Aetna Insurance v. Harter

379 So. 2d 1019, 1980 Fla. App. LEXIS 15549
CourtDistrict Court of Appeal of Florida
DecidedFebruary 13, 1980
DocketNo. 79-653
StatusPublished
Cited by1 cases

This text of 379 So. 2d 1019 (Aetna Insurance v. Harter) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court of Appeal of Florida primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Aetna Insurance v. Harter, 379 So. 2d 1019, 1980 Fla. App. LEXIS 15549 (Fla. Ct. App. 1980).

Opinion

SCHEB, Judge.

Appellant, Aetna Insurance Company, paid workers’ compensation benefits to an injured employee who subsequently recovered damages for her injuries in a suit against third-party tortfeasors. The trial court dismissed a motion for equitable distribution filed under Section 440.39(3), Florida Statutes (1975).1 Aetna appeals.

[1020]*1020The issue we address is whether Aetna’s failure to file and record a notice of lien in the employee’s third-party suit deprived it of its right under Section 440.39(3) to obtain an equitable distribution of the damages recovered by the employee in her third-party action. We hold it did not and reverse.

' On October 7, 1976, Gayle C. Harter was injured in an automobile collision while she was driving a car within the scope of her employment. Harter began receiving workers’ compensation benefits from Aet-na, her employer’s carrier. On September 19, 1977, Aetna furnished the required statutory notice of its subrogation rights. § 440.39(3)(b), Fla.Stat. (1975). On September 23 Harter filed a tort action seeking damages from the driver and the owner of the other vehicle. Subsequently, she accepted $15,000 in settlement of her claims from their insurance company.

Harter then filed a motion in the tort litigation requesting the court to make an equitable distribution of the settlement proceeds between her and Aetna, and served the motion on Aetna. She was still receiving compensation benefits from Aetna at this time. Aetna’s first notice of Harter’s third-party action was the motion.2 At a hearing on Harter’s request for equitable distribution, Aetna responded that since it was currently making payments to her and would be required to make further payments, it was premature for the court to make a determination on the motion. After several continuances, the court, at Har-ter’s request, dismissed the motion.

Aetna contends the court erred because Section 440.39(3)(b) entitles it to have its subrogation rights determined since it furnished written notice of its rights of subro-gation to the third-party tortfeasors. Har-ter seeks to sustain the trial court’s order on the basis that Aetna did not file and record a notice of payment of compensation in the tort suit as it contends Section 440.-39(3)(a) requires.

Section 440.39(3)(a) allows an employee who receives compensation benefits the exclusive right to bring a third-party action during the first year after an accident occurs. It also provides that the carrier may file and record a notice of payment in any third-party suit. If it does, the notice constitutes a lien on any payments made on behalf of the third-party tortfeasor.

Section 440.39(3)(b) covers the situation where a settlement occurs either before or after suit by an injured employee. It provides for a court determination of the subrogation rights of a compensation carrier which has given notice of its rights to the third-party tortfeasor. Of course, if the carrier proceeds under (3)(b), it does not have the advantage of the lien afforded by the carrier’s compliance under (3)(a). Yet, [1021]*1021it is entitled to have its proportionate recovery determined under (3)(a).

Harter seeks to sustain the trial court’s holding on the authority of Alfar Creamery Co. v. Williams, 366 So.2d 458 (Fla. 4th DCA 1979). There the Fourth District Court of Appeal held that a carrier which proceeded under Section 440.39(3)(a) was required to comply with the requirement of filing and recording its notice to be entitled to subrogation under (3)(a). Here the issue is Aetna’s entitlement to subrogation under (3)(b), not (3)(a). To extend the holding in Alfar to (3)(b) is unwarranted.3

Aetna gave written notice of its rights of subrogation to the third-party tortfeasors and thereafter Harter and the tortfeasors settled the tort suit. Since Aetna and Har-ter failed to agree on the proportion to be paid to each, the trial court should have determined the amount to be paid to each in accordance with Subsection (3)(a). § 440.39(b), Fla.Stat. (1975).

Accordingly, we reverse the order of the trial court and remand for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.

GRIMES, C. J., and HOBSON, J., concur.

Free access — add to your briefcase to read the full text and ask questions with AI

Related

Continental Insurance v. Industrial Fire & Casualty Insurance
427 So. 2d 792 (District Court of Appeal of Florida, 1983)

Cite This Page — Counsel Stack

Bluebook (online)
379 So. 2d 1019, 1980 Fla. App. LEXIS 15549, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/aetna-insurance-v-harter-fladistctapp-1980.