Aetna Health Management, Inc. v. Mid-America Health Network, Inc.

82 F. Supp. 2d 1220, 2000 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 1034, 2000 WL 135101
CourtDistrict Court, D. Kansas
DecidedJanuary 24, 2000
Docket97-2332-JTM
StatusPublished

This text of 82 F. Supp. 2d 1220 (Aetna Health Management, Inc. v. Mid-America Health Network, Inc.) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, D. Kansas primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Aetna Health Management, Inc. v. Mid-America Health Network, Inc., 82 F. Supp. 2d 1220, 2000 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 1034, 2000 WL 135101 (D. Kan. 2000).

Opinion

ORDER

MARTEN, District Judge.

The matter is now before the court on Aetna’s motion seeking a determination the defendants violated agreements between the parties, and that it is entitled to attorney fees. In earlier proceedings familiar to the parties, the court granted Aetna’s request for injunctive relief. Aetna Health Management v. Mid-America Health Network, 975 F.Supp. 1382 (D.Kan.1997). For the reasons identified herein, *1221 the court finds that the plaintiffs motion must be granted.

Summary judgment is proper where the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with affidavits, if any, show there is no genuine issue as to any material fact, and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c). In considering a motion for summary judgment, the court must examine all evidence in a light most favorable to the opposing party. McKenzie v. Mercy Hos pital, 854 F.2d 365, 367 (10th Cir.1988). The party moving for summary judgment must demonstrate its entitlement to summary judgment beyond a reasonable doubt. Ellis v. El Paso Natural Gas Co., 754 F.2d 884, 885 (10th Cir.1985). The moving party need not disprove plaintiffs claim; it need only establish that the factual allegations have no legal significance. Dayton Hudson Corp. v. Macerich Real Estate Co., 812 F.2d 1319, 1323 (10th Cir.1987).

In resisting a motion for summary judgment, the opposing party may not rely upon mere allegations or denials contained in its pleadings or briefs. Rather, the nonmoving party must come forward with specific facts showing the presence of a genuine issue of material fact for trial and significant probative evidence supporting the allegation. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 256, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986). Once the moving party has carried its burden under Rule 56(c), the party opposing summary judgment must do more than simply show there is some metaphysical doubt as to the material facts. “In the language of the Rule, the nonmoving party must come forward with ‘specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial’ ” Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co., Ltd. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 587, 106 S.Ct. 1348, 89 L.Ed.2d 538 (1986) (quoting Fed. R.Civ.P. 56(e)) (emphasis in Matsushita). One of the principal purposes of the summary judgment rule is to isolate and dispose of factually unsupported claims or defenses, and the rule should be interpreted in a way that allows it to accomplish this purpose. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 106 S.Ct. 2548, 91 L.Ed.2d 265 (1986).

Findings of Fact

Aetna is engaged generally in the business of providing healthcare plans and healthcare providers access to contracting employers (known as “payors”) and to their employees (known as “members”). HealthNet is a managed care organization that provides healthcare services (i.e., doctors) in the Kansas City Metropolitan Area, and is comprised of Mid-America Health Network, Inc., and its subsidiary, HealthNet, Inc. HealthNet is engaged in the business of, among other things, renting access to networks of healthcare providers.

In their response to the motion for summary judgment, the defendants (collectively here identified as “HealthNet”) stress that “HealthNet” is not a legal entity. They contend that both HealthNet, Inc. and Mid-America operated in the marketplace, and did sometimes distinguish between themselves. Mid-America operates and sells a “PPO” provider network of physicians and hospitals. At the time of the agreement, HealthNet, Inc. sold only an HMO product.

However, the evidence before the court establishes that HealthNet and Mid-America frequently made no distinction between themselves to the public, and often they do not make any internal distinction between themselves. Further, although defendants contend that Health-Net, Inc. never contracted with Aetna, the 1995 confidentiality agreement— which forms a key part of the claims of the plaintiff — was not, according to the express terms of the agreement, a contract between Aetna and • Mid-America, but a contract “between HealthNet (‘HN’) and Aetna Health Management, Inc. (‘AHM’).” (Plf.Exh.6).

In 1994, Aetna and HealthNet entered into discussions about the possibility of *1222 Aetna renting access to the HealthNet provider network of healthcare providers. Pursuant to Aetna’s standard operating procedure in negotiating the potential rental network arrangement, Aetna and HealthNet discussed the terms of the confidentiality agreement before the parties shared any information. On August 22, 1994, HealthNet and Aetna entered into a confidentiality agreement.

The August, 1994 agreement applied to “all information which is considered proprietary to Aetna, or any of its affiliated companies, including, but not limited to, information or materials related to the business affairs or procedures of Aetna and it’s (sic) affiliated companies.” (Def.Exh. E, at ¶ 19). According to the testimony of Emelia DeMusis Dasse of Aetna, the primary purpose for the agreement was “protecting our network information, as well as protecting any information that they shared with us through the process of completing a contract negotiation with them.” (Plf.Exh. 4, at 22). The idea behind the confidentiality agreements was basically that the information that was to be shared between the two organizations was solely for the purpose of furthering the business relationship.

The 1994 confidentiality agreement (Plf.Exh.5) states:

2. [Aetna] and [HealthNet] shall use the Confidential Information solely for the purposes of contracting negotiations and any continuing business relationship anticipated and shall not disclose any Confidential Information received from each other or each others agents hereunder to any person or entity except employees, officers, or agents of [Aetna] or [HealthNet] who have a need to know and who have been informed of [Aetna’s] and [HealthNet’s] obligations under the Agreement.
5. [HealthNet] agrees to indemnify and hold [Aetna] harmless against any claim, liability, loss or expense (including reasonable attorney fees) arising from a) [HealthNet’s] use or disclosure, or the use or disclosure by [HealthNet] officers, directors, employees or agents, of Confidential Information, or b) from actions taken to enforce the terms of this Agreement.
6.

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Bluebook (online)
82 F. Supp. 2d 1220, 2000 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 1034, 2000 WL 135101, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/aetna-health-management-inc-v-mid-america-health-network-inc-ksd-2000.