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Florida Attorney General Reports·Decided January 22, 1980·Published

Opinion

Elton Gissendanner Executive Director Department of Natural Resources Tallahassee

QUESTIONS:

1. Under the provisions of s. 253.023(2), F. S., created by ch. 79-255, Laws of Florida, if, on July 1, 1980, the balance of the Conservation and Recreation Lands Trust Fund is $3 million, could the Department of Revenue credit an additional $3 million to the fund in fiscal year 1980-1981 for a total of $6 million; likewise, if, on July 1, 1981, the balance of the fund is $3 million, could an additional $20 million be credited for fiscal year 1981-1982 for a total of $23 million?

2. Can funds be obligated under the provisions of s. 253.023(3), F. S., for the acquisition of a project in one fiscal year when the purchase will not be consummated until the next fiscal year; could this be done if the funds being obligated will revert to the General Revenue Fund at the end of the fiscal year?

3. Under the provisions of s. 253.023(4), F. S., can interest received on the investment of funds in the Conservation and Recreation Lands Trust Fund be credited to said fund and used to purchase projects in the fiscal year within which the interest accrues; if such interest causes the balance of the fund to exceed $3 million on June 30, 1980, will it carry over to fiscal year 1980-1981?

4. Can the acquiring agency pay, under the provisions of s.253.025(3), F. S., for title insurance and the cost of a survey from funds available for land acquisition if the seller refuses?

5. Can the Board of Trustees of the Internal Improvement Trust Fund authorize, under the provisions of s. 253.025(5)(d), F. S., a purchase in excess of the highest appraisal?

6. Should acquisition projects which were in progress on October 1, 1979, when ch. 79-255, Laws of Florida, took effect, be reinitiated under the procedures set forth in that act?

SUMMARY:

The Conservation and Recreation Lands Trust Fund can be credited with an additional $3 million on July 1, 1980, for fiscal year 1980-1981, although the balance at the time may already be $3 million, and similarly on July 1, 1981, $20 million can be credited to the fund; the board is not authorized to `obligate' funds, thereby avoiding a transfer of excess moneys to the General Revenue Fund, when an acquisition is not finalized until the following fiscal year; interest can be received on the investment of moneys in the fund and used to purchase projects, and such interest is not subject to the limitations imposed by s. 253.023(2), F. S.; the acquiring agency cannot pay for title insurance, but such agencies can pay for the cost of a survey; there is no authority for a purchase in excess of the highest appraisal; acquisition projects in progress on October 1, 1979, must comply with the provisions of s. 253.025, F. S., before the state can commit to the acquisition of such lands, and any projects not in compliance should be reinitiated.

Before addressing these questions individually, I must reiterate the well-settled principle that the meaning and intent of statutes must be primarily determined from the language of the legislation itself, not from conjecture. Maryland Casualty Company v. Sutherland, 169 So. 679 (Fla. 1936). Words used in a statute are to be construed according to their plain and ordinary signification, unless used in a technical sense. State v. Tunnicliffe, 124 So.2d 279 (Fla. 1929); Gaulden v. Kirk,47 So.2d 567 (Fla. 1950); and Gasson v. Gay, 49 So.2d 525 (Fla. 1950). The legislative intent as deducible from the language employed in a statute is the law, Pillans and Smith Co., Inc. v. Lowe,157 So. 649 (Fla. 1934); State v. Knight, 124 So. 461 (Fla. 1929); and Overman v. State Board of Control, 62 So.2d 696 (Fla. 1952); and when ascertained, the statute must be given its plain and obvious meaning. A. R. Douglass, Inc. v. McRainey, 137 So. 157 (Fla. 1931), and Van Pelt v. Hilliard, 78 So. 693 (Fla. 1918). Thus, in responding to these questions, it will be necessary to closely examine the language of ch. 79-255, Laws of Florida.

AS TO QUESTION 1:

Section 8, ch. 79-255, Laws of Florida, creates s. 253.023(2), F. S., which provides in pertinent part that:

The Department of Revenue, upon compilation of each month's receipts of the severance tax, shall credit the amount provided in this section to the fund, commencing with the funds collected in October 1979. If the moneys credited to the fund at any time during the fiscal year or the balance of the fund at the end of the fiscal year exceed $3 million for fiscal year 1979-1980 or 1980-1981, in either case, the excess shall be transferred to the General Revenue Fund. If the moneys credited to the fund at any time during the fiscal year or the balance of the fund at the end of the fiscal year exceeds $20 million for fiscal year 1981-1982 or any fiscal year thereafter, in either case the excess shall be transferred to the General Revenue Fund. (Emphasis supplied.)

The title to ch. 79-255 provides that the Conservation and Recreation Lands Trust Fund `is to be credited one-half the moneys collected from the severance tax on oil, gas, and solid minerals,not to exceed $3 million for fiscal year 1979-80 or fiscal year1980-81 and $20 million for subsequent fiscal years.' (Emphasis supplied.) The apparent intent of the Legislature, as evidenced by this language in the title of the act, is that the fund will receive or have distributed to it no more than $3 million in fiscal year 1979-1980 or fiscal year 1980-1981, and it will receive or have distributed to it no more than $20 million in fiscal year 1981-1982 and thereafter. The limitation thus expressed in the title is on the amount that can be `credited' to the fund `for' each fiscal year. Distributions during each fiscal year may not exceed the designated amount. The above-cited provision of s. 253.023(2), F. S., confirms and expressly provides the limit on the amount of severance tax collections which may be `credited' to the fund `during' each fiscal year. This section also provides a limitation on `the balance of the fund at the end of the fiscal year.' By its terms s. 253.023(2) limits the amount that can be `credited' to the fund at any time during fiscal year 1979-1980 to a total of $3 million but also specifies that, at the end of the current fiscal year (June 30, 1980), the `balance' cannot exceed $3 million. Commencing on July 1, 1980, and continuing thereafter during fiscal year 1980-1981, additional moneys may be `credited' to the fund up to, but not to exceed, $3 million during fiscal year 1980-1981; but, again, the `balance' at the end of that fiscal year cannot exceed $3 million.

The language of s. 253.023(2), F. S., is stated in the disjunctive, both as to the designated fiscal periods and as to the designated limitations on the fund. The use of the disjunctive `or' usually denotes alternatives. Thus, if the amount credited to the fund during a fiscal year exceeds the designated limit at any time, or if the balance at the end of a fiscal year exceeds the designated limit, then in either case any such excess is to be transferred to the General Revenue Fund.

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Related

Overman v. State Board of Control
62 So. 2d 696 (Supreme Court of Florida, 1952)
Gaulden v. Kirk
47 So. 2d 567 (Supreme Court of Florida, 1950)
Gasson v. Gay
49 So. 2d 525 (Supreme Court of Florida, 1950)
State Ex Rel. Davis v. Knight
124 So. 461 (Supreme Court of Florida, 1929)
Pillans Smith Co., Inc. v. Lowe
157 So. 649 (Supreme Court of Florida, 1934)
A. R. Douglass, Inc. v. McRainey, as Admrx.
137 So. 157 (Supreme Court of Florida, 1931)
Maryland Casualty Co. v. Sutherland
169 So. 679 (Supreme Court of Florida, 1936)
Wheeler v. Meggs
78 So. 685 (Supreme Court of Florida, 1918)
Ferguson v. Denton
124 So. 2d 279 (Mississippi Supreme Court, 1960)