Aero Service Corporation v. Gordy

Superior Court of Delaware

Aero Service Corporation v. Gordy

109 A.2d 393, 49 Del. 59, 10 Terry 59, 1954 Del. Super. LEXIS 131

CourtSuperior Court of Delaware

DecidedNovember 15, 1954

Docket295, Civil Action, 1954

StatusPublished

Cited by8 cases

This text of 109 A.2d 393 (Aero Service Corporation v. Gordy) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Superior Court of Delaware primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook

Aero Service Corporation v. Gordy, 109 A.2d 393, 49 Del. 59, 10 Terry 59, 1954 Del. Super. LEXIS 131 (Del. Ct. App. 1954).

Pincite

Opinion

*61 Layton, J.:

It is tacitly conceded by defendant that the plaintiff was acting in the capacity of an independent contractor. Defendant also admits that unless the nature of the services performed by plaintiff under the contract in question were “personal services” within the meaning of § 8110, the plea of the Statute of Limitations cannot prevail.

It is clear to me that § 8110 was not designed to apply to the instant case. The very language of the section demonstrates that it has reference to the claims of servants, or members of the laboring classes and salaried employees. This is so because the kind of financial compensation or pay referred to is defined as “* * * wages, salary, or overtime * * *.” It takes no citation of authority to conclude that wages, salary and overtime are definitions of the kind of financial compensation paid, not to the independent contractor, but rather to the worker in the master and servant relationship or to salaried employees.

Defendant has bolstered its argument by the expedient of lifting the words “personal services” out of context and citing certain cases 1 which, in the loose sense of the word refer to the work of an independent contractor as services. But the words “personal services” as they appear in § 8110 must be read in connection with the language of the entire section in order to ascertain their true meaning and, when so done, the conclusion must be as above stated.

It is probably true, as plaintiff’s counsel argues, that § 8110 was designed to provide a Statute of Limitations for actions brought under the Fair Labor Standards Act, 29 U. S. C. A. § 201 et seq., with particular reference to litigation growing out of the decision of the Supreme Court of the United States in Anderson v. Mt. Clemens Pottery Co., 328 U. S. 680, 66 S. Ct. 1187, 90 L. Ed. 1515, the famous portal-to-portal decision. How *62 ever, it appears too clear to me that § 8106, not § 8110, is the applicable Statute to render it necessary to decide this latter proposition.

Motion to strike granted.

1

Gerber v. Weinstein, 141 A. 3, 6 N. J. Misc. 284, Services of an Architect.

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*61 Layton, J.:

It is tacitly conceded by defendant that the plaintiff was acting in the capacity of an independent contractor. Defendant also admits that unless the nature of the services performed by plaintiff under the contract in question were “personal services” within the meaning of § 8110, the plea of the Statute of Limitations cannot prevail.

It is clear to me that § 8110 was not designed to apply to the instant case. The very language of the section demonstrates that it has reference to the claims of servants, or members of the laboring classes and salaried employees. This is so because the kind of financial compensation or pay referred to is defined as “* * * wages, salary, or overtime * * *.” It takes no citation of authority to conclude that wages, salary and overtime are definitions of the kind of financial compensation paid, not to the independent contractor, but rather to the worker in the master and servant relationship or to salaried employees.

Defendant has bolstered its argument by the expedient of lifting the words “personal services” out of context and citing certain cases 1 which, in the loose sense of the word refer to the work of an independent contractor as services. But the words “personal services” as they appear in § 8110 must be read in connection with the language of the entire section in order to ascertain their true meaning and, when so done, the conclusion must be as above stated.

It is probably true, as plaintiff’s counsel argues, that § 8110 was designed to provide a Statute of Limitations for actions brought under the Fair Labor Standards Act, 29 U. S. C. A. § 201 et seq., with particular reference to litigation growing out of the decision of the Supreme Court of the United States in Anderson v. Mt. Clemens Pottery Co., 328 U. S. 680, 66 S. Ct. 1187, 90 L. Ed. 1515, the famous portal-to-portal decision. How *62 ever, it appears too clear to me that § 8106, not § 8110, is the applicable Statute to render it necessary to decide this latter proposition.

Motion to strike granted.

1

Gerber v. Weinstein, 141 A. 3, 6 N. J. Misc. 284, Services of an Architect.

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109 A.2d 393, 49 Del. 59, 10 Terry 59, 1954 Del. Super. LEXIS 131, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/aero-service-corporation-v-gordy-delsuperct-1954.

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