Aetna Insurance Company v. William M. O'keeffe, Deputy Commissioner, Sixth Compensation District

356 F.2d 660, 1966 U.S. App. LEXIS 7094, 1966 A.M.C. 2044
CourtCourt of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit
DecidedFebruary 21, 1966
Docket22133_1
StatusPublished

This text of 356 F.2d 660 (Aetna Insurance Company v. William M. O'keeffe, Deputy Commissioner, Sixth Compensation District) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Aetna Insurance Company v. William M. O'keeffe, Deputy Commissioner, Sixth Compensation District, 356 F.2d 660, 1966 U.S. App. LEXIS 7094, 1966 A.M.C. 2044 (5th Cir. 1966).

Opinion

SLOAN, Senior District Judge:

This is an appeal by Aetna Insurance Company from a final decree of the district court, dismissing its complaint for a mandatory injunction to the Deputy Commissioner for the Sixth Compensation District. The decree in effect affirmed the action of the Deputy Commissioner in awarding benefits to appel-lee Walter Thomas Dykes, hereinafter referred to as claimant, under the Non-appropriated Fund Instrumentalities Act.

The complaint was filed by Aetna Insurance Company hereinafter referred to as the carrier, against William O’Keeffe, Deputy* Commissioner for the Sixth Compensation District, hereinafter referred to as the deputy and claimant.

The case was, in effect, an appeal from a compensation order entered by the deputy on August 1, 1963. Only questions of law were raised in the district court. The complaint alleged it should be set aside and the claim dismissed for two reasons. (1) That the claimant was not covered by the Act, and (2) that there was no substantial evidence to support the deputy’s finding that the claimant was permanently and totally disabled by the injury.

By finding for the deputy and claimant the district court held that the claimant was covered by the Act and that the deputy’s findings were supported by substantial evidence.

In this appeal the carrier relies upon only one error — the finding by the district court that the deputy had jurisdiction over the claim.

The carrier’s contention that the deputy lacked jurisdiction rests on two arguments. (1) That the Nonappropriated Fund Instrumentalities Act does not cover a “member of the crew”, and (2) that this claimant is a member of the crew.

The questions presented here are:

1. Is an “employee” of a nonappropriated fund instrumentality within the meaning of the Nonappropriated Instrumentalities Act, 5 U.S.C. § 150k-1, excluded from coverage if such employee is a member of a crew of a vessel?

*662 2. If so, was the claimant under the facts here a member of the crew of a vessel?

It is undisputed that the claimant was employed by the Central Base Fund at Eglin Air Force Base, a nonappropriated fund instrumentality within the meaning of the Nonappropriated Fund Instrumen-talities Act, 5 U.S.C. § 150k-l.

The carrier and the claimant entered into a stipulation as to the claimant’s employment and duties from which it appears that:

The claimant was employed as a deck hand aboard the Eglin Queen, a vessel sixty-three feet, five inches in length, about fifteen feet in beam, that is powered by two diesel engines of one hundred sixty-five horsepower each and is rigged for bottom fishing and trawling. The vessel carries twenty passengers and is about twenty tons in gross weight. Title to the vessel is held by Central Base Fund of Eglin Air Force Base, Florida. It is used to take military personnel, their dependents and house guests, out into the Gulf of Mexico for pleasure fishing. Central Base Fund charges each passenger $3.00 per day and loses about $7,000 per year in the operation of the vessel.

Among the duties of the claimant as a deck hand were the normal duties of a deck hand in the operation of a vessel of that size, together with the preparation of bait, and assisting passengers in fishing.

“Nonappropriated fund” activities, such as post exchanges, are operated for the convenience of armed forces personnel, and are as the name suggests — self supporting, that is, they are not supported by funds appropriated by Congress.

In 1942 the Supreme Court in Standard Oil Company of California v. Johnson, 316 U.S. 481, after describing the operation of post exchanges, said at page 485, 62 S.Ct. 1168, at page 1170, 86 L.Ed. 1611:

“ * * * government officers, under government regulations, handle and are responsible for all funds of the exchange which are obtained from the companies or detachments composing its membership. Profits, if any, do not go to individuals. They are used to improve the soldiers’ mess, to provide various types of recreation, and in general to add to the pleasure and comfort of the troops.
“From all of this, we conclude that post exchanges as now operated are arms of the government * *

After this decision the status of civilian employees of these instrumentalities were in doubt.

To resolve this doubt, Congress enacted what is now 5 U.S.C. § 150-k the second section of which, as added by Congress required the instrumentalities to “ * * * provide their civilian employees, by insurance or otherwise with compensation for death or disability incurred in the course of employment.”

Problems arose in the administration of the compensation program and Congress by Public Law 85-538 § 1, 72 Stat. 397 amended the section to provide for adjudication of claims of civilian employees of nonappropriated fund instrumentalities of the armed forces by judicial tribunals established by the Secretary of Labor under the Longshoremen’s and Harbor Workers’ Act, such amendment is now 5 U.S.C. § 150k-l. 1

*663 Only sections or parts of sections 902, 903, and 920 2 of the Longshoremen’s and Harbor Workers’ Compensation Act [Ti-tie 33 U.S.C. §§ 901 et seq.] are necessary to be considered in determining the question here.

It is the contention of the appellant carrier—

“ * * * that a claimant who is a member of a crew of a vessel is specifically excluded from coverage by § 902(3). It is on the basis of this exclusion that the carrier contends that the deputy commissioner did not have jurisdiction to make the award.”

*664 We disagree.

Congress has extended the coverage of the Longshoremen’s and Harbor Workers’ Compensation Act so that the act now applies to civilian employees of nonappro-priated fund instrumentalities who meet the requirements of 5 U.S.C. § 150k-l(a) (1). To accomplish this Congress changed the coverage provision of the Longshoremen’s and Harbor Workers’ Compensation Act [33 U.S.C. §§ 903(a) (a)(1) and (a)(2)].

In the Fund Act [5 U.S.C. § 150k

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Related

Standard Oil Co. of Cal. v. Johnson
316 U.S. 481 (Supreme Court, 1942)

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Bluebook (online)
356 F.2d 660, 1966 U.S. App. LEXIS 7094, 1966 A.M.C. 2044, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/aetna-insurance-company-v-william-m-okeeffe-deputy-commissioner-sixth-ca5-1966.