NOT FOR PUBLICATION FILED UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS APR 27 2026 MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK U.S. COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
TERESA AGAPITO MORALES; No. 24-7200 M. N. P. A., Agency Nos. A246-089-057 Petitioners, A246-089-058 v. MEMORANDUM* TODD BLANCHE, Acting Attorney General,
Respondent.
On Petition for Review of an Order of the Board of Immigration Appeals
Submitted April 23, 2026** Seattle, Washington
Before: MURGUIA, Chief Judge, and W. FLETCHER and KOH, Circuit Judges.
Petitioners Teresa Agapito Morales (“Morales”) and her minor child,
M.N.P.A,1 natives and citizens of Mexico, petition for review of a decision by the
* This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3. ** The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2). 1 Morales and her minor child each filed their own applications for asylum, withholding of removal, and protection under CAT based on the same set of facts. Board of Immigration Appeals (“BIA”) dismissing their appeal of an Immigration
Judge’s (“IJ”) decision deeming Petitioners’ applications for asylum, withholding
of removal, and protection under the Convention Against Torture (“CAT”)
abandoned for failure to submit biometrics as required by the governing
regulations. See 8 C.F.R. § 1003.47(c).
“An IJ’s decision to deem an asylum application abandoned is reviewed for
abuse of discretion.” Gonzalez-Veliz v. Garland, 996 F.3d 942, 948 (9th Cir. 2021).
We also review the denial of a continuance for abuse of discretion. See Arizmendi-
Medina v. Garland, 69 F.4th 1043, 1051 (9th Cir. 2023). We review de novo due
process challenges to immigration proceedings. Id. at 1047.
1. The IJ did not abuse his discretion in finding Petitioners’ applications
abandoned for failure to submit the required biometrics. The governing regulation
provides that “[f]ailure to file necessary documentation and comply with the
requirements to provide biometrics . . . within the time allowed by the immigration
judge’s order, constitutes abandonment of the application and the immigration
judge may enter an appropriate order dismissing the application unless the
applicant demonstrates that such failure was the result of good cause.” 8 C.F.R.
§ 1003.47(c); see also 8 C.F.R. § 1208.10 (similar).
Here, the IJ informed Morales at three separate hearings, on February 9,
April 13, and June 15, 2023, of the biometrics requirement and warned her that
2 24-7200 failure to complete her biometrics by the date of her final hearing on June 5, 2024,
would result in a finding of abandonment absent good cause. On each occasion, the
IJ asked Morales if she understood, and Morales responded that she did. When
Morales appeared for her final hearing on June 5, 2024, she had been on notice of
the biometrics requirement for sixteen months but still had not complied. She also
failed to articulate what steps she had taken to begin the process. In such
circumstances, the IJ did not abuse his discretion in deeming Petitioners’
applications abandoned. See Gonzalez-Veliz, 996 F.3d at 948 (finding no abuse of
discretion where “the IJ twice warned [the petitioner] that if she did not provide
her biometrics before the next hearing her application would be deemed
abandoned”).
Petitioners argue that the IJ erred in failing to consider whether the allegedly
inadequate legal assistance provided to Petitioners by the Northwest Immigrant
Rights Project (“NWIRP”) constituted good cause for Petitioners’ noncompliance.
However, Petitioners never raised any concern regarding NWIRP with the IJ, and
thus the IJ did not err in failing to consider this issue. In any event, the record does
not show that NWIRP failed to act diligently or failed to fulfill its obligations to
Petitioners, which were limited to providing assistance in filing Petitioners’ Form
1-589 applications. See 8 C.F.R. § 1003.17(b)(2) (noting that a practitioner’s entry
of a limited appearance in immigration court to assist a pro se petitioner with
3 24-7200 completing documents “does not create additional ongoing obligations between the
practitioner, the respondent, and EOIR”).
To the extent Petitioners raise a due process claim related to the IJ’s
abandonment finding, that claim fails because Petitioners have not established that
the agency erred. See Hussain v. Rosen, 985 F.3d 634, 645 (9th Cir. 2021)
(requiring both agency error and substantial prejudice to establish a violation of
due process).
2. The IJ did not violate Petitioners’ due process right to a full and fair
hearing by failing to develop the record before finding Petitioners’ applications for
relief abandoned. Petitioners contend that the IJ knew that NWIRP had filed a
biometrics request on Petitioners’ behalf and thus should have asked Morales
whether she received an appointment notice, understood her obligations, or faced
any barriers to compliance. However, there is no evidence in the record that the IJ
knew or had any reason to believe that NWIRP had taken any steps to assist
Petitioners with the biometrics request. Moreover, the IJ repeatedly asked Morales
if she understood her obligation to complete her biometrics by her final hearing
date. At Petitioners’ final hearing on June 5, 2024, the IJ asked Morales several
times what steps she had taken to get her fingerprints taken. Given that the IJ gave
Morales multiple opportunities to explain what steps she had taken and that
Morales’s responses made no mention of NWIRP, the IJ did not fail to properly
4 24-7200 develop the record. See Gonzalez-Veliz, 996 F.3d at 950 (rejecting the argument
that the IJ failed to develop the record by “failing to question the government about
whether it sent the biometrics submission receipt notices,” because “the burden is
on the alien to follow up if the notice is not received”).
3. The IJ did not abuse his discretion in denying Petitioners a
continuance of their final hearing to secure legal representation. “In the context of
immigration proceedings, the decision to grant or deny continuances is in the
sound discretion of the trial judge.” Cui v. Mukasey, 538 F.3d 1289, 1292 (9th Cir.
2008); see also 8 C.F.R. § 1003.29. Whether good cause exists is a case-by-case
inquiry that considers various factors, including “(1) the importance of the
evidence, (2) the unreasonableness of the immigrant’s conduct, (3) the
inconvenience to the court, and (4) the number of continuances previously
granted.” Cui, 538 F.3d at 1292.
By the time of Petitioners’ final hearing on June 5, 2024, the IJ had already
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NOT FOR PUBLICATION FILED UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS APR 27 2026 MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK U.S. COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
TERESA AGAPITO MORALES; No. 24-7200 M. N. P. A., Agency Nos. A246-089-057 Petitioners, A246-089-058 v. MEMORANDUM* TODD BLANCHE, Acting Attorney General,
Respondent.
On Petition for Review of an Order of the Board of Immigration Appeals
Submitted April 23, 2026** Seattle, Washington
Before: MURGUIA, Chief Judge, and W. FLETCHER and KOH, Circuit Judges.
Petitioners Teresa Agapito Morales (“Morales”) and her minor child,
M.N.P.A,1 natives and citizens of Mexico, petition for review of a decision by the
* This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3. ** The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2). 1 Morales and her minor child each filed their own applications for asylum, withholding of removal, and protection under CAT based on the same set of facts. Board of Immigration Appeals (“BIA”) dismissing their appeal of an Immigration
Judge’s (“IJ”) decision deeming Petitioners’ applications for asylum, withholding
of removal, and protection under the Convention Against Torture (“CAT”)
abandoned for failure to submit biometrics as required by the governing
regulations. See 8 C.F.R. § 1003.47(c).
“An IJ’s decision to deem an asylum application abandoned is reviewed for
abuse of discretion.” Gonzalez-Veliz v. Garland, 996 F.3d 942, 948 (9th Cir. 2021).
We also review the denial of a continuance for abuse of discretion. See Arizmendi-
Medina v. Garland, 69 F.4th 1043, 1051 (9th Cir. 2023). We review de novo due
process challenges to immigration proceedings. Id. at 1047.
1. The IJ did not abuse his discretion in finding Petitioners’ applications
abandoned for failure to submit the required biometrics. The governing regulation
provides that “[f]ailure to file necessary documentation and comply with the
requirements to provide biometrics . . . within the time allowed by the immigration
judge’s order, constitutes abandonment of the application and the immigration
judge may enter an appropriate order dismissing the application unless the
applicant demonstrates that such failure was the result of good cause.” 8 C.F.R.
§ 1003.47(c); see also 8 C.F.R. § 1208.10 (similar).
Here, the IJ informed Morales at three separate hearings, on February 9,
April 13, and June 15, 2023, of the biometrics requirement and warned her that
2 24-7200 failure to complete her biometrics by the date of her final hearing on June 5, 2024,
would result in a finding of abandonment absent good cause. On each occasion, the
IJ asked Morales if she understood, and Morales responded that she did. When
Morales appeared for her final hearing on June 5, 2024, she had been on notice of
the biometrics requirement for sixteen months but still had not complied. She also
failed to articulate what steps she had taken to begin the process. In such
circumstances, the IJ did not abuse his discretion in deeming Petitioners’
applications abandoned. See Gonzalez-Veliz, 996 F.3d at 948 (finding no abuse of
discretion where “the IJ twice warned [the petitioner] that if she did not provide
her biometrics before the next hearing her application would be deemed
abandoned”).
Petitioners argue that the IJ erred in failing to consider whether the allegedly
inadequate legal assistance provided to Petitioners by the Northwest Immigrant
Rights Project (“NWIRP”) constituted good cause for Petitioners’ noncompliance.
However, Petitioners never raised any concern regarding NWIRP with the IJ, and
thus the IJ did not err in failing to consider this issue. In any event, the record does
not show that NWIRP failed to act diligently or failed to fulfill its obligations to
Petitioners, which were limited to providing assistance in filing Petitioners’ Form
1-589 applications. See 8 C.F.R. § 1003.17(b)(2) (noting that a practitioner’s entry
of a limited appearance in immigration court to assist a pro se petitioner with
3 24-7200 completing documents “does not create additional ongoing obligations between the
practitioner, the respondent, and EOIR”).
To the extent Petitioners raise a due process claim related to the IJ’s
abandonment finding, that claim fails because Petitioners have not established that
the agency erred. See Hussain v. Rosen, 985 F.3d 634, 645 (9th Cir. 2021)
(requiring both agency error and substantial prejudice to establish a violation of
due process).
2. The IJ did not violate Petitioners’ due process right to a full and fair
hearing by failing to develop the record before finding Petitioners’ applications for
relief abandoned. Petitioners contend that the IJ knew that NWIRP had filed a
biometrics request on Petitioners’ behalf and thus should have asked Morales
whether she received an appointment notice, understood her obligations, or faced
any barriers to compliance. However, there is no evidence in the record that the IJ
knew or had any reason to believe that NWIRP had taken any steps to assist
Petitioners with the biometrics request. Moreover, the IJ repeatedly asked Morales
if she understood her obligation to complete her biometrics by her final hearing
date. At Petitioners’ final hearing on June 5, 2024, the IJ asked Morales several
times what steps she had taken to get her fingerprints taken. Given that the IJ gave
Morales multiple opportunities to explain what steps she had taken and that
Morales’s responses made no mention of NWIRP, the IJ did not fail to properly
4 24-7200 develop the record. See Gonzalez-Veliz, 996 F.3d at 950 (rejecting the argument
that the IJ failed to develop the record by “failing to question the government about
whether it sent the biometrics submission receipt notices,” because “the burden is
on the alien to follow up if the notice is not received”).
3. The IJ did not abuse his discretion in denying Petitioners a
continuance of their final hearing to secure legal representation. “In the context of
immigration proceedings, the decision to grant or deny continuances is in the
sound discretion of the trial judge.” Cui v. Mukasey, 538 F.3d 1289, 1292 (9th Cir.
2008); see also 8 C.F.R. § 1003.29. Whether good cause exists is a case-by-case
inquiry that considers various factors, including “(1) the importance of the
evidence, (2) the unreasonableness of the immigrant’s conduct, (3) the
inconvenience to the court, and (4) the number of continuances previously
granted.” Cui, 538 F.3d at 1292.
By the time of Petitioners’ final hearing on June 5, 2024, the IJ had already
granted four previous continuances over the span of seventeen months. Despite
these numerous continuances, Petitioners had still had not obtained counsel and
had only “just contacted” an attorney, who was unavailable for the hearing on such
short notice. In such circumstances, the IJ did not abuse his discretion in
determining that no good cause existed for a fifth continuance. See Gonzalez-Veliz,
996 F.3d at 949 (finding no abuse of discretion where the petitioner was previously
5 24-7200 granted a two month continuance to obtain counsel).
Again, because Petitioners have failed to demonstrate agency error, to the
extent Petitioners raise a related due process claim, that claim also fails. See
Hussain, 985 F.3d at 645.
4. The BIA did not err in rejecting Petitioners’ ineffective assistance of
counsel claim against NWIRP. The BIA properly found that Petitioners failed to
demonstrate substantial compliance with any of the procedural requirements of
Matter of Lozada, 19 I. & N. Dec. 637 (BIA 1988). Specifically, Petitioners did
not: (1) provide an affidavit detailing their agreement with NWIRP, (2) notify
NWIRP of the ineffectiveness claim or afford NWIRP an opportunity to respond,
or (3) file a complaint with a disciplinary authority or provide an explanation as to
why. See id. at 639. Although noncompliance with Lozada may be excused where
“the ineffectiveness of counsel was plain on its face,” Tamang v. Holder, 598 F.3d
1083, 1090 (9th Cir. 2010), the record here does not demonstrate any ineffective
assistance of counsel for the reasons discussed above.
PETITIONS DENIED.2
2 The stay of removal shall remain in place until the mandate issues.
6 24-7200