This opinion is nonprecedential except as provided by Minn. R. Civ. App. P. 136.01, subd. 1(c).
STATE OF MINNESOTA IN COURT OF APPEALS A25-1685
Advanced Correctional Healthcare, Inc., et al., Appellants,
Minnesota Sheriff’s Association, et al, Appellants,
Becker County, et al., Appellants,
St. Louis County, Appellant,
Steele County, Appellant,
vs.
Paul Schnell, Respondent.
Filed June 15, 2026 Affirmed Bratvold, Judge
Ramsey County District Court File No. 62-CV-25-5225
Sarah M. Hoffman, Bassford Remele, P.A., Minneapolis, Minnesota; and
Peter R. Jennetten (pro hac vice), Quinn Johnston, Peoria, Illinois (for appellants Advanced Correctional Healthcare, Inc., et al.)
Richard D. Hodsdon, Stillwater, Minnesota (for appellants Minnesota Sheriffs’ Association, et al.) Brian W. McDonald, Becker County Attorney, Detroit Lakes, Minnesota (for appellants Becker County, et al.)
Kimberly J. Maki, St. Louis County Attorney, Nick D. Campanario, Assistant County Attorney, Duluth, Minnesota (for appellant St. Louis County)
Robert J. Jarrett, Steele County Attorney, Owatonna, Minnesota (for appellant Steele County)
Keith Ellison, Attorney General, Kevin M. Jonassen, Christy L. Hall, Assistant Attorneys General, St. Paul, Minnesota (for respondent)
Considered and decided by Bratvold, Presiding Judge; Ross, Judge; and Reilly,
Judge. *
NONPRECEDENTIAL OPINION
BRATVOLD, Judge
Appellants are individuals, corporations, and government entities responsible for
providing medical care to incarcerated persons in correctional facilities. Appellants sued
to challenge the constitutionality of recently enacted Minnesota Statutes section 241.021,
subdivision 4f (Supp. 2025), which governs the licensing and supervision of correctional
facilities under the authority of the Minnesota Department of Corrections (DOC).
Subdivision 4f(a) requires licensed correctional facilities to administer “the same
medications” prescribed to incarcerated persons before their incarceration. Appellants
received a temporary restraining order (TRO) by stipulation among the parties and moved
for a temporary injunction to block enforcement of the statute during the lawsuit. The
* Retired judge of the Minnesota Court of Appeals, serving by appointment pursuant to Minn. Const. art. VI, § 10.
2 district court denied the temporary injunction and dissolved the TRO, and this interlocutory
appeal follows. We affirm.
FACTS
In May 2025, the legislature amended Minnesota Statutes section 241.021 and
adopted subdivision 4f: “Correctional facilities licensed by the commissioner shall
administer to confined and incarcerated persons the same medications prescribed to those
individuals prior to their confinement or incarceration.” Minn. Stat. § 241.021, subd. 4f(a);
see also 2025 Minn. Laws ch. 35, art. 5, § 6, at 694. Subdivision 4f(b) has three
exceptions, 1 providing that subdivision 4f does not apply when
(1) a licensed health care professional determines, after consulting with the licensed health care professional who prescribed the medication, that the prescribed medication is not medically appropriate for the person based on the person’s medical condition or status; (2) a licensed health care professional determines a medication that is at least as effective as the current medication the person is prescribed is available to treat the condition and the licensed health care professional who prescribed the current medication approves the change in medications; or (3) the person provides written notice to the licensed health care professional who is responsible for inmate health
1 Subdivision 4f(b) includes prefatory language stating that these exceptions do not apply to “a confined or incarcerated person who is subject to a Jarvis order that dictates otherwise.” A Jarvis order authorizes the involuntary administration of neuroleptic medication. See Jarvis v. Levine, 418 N.W.2d 139, 150 (Minn. 1988). Neuroleptic medication is used for “sedation of the nervous system”; the term may be used interchangeably with “antipsychotic” medication. Id. at 140 n.1.
3 care at the correctional facility that the person no longer desires to take the medication.
Minn. Stat. § 241.021, subd. 4f(b). 2 Because subdivision 4f and its exceptions were
adopted as part of an appropriations bill, they became effective on July 1, 2025. 3
Before subdivision 4f took effect, appellants filed a complaint seeking a permanent
injunction to block respondent Paul Schnell, in his official capacity as Minnesota
Commissioner of Corrections, from enforcing subdivision 4f and further requesting
declaratory-judgment relief as described below. Appellants are: three corporations that
provide medical services or medical staffing to Minnesota county jails; four individual
medical providers who are employed by one of the appellant corporations, including two
physicians and two certified nurse practitioners; thirteen Minnesota counties; five county
sheriffs; and the Minnesota Sheriffs’ Association (MSA).
The amended complaint alleges three claims for declaratory-judgment relief under
the Minnesota Uniform Declaratory Judgments Act, Minnesota Statutes
sections 555.01-.16 (2024). Each claim incorporates the allegation that subdivision 4f
2 The legislature recently enacted revisions to subdivision 4f effective August 1, 2026. 2026 Minn. Laws, ch. 97, art. 4, § 1; Minn. Stat. § 645.02 (2024) (“Each act, except one making appropriations, enacted finally at any session of the legislature takes effect on August 1 next following its final enactment, unless a different date is specified in the act.”). The 2026 amendment is not before us in this appeal, and we consider only the 2025 version of subdivision 4f. 3 “An appropriation act or an act having appropriation items enacted finally at any session of the legislature takes effect at the beginning of the first day of July next following its final enactment, unless a different date is specified in the act.” Minn. Stat. § 645.02; see 2025 Minn. Laws, ch. 35, arts. 1-2 (setting appropriations for the judiciary and public safety), 5, § 7, at 694 (adding subdivision 4f to section 241.021).
4 “mandates the administration of medication that could be harmful or fatal to inmates who
are in the custody” of correctional facilities that are subject to the statute.
Count 1 alleges that subdivision 4f compels appellants to provide medical care that
may violate inmates’ rights under the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments to the
U.S. Constitution and article I, section 5 of the Minnesota Constitution and that
subdivision 4f prevents appellants “from complying with their obligations to provide care
that complies” with these constitutional rights. Count 2 alleges that subdivision 4f violates
the liberty and property rights of the corporate and individual medical-provider appellants
under the Fourteenth Amendment by compelling them to violate their professional
obligations in order to comply with state and federal law. Count 3 alleges that
subdivision 4f would compel the individual medical-provider appellants to violate
professional standards in the Minnesota Medical Practice Act and the Minnesota Nurse
Practice Act. For each count, appellants seek a declaratory judgment that subdivision 4f is
unconstitutional or unlawful and a permanent injunction against its enforcement.
Appellants moved for a temporary injunction to block enforcement of subdivision 4f
during the lawsuit. Four days later, the parties stipulated to entry of a TRO to enjoin
enforcement of subdivision 4f until August 1, 2025. The district court filed a TRO “in effect
until August 1, 2025, unless extended or rescinded by Order of the Court.” The district
court later extended the TRO until it ruled on appellants’ motion for temporary injunctive
relief. Respondent opposed the motion for a temporary injunction.
In support of their motion for a temporary injunction, appellants submitted over
20 affidavits about the risk of harm posed by subdivision 4f, including affidavits of medical
5 doctors, nurse practitioners, jail administrators, and sheriffs. One medical doctor averred
that they had “encountered situations where the administration of outside prescriptions
tendered or reported by the patient in custody would have harmed or possibly killed the
patient.” The medical doctor’s affidavit gave examples, explaining the potential harm from
(1) Ativan or Suboxone administered while a patient is “under the influence of other
drugs”; (2) side effects from “medications like Seroquel, SSRIs, and gabapentin” if a
patient has not been taking the prescribed dose regularly and immediately resumes
“maintenance doses”; (3) risk of severe bleeding “if a patient is on a blood thinner
medication like Coumadin, and is also abusing alcohol”; and (4) continuing combinations
of medications that can “alter heart rhythms” and “put patients at risk of dangerous and
potentially fatal heart rhythm abnormalities.” 4
The medical doctor also attested that the “correctional environment poses unique
challenges generally and regarding medications in particular. Medications can be diverted
and misused in ways that are rare or absent outside the jail.” The medical doctor averred
that reliance “upon primary care providers, who are generally unfamiliar with the
correctional environment, will lead to subpar care and cause patients to suffer unnecessary
morbidity and even mortality.” The medical doctor also attested that they would be unable
to “comply with both the mandate of new Subdivision 4f and [their] professional
responsibilities” because subdivision 4f would require that the medical doctor “administer
4 In another affidavit, a certified nurse practitioner discussed the possible need to adjust diabetes medication “quickly, in order to avoid severe hypoglycemia” because of dietary changes during confinement.
6 or direct the administration of medication that [they] know would be harmful or potentially
fatal to [their] patients in the jail.”
The medical doctor recognized that two of subdivision 4f’s exceptions require
approval from a prescribing provider to change an existing medication. See Minn. Stat.
§ 241.021, subd. 4f(b)(1)-(2). The medical doctor averred that “[c]ommunity providers are
generally not available” to discuss changes to an inmate’s prescription and are “likely not
willing to accept the responsibility and the risk of liability associated with making decisions
regarding the administration of medications in the jail.” As for subdivision 4f’s exception
requiring a patient’s written consent, id., subd. 4f(b)(3), the medical doctor attested that
“[m]any inmates are poor historians,” experience “mental health or substance abuse issues
that significantly impair their cognitive and communication abilities,” or “may not agree
with changes to their medications due to suspicion regarding the jail medical provider,
animosity toward jail staff, drug or alcohol intoxication, mental health crises, or a desire to
deliberately cause self-harm.”
The affidavits of other individual medical providers were submitted in support of
appellants’ motion and expressed similar concerns. One averred that it is “very important
that correctional healthcare providers be able to exercise their independent, professional
judgment about medications that should be given to detainees.” Another attested, “I have
personally handled situations in which continuing all of an inmate’s [prescribed]
medications would have been inappropriate and dangerous to the patient.” A nurse attested
to an incident when an “inmate came into the jail with a prescription of a high dose of
Lamictal” despite not having taken that medication for at least one month. The nurse
7 averred that “[i]f this medication had been given at the prescribed dosage as the new law
would require . . . it could have had serious consequences,” for example, causing “a serious
skin condition that can be life-threatening.”
The affidavits of sheriffs and jail administrators state, among other things, that
(1) affiants “have never overruled a prescription for medication issued by a provider based
on the cost of medication” and (2) “it is often very difficult to verify with community
providers in a timely manner the accuracy of the information provided by the inmates”
about their prescriptions.
Finally, appellants filed an affidavit from the attorney representing the MSA. The
attorney attested to and identified specific DOC enforcement actions against county
correctional facilities in 2023 and 2024. The attorney averred that “DOC has demonstrated
a marked propensity to take adverse action against county jails when it perceives that rules
or statutes within its authority to enforce have been violated.” The attorney also attested
that, during a meeting in June 2025, DOC representatives stated that “they would be
developing protocols to determine compliance with” subdivision 4f and that “licensed
facilities that did not comply with the terms of the statute could be subject to sanctions and
consequences.” The attorney’s affidavit also summarized discussions among DOC staff,
obtained through a data-practices request, expressing concern about the legality of
subdivision 4f and whether enforcement posed administrative issues.
The district court heard oral argument on appellants’ motion for a temporary
injunction. On September 8, 2025, the district court denied appellants’ motion for a
temporary injunction and dissolved the TRO in an order that included a 13-page
8 memorandum (September order). Appellants moved the district court to stay enforcement
of the September order pending appeal and to reinstate the TRO; the district court denied
appellants’ motion in January 2026. On appellants’ motion, this court reviewed the district
court’s order denying a stay and determined that the district court did not abuse its
discretion. 5
This appeal follows.
DECISION
“A temporary injunction is an extraordinary equitable remedy.” Miller v. Foley,
317 N.W.2d 710, 712 (Minn. 1982). “Its purpose is to preserve the status quo until
adjudication of the case on its merits.” Id. A temporary injunction should be granted “only
when it is clear that the rights of a party will be irreparably injured before a trial on the
merits is held.” Id.
The district court has discretion to grant or deny a temporary injunction, and
appellate courts will reverse only for “clear abuse of that discretion.” Carl Bolander &
Sons Co. v. City of Minneapolis, 502 N.W.2d 203, 209 (Minn. 1993). “An appeal from an
order denying a motion for a temporary injunction is strictly limited in scope” because the
district court’s ruling “is largely an exercise of judicial discretion.” Hvamstad v. City of
5 In support of their initial motion for a stay pending appeal, appellants submitted additional evidence that was not before the district court when it denied appellants’ motion for a temporary injunction. On appeal, we limit our consideration to the appellate record and the materials submitted to the district court at the time it made the decision under review. Minn. R. Civ. App. P. 110.01 (stating that the appellate record consists of documents and exhibits “filed in the trial court”); Loth v. Loth, 35 N.W.2d 542, 550 (Minn. 1949) (stating that appellate courts generally limit their consideration to the record in front of the district court at the time of its decision).
9 Rochester, 276 N.W.2d 632, 632 (Minn. 1979). Appellate courts “view the facts alleged in
the pleadings and affidavits as favorably as possible to the party who prevailed below.” Id.
at 633.
In Dahlberg Brothers, Inc. v. Ford Motor Co., the supreme court articulated five
factors for district courts to apply when considering a motion for a temporary injunction.
137 N.W.2d 314, 321-22 (Minn. 1965). The Dahlberg factors are as follows:
(1) The nature and background of the relationship between the parties preexisting the dispute giving rise to the request for relief.
(2) The harm to be suffered by plaintiff if the temporary restraint is denied as compared to that inflicted on defendant if the injunction issues pending trial.
(3) The likelihood that one party or the other will prevail on the merits when the fact situation is viewed in light of established precedents fixing the limits of equitable relief.
(4) The aspects of the fact situation, if any, which permit or require consideration of public policy expressed in the statutes, State and Federal.
(5) The administrative burdens involved in judicial supervision and enforcement of the temporary decree.
Id. (footnotes omitted).
Here, the district court determined that, based on the record before it, factor (1) was
neutral, factors (2)-(4) weighed against granting a temporary injunction, and factor (5)
favored granting an injunction. Appellants challenge the district court’s determinations on
factors (1)-(4). Because the parties’ arguments focus on factor (3), appellants’ likelihood of
success on the merits, we address that factor first. We then consider, in turn, (1) the
10 relationship between the parties, (2) the balance of harms, and (4) the public-policy
considerations.
Factor (3) Likelihood of Success on the Merits
Under the third Dahlberg factor, “if a plaintiff makes even a doubtful showing as to
the likelihood of prevailing on the merits, a district court may consider issuing a temporary
injunction to preserve the status quo until trial on the merits.” Metro. Sports Facilities
Comm’n v. Minn. Twins P’ship, 638 N.W.2d 214, 226 (Minn. App. 2002), rev. denied
(Minn. Feb. 4, 2002). Appellants argued during district court proceedings that they were
likely to succeed on the merits. The district court agreed with respondent, however, and
concluded that appellants’ claims are not justiciable and therefore this factor weighs against
granting an injunction. The district court reasoned that appellants had “not shown a direct
and imminent injury that they would suffer” under section 241.021 and that, therefore, their
claims were “not ripe for adjudication.” Thus, we first consider justiciability.
Appellants pursued relief under the Minnesota Uniform Declaratory Judgments Act
(Act). 6 The supreme court has recognized the “preventative” purpose of
declaratory-judgment actions. County of Blue Earth v. Phillips (In re Improvement of Cnty.
Ditch No. 86), 625 N.W.2d 813, 821 (Minn. 2001). But “like every other action, a
declaratory judgment action must present an actual, justiciable controversy.” McCaughtry
6 Under the Act, courts have the “power to declare rights, status, and other legal relations whether or not further relief is or could be claimed.” Minn. Stat. § 555.01. The Act allows any person “whose rights, status, or other legal relations are affected by a statute” to “have determined any question of . . . validity arising under the . . . statute” and “obtain a declaration of rights, status, or other legal relations thereunder.” Minn. Stat. § 555.02.
11 v. City of Red Wing, 808 N.W.2d 331, 337 (Minn. 2011). “To establish a justiciable
controversy in a declaratory judgment action challenging the constitutionality of a law, a
plaintiff must show a direct and imminent injury which results from the alleged
unconstitutional provision.” Id. (quotations omitted). A plaintiff “need not necessarily
possess a cause of action (as that term is ordinarily used) as a basis for obtaining declaratory
relief” but must “possess a bona fide legal interest which has been, or with respect to the
ripening seeds of a controversy is about to be, affected in a prejudicial manner.” State ex rel.
Smith v. Haveland, 25 N.W.2d 474, 477 (Minn. 1946).
Here, the district court reasoned that the potential harms that appellants would suffer
through enforcement of subdivision 4f were “based on a series of hypotheticals” and “too
speculative for [the] Court to reach a meaningful resolution by judgment.” The district
court summarized the “series of hypotheticals”:
First, an individual must be booked into one of the local jails with medication or a prescription with them and must wish to continue taking that medication. The [appellants] must then determine that in their medical judgment dispensing the incarcerated individual’s medication is not in the individual’s best interest. The incarcerated individual must then disagree with the [appellants’] assessment. The [appellants] must then be unable to reach the incarcerated individual’s prescribing provider. After all of those steps, the [appellants] must then choose to ignore the statute and refuse medication to the individual that she believes she needs. The [respondent] must then take regulatory action against the correctional facility.
Appellants contend that the district court erred on the third Dahlberg factor when it
determined that their claims were not justiciable. First, appellants argue that the district
court “failed to give proper weight to the conflict between the legal rights highlighted by
12 Appellants in this case” and subdivision 4f. Second, appellants emphasize that the Act
authorizes relief before a party’s legal rights have been invaded. Third, and relatedly,
appellants argue, quoting Minneapolis Federation of Men Teachers, Local 238 v. Board of
Education, 56 N.W.2d 203, 205-06 (Minn. 1952), that the district court erred in reasoning
that regulatory action by respondent was a prerequisite to a justiciable controversy because
“a justiciable controversy exists in declaratory judgment actions like this one . . . even
though the ‘status quo between the parties has not yet been destroyed or impaired.’”
We are unpersuaded by appellants’ arguments based on the supreme court’s decision
in McCaughtry, which analyzed the justiciability of a constitutional challenge brought
under the Act. In McCaughtry, plaintiffs were landlords and tenants whose properties had
been “subject to repeated applications for administrative warrants” under a rental-property
inspection ordinance. 808 N.W.2d at 333. The ordinance required the city to “seek
permission, from a judicial officer through an administrative warrant,” to inspect a
property. Id. at 334 (quotation omitted). The plaintiffs sought a declaratory judgment that
the ordinance violated the Minnesota Constitution because the ordinance did not require a
showing of probable cause for the administrative warrant. Id. at 334, 339. The ordinance
allowed property owners and tenants to challenge administrative warrant applications in
district court, and appellants had successfully done so three times. Id. at 334-35. During
litigation over the third administrative warrant, the district court dismissed appellants’
constitutional challenge, reasoning that they had “not suffered an injury that is actual or
imminent.” Id. at 335-36.
13 On appeal, the supreme court reversed and remanded the district court’s decision,
concluding that appellants had presented a justiciable controversy. Id. at 341. The supreme
court decided that the constitutional issue was “neither hypothetical nor abstract” because
the city had “actually begun enforcing the rental inspection ordinance against appellants.”
Id. at 340. The supreme court noted that appellants had challenged three administrative
warrants and that the city “indicated that it will continue to seek administrative warrants to
inspect appellants’ properties.” Id. The supreme court also observed that appellants were
“presenting a facial challenge to the constitutionality of the ordinance” that “does not
depend on the contents of any administrative warrant application because a facial challenge
asserts that a law always operates unconstitutionally.” Id. at 339 (quotation omitted). 7
McCaughtry supports the district court’s decision that appellants’ claims are not
justiciable for two reasons. First, unlike the city in McCaughtry, respondent has not
“actually begun enforcing” subdivision 4f. Appellants’ evidence does not establish any
enforcement action or a specific appellant targeted for enforcement. Appellants assert that
their affidavits “provide concrete examples based on the real-life experiences of individuals
who have provided care to inmates” and “describe the serious problems that would occur
if the law were enforced.” (Emphasis added.) This argument implicitly concedes that the
7 The supreme court rejected the city’s argument that the availability of proceedings in district court precluded declaratory judgment for three reasons: (1) a “disruption of the status quo is not a prerequisite” to justiciability; (2) a court’s action that prevents the ripening of a controversy is “no defense” to a claim; and (3) third, the possibility that a judge might “write in” constitutional limitations to future administrative warrant applications did not render appellants’ challenge “premature.” Id. at 340-41 (quotations omitted).
14 alleged injuries are hypothetical and therefore not ripe for adjudication. See id. at 338 (“An
injury that is merely possible or hypothetical is not enough to establish justiciability.”
(quotation omitted)).
We do not suggest, however, that an inmate must be harmed to prove “a direct and
imminent injury.” See id. at 337 (quotation omitted). And it is concerning that respondent’s
justiciability argument assumes, as explained by respondent’s attorney during oral
argument to this court, that a medical provider will violate subdivision 4f when statutory
compliance runs contrary to their medical judgment. Our concern is not alleviated by
respondent’s assurance on appeal that subdivision 4f will not be enforced “in a manner that
would punish the Appellants for acting to preserve patient health or for following medical
ethics and licensure requirements.” This argument concedes that the requirements of
subdivision 4f and the availability of exceptions may conflict with sound medical judgment
for administering medications to some incarcerated persons in some circumstances.
Despite these concerns, we are not persuaded that appellants have sufficiently established
the likelihood of an enforcement action for an appellant’s violation of subdivision 4f when
sound medical judgment and state and federal law support not administering prescribed
medication.
Second, unlike in McCaughtry, appellants do not make a facial constitutional
challenge to subdivision 4f. 808 N.W.2d at 339; see, e.g., Thigpen v. Best Home Care LLC,
29 N.W.3d 205, 213 n.8 (Minn. 2025) (“To succeed on a facial challenge, the challenger
must establish that no set of circumstances exists under which the legislation would be
valid.” (quotation omitted)). Appellants do not claim that subdivision 4f would be
15 unconstitutional in all circumstances. As the district court summarized, a “series of
hypotheticals” would have to occur before subdivision 4f would require appellants to
administer medication against sound medical judgment and state and federal law. Because
appellants’ challenge to the statute is not facial, it does not present a “purely legal question”
and a factual record would aid the district court in resolving the issues. McCaughtry,
808 N.W.2d at 339-40. This supports the district court’s conclusion that the controversy is
not ripe for adjudication.
Appellants raise a troubling possibility that subdivision 4f may force medical
providers to choose between their sound medical judgment and statutory compliance. But
this troubling possibility is based on speculation. Thus, the district court did not abuse its
discretion by concluding that the alleged harms were too speculative to be justiciable and
therefore that appellants were unlikely to succeed on the merits. Because the district court
did not abuse its discretion by weighing the third Dahlberg factor against granting the
injunction based on justiciability, we need not reach the parties’ other arguments on the
likelihood that appellants’ claims would succeed.
Factor (1) Relationship Between the Parties
The first Dahlberg factor favors an injunction that will maintain the status quo
between the parties. Metro. Sports Facilities Comm’n, 638 N.W.2d at 221. Thus, the first
factor requires an examination of the parties’ relationship. The district court characterized
the parties’ relationship as “regulated facilities and the Commissioner who regulates them”
and determined that a temporary injunction “would not alter the parties’ relationships.” The
16 district court ultimately concluded that this factor “is neutral on the question of whether an
injunction should issue.”
Appellants contend that the district court misapplied the law and that this factor
favors an injunction barring enforcement of subdivision 4f because doing so “would not
alter the relationship between the parties.” Appellants argue that “[d]enying injunctive
relief would alter the [parties’] relationship” because subdivision 4f establishes a basis for
enforcement actions and thus the injunction is necessary to maintain the status quo.
We are not persuaded that the district court abused its discretion in determining that
this factor is neutral. Many new statutes alter the status quo between the government and a
regulated party. If mere alteration of a relationship could tip this factor, the first Dahlberg
factor would favor injunctive relief in many challenges to new statutes. Such a result would
contradict the longstanding principle that courts “owe great deference to the judgment of
the legislature as to matters properly within its purview.” Fugina v. Donovan, 104 N.W.2d
911, 915 (Minn. 1960); see Baertsch v. Minn. Dep’t of Revenue, 518 N.W.2d 21, 24 (Minn.
1994) (describing “a specific effective date for [a] statute” as “a clear manifestation” of
legislative intent). Instead, we conclude that subdivision 4f is another provision within a
preexisting enforcement scheme and that it therefore does not “create a new legal
relationship between the parties” supporting a preliminary injunction. Metro. Sports
Facilities Comm’n, 638 N.W.2d at 221. Because deference to legislative judgment supports
the district court’s conclusion that the first Dahlberg factor is neutral, it was not an abuse
of discretion.
17 Factor (2) The Balance of Harms
Under the second Dahlberg factor, the movant “must show irreparable harm to
trigger an injunction” while the nonmoving party “need only show substantial harm to bar
it.” Pac. Equip. & Irrigation, Inc. v. Toro Co., 519 N.W.2d 911, 915 (Minn. App. 1994),
rev. denied (Minn. Sept. 16, 1994). “Any time a State is enjoined by a court from
effectuating statutes enacted by representatives of its people, it suffers a form of irreparable
injury.” Maryland v. King, 567 U.S. 1301, 1303 (2012) (quotation omitted); see also Metro.
Sports Facilities Comm’n, 638 N.W.2d at 223-25 (concluding that “the district court did
not abuse its discretion in considering harm to the public when deciding whether to grant
temporary injunctive relief”).
The district court concluded that respondent “met its burden of demonstrating
sufficient substantial harm to the public to preclude the issuance of an injunction.” The
district court noted three distinct harms that would arise from enjoining enforcement of
subdivision 4f: (1) the injunction would “significantly undermine” legislative intent;
(2) the injunction would impair the commissioner’s “ability to safeguard the health, safety,
and orderly operation of correctional facilities”; and (3) the injunction would “jeopardiz[e]
the continuity of medical care for incarcerated individuals.” The district court also noted
the “unripe and speculative nature of [appellants’] complaints” under this factor.
Appellants challenge the district court’s conclusion for two reasons. First, appellants
argue that the district court erred in relying on legislative testimony that supported a version
of the bill that “did not contain the problematic requirements” of consulting with the
prescribing licensed health care professional or obtaining consent from the inmate to satisfy
18 an exception to the mandate in subdivision 4f before changing a prescription. This
argument is unavailing because appellate courts “do not consider legislative history if the
statute’s language is clear on its face.” Great N. Ins. Co. v. Honeywell Int’l, Inc.,
911 N.W.2d 510, 518 (Minn. 2018). Appellants do not argue that subdivision 4f is not
“clear on its face.” Thus, even assuming that appellants’ legislative-history argument is
accurate, we rely on the unambiguous language of subdivision 4f to determine legislative
intent. And subdivision 4f unambiguously requires consultation with the prescribing
licensed health care professional or inmate consent before changing prescription
medication. Thus, the district court therefore did not abuse its discretion by concluding that
a temporary injunction would undermine legislative intent.
Second, appellants argue that “an injunction would not hinder Respondent’s goal of
protecting inmates’ health and welfare, but rather, would actually support that goal”
because existing statutes and rules are sufficient. Appellants cite administrative rules on
staff training and procedures related to medical care in correctional facilities. But none of
these rules expressly protect an inmate’s access to prescription medication except
Minnesota Rule 2911.6600, subpart 11 (2025), which states that an “inmate shall not be
deprived of medication as a means of punishment.” The overlap between subdivision 4f
and existing rules is minimal. The district court therefore did not abuse its discretion by
concluding that a temporary injunction would harm respondent’s ability to safeguard
inmate health by enforcing subdivision 4f.
In their brief, appellants do not appear to contest that the temporary injunction
would jeopardize the continuity of care for incarcerated persons with prescriptions. Still,
19 we recognize that appellants’ affidavits describe plausible circumstances when
enforcement of subdivision 4f could lead to harm. But because the circumstances described
are hypothetical and the supreme court stated that a temporary injunction “should be
granted only when it is clear that the rights of a party will be irreparably injured before a
trial on the merits is held,” Miller, 317 N.W.2d at 712, these affidavits do not tip the second
Dahlberg factor in favor of injunctive relief.
We conclude that each of the harms identified by the district court is supported by
the law and the record, as is its determination that appellants established only speculative
harm. Thus, the district court did not abuse its discretion by concluding that the second
Dahlberg factor weighed against issuing a temporary injunction.
Factor (4) Public-Policy Considerations
The district court concluded that it was a “close call,” but the fourth Dahlberg factor
weighed against granting a temporary injunction. The district court acknowledged there is
a “compelling public policy concern” that subdivision 4f might undermine medical-care
providers in correctional facilities, “create a chilling effect on the availability of necessary
care and threaten the stability of correctional health systems.” But the district court
concluded that this concern was outweighed by the subdivision 4f’s policy of guaranteeing
a detainee’s “right to meaningfully access their prescribed medication.” The district court
reasoned that the legislature is “far better equipped to discern meaningful public interest
than a single judge making a ruling based upon limited facts.”
Appellants contend that the district court abused its discretion because the public
policy of promoting inmate health care is better served by allowing medical providers to
20 exercise sound medical judgment without the constraints enacted in subdivision 4f.
Appellants argue that obtaining inmate or prescriber consent to change prescribed
medications is unworkable and will undermine the public policy that subdivision 4f
purports to advance.
We are not convinced that the district court abused its discretion. It is not the courts’
role to second-guess the legislature’s policy decisions. In re Welfare of M.L.M., 813 N.W.2d
26, 35 (Minn. 2012). Subdivision 4f expresses the legislature’s intent to guarantee that
inmates receive prescribed medications and to limit appellants’ discretion to change an
inmate’s prescription medications without consulting the prescribing physician or
obtaining the inmate’s consent. See Smith v. Carver County, 931 N.W.2d 390, 395 (Minn.
2019) (“The plain language of the statute is our best guide to the Legislature’s intent.”). We
acknowledge that appellants raise some compelling challenges to the policy expressed in
subdivision 4f, but any disagreement with the policy underlying a statute “should be
directed to the legislature.” Irongate Enters., Inc. v. County of St. Louis, 736 N.W.2d 326,
331 (Minn. 2007). The district court did not abuse its discretion by deferring to the
legislature’s policy determinations as expressed in subdivision 4f and concluding that the
fourth Dahlberg factor weighed against a temporary injunction.
Because the district court did not abuse its discretion by concluding that three
Dahlberg factors weighed against granting a temporary injunction, one factor was neutral,
and one factor favored granting the injunction, we conclude that it was not an abuse of
discretion for it to deny appellants’ motion for a temporary injunction. Therefore, we affirm
21 the district court’s decision to deny appellants’ motion for a temporary injunction. We take
no position on the merits of appellants’ underlying complaint.
Affirmed.