RENDERED: AUGUST 21, 2026; 10:00 A.M.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
Commonwealth of Kentucky
Court of Appeals
NO. 2025-CA-1639-ME
A.F. AND J.V. APPELLANTS
APPEAL FROM MARSHALL CIRCUIT COURT v. FAMILY COURT DIVISION HONORABLE BRIAN WIGGINS, SPECIAL JUDGE ACTION NO. 25-AD-00004
COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY, CABINET FOR HEALTH AND FAMILY SERVICES AND D.D.V., A MINOR CHILD APPELLEES
OPINION
AFFIRMING
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BEFORE: COMBS, EASTON, AND L. JONES, JUDGES. EASTON, JUDGE: A.F. (Mother) and J.V. (Father) (collectively, Parents) appeal the Marshall Family Court’s order terminating their parental rights to D.D.V. (Child). After a thorough review of the record, we affirm.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND Child was born in April 2022 in Madison County, Illinois. When Child was three days old, the Illinois Department of Children and Family Services (IL DCFS) filed a petition alleging that Child was a neglected child. The petition stated Mother tested positive for methamphetamine during her pregnancy with Child. It also stated Mother had previously been found unfit and has a substantial history with the Kentucky Cabinet for Health and Family Services (Cabinet). Child is Mother’s ninth child, and Mother did not have custody of any of her children. Mother’s three oldest children are in permanent custody of relatives; Mother voluntarily terminated her rights to four of her children, and there was an active Cabinet case involving the second-youngest child at the time the petition was filed. In May 2022, Child was placed in the custody of IL DCFS.
The Illinois court transferred venue from Madison County, Illinois, to Marshall County, Kentucky. The Marshall Family Court obtained jurisdiction of Child’s case, and the Cabinet took over the case from IL DCFS. Father filed a Petition for Immediate Entitlement to Custody in the Marshall Family Court in January 2023, which was granted. The family court determined that the Illinois petition did not make any allegations of abuse or neglect against Father, and no findings were made against him. The family court concluded that the least restrictive placement was with Father. This decision also closed that case.
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Mother was still subject to a case plan with the Cabinet involving another child. Because Mother and Father were married and living together and Father had custody of Child, the Cabinet included Child in their ongoing case plan. In August 2023, the Cabinet filed a non-removal DNA1 petition as to Child because Mother and Father refused to submit to requested drug screens. When Parents were unable to be served with the petitions due to having a wire cable blocking their driveway and not allowing access to the home, the Cabinet filed another petition asking for the removal of Child in September 2023. Emergency custody of Child was granted to the Cabinet, and Child has remained in the Cabinet’s custody since.
At the temporary removal hearing, both Mother and Father were ordered to submit to drug screens. While the urine screens were negative, both hair follicle screens returned with positive results for methamphetamine and amphetamines.
An adjudication hearing was held in January 2024, and the family court made a finding of neglect. Specifically, the family court found that Parents had created or allowed to be created a risk of physical or emotional injury by other than accidental means, and that they had engaged in a pattern of conduct that makes them incapable of caring for the immediate and ongoing needs of Child,
1 Dependency, Neglect, or Abuse.
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including but not limited to parental incapacity due to a substance use disorder. The family court further outlined its Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law. This included describing the testimony of the drug tester and the forensic laboratory scientist who performed the drug tests on Mother and Father in September 2023. It also included testimony from the Cabinet worker and Mother, who acknowledged that her previous eight children had been removed from her custody.
In February 2024, the DNA Disposition Order was entered. Mother and Father were ordered to submit to another hair follicle drug test, complete a substance abuse assessment, a mental health assessment, a CATS2 assessment, complete parenting classes, follow all recommendations, and cooperate with the Cabinet.
Mother and Father did two hair follicle tests at two different locations.
One result filed in the court record showed positive results for methamphetamine and amphetamines for both Mother and Father. Parents claim the other tests showed negative results, although it is uncertain if these results were filed in the court record at that time. Additional tests in June 2024 also showed positive results for methamphetamine and amphetamines for Mother and Father.
2 Comprehensive Assessment and Training Services Program, performed by the University of Kentucky Center on Trauma & Children.
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In March 2025, a Permanency Order was entered, which changed the goal for Child from “return to parent” to “adoption.” The family court also granted the Cabinet’s request to waive further reasonable efforts. The Petition for Involuntary Termination of Parental Rights was filed in May 2025. A final hearing was held in October 2025.
At the final hearing, the Cabinet worker testified as to the preceding events. She outlined Parents’ noncompliance with the case plan and their positive drug screens. The only tasks on the case plan that were completed were the initial substance abuse and mental health assessments. The Cabinet worker also testified about Parents’ refusal to submit to several requested drug screens. She performed monthly home visits, and the home was appropriate. Parents did consistently come to their weekly visits with Child. Mother was current on her child support obligation, but only because her tax refund was intercepted. Father was not current on his child support payments, and he had an arrearage of over $4,000. The Cabinet worker testified that Parents have denied they have any substance abuse or mental health issues.
Child’s foster mother also testified. Child had been in their home for 17 months at the time of the hearing. She testified as to Child’s progress and demeanor. Child has acclimated well into their home, and the home is an adoptive home.
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Mother testified. She stated she has lived at the same location since August 2018 and owns the home.3 She denies ever having used methamphetamine. She claims she has no issues with drug abuse and has never had any criminal charges regarding drugs. She explained that she did not submit to all the requested drug screens because the Cabinet never gave her a reason as to why they were requesting those screens. She testified that the Cabinet’s Standards of Practice manual states they must have a reasonable suspicion to request a drug screen.
Mother claimed the reason she did not follow the recommendations following her substance abuse assessment was because she did not agree with them. She also alleged the assessment itself did not list any recommendations until the Cabinet told them to list certain classes as a recommendation. Mother further testified she is in school, in an honor society, and making straight As. She claimed she was unaware she had a child support obligation until her tax refund was intercepted.
Father also testified. He claims he is required to take drug tests for his doctor, because he is prescribed an opioid painkiller. He stated he always passes those screens, and if he did not, he would not be able to keep getting his prescription. He testified his doctor would not allow him to sign a release to send
3 There was never any explanation given at the hearing for the discrepancy of why Mother was residing in Illinois when Child was born when Mother says she owned her home in Marshall County and claims to have resided there since 2018.
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his drug test results to the Cabinet. Father claims the Cabinet would only accept drug tests from one location, and that location is the only place he has ever failed a drug screen.
The family court entered an order on November 26, 2025, terminating both Mother and Father’s parental rights to Child. This appeal follows.
STANDARD OF REVIEW
This Court’s standard of review of a termination of parental rights case is the clearly erroneous standard in CR4 52.01. The factual findings must be supported by clear and convincing evidence. M.E.C. v. Commonwealth, Cabinet for Health and Family Services, 254 S.W.3d 846, 850 (Ky. App. 2008). The findings of the trial court should not be disturbed unless there exists no substantial evidence in the record to support its findings. V.S. v. Commonwealth, Cabinet for Human Services, 706 S.W.2d 420, 424 (Ky. App. 1986). “‘Substantial evidence’ means evidence of substance and relevant consequence having the fitness to induce conviction in the minds of reasonable men.” Kentucky Ret. Sys. v. Bowens, 281 S.W.3d 776, 780 (Ky. 2009) (citing Owens–Corning Fiberglas Corp. v. Golightly, 976 S.W.2d 409, 414 (Ky. 1998)). “The test for abuse of discretion is whether the trial judge’s decision was arbitrary, unreasonable, unfair or unsupported by sound legal principles.” Woodard v. Commonwealth, 147 S.W.3d 63, 67 (Ky. 2004).
4 Kentucky Rules of Civil Procedure.
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BRIEF NON-COMPLIANCE
Before we analyze the merits of the appeal, we must first address the deficiencies in Parents’ brief. RAP5 32 requires an Appellant’s brief to contain:
(3) A statement of the case consisting of a summary of the facts and procedural events relevant and necessary to an understanding of the issues presented by the appeal, with ample references to the specific location in the record supporting each of the statements contained in the summary.
(4) An argument conforming to the statement of points and authorities, with ample references to the specific location in the record and citations of authority pertinent to each issue of law and which shall contain at the beginning of the argument a statement with reference to the record showing whether the issue was properly preserved for review and, if so, in what manner.
Parents’ brief contains no citations to the record in its Statement of the Case. It also lacks a preservation statement. Further, while several statutes are cited, only one case is cited in their entire brief to support their argument.
“When an appellate advocate fails to abide by the appellate briefing rules, this Court has the option to: (1) ignore the deficiency and proceed with the review; (2) strike the brief or its offending portions; or (3) to review the issues raised in the brief for manifest injustice only, if the briefing deficiency pertains to the appellant’s statement of preservation of error.” Swan v. Gatewood, 678 S.W.3d
5 Kentucky Rules of Appellate Procedure.
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463, 469 (Ky. App. 2023). “The decision as to how to proceed in imposing such penalties is a matter committed to our discretion.” Roberts v. Bucci, 218 S.W.3d 395, 396 (Ky. App. 2007).
Despite Parents’ noncompliance with the rules, this Court has thoroughly reviewed the record because this case involves the termination of parental rights to a young child. “The seriousness of the ramifications of terminating a parent’s rights to custody and care of a child cannot be overstated. ‘The rights to conceive and to raise one’s children have been deemed essential, basic civil rights of man, and rights far more precious than property rights.’” Commonwealth, Cabinet for Health & Fam. Servs. v. S.H., 476 S.W.3d 254, 259 (Ky. 2015) (citing Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645, 651, 92 S. Ct. 1208, 31 L. Ed. 2d 551 (1972)).
ANALYSIS
KRS6 625.090 is the controlling statute regarding the involuntary termination of parental rights. This statute allows parental rights to be involuntarily terminated only upon findings, based on clear and convincing evidence, that (1) the child has been found to be an abused or neglected child as defined in KRS 600.020(1) by a court of competent jurisdiction; (2) that the Cabinet has filed a petition seeking the termination of parental rights pursuant to
6 Kentucky Revised Statutes.
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KRS 620.180 or KRS 625.050; (3) that termination is in the child’s best interests; and (4) at least one of the grounds set out in KRS 625.090(2)(a)-(k) is present.
The first prong is that Child must have been found to be abused or neglected. Parents’ first allegation of error is that the family court’s finding of neglect failed to satisfy the requirements of KRS 600.020 and that the finding is clearly erroneous based on the evidence presented.
The family court referenced the adjudication of neglect in the underlying DNA action. Further, it also made its own independent finding of neglect in the termination action. The family court stated in its order:
This court again finds that [Child] is an abused and neglected child under KRS 600.020(1). See KRS 625.090(1)(a)(2). Specifically, the respondent parents have created a risk of physical and emotional injury to [Child]. See KRS 600.020(1)(a)2. Moreover, the respondent parents have engaged in a pattern of conduct that has rendered them incapable of caring for [Child]’s immediate and ongoing needs, and they have repeatedly refused to provide essential care for the three-year-old.
See KRS 600.020(1)(a)(3) and (4). In support of these findings, the court must point out that the evidence clearly shows the respondents have engaged in what can reasonably be described as a pattern of substance abuse.
...
The record demonstrates that although respondents maintained a home, visited with [Child], and underwent an initial assessment in accordance with the case plan, they refused to carry out any of the directives made as a result of the assessments. Both respondents have been uncooperative with CHFS. The respondent parents’
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failure to make sufficient progress toward the courtordered case plan has prevented the safe return of the child to their care and has resulted in [Child] remaining in foster care in excess of fifteen (15) cumulative months out of forty-eight (48) months. See KRS 600.020(1)(a)(9).7
Parents state in their brief that “Kentucky law requires proof of actual harm or legitimate risk of harm to support a neglect finding, and mere case plan noncompliance or substance use allegations, without more, are insufficient to establish statutory neglect.”8 First, it is disingenuous to claim there is mere “substance use allegations” here; both parents have multiple drug screens in which they tested positive for methamphetamine and amphetamines. Furthermore, there is case law directly contradicting the Parent’s statement. See Cabinet for Health & Family Services on behalf of C.R. v. C.B., 556 S.W.3d 568, 576 (Ky. 2018) (Risk of harm, without any actual harm, is sufficient for a finding of neglect or abuse). In that case, father’s drug use was determined to have created a risk of harm to his child. Id. See also Cabinet for Health and Family Services v. K.O., 721 S.W.3d 124 (Ky. 2025).
The statute defining “abused or neglected child” explicitly acknowledges that case plan non-compliance can lead to a finding of neglect. KRS
7 Opinion and Order, entered November 26, 2025, Record at 165.
8 Appellants’ Brief, Page 11.
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600.020(1)(a)9. explains that a child can be abused or neglected when a parent or guardian “fails to make sufficient progress toward identified goals as set forth in the court-approved case plan to allow for the safe return of the child to the parent that results in the child remaining committed to the cabinet and remaining in foster care for fifteen (15) cumulative months out of forty-eight (48) months.” The family court determined this factor was applicable here. See also Cabinet for Health & Fam. Servs. v. K.S., 585 S.W.3d 202, 213 (Ky. 2019) (The Kentucky Supreme Court has held “in response to a parent’s argument that there was no evidence of abuse or neglect because the child had been committed to the Cabinet the whole time and his needs were being met by relatives or foster parents, that the child could still be considered neglected due to failure to complete case plan goals.”).
Parents cite M.C. v. Cabinet for Health and Family Services, 614 S.W.3d 915 (Ky. 2021), in support of their argument that substance use alone is insufficient to support a finding of neglect. We find the facts of M.C. and the facts herein to be substantially different. The substance at issue in M.C. was alcohol, and there was no evidence that father’s level of drinking impaired his ability to parent his three children, who were all teenagers during the pendency of the action. In this case, Child was slightly over a year old when removed from Parents’ custody by the family court. And, Child had been removed previously by IL
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DCFS when he was a newborn. It should go without saying that the needs of an infant or toddler are vastly different than those of teenagers. The Kentucky Supreme Court in M.C. clearly established that the age of the children is a significant factor to consider when it distinguished M.C. from other cases where parents’ drug use was the source of a finding of neglect.
“A trial court has broad discretion in its determination of whether a child is dependent, neglected, or abused.” Cabinet for Health & Fam. Servs. on behalf of C.R. v. C.B., 556 S.W.3d at 573. Based on the evidence presented in this case, we do not believe the family court abused its discretion in its ruling that Child was neglected by Parents. It is not unreasonable to determine that when both parents are under the influence of methamphetamine while caring for a toddler, that the child faces a legitimate risk of harm. The fact that the home was clean and appropriate and that Child was not physically abused does not mitigate the risks that exist when caretakers of a young child are impaired by methamphetamine. The first requirement of KRS 625.090 is met in this case.
Next, the court must find that at least one of the grounds outlined in KRS 625.090(2) is present. The family court found these grounds applied:
(e) That the parent, for a period of not less than six (6)
months, has continuously or repeatedly failed or refused to provide or has been substantially incapable of providing essential parental care and protection for the child and that there is no reasonable expectation of
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improvement in parental care and protection, considering the age of the child;
...
(g) That the parent, for reasons other than poverty alone, has continuously or repeatedly failed to provide or is incapable of providing essential food, clothing, shelter, medical care, or education reasonably necessary and available for the child’s well-being and that there is no reasonable expectation of significant improvement in the parent’s conduct in the immediately foreseeable future, considering the age of the child;
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(j) That the child has been in foster care under the responsibility of the cabinet for fifteen (15) cumulative months out of forty-eight (48) months preceding the filing of the petition to terminate parental rights.
Parents make a generalized argument contesting the findings that there is no expectation of improvement in the foreseeable future. They point to their stability in housing, as well as Mother’s academic performance. It should be noted that the only evidence presented as to Mother’s academic success was her own testimony; no evidence or exhibits were admitted to prove Mother’s enrollment or her grades. Furthermore, even if Mother’s testimony is accurate, it does not negate that Mother repeatedly tested positive for methamphetamine. She likewise refused to acknowledge she had a substance abuse problem or seek any type of treatment. And at any rate, factor (j) is undisputed; Child was continually in the custody of the Cabinet from September 1, 2023, through the date of the final
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hearing, clearly exceeding the fifteen-month threshold. The court is only required to find the existence of one of the grounds under KRS 625.090(2) to grant termination. Commonwealth, Cabinet for Health and Family Services v. T.N.H., 302 S.W.3d 658, 663 (Ky. 2010).
The final consideration is the “best interest” standard. In determining the best interest of Child and the existence of a ground for termination, the family court must consider the factors in KRS 625.090(3), which are:
(a) Mental illness as defined by KRS 202A.011(9), or an intellectual disability as defined by KRS 202B.010(9)
of the parent as certified by a qualified mental health professional, which renders the parent consistently unable to care for the immediate and ongoing physical or psychological needs of the child for extended periods of time;
(b) Acts of abuse or neglect as defined in KRS 600.020(1)
toward any child in the family;
(c) If the child has been placed with the cabinet, whether the cabinet has, prior to the filing of the petition
1. made reasonable efforts as defined in KRS 620.020 to reunite the child with the parents unless one or more of the circumstances enumerated in KRS 610.127 for not requiring reasonable efforts have been substantiated in a written finding by the District Court; or
2. Provided a parent with a disability as defined in KRS 199.011 with targeted adaptive and supportive services based on an individual assessment of the parent, or has received a written
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acknowledgment from the parent knowingly and affirmatively rejecting the offered services;
(d) The efforts and adjustments the parent has made in his circumstances, conduct, or conditions to make it in the child’s best interest to return him to his home within a reasonable period of time, considering the age of the child;
(e) The physical, emotional, and mental health of the child and the prospects for the improvement of the child’s welfare if termination is ordered; and
(f) The payment or the failure to pay a reasonable portion of substitute physical care and maintenance if financially able to do so.
The family court made the requisite findings under this prong of the statute. Parents do not specifically challenge the finding that termination was in Child’s best interest. But Parents do argue that the family court’s waiver of reasonable efforts was improper. They claim the waiver failed to meet the statutory requirements of KRS 610.127. First, we note that this argument is not preserved; at no point during the termination proceedings was this argument presented to the family court. Because of the lack of preservation, we may review this claim for manifest injustice only, if we generously elect to review the unpreserved issue at all. CR 61.02.
No manifest injustice occurred here when the family court granted the Cabinet’s request to waive further reasonable efforts. In fact, no error occurred at all, let alone a palpable error. KRS 610.127 states:
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Reasonable efforts as defined in KRS 620.020 shall not be required to be made with respect to a parent of a child if a court of competent jurisdiction determines that the parent has:
...
(5) Engaged in a pattern of conduct due to a substance use disorder as defined in KRS 222.005 for a period of not less than ninety (90) days that has rendered the parent incapable of caring for the immediate and ongoing needs of the child, and the parent has refused or failed to complete available treatment for alcohol or other drug abuse.
Despite Parents’ arguments that they do not have a substance abuse problem and have never used methamphetamine, the evidence presented to the family court was to the contrary. Both parents had multiple positive drug screens, and Mother had positive screens during her pregnancy with Child. This portion of the statute is directly applicable to the facts of this case, and the family court did not commit error when waiving reasonable efforts after the case had been open for over a year.
Parents further argue the Cabinet failed to provide meaningful reunification efforts, because their case plan tasks were not tailored to the family’s circumstances. Yet Parents do not give any indication of what tasks or programs would have been helpful to the family; they only disagree with the tasks the Cabinet did assign to them. They essentially continue to argue that substance abuse treatment was unnecessary.
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The remainder of Parents’ brief is a criticism of the family court’s factual findings. They take issue with the court’s acceptance of the positive drug screens while disregarding the negative screens. Mother did submit one negative drug screen into the record, over the Cabinet’s objection, as it had not been authenticated. This drug screen was dated February 28, 2024, the same date Mother also had a positive drug screen from another facility. It is true that the family court did not reference this screen in its findings. But this screen is largely irrelevant when considering the overall history of the case. Mother had many positive drug screens, including two that occurred during her pregnancy with Child, that she is unable to explain. The fact that she may have had one negative drug screen does not negate the several positive screens that were submitted as evidence to the family court.
Parents further argue the court failed to address the assessments which originally concluded that no treatment was necessary. These assessments were not introduced into the record, so the only evidence presented regarding those initial assessments is Parents’ testimony. Regardless of what those initial assessments may or may not have recommended, the Cabinet’s case plan, which included the classes and recommendations ultimately listed in the assessments, became a court order at the Disposition Hearing. It is undisputed that Parents did not complete those tasks.
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Ultimately, “an appellate court is obligated to give a great deal of deference to the family court’s findings and should not interfere with those findings unless the record is devoid of substantial evidence to support them.” Cabinet for Health & Fam. Servs. v. K.H., 423 S.W.3d 204, 211 (Ky. 2014). “As the fact-finder, the court had sole discretion to determine the quality, character, and substance of the evidence and the sole duty to judge the credibility of the witnesses.” Ball v. Tatum, 373 S.W.3d 458, 465 (Ky. App. 2012) (citations omitted). When testimony is conflicting, “we will not substitute our decision for the trial court’s judgment.” Id.
CONCLUSION
The family court’s factual findings were supported by substantial evidence and were not clearly erroneous. We determine the family court did not abuse its discretion in ordering the termination of Parents’ parental rights to Child. For the foregoing reasons, we AFFIRM the Order of the Marshall Family Court.
ALL CONCUR.
BRIEF FOR APPELLANT: BRIEF FOR APPELLEE:
Heather L. Jones Kevin Martz Paducah, Kentucky Covington, Kentucky