Agero Administrative Service Corp. v. Campolo

CourtDistrict Court, D. Massachusetts
DecidedFebruary 5, 2019
Docket1:18-cv-12643
StatusUnknown

This text of Agero Administrative Service Corp. v. Campolo (Agero Administrative Service Corp. v. Campolo) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, D. Massachusetts primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Agero Administrative Service Corp. v. Campolo, (D. Mass. 2019).

Opinion

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT DISTRICT OF MASSACHUSETTS CIVIL ACTION NO. 18-12643-RWZ

AGERO ADMINISTRATIVE SERVICE CORP. v. FRANK CAMPOLO, et al. ORDER

February 4, 2019 ZOBEL, S.D.J. Plaintiff Agero Administrative Service Corp. (“Agero”) filed suit against Frank Campolo, its former Vice President of Sales, and Road America Motor Club, Inc. (“Road America”), Campolo’s current employer. The complaint asserts several claims related to both Campolo’s alleged breach of his employment agreement with plaintiff and his current employment with Road America.

Plaintiff seeks an injunction prohibiting Campolo from working for Road America, soliciting plaintiff’s customers, and using or disclosing any of plaintiff’s confidential information or goodwill. Plaintiff also seeks to enjoin Road America from using plaintiff’s confidential information or goodwill. The motion (Docket # 1-1) is allowed in part and denied in part.

I. Factual Background Agero and Road America both contract with various companies, including insurance carriers and car manufacturers, to provide towing services and roadside assistance to consumers. Campolo began working for Agero in 2004. Thereafter, he executed an employment agreement that includes three provisions relevant to the instant dispute: (1) a confidentiality provision; (2) a customer non-solicitation provision; and (3) a non-compete provision. Docket # 1-1 at 51-56 (“Agreement”).1 On November 30, 2018, Campolo left his position as Agero’s Vice President of Sales and on,

December 3, 2018, he joined Road America as its Vice President of Sales. II. Legal Standard A preliminary injunction is an extraordinary remedy granted only if the movant

demonstrates “(1) a substantial likelihood of success on the merits; (2) a significant risk of irreparable harm if the injunction is withheld; (3) a favorable balance of hardships; and (4) a fit (or lack of friction) between the injunction and the public interest.” Nieves- Marquez v. Puerto Rico, 353 F.3d 108, 120 (1st Cir. 2003). “The sine qua non of this four-part inquiry is likelihood of success on the merits.” New Comm Wireless Servs., Inc. v. SprintCom, Inc., 287 F.3d 1, 9 (1st Cir. 2002). Under Massachusetts law,2 a restrictive covenant in an employment agreement

is enforceable “only if it is necessary to protect a legitimate business interest, reasonably limited in time and space, and consonant with the public interest.” Boulanger v. Dunkin' Donuts Inc., 442 Mass. 635, 639 (2004) (collecting cases).

1 The parties agree that the Agreement, which Campolo signed in April 2015 and reaffirmed in June 2015, is the operative contract. 2 The Agreement contains a Massachusetts choice-of-law provision. However, because the Agreement was executed prior to October 1, 2018, the Massachusetts Noncompetition Agreement Act does not apply. Mass. Gen. Laws c. 149, § 24L. 2 Legitimate business interests include the protection of confidential information, goodwill, and trade secrets. Id. at 641.

III. Analysis A. Likelihood of Success On the merits, the core issue before the court is the enforceability of the

customer non-solicitation provision and the non-compete provision. The parties do not contest the confidentiality provision. 1. Customer Non-Solicitation Provision

During the Restricted Period, [Campolo] will not directly or indirectly solicit, divert, take away, or attempt to divert or take away, from [Agero] any of the business or patronage of any of its actual or potential customers, clients, accounts, vendors, or suppliers with whom [Campolo] had material contact with or which whom [Campolo] had access to material Confidential Information regarding, or induce or attempt to induce any such customers, clients, accounts, vendors or suppliers to reduce the amount of business it does with [Agero]. Agreement at ¶ 3(c).3 The “Restricted Period” is defined as a period of 12 months following the termination of Campolo’s employment with Agero, which may be extended by a “period 3 Rather than identify the Agreement’s many grammatical errors and muddy meanings with “[sic],” the Agreement’s text is quoted verbatim. 3 of time equal to any period in which [Campolo] is in breach” of certain covenants.4 Agreement at ¶ 3(a)(i).

Thus, the provision prevents Campolo from soliciting two categories of Agero’s “actual or potential customers, clients, accounts, vendors, or suppliers”: (1) those with whom Campolo had “material contact”; and (2) those regarding whom Campolo had “access to material Confidential Information.” Id. at ¶ 3(c). Because Section 3(c) contains a 12-month temporal limit and only applies to a subset of customers, I am persuaded that the covenant is reasonably tailored to

protect plaintiff’s legitimate business interests. Putting aside the parties’ disagreement regarding the extent of Campolo’s client interaction after closing a sale, Campolo undisputedly interacted with and solicited customers on behalf of Agero during his lengthy employment. Plaintiff has a cognizable interest in preventing Campolo from usurping its goodwill and this interest is particularly strong during the 12 months following his resignation and with respect to customers with whom Campolo had material contact or regarding whom he had access to certain sensitive information. Plaintiff is therefore likely to prove that the customer non-solicitation is valid and enforceable.

2. Non-Compete Provision

4 Aside from the non-competition agreement which is addressed below, plaintiff does not allege that Campolo has violated these triggering provisions. Therefore, the court need not consider whether a temporal extension of the Restricted Period would be reasonable. 4 [For the Restricted Period, Campolo] will not directly or indirectly, for his/her own account, or in any capacity on behalf of any other third person or entity, whether as an owner, officer, director, employee, partner, joint venture, consultant, investor, lender or otherwise, engage or assist others to engage, in whole or in part in any business that is in direct competition with [Agero] (which includes current or planned activities of [Agero]), in a business unit or area in which [Campolo] participated in on behalf of [Agero] (either directly or through his/her supervision or assistance of others) or in an area in which [Campolo] had access to Confidential Information .... Agreement at ¶ 3(a)(i).5 Although the non-compete provision is similarly limited to a period of 12 months, it lacks a geographic limit and is far-reaching. Plaintiff concedes that its enforcement would prevent Campolo from working in the entire U.S. industry of roadside assistance services sales to insurance carriers.6 Particularly because non-compete provisions are only enforceable to the extent necessary to protect legitimate business interests, plaintiff has not met its burden to show that it will likely prove that this covenant is enforceable. The confidentiality provision and the customer non-solicitation provision protect plaintiff’s interests such that enforcement of the non-compete at this stage would only protect plaintiff from “ordinary competition.” Marine Contractors Co. v. Hurley, 310 N.E.2d 915, 920 (Mass. 1974) (explaining that ordinary competition is not a recognized business interest supporting enforceability under Massachusetts law). 5 See supra, note 4. 6 Notably, it is not clear that the provision is written to cover only the United States.

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Related

Nieves-Marquez v. Commonwealth of PR
353 F.3d 108 (First Circuit, 2003)
Marine Contractors Co. Inc. v. Hurley
310 N.E.2d 915 (Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court, 1974)
Boulanger v. Dunkin' Donuts Inc.
815 N.E.2d 572 (Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court, 2004)

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Agero Administrative Service Corp. v. Campolo, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/agero-administrative-service-corp-v-campolo-mad-2019.