalities in the county. And see, s. 9, Ch. 73-594, Laws of Florida, setting forth the procedure for the adoption of any plan, code or regulation called for under the provisions of this act and for the binding effect of such plans. Further, the council has the authority to review each element of the countywide comprehensive plan with the individual units of local government on an annual basis to assure coordination with local goals and policies. Chapter 74-584, Laws of Florida, amended the adoption procedure and required the PPC to, within a specified time period, develop and propose countywide subdivision regulations, a zoning code and master drainage plan to be effective within Pinellas County and all municipalities upon adoption by all units of local government within the county as provided in s. 9. of Ch. 73-594. Chapter 76-473, Laws of Florida, granted the PPC the additional power to review and make a recommendation to the affected municipality of each proposed annexation within Pinellas County to such municipality with reference to the ability of said municipality to provide municipal services to the territory which is proposed to be annexed, if the proposed area is 10 or more acres in size.

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State v. Dunmann
427 So. 2d 166 (Supreme Court of Florida, 1983)
Citizens of State v. PUBLIC SERVICE COM'N
425 So. 2d 534 (Supreme Court of Florida, 1982)
City of Tampa v. Thatcher Glass Corp.
445 So. 2d 578 (Supreme Court of Florida, 1984)
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395 So. 2d 540 (Supreme Court of Florida, 1981)
Thayer v. State
335 So. 2d 815 (Supreme Court of Florida, 1976)
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440 So. 2d 1277 (Supreme Court of Florida, 1983)
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396 So. 2d 1107 (Supreme Court of Florida, 1981)
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