NOT RECOMMENDED FOR PUBLICATION File Name: 20a0522n.06
No. 19-4048
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE SIXTH CIRCUIT FILED ADRIENNE HOOD, Administrator of the Estate of ) Sep 08, 2020 Henry Green V, ) DEBORAH S. HUNT, Clerk ) Plaintiff-Appellant, ) ) ON APPEAL FROM THE v. ) UNITED STATES DISTRICT ) COURT FOR THE CITY OF COLUMBUS, OHIO; JASON S. BARE; ) SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF ZACHARY B. ROSEN; ERIC J. PILYA; ) OHIO COMMANDER GARY CAMERON; CHIEF KIM ) JACOBS, ) OPINION ) Defendants-Appellees. )
BEFORE: MERRITT, GUY, and STRANCH, Circuit Judges.
JANE B. STRANCH, Circuit Judge. Plaintiff Adrienne Hood appeals the dismissal of
her claims of excessive force for the death of Henry Green V in a shootout between him and
plainclothes police officers Zachary Rosen and Jason Bare. The district court granted summary
judgment to all defendants, holding that the officers are entitled to qualified immunity and the
municipal defendants did not violate Green’s constitutional rights. For the reasons explained
below, we AFFIRM the grant of summary judgment to all defendants on all claims against them
except for Officers Rosen and Bare. We REVERSE the grant of summary judgment to Rosen and
Bare for the shots fired at Green after he was no longer a safety threat. No. 19-4048, Adrienne Hood v. City of Columbus, OH, et al.
I. BACKGROUND
City of Columbus police officers Zachary Rosen and Jason Bare were partners on a
plainclothes assignment as part of the police department’s Community Safety Initiative in the
South Linden neighborhood of Columbus. They were assigned to patrol known crime hotspots in
the community in an unmarked white GMC vehicle on June 6, 2016. Rosen was driving the car
and Bare was sitting in the second row on the passenger side.
That afternoon, Henry Green V, a 23-year-old man who lived in that neighborhood, met
up with his friend Christian Rutledge at a home on Ontario Street, where he had been drinking.
Around 4:30 pm, Rutledge and Green went to another home, where Green got into a verbal dispute
with a woman and decided to leave. Green and Rutledge left the house together at around 5:45
pm and walked north on Ontario Street toward East 26th Avenue.
Sometime between 6:05 pm and 6:10 pm, the Officers were driving westbound on East
26th Avenue and encountered Green and Rutledge crossing the street. Rutledge stopped crossing
to avoid the car, but Green kept walking into the intersection toward the GMC, to “where [the
Officers] probably thought they would have hit him.” The GMC came to a screeching halt.
According to Rutledge, Green yelled “what the f---” repeatedly at the GMC. According to the
Officers, Green lifted his shirt to display a gun and pulled the gun out. Rosen stated that he drove
past Green then saw him in the side view mirror aiming the gun at the GMC. Rutledge said that
he could not confirm whether Green had pulled a gun out because he was on his phone at the time.
Rosen radioed in the physical descriptions of Green and Rutledge, telling police dispatch
that Green pulled a gun on them. The Officers drove around the block then eastbound on Duxberry
Avenue toward Ontario Street trying to locate Green and Rutledge again north of the intersection
where they had just encountered the pair. Meanwhile, Green and Rutledge continued northbound
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on Ontario Street and encountered witness Jherri Alfred. Alfred said that Green gave him a “mean-
mug stare” as Alfred was getting into his car; Alfred put his gun into the holster at his hip in a way
that Green could see, in order to send the message that “I don't know what you got under your
shirt, but it’s not going to kill me.”
Less than a minute later, the Officers encountered Green and Rutledge again near the
intersection of Duxberry Avenue and Ontario Street. A shootout ensued between Rosen and Bare
in their unmarked GMC and Green on foot. The record contains conflicting accounts from several
witnesses. The evidence as a whole indicates that the shootout happened in two segments—when
the shooting first started and, after a short pause, when the Officers took their last shots.
The Officers explained the encounter as follows: they saw Green in the middle of Duxberry
Avenue with his hands near his waistband where he previously had the gun. Rosen stated that he
began to pull out his gun as he drove toward Green, who then pulled his gun from under his shirt;
Rosen aimed his gun at Green with his right hand while putting the car in park with his left hand
reaching over his body. Rosen said that he opened the door of the car with his left hand and began
to get out of the car, shouting “Police!” and “Don’t Move!” Rosen stated that Green pointed the
gun at him and “was either firing or was about to fire his weapon at [him].” Rosen noted that he
fired several shots as he fell back on his seat in the GMC; Green fired toward Rosen and the GMC,
shooting out its front and back driver-side windows.
Bare explained that he got out of the car from the rear passenger door with his gun drawn
and began to move around the front of the GMC toward Rosen and Green, flashing his police
badge. The Officers were driving an unmarked car and the shooting started immediately after they
got out of the car. Both officers were in plainclothes but stated that they were wearing their police
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badges on lanyards. Rutledge stated that he did not know they were police officers at the time of
the encounter.
Rutledge stated that when the shooting started, he ran westbound on Duxberry Avenue
toward the house of Green’s aunt and did not see the initial round of shots. Several people who
were near the intersection witnessed the incident in whole or in part. Jamar Jordan, who was
standing in front of his home on Duxberry Avenue and Ontario Street, said that Green did not have
his gun out initially, but pulled it out after two shots from the Officers. Shantel Anderson, who
was in her house on Duxberry Avenue close to the intersection, stated that she saw Green shoot
out the windows of the GMC, after which the officers shot back. Harold Newsome and Erika
Hickman were near the sidewalk by Anderson’s house on Duxberry Avenue, with Newsome inside
his vehicle and Hickman just outside. When the shots were fired, Newsome grabbed Hickman and
pushed her into the vehicle under the dashboard. Neither saw Green with a gun or firing a gun.
Jherri Alfred, who was by his car approximately 200 feet south of the intersection on Ontario
Street, said that he saw Green hold a gun up in the air right before the shots started, though he did
not know who took the first shot, and could not say whether Green shot at the Officers when his
gun was initially in the air.
After the initial shots, Green momentarily moved out of Rosen’s view; Rosen stated that
he moved away from the GMC door and fired additional shots at Green in rapid succession, but
stopped firing after Green fell to the ground and dropped his gun. Bare stated that he fired several
shots at Green while Green was shooting at Rosen, and when Green fell to the ground, he also
stopped firing immediately.
Jordan saw Green’s gun come out of his hand once he was struck by the Officers’ initial
shots, and he staggered to the ground on his knees before falling flat on his back. Jordan said that
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the Officers continued to shoot at Green even after he dropped his gun and while he was on his
knees, but the shots stopped once he was on his back. While Newsome and Hickman had partially
obstructed views, Newsome stated that “after [the police] got out of the car, [Green] was laying on
the ground, they kept shooting him.” Alfred said that after Green was shot several times, his gun
flew out of his hand and his shoe flew in the air before he hit the ground, and that the Officers shot
Green two or three more times each after he hit the ground.
Rutledge stated that he saw only the final two shots from the Officers when he turned
around down the street. According to Rutledge, one of the Officers walked up to Green, who was
on the ground and “looked like he was already dead,” and shot him two times within two feet.
Rutledge said that he heard around 17 shots in total from two different caliber guns.
The forensics evidence indicates that Green was armed with a .45-caliber semiautomatic
pistol that he fired at least six times. Matthew Noedel, the City’s expert witness, stated that Green’s
shots struck the GMC several times at the side door and the back of the rear-view mirror. Based
on his analysis, Noedel also stated that Green fired shots while in a lowered stature, and that some
of his bullet wounds were sustained while he was in a lowered or bent position. Plaintiff’s expert
witness, Francisco Diaz, analyzed Green’s autopsy and photographs of Green’s body and
determined that the location of one of his bullet wounds suggests that Green was hit while he was
down or in the process of going down. He also found that another bullet wound, a graze on the
left flank, was sustained while Green was down, based on its physical characteristics. Green was
shot eight times and died from a gunshot wound to the chest.
Adrienne Hood, the mother of Green and administrator of his estate, brought claims of
excessive force and unreasonable seizure in violation of 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and the Fourth and
Fourteenth Amendments against Rosen and Bare. Hood also sued the City of Columbus, Police
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Chief Kim Jacobs, Police Commander Gary Cameron, and Sergeant Eric Pilya under a municipal
liability theory. The defendants asserted qualified immunity and moved for summary judgment
on all claims. The district court found that the Officers are entitled to qualified immunity and
granted summary judgment on all claims in favor of Rosen and Bare; it also found that the City of
Columbus and the other municipal defendants are not liable under Monell v. Dep’t of Soc. Servs.
of City of New York, 436 U.S. 658 (1978). Hood filed a timely appeal.
II. ANALYSIS
A. Claims Against the Officers
On appeal, we review the “grant of summary judgment de novo.” Hanover Ins. Co. v.
American Eng’g Co., 33 F.3d 727, 730 (6th Cir. 1994). Summary judgment is appropriate only
“if the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is
entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). Summary judgment is not
appropriate if the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving
party. See Weigel v. Baptist Hosp. of E. Tenn., 302 F.3d 367, 375 (6th Cir. 2002).
Qualified immunity “protects government officials ‘from liability for civil damages insofar
as their conduct does not violate clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which a
reasonable person would have known.’” Goodwin v. City of Painesville, 781 F.3d 314, 320–21
(6th Cir. 2015) (quoting Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223, 231 (2009)). Courts apply a
“two-tiered inquiry to determine whether a defendant is entitled to qualified immunity.” Id. at
321. Summary judgment is inappropriate if a court finds that 1) there are genuine issues of material
fact as to whether officers violated the plaintiff’s constitutional rights in an objectively
unreasonable way, and 2) those rights were clearly established at the time such that a reasonable
officer would have known that his conduct violated them. Id.
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1. Constitutional Violation
To determine if an officer’s use of force is excessive in violation of the Fourth Amendment,
we ask “whether the officers’ actions are ‘objectively reasonable’ in light of the facts and
circumstances confronting them, without regard to their underlying intent or motivation.” Graham
v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 397 (1989). We assess “reasonableness at the moment” of the use of
force, as “judged from the perspective of a reasonable officer on the scene, rather than with the
20/20 vision of hindsight.” Id. at 396. “[T]he key inquiry is whether a reasonable officer in the
same circumstances would have used the same amount of force.” Mullins v. Cyranek, 805 F.3d
760, 768 (6th Cir. 2015). Use of deadly force is reasonable “[w]here the officer has probable cause
to believe that the suspect poses a threat of serious physical harm, either to the officer or to others.”
Tennessee v. Garner, 471 U.S. 1, 11 (1985).
Three factors from Graham guide our analysis: “the severity of the crime at issue, whether
the suspect poses an immediate threat to the safety of the officers or others, and whether he is
actively resisting arrest or attempting to evade arrest by flight.” Goodwin, 781 F.3d at 321 (quoting
Graham, 490 U.S. at 396). Ultimately, we determine whether “the totality of the circumstances
justified a particular sort of search or seizure.” Garner, 471 U.S. at 9; see id.
For the first Graham factor—the severity of the crime at issue—the Officers said they
drove to the intersection of Duxberry Avenue and Ontario Street to find Green because he pulled
a gun on them at the intersection of East 26th Avenue and Ontario Street. We apply the first
Graham factor based on the encounter at the East 26th Avenue intersection. Green had a gun and
no evidence contradicts the Officers’ assertion that he pulled it out. The only other witness was
Rutledge, who could not say whether Green pulled out the gun because he was on his phone at the
time. According to Rutledge, the Officers had to stop abruptly when Green walked in front of
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their unmarked GMC, and Green was angry and yelled at the Officers. The Officers immediately
reported to dispatch that Green pulled out a gun. The Officers stated that they believed Green
“posed a serious threat to anyone in the area,” and they intended to “get[] eyes on Green to make
sure that he was taken into custody as soon as possible.” Considering all these circumstances, it
was reasonable for the Officers to notify the police dispatch of the encounter and to continue their
investigation. The record does not present a dispute of material fact on the first Graham factor.
The other Graham factors—and whether there was a violation of Green’s constitutional
rights—turn on the events at the intersection of Duxberry Avenue and Ontario Street. Because the
shooting started almost immediately after the Rosen stopped their unmarked GMC, there is no
evidence that the Officers made any attempt to arrest Green or that Green attempted to resist or
evade arrest. The only remaining question is whether Green posed an immediate safety threat such
that the Officers acted reasonably in drawing and firing their weapons. “The fact that a situation
unfolds quickly ‘does not, by itself, permit [officers] to use deadly force.’ Rather, qualified
immunity is available only where officers make split-second decisions in the face of serious
physical threats to themselves and others.” Mullins, 805 F.3d at 766–67 (quoting Smith v.
Cupp, 430 F.3d 766, 775 (6th Cir. 2005)). This analysis turns on the two segments of the
encounter, which we analyze in turn.
a. The Officers’ Initial Shots
Several witnesses, including Officers Rosen and Bare, Jordan, Anderson, and Alfred, and
the forensic evidence indicated that Green pulled his gun and fired at the Officers at some point.
Hickman and Newsome did not see Green with a gun, but they had partially obstructed views and
were occupied with getting out of the way when the shooting began.
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We have held that “an officer may use deadly force whenever he or she, in the face of a
rapidly unfolding situation, has probable cause to believe that a suspect poses a serious physical
threat either to the police or members of the public.” Williams v. City of Grosse Pointe Park,
496 F.3d 482, 487 (6th Cir. 2007). Even if Green did not fire first, the Officers could still be
“acting reasonably under the circumstances known to them [and] in defense of their own safety
and the safety of officers through the use of deadly force.” Boyd v. Baeppler, 215 F.3d 594, 600
(6th Cir. 2000). In Mullins v. Cyranek, we found to be reasonable a police officer’s use of deadly
force in response to a suspect pulling out a previously concealed weapon and throwing it over his
shoulder. 805 F.3d at 767. We noted that the suspect there “had his finger on the trigger of a gun,
and at that time, he posed a serious threat to [the officer] and the general public.” Id. And in one
of the more recent cases on this subject, the Supreme Court found that an officer who shot a woman
engaging in erratic behavior with a knife is entitled to qualified immunity, where the officer
assessed in mere seconds that she was a potential danger to another person. Kisela v. Hughes, 138
S. Ct. 1148, 1151–53 (2018) (per curiam). Likewise, objectively reasonable officers could have
viewed Green, who pointed and fired a gun at the Officers in close proximity, as a serious and
immediate safety threat to themselves and others. The totality of the circumstances—the proximity
of Green to the Officers, the fact that he had a gun with him and either shot at or was about to
shoot at the Officers, and the split-second decision that the Officers had to make—suggest that the
Officers did not violate Green’s constitutional rights when they first fired at Green.
b. The Officers’ Last Shots
Even if it was reasonable for the Officers to open fire, however, that does not automatically
clear the entire encounter of the Constitution’s prohibition against excessive use of force. We have
analyzed similar claims in segments and found some parts of police officers’ actions to be
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reasonable and other parts to be unreasonable. See, e.g., Russo v. City of Cincinnati, 953 F.2d
1036, 1044–45 (6th Cir. 1992) (analyzing separately three distinct excessive force claims raised
by the plaintiffs even though they were part of one incident); Pleasant v. Zamieski, 895 F.2d 272,
276 (6th Cir. 1990) (analyzing whether the officer’s actions in arresting a suspect were objectively
reasonable in two components: the officer’s decision to (1) draw his gun and (2) not to return the
gun to its holster). In Bouggess v. Mattingly, 482 F.3d 886, 890 (6th Cir. 2007), we reiterated that
“[i]t is crucial for the purposes of this inquiry to separate [the officer’s] decision-points and
determine whether each of his particular decisions was reasonable.”
Hood alleged that the Officers continued to shoot at Green even after he no longer held a
gun and was falling or already down on the ground. The district court dismissed this argument
and declined to adopt a segmented analysis because it viewed all the shots as a single incident.
Citing Stevens-Rucker v. City of Columbus, the court found that the Officers’ shots were not
separated by “such a significant gap in time that they must be viewed as distinct incidents requiring
individualized analysis.” 739 F. App’x 834, 844 (6th Cir. 2018). In Stevens-Rucker, the court
found that all the officer’s shots were part of a single incident because the last shots were fired
“within a second or even fractions of a second” and there “was not enough time for [the officer]
to stop and reassess the threat level between the shots.” Id. While all the shots fired were in quick
succession here, Rosen himself remembered a momentary lapse when Green disappeared from his
view. And Rutledge’s observation that the Officers walked over to Green and took more shots
while Green was on the ground shows a segment of the event separate from the initial shots.
Alfred, who was by his car on Ontario Street, also said that the Officers continued to shoot at
Green even as he was falling to the ground, and then they each took two or three more shots when
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Green was on the ground. It appears that there were gaps between the Officers’ shots, and they
had time to reassess Green’s threat.
Applying a segmented approach to this situation, the question is whether “the officers’
initial decision to shoot was reasonable but there was no need to continue shooting.” Dickerson v.
McClellan, 101 F.3d 1151, 1162 n.9 (6th Cir. 1996) (citing Ellis v. Wynalda, 999 F.2d 243, 247
(7th Cir. 1993) (“When an officer faces a situation in which he could justifiably shoot, he does not
retain the right to shoot at any time thereafter with impunity.”)) “We have held repeatedly that the
use of force after a suspect has been incapacitated or neutralized is excessive as a matter of law.”
Baker v. City of Hamilton, 471 F.3d 601, 607 (6th Cir. 2006). In Russo v. Cincinnati, for example,
we held that a reasonable jury could find that the officers violated the suspect’s constitutional
rights with the use of deadly force when they repeatedly shot at the suspect, even after he dropped
his weapon and posed no serious threat of physical harm. 953 F.2d at 1045. In Margeson v. White
Cty., Tenn., police officers entered the suspect James Margeson’s residence, who grabbed his gun
and pointed it at the officers. 579 F. App’x 466, 468 (6th Cir. 2014). Multiple officers shot at
Margeson, and he suffered 21 separate gunshot wounds. Id. We held that while any objectively
reasonable officer would respond with deadly force in the first instance, the officers there were not
entitled to qualified immunity on summary judgment because the record suggested that “at least
twelve additional shots were fired at Mr. Margeson after he had fallen to the ground with multiple
gunshot wounds,” and that “a jury could reasonably infer that Mr. Margeson became incapacitated,
and was therefore unable to pose a threat after having been shot with the first few bullets.” Id. at
472.
Both Rosen and Bare said they stopped shooting when Green fell to the ground. In cases
involving the use of deadly force, the deceased suspect is unable to tell what occurred, and “[a]
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court may not simply accept what may be a self-serving account by the police officer. It must look
at the circumstantial evidence that, if believed, would tend to discredit the police officer’s
story.” Jefferson v. Lewis, 594 F.3d 454, 462 (6th Cir. 2010) (quoting Scott v. Henrich, 39 F.3d
912, 915 (9th Cir. 1994)).
Several witnesses discredit the Officers’ claim. Rutledge stated that the Officers “were
walking up on [Green’s] body,” which was “flat on the ground,” and shot him twice. Rutledge
added that the Officers were “basically checking like he don’t move or nothing like that. . . . [H]e
was already flat, so I don’t see why the actual two gunshots was necessary.” Alfred, from his
vantage point down the block, stated that shots continued after Green had dropped his gun, “As
he’s going down, like his gun done flew out his hand, . . . shots are still being [fired]. No. They
still going. Then they stop.” Jordan, who was outside his home right at the intersection, said the
police stopped shooting Green when he was flat on his back, but likely fired a shot while he was
down on one knee, in the process of falling down. The experts from both parties indicated that
some of Green’s gunshot wounds were sustained while he was in a “lowered” position, likely when
he was down on the ground or in the process of going down.
Considering the totality of the circumstances as explained by the multiple witnesses,
including expert witnesses, the encounter between the Officers and Green is similar to the
circumstances in Russo and Margeson, where the police continued to shoot even after the suspects
were incapacitated, on the ground, and no longer safety threats. Genuine issues of material fact
exist as to when the Officers stopped shooting at Green. This dispute is material to whether the
Officers continued to shoot at Green after he was no longer a physical threat, in violation of
Green’s constitutional rights. Drawing all reasonable inferences in favor of Hood, the nonmoving
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party, a jury could reasonably conclude that the Officers’ use of force in this context was
unreasonable.
2. Clearly Established Law
We turn to the second inquiry of the qualified immunity analysis: whether “the right was
clearly established at the time of the alleged violation.” Campbell v. City of Springboro, 700 F.3d
779, 786 (6th Cir. 2012). A right is clearly established if its contours are “sufficiently clear that a
reasonable official would understand that what he is doing violates that right.” Goodwin, 781 F.3d
at 325 (quoting Wheeler v. City of Lansing, 660 F.3d 931, 938 (6th Cir. 2011)). To find a clearly
established right, we ask whether the defendants had “fair warning” that the actions were
unconstitutional; an unconstitutional act may be clearly established without an existing case with
the exact same, or even “fundamentally similar” or “materially similar” facts. Id. (quoting
Cummings v. City of Akron, 418 F.3d 676, 87 (6th Cir. 2005)). “The relevant, dispositive inquiry
in determining whether a right is clearly established is whether it would be clear to a reasonable
officer that his conduct was unlawful in the situation he confronted.” Saucier v. Katz, 533 U.S.
194, 202 (2001).
As discussed above, the use of force is excessive as a matter of law once the suspect has
been incapacitated or neutralized and is no longer a safety threat. See, e.g., Shreve v. Jessamine
County Fiscal Court, 453 F.3d 681, 687 (6th Cir. 2006); Baker, 471 F.3d at 607; Dickerson, 101
F.3d at 1162 n.9. There may be instances when an officer is lawfully justified in using deadly
force even on an already wounded suspect. In Boyd v. Baeppler, for example, we held that an
officer was entitled to qualified immunity when he fired on a wounded suspect, because the
evidence there indicated that the suspect was pointing a gun at the officers even after being
wounded. 215 F.3d at 603. We have also held that “even when a suspect has a weapon, but the
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officer has no reasonable belief that the suspect poses a danger of serious physical harm to him or
others, deadly force is not justified.” Bouggess, 482 F.3d at 896. And in Russo v. Cincinnati, we
reversed the district court’s grant of summary judgment to the officers on qualified immunity
grounds because the “plaintiffs raised a genuine issue of fact as to whether . . . the officers may
have shot [the suspect] even though he posed no serious threat of physical harm.” 953 F.2d at
1045. Several witnesses stated that the Officers here continued to shoot Green after he dropped
his gun and was falling or already down on the ground. Our precedents provide “fair warning” to
the Officers that shooting at Green after he was no longer a safety threat is unconstitutional.
Officers Rosen and Bare are not entitled to qualified immunity on summary judgment.
B. Claims Against the Remaining Defendants
Under Monell, local government units, including local government officials, may be liable
under § 1983 only when the constitutional deprivation arises from a government custom or policy.
436 U.S. at 691. We have held that a plaintiff may establish constitutional deprivation in four
ways: “(1) the municipality’s legislative enactments or official policies; (2) actions taken by
officials with final decision-making authority; (3) a policy of inadequate training or supervision;
or (4) a custom of tolerance of acquiescence of federal violations.” Baynes v. Cleland, 799 F.3d
600, 621 (6th Cir. 2015). Monell liability requires the plaintiff to “identify the policy, connect the
policy to the city itself and show that the particular injury was incurred because of the execution
of that policy.” Searcy v. City of Dayton, 38 F.3d 282, 287 (6th Cir. 1994) (quoting Garner v.
Memphis Police Dep’t, 8 F.3d 358, 364 (6th Cir. 1993)).
Hood did not address any of these factors in the summary judgment proceeding below, and
she does not argue the law supporting a Monell claim in her appellate brief. The district court did
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not err in granting summary judgment in favor of the defendants on Hood’s claims of municipal
liability.
III. CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, we AFFIRM the grant of summary judgment to all defendants
on all claims, except for the claims against Officers Rosen and Bare. We REVERSE the grant of
summary judgment to Rosen and Bare for the alleged shots at Green after he was no longer a safety
threat. We REMAND the case for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
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RALPH B. GUY, JR., Circuit Judge, concurring in part and dissenting in part.
I concur in the majority opinion except for the conclusion that there is a genuine dispute whether
the officers continued to shoot at Green after a reasonable officer would have known that Green
no longer posed a safety threat. The exchange of gunfire was brief, and the officers fired all of
their rounds within a period of approximately five seconds. I cannot agree that the officers had
time “to stop and reassess the threat level” before the last shots were fired. Stevens-Rucker, 739 F.
App’x at 844. In my view, no reasonable juror could find there was a point at which an objectively
reasonable officer would have known that Green was no longer a threat. I would affirm the district
court’s judgment in full.
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