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Florida Attorney General Reports·Decided August 25, 1976·Published

Opinion

QUESTIONS: 1. Are two-way mobile radios installed in concrete mixer trucks, which are properly tagged vehicles, exempt from tangible personal property taxation? 2. Are all two-way mobile radios installed in properly tagged vehicles exempt from tangible personal property taxation?

SUMMARY: Two-way mobile radios installed in properly tagged vehicles, including concrete mixer trucks, are exempt from tangible personal property taxation as "household goods" and "personal effects" under s. 3(b), Art. VII, State Const., when such radios are used for personal purposes and not for commercial purposes by the owners. The answers to questions 1 and 2 are dependent upon the uses to which two-way mobile radios are put, as governed by the following discussion. In answering your questions I must first consider whether two-way mobile radios "become" part of the motor vehicles in which they are installed. If so, they may be deemed constitutionally exempt from taxation under the exemption granted to motor vehicles in s. 1(b), Art. VII, State Const. I am aware of no statute or reported case dealing specifically with this issue, but at least two approaches may be used to evaluate the status of installed equipment: A "fixture" approach and a "use" approach. The "fixture" approach relies upon the analogy of the common law of fixtures to realty, which requires a case-by-case analysis of the following factors to determine whether a particular item of equipment installed on a motor vehicle becomes part of the motor vehicle itself: Actual annexation to realty or actual annexation to an appurtenance of said realty; appropriateness to the use or to the purpose of that portion of the realty to which the particular item is annexed; intent of the party effecting the annexation that the particular item shall be a permanent annexation to the realty. Cf. Commercial Finance Co. v. Brooksville Hotel Co., 123 So. 814 (Fla. 1929); Wetjen v. Williamson, 196 So.2d 461 (1 D.C.A. Fla., 1967). The "use" approach relies on the legislative definition of "motor vehicle" in s. 320.01(1)(a), F. S., which defines "motor vehicle" as "[a]utomobiles, motorcycles, motor trucks, trailers, semitrailers, tractor-trailer combinations, and all other vehicles operated over the public streets and highways of this state and used as a means of transporting persons or property over the public steets and highways." (Emphasis supplied.) The commentary to s. 1(b), Art. VII, State Const., suggests that the Legislature has the power to define "motor vehicle" for purposes of the tax exemption. Thus, in order to qualify as tax-exempt property, the equipment must, at a minimum, serve the primary purpose of "transporting persons or property." This conclusion is consistent with that of AGO 050-144, March 23, 1950, Biennial Report of the Attorney General, 1949-1950, p. 363; AGO 056-314; and with case law interpreting the statute. See Forbes v. Bushnell Steel Const. Co., 76 So.2d 268 (Fla. 1954). Applying the three factors under the "fixture" approach, the Supreme Court of Florida determined that a refrigerating plant installed by the seller upon a concrete base and connected by necessary pipes did not lose its quality of personal property because the refrigerator was personal property at the time of contract execution; the refrigerator was referred to as a chattel in the contract; and a contract provision dealt with the possibility of the refrigerator's removal from the building in the event of default in payment. Commercial Finance Co. v. Brooksville Hotel Co., supra at 815. Applying the three-pronged test enumerated in the Commercial Finance Company case and until otherwise legislatively or judicially clarified, it is my opinion that two-way mobile radios installed in properly tagged vehicles do not become part of the motor vehicles and are therefore not exempt from tangible personal property taxation under s. 1(b), Art. VII, supra. Although the two-way radio may actually be affixed to the motor vehicle, it is not necessarily appropriate to the purpose for which the motor vehicle is used, i.e., transporting persons and property over the public highways; and it is not necessarily the intent of a buyer purchasing said radio to permanently affix the radio to a particular motor vehicle but to remove the radio and to place it in another vehicle when so desired. It should also be emphasized that a seller of a two-way mobile radio on a credit or installment basis would have little difficulty removing the equipment from the motor vehicle and repossessing said equipment should the purchaser default in payment. See Maas Bros., Inc. v. Guaranty Fed. Sav. Loan Ass'n,157 So.2d 528 (2 D.C.A. Fla., 1963); Fell v. Messeroff,145 So.2d 238 (3 D.C.A. Fla., 1962). Likewise, applying the use approach, until legislatively or judicially determined otherwise, it is my opinion that regardless of how two-way mobile radios are installed, said radios are not used primarily to transport persons or property over the public streets and highways and are therefore not exempt from tangible personal property taxation under s. 1(b), Art. VII, supra. A two-way mobile radio is a communications device. Notwithstanding the fact that the radio and the vehicle may be combined to accomplish a myriad of purposes, the radio itself cannot be considered to serve as a means of transportation or as an essential part of such a means. A two-way mobile radio is designed for purposes of communication and is not designed for purposes of transporting persons or property over the public highways. Such a conclusion is consistent with that reached by the Supreme Court of Florida in determining that motor vehicles which were designed exclusively for special nonhighway use and which were used in construction work were subject to ad valorem tangible personal property taxation. The court specifically stated: It seems to us that if we affirm the decree brought here for review the rule will have been established that any equipment mounted on wheels equipped with pneumatic tires that is capable of being self-propelled on the highways by means of a gasoline engine is a motor vehicle, and therefore immune from ad valorem taxation under our laws, even though the equipment is designed exclusively for construction work and is used for this purpose. [Forbes v. Bushnell Steel Const. Co., supra, at 269.] Therefore, in the absence of contrary authority, and until legislatively or judicially determined otherwise, it is my opinion that under both the "fixture" approach and the "use" approach, twoway mobile radios installed in properly tagged motor vehicles are not considered to be parts of the motor vehicles and are therefore subject to tangible personal property taxation, unless said radios are exempt from taxation under some other constitutional and/or statutory provision. Although your letter did not specifically ask whether two-way mobile radios installed in properly tagged motor vehicles could be exempt under other provisions of law, in the interest of treating the matter thoroughly I must consider whether said radios qualify for exemption from tangible personal property taxation as either "household goods" or "personal effects." The exemption for these forms of personalty is authorized by s. 3(b), Art. VII, State Const., and by s. 196.181, F. S. Said s. 196.181 reads: There shall be exempt from taxation to every person residing and making his or her permanent home in this state household goods and personal effects. Title to such household goods and personal effects may be held individually, by the entireties, jointly or in common with others. "Household goods" are defined in s.

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Related

Fell v. Messeroff
145 So. 2d 238 (District Court of Appeal of Florida, 1962)
Wetjen v. Williamson
196 So. 2d 461 (District Court of Appeal of Florida, 1967)
Commercial Finance Co. v. Brooksville Hotel Co.
123 So. 814 (Supreme Court of Florida, 1929)
City of Tarpon Springs v. Chrysostomides
146 So. 845 (Supreme Court of Florida, 1933)
Maas Bros., Inc. v. Guaranty Federal Savings & Loan Ass'n
157 So. 2d 528 (District Court of Appeal of Florida, 1963)
Forbes v. Bushnell Steel Construction Co.
76 So. 2d 268 (Supreme Court of Florida, 1954)