Court of Appeals Tenth Appellate District of Texas
10-25-00144-CV
Agnes Wunnetter Lane, Appellant
v.
DFW Nadlan, LLC, Appellee
On appeal from the County Court of Navarro County, Texas Senior Judge H. D. Black Jr., presiding Trial Court Cause No. CV-10560
JUSTICE SMITH delivered the opinion of the Court.
MEMORANDUM OPINION
Agnes Wunnetter Lane appeals from the trial court’s judgment awarding
possession of certain real property to DFW Nadlan, LLC in this forcible
detainer suit. Lane contends the trial court did not have jurisdiction and DFW
Nadlan failed to prove its prima facie case. We affirm. BACKGROUND
In 2015, Vassie Lane, as grantor, executed a deed of trust conveying two
lots to a Trustee in trust as security on a real estate lien note to purchase the
property. In 2023, the property was sold at a foreclosure sale and purchased
by DFW Nadlan. By letters dated November 20, 2024, DFW Nadlan gave
Vassie Lane, Agnes Lane, and other occupants of the property notice to vacate
the property. The notice also warned that if they did not comply, DFW Nadlan
would seek possession of the property and have the occupants removed by writ
of possession.
In January 2025, DFW Nadlan filed its eviction suit in Justice of the
Peace Court citing as grounds for eviction that “[t]enants are at sufferance
after primary lien holder foreclosure.” Agnes Lane filed a general denial and
asserted as an affirmative defense that she has sued “the Seller that
transferred the property and disputes ownership of the property due to fraud,
wrongful foreclosure, and breach of fiduciary duty.” She further asserted that
the justice court could not determine the title issue.1 The justice court
rendered judgment in favor of DFW Nadlan, ordering that DFW Nadlan
recover possession of the property.
1 Our record does not include answers filed by any other defendant, and no other defendants are parties
to this appeal.
Lane v. DFW Nadlan, LLC Page 2 The case was appealed to the county court for a de novo trial, after which
the court awarded possession of the property to DFW Nadlan. Agnes Lane
appealed the cause to this Court.
JURISDICTION
In what we construe to be Lane’s first issue, she contends the trial court
did not have jurisdiction over this suit because title issues are inextricably
intertwined with the possession issue. Therefore, she contends, this dispute
should be addressed in her pending suit for wrongful foreclosure.
Standard of Review
Whether a trial court has subject matter jurisdiction is a question of law
we review de novo. Tex. Nat. Res. Conservation Comm’n v. IT-Davy, 74 S.W.3d
849, 855 (Tex. 2002). When conducting a de novo review, because the question
is one of law and not of facts, the reviewing tribunal exercises its own judgment
and accords the original tribunal’s decision no deference. Quick v. City of
Austin, 7 S.W.3d 109, 116 (Tex. 1998).
Applicable Law
When there is no unlawful entry, a forcible-detainer suit is the proper
procedure to determine possession of real property. See TEX. PROP. CODE ANN.
§ 24.002; see also Lenz v. Bank of Am., N.A., 510 S.W.3d 667, 671 (Tex. App.—
San Antonio 2016, pet. denied). A justice court in the precinct in which real
Lane v. DFW Nadlan, LLC Page 3 property is located has jurisdiction over a forcible detainer suit. TEX. PROP.
CODE ANN. § 24.004(a); TEX. GOV’T CODE ANN. § 27.031(2). Appeal is to the
county court. TEX. R. CIV. P. 510.10(c). The sole issue in a forcible detainer
suit is the right to immediate possession of the premises. See Rice v. Pinney,
51 S.W.3d 705, 709 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2001, no pet.). Neither justice courts
nor county courts exercising appellate jurisdiction have jurisdiction to
determine or adjudicate title to land in a forcible detainer action. See
Yarbrough v. Household Fin. Corp. III, 455 S.W.3d 277, 280 (Tex. App.—
Houston [14th Dist.] 2015, no pet.).
The existence of a title dispute does not deprive the justice court, or
county court hearing the appeal, of jurisdiction, but when there is a genuine
issue of title so intertwined with the issue of possession that the issue of
possession cannot be decided without first deciding the title issue, then the
justice court, and county court hearing the appeal, lack jurisdiction over the
suit. Id. However, if there is an independent basis to resolve the possession
issue, such as a landlord-tenant relationship, then the justice court and county
court retain jurisdiction and may resolve the possession issue without deciding
the title issue. See Chinyere v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A., 440 S.W.3d 80, 83-84
(Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2012, no pet.).
Lane v. DFW Nadlan, LLC Page 4 Discussion
Lane contends the trial court did not have jurisdiction over the eviction
suit because the title issue is inextricably linked to the forcible detainer action.
She alleges, without details, that the property was unlawfully foreclosed and
DFW Nadlan acquired title through a fraudulent foreclosure action.
The deed of trust in this case contained the following tenant-at-
sufferance clause:
If any of the property is sold under this deed of trust, Grantor shall immediately surrender possession to the purchaser. If Grantor fails to do so, Grantor shall become a tenant at sufferance of the purchaser, subject to an action for forcible detainer.
A tenancy-at-sufferance clause in a deed of trust creates a landlord-tenant
relationship when the property is foreclosed. See Pinnacle Premier Props., Inc.
v. Breton, 447 S.W.3d 558, 564-65 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2014, no
pet.). Tenant-at-sufferance clauses separate the issue of possession from the
issue of title. Id. at 564. When a party to be evicted is subject to a tenant-at-
sufferance clause and the party seeking possession purchased the property at
a foreclosure sale and gave proper notice requiring the occupants to vacate the
premises, defects in the foreclosure process are not relevant to possession. Id.
Here, the deed of trust created a landlord-tenant relationship, DFW Nadlan
purchased the property at a foreclosure sale, the occupants of the property
Lane v. DFW Nadlan, LLC Page 5 became tenants-at-sufferance, and as explained below, DFW Nadlan sent the
required notice to the tenants. Under these circumstances, Lane’s complaints
about defects in the foreclosure process do not require the trial court to resolve
a title dispute before determining the right to immediate possession, and the
justice court, and county court on appeal, have jurisdiction. Id. We overrule
Lane’s first issue.
NOTICE TO VACATE
In what we construe as her second issue, Lane apparently contends she
was not given adequate notice to vacate. Next to a sub-heading entitled
Free access — add to your briefcase to read the full text and ask questions with AI
Court of Appeals Tenth Appellate District of Texas
10-25-00144-CV
Agnes Wunnetter Lane, Appellant
v.
DFW Nadlan, LLC, Appellee
On appeal from the County Court of Navarro County, Texas Senior Judge H. D. Black Jr., presiding Trial Court Cause No. CV-10560
JUSTICE SMITH delivered the opinion of the Court.
MEMORANDUM OPINION
Agnes Wunnetter Lane appeals from the trial court’s judgment awarding
possession of certain real property to DFW Nadlan, LLC in this forcible
detainer suit. Lane contends the trial court did not have jurisdiction and DFW
Nadlan failed to prove its prima facie case. We affirm. BACKGROUND
In 2015, Vassie Lane, as grantor, executed a deed of trust conveying two
lots to a Trustee in trust as security on a real estate lien note to purchase the
property. In 2023, the property was sold at a foreclosure sale and purchased
by DFW Nadlan. By letters dated November 20, 2024, DFW Nadlan gave
Vassie Lane, Agnes Lane, and other occupants of the property notice to vacate
the property. The notice also warned that if they did not comply, DFW Nadlan
would seek possession of the property and have the occupants removed by writ
of possession.
In January 2025, DFW Nadlan filed its eviction suit in Justice of the
Peace Court citing as grounds for eviction that “[t]enants are at sufferance
after primary lien holder foreclosure.” Agnes Lane filed a general denial and
asserted as an affirmative defense that she has sued “the Seller that
transferred the property and disputes ownership of the property due to fraud,
wrongful foreclosure, and breach of fiduciary duty.” She further asserted that
the justice court could not determine the title issue.1 The justice court
rendered judgment in favor of DFW Nadlan, ordering that DFW Nadlan
recover possession of the property.
1 Our record does not include answers filed by any other defendant, and no other defendants are parties
to this appeal.
Lane v. DFW Nadlan, LLC Page 2 The case was appealed to the county court for a de novo trial, after which
the court awarded possession of the property to DFW Nadlan. Agnes Lane
appealed the cause to this Court.
JURISDICTION
In what we construe to be Lane’s first issue, she contends the trial court
did not have jurisdiction over this suit because title issues are inextricably
intertwined with the possession issue. Therefore, she contends, this dispute
should be addressed in her pending suit for wrongful foreclosure.
Standard of Review
Whether a trial court has subject matter jurisdiction is a question of law
we review de novo. Tex. Nat. Res. Conservation Comm’n v. IT-Davy, 74 S.W.3d
849, 855 (Tex. 2002). When conducting a de novo review, because the question
is one of law and not of facts, the reviewing tribunal exercises its own judgment
and accords the original tribunal’s decision no deference. Quick v. City of
Austin, 7 S.W.3d 109, 116 (Tex. 1998).
Applicable Law
When there is no unlawful entry, a forcible-detainer suit is the proper
procedure to determine possession of real property. See TEX. PROP. CODE ANN.
§ 24.002; see also Lenz v. Bank of Am., N.A., 510 S.W.3d 667, 671 (Tex. App.—
San Antonio 2016, pet. denied). A justice court in the precinct in which real
Lane v. DFW Nadlan, LLC Page 3 property is located has jurisdiction over a forcible detainer suit. TEX. PROP.
CODE ANN. § 24.004(a); TEX. GOV’T CODE ANN. § 27.031(2). Appeal is to the
county court. TEX. R. CIV. P. 510.10(c). The sole issue in a forcible detainer
suit is the right to immediate possession of the premises. See Rice v. Pinney,
51 S.W.3d 705, 709 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2001, no pet.). Neither justice courts
nor county courts exercising appellate jurisdiction have jurisdiction to
determine or adjudicate title to land in a forcible detainer action. See
Yarbrough v. Household Fin. Corp. III, 455 S.W.3d 277, 280 (Tex. App.—
Houston [14th Dist.] 2015, no pet.).
The existence of a title dispute does not deprive the justice court, or
county court hearing the appeal, of jurisdiction, but when there is a genuine
issue of title so intertwined with the issue of possession that the issue of
possession cannot be decided without first deciding the title issue, then the
justice court, and county court hearing the appeal, lack jurisdiction over the
suit. Id. However, if there is an independent basis to resolve the possession
issue, such as a landlord-tenant relationship, then the justice court and county
court retain jurisdiction and may resolve the possession issue without deciding
the title issue. See Chinyere v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A., 440 S.W.3d 80, 83-84
(Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2012, no pet.).
Lane v. DFW Nadlan, LLC Page 4 Discussion
Lane contends the trial court did not have jurisdiction over the eviction
suit because the title issue is inextricably linked to the forcible detainer action.
She alleges, without details, that the property was unlawfully foreclosed and
DFW Nadlan acquired title through a fraudulent foreclosure action.
The deed of trust in this case contained the following tenant-at-
sufferance clause:
If any of the property is sold under this deed of trust, Grantor shall immediately surrender possession to the purchaser. If Grantor fails to do so, Grantor shall become a tenant at sufferance of the purchaser, subject to an action for forcible detainer.
A tenancy-at-sufferance clause in a deed of trust creates a landlord-tenant
relationship when the property is foreclosed. See Pinnacle Premier Props., Inc.
v. Breton, 447 S.W.3d 558, 564-65 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2014, no
pet.). Tenant-at-sufferance clauses separate the issue of possession from the
issue of title. Id. at 564. When a party to be evicted is subject to a tenant-at-
sufferance clause and the party seeking possession purchased the property at
a foreclosure sale and gave proper notice requiring the occupants to vacate the
premises, defects in the foreclosure process are not relevant to possession. Id.
Here, the deed of trust created a landlord-tenant relationship, DFW Nadlan
purchased the property at a foreclosure sale, the occupants of the property
Lane v. DFW Nadlan, LLC Page 5 became tenants-at-sufferance, and as explained below, DFW Nadlan sent the
required notice to the tenants. Under these circumstances, Lane’s complaints
about defects in the foreclosure process do not require the trial court to resolve
a title dispute before determining the right to immediate possession, and the
justice court, and county court on appeal, have jurisdiction. Id. We overrule
Lane’s first issue.
NOTICE TO VACATE
In what we construe as her second issue, Lane apparently contends she
was not given adequate notice to vacate. Next to a sub-heading entitled
“Notice/Burden of Proof,” she asserts that the record does not show that DFW
Nadlan provided sufficient evidence to prove a prima facie case for forcible
detainer. We construe her complaint to be a challenge to the legal sufficiency
of the evidence to satisfy the statutory notice requirement that is an element
of a forcible detainer action.
Standard of Review
A party who challenges the legal sufficiency of the evidence to support
an issue upon which it did not have the burden of proof at trial must
demonstrate on appeal that there is no evidence to support the adverse finding.
Exxon Corp. v. Emerald Oil & Gas Co., 348 S.W.3d 194, 215 (Tex. 2011).
Evidence is legally sufficient if it would enable reasonable and fair-minded
Lane v. DFW Nadlan, LLC Page 6 people to reach the verdict under review. Id. We credit favorable evidence if
a reasonable finder of fact could, and disregard contrary evidence unless a
reasonable finder of fact could not. Id. If there is any evidence of probative
force to support the finding, i.e. more than a scintilla, we will overrule the
issue. Haggar Clothing Co. v. Hernandez, 164 S.W.3d 386, 388 (Tex. 2005) (per
curiam).
Applicable Law
A tenant commits forcible detainer by refusing to surrender possession
of real property after a person entitled to possession has lawfully terminated
the tenant’s right to possession. TEX. PROP. CODE ANN. § 24.002. To establish
a superior right to immediate possession for a forcible detainer claim, the
person or entity claiming so has the burden to prove that (1) he owned the
property, (2) the tenant was either a tenant at will, tenant at sufferance, or a
tenant willfully holding over after the termination of the tenant’s right of
possession, (3) the owner gave proper notice to vacate the premises, and (4) the
tenant refused to vacate the premises. Shields Ltd. P’ship v. Bradberry, 526
S.W.3d 471, 478 (Tex. 2017). A landlord must give a tenant by sufferance at
least three days’ written notice to vacate the premises before the landlord may
file a forcible detainer suit. TEX. PROP. CODE ANN. §§ 24.002(b), 24.005(b). The
notice must be either mailed or hand delivered to a person at the premises.
Lane v. DFW Nadlan, LLC Page 7 TEX. PROP. CODE ANN. § 24.005(f). Proper notice is an element of a forcible
detainer action. Mendoza v. Bazan, 574 S.W.3d 594, 607 (Tex. App.—El Paso
2019, pet. denied).
Discussion
Inasmuch as Lane does not identify the notice’s inadequacy, or cite to
appropriate authorities or to the record, the briefing of this contention is
inadequate. See TEX. R. APP. P. 38.1(i); San Saba Energy, L.P. v. Crawford,
171 S.W.3d 323, 338 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2005, no pet.).
Nonetheless, we note that the record contains letters dated November 20, 2024,
mailed to all defendants at each of the two addresses foreclosed on, declaring
the topic to be “3 DAY NOTICE TO VACATE,” and indicating DFW Nadlan’s
intent to seek possession of the property in accordance with state law. Almost
two months later, DFW Nadlan filed its forcible detainer petition. See TEX.
PROP. CODE ANN. §§ 24.002(b), 24.005(b). This is sufficient evidence of the
statutorily required notice. See Hernandez, 164 S.W.3d at 388. We overrule
Lane’s second issue.
CONCLUSION
Having overruled Lane’s issues, we affirm the trial court’s judgment.
Lane v. DFW Nadlan, LLC Page 8 STEVE SMITH Justice
OPINION DELIVERED and FILED: October 30, 2025 Before Chief Justice Johnson, Justice Smith, and Justice Harris Affirmed CV06
Lane v. DFW Nadlan, LLC Page 9