Agile Safety Variable Fund, L.P. v. RBS Citizens, N.A.

793 F. Supp. 2d 1248, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 57766, 2011 WL 2144620
CourtDistrict Court, D. Colorado
DecidedMay 31, 2011
DocketCivil Action 09-cv-02786-WJM-BNB
StatusPublished
Cited by1 cases

This text of 793 F. Supp. 2d 1248 (Agile Safety Variable Fund, L.P. v. RBS Citizens, N.A.) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, D. Colorado primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Agile Safety Variable Fund, L.P. v. RBS Citizens, N.A., 793 F. Supp. 2d 1248, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 57766, 2011 WL 2144620 (D. Colo. 2011).

Opinion

OPINION AND ORDER ON MOTIONS TO DISMISS AND FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT

WILLIAM J. MARTINEZ, District Judge.

This matter is before the Court on Swiss Financial Services, Inc.’s (“Swiss Financial”) Motion to Dismiss, ECF No. 44; RBS Citizens, N.A.’s 1 (“Charter One”) Motion to Dismiss the Amended Complaint, ECF No. 51, and Defendant RBS Citizens, N.A.’s Amended Motion for Summary Judgment, ECF No. 166.

INTRODUCTION 2

Plaintiffs Agile Safety Variable Fund, L.P. (“Agile”) and Sky Bell Select LP (“Sky Bell”) allege Defendants Charter One and Swiss Financial induced Plaintiffs to continue to invest in Lancelot Investors Fund L.P. and Lancelot Investors Fund II, L.P. (jointly “Lancelot”) through numerous specific material misrepresentations. (See Second Amend. Compl. at ¶¶ 2, 4, 49; ECF No. 92.) Lancelot turned out to be a massive Ponzi scheme as a result of which Plaintiffs Agile and Sky Bell and their related entities lost more than $65 million. (Id. at ¶ 13.)

Lancelot

Lancelot consisted of two funds that provided purchase order financing to entities owned or controlled by Thomas Petters (“Petters”) for transactions involving the purchase and resale of excess consumer goods to discount retailers such as Costco Wholesale Corporation. (Id. at ¶ 2.) Investors of Lancelot, including Plaintiffs, *1251 were “holders” of interests that were not for sale on an open market, such as shares of stock of a public corporation. Lancelot investors earned a profit from repayment of the promissory notes by Petters. (Id.) Lancelot’s manager was Gregory Bell (“Bell”). (Id. at ¶ 3.)

Swiss Financial as Administrator

Swiss Financial became involved with Lancelot as the fund’s administrator in 2001. (Id. at ¶ 24.) According to the contract with Lancelot, Swiss Financial recorded Lancelot’s transactions and produced financial statements. (ECF No. 183 at 3.) Swiss Financial had access to Lancelot’s bank account statements and could view the activity conducted in those accounts. (Id.) Swiss Financial asserts that it had no duty to verify the underlying investments of Lancelot or the source of those investments. (Id. at 4.) According to Swiss Financial, “[a]s a matter of custom and practice, administrators have no duty to verify the existence of collateral.” (Id.)

In public documents, Lancelot listed Swiss Financial’s duties as being “responsible for certain matters pertaining to the administration of the Fund, including: (i) maintaining the financial books and records of the Fund, (ii) communications with the Limited Partners, including the preparation and distribution of periodic performance reports of the Fund, and (in) coordinating the audit of the Fund’s financial statements by independent auditors and (iv) calculating the Net Asset Value of the Fund and its Units.” (ECF No. 92 at ¶ 25.) Swiss Financial made money from Lancelot based on the value of Lancelot’s assets. (Id.)

Charter One as Bank

Charter One first established a commercial relationship with Lancelot in 2005. (ECF No. 166 at ¶ 38.) Charter One had a longstanding relationship with Bell and established a line of credit with him senior to all debt Lancelot would later incur. (ECF No. 92 at ¶ 3.) It was this financing which allowed Lancelot to fund its alleged goods purchases. Id. Lancelot thereafter became Charter One’s single largest client. (ECF No. 174 at 2.)

Charter One recruited Lancelot by promising to decrease the administrative burden and oversight of Lancelot as compared to its previous lender. (Id. at 2.) In decreasing the oversight, Plaintiffs allege, Charter One failed to follow up on warnings from field examiners who repeatedly warned Charter One’s senior management to verify whether the underlying transactions were real. (Id.)

Agile’s Investments

Agile is a Delaware limited partnership with its principal place of business in Boulder, Colorado. (ECF No. 92 at ¶ 11.) In 2003, Agile purchased a limited partnership in Lancelot. (Id. at ¶ 40.) Agile made purchases of Lancelot interests on March 1, 2004, April 1, 2004, May 1, 2004, July 1, 2004, and November 1, 2004. (ECF No. 166 at 10 ¶ 5.) Agile alleges it continued to increase its interest in Lancelot by at first purchasing more shares in Lancelot, then by reinvesting its returns. (ECF No. 92 at ¶ 40.) Agile alleges that it made the decision to reinvest these returns following monthly meetings during which Agile reassessed its current investments. (See ECF No. 174 at 8-9.)

In early 2007 Agile and related entities were questioning their investment in Lancelot and determined they needed additional due diligence done on these investments. (Id. at 7.) As part of Agile’s due diligence, Agile spoke with Lancelot and was given permission to talk to Charter One about the results of a biannual field exam recently completed on Lancelot. (Id. at 7.) Through this due diligence effort, Agile alleges, it determined it would not redeem its investments but instead *1252 continued reinvesting in Lancelot. (Id. at 9.)

Communications between Plaintiffs and Defendants

Charter One and Swiss Financial allegedly claimed to be monitoring Lancelot prior to the discovery of the fraud. (ECF No. 92 at ¶ 7.) Swiss Financial purported to provide monthly account statements to Lancelot partners based on its verification of Lancelot’s assets and what they were worth. (Id. at ¶¶ 30, 31.) Plaintiffs allege, however, that Swiss Financial never independently verified Lancelot’s assets and thus failed to uncover the fact that Lancelot had no assets. (Id. at ¶ 31.)

Plaintiffs further allege that during a conversation with Swiss Financial’s chief executive officer Joe Barone, Agile was told that Swiss Financial was initially skeptical about Lancelot, but were assured that Swiss Financial had thoroughly reviewed Lancelot’s financial documentation in depth and were comfortable with the fund following the investigation. (Id. at ¶ 46(a).) In another conversation, Plaintiffs allege, a Swiss Financial representative stated Swiss Financial saw all of Lancelot’s loan agreements and were “comfortable with Lancelot because they have transparency into all the bank accounts.” (Id. at ¶ 46(f).)

Plaintiffs also allege Charter One vouched for Bell, citing a longstanding relationship. (Id. at ¶ 47(a).) Plaintiffs assert that Charter One assured them it performed bi-annual, independent audits of Lancelot’s records to verify notes receivable, notes, and all material assets on Lancelot’s books. (Id. at ¶ 37.) Plaintiffs allege, however, that Charter One used internal field examiners instead of independent auditors to conduct said audits. (ECF No.

Free access — add to your briefcase to read the full text and ask questions with AI

Related

Touchtone Group, LLC v. Rink
913 F. Supp. 2d 1063 (D. Colorado, 2012)

Cite This Page — Counsel Stack

Bluebook (online)
793 F. Supp. 2d 1248, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 57766, 2011 WL 2144620, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/agile-safety-variable-fund-lp-v-rbs-citizens-na-cod-2011.