This opinion will be unpublished and may not be cited except as provided by Minn. Stat. § 480A.08, subd. 3 (2014).
STATE OF MINNESOTA IN COURT OF APPEALS A15-1440
Adrianne Robbennolt and obo minor child, petitioner, Respondent,
vs.
Sandi Weigum, Appellant.
Filed April 18, 2016 Affirmed; motion denied Peterson, Judge
Ramsey County District Court File No. 62-HR-CV-15-130
Adrianne Robbennolt, St. Paul, Minnesota (pro se respondent)
Sandi Weigum Grob, Kalispell, Montana (pro se appellant)
Considered and decided by Ross, Presiding Judge; Peterson, Judge; and Reyes,
Judge.
UNPUBLISHED OPINION
PETERSON, Judge
Pro se appellant challenges a harassment restraining order (HRO) granted to pro se
respondent and her minor child. Appellant also filed a motion in this court asking us to
consider materials that were not filed in the district court. We deny appellant’s motion and
affirm the HRO. FACTS
Appellant Sandi Weigum Grob is the paternal grandmother of respondent-mother
Adrianne Robbennolt’s minor child, J.G. On April 1, 2015, mother petitioned for an HRO
on behalf of herself and J.G. Mother alleged that grandmother, while falsely claiming to
be mother’s mother, baselessly called the Saint Paul Police Department to request a welfare
check on mother’s home, and the police found the check unwarranted. According to
mother, this was the second such call to the Saint Paul Police Department in the past year,
and grandmother also called the West Saint Paul Police Department and Dakota County
Child Protection in 2013, which resulted in two more welfare checks. Mother also alleged
that, in a telephone conversation with mother, grandmother stated that she would continue
to make such calls in the future.
Mother further alleged that (1) J.G. expressed to her that he does not desire a
relationship with grandmother and he has anxiety because of grandmother’s phone calls
and the welfare checks, and (2) J.G. does not want to speak with grandmother by phone
because he does not need to be “saved” and does not like the negative things grandmother
says about mother and her family.
On April 1, 2015, the district court granted a temporary ex parte HRO (THRO).
Within days, grandmother was served with a copy of the THRO and was informed of her
right to request a hearing. Grandmother requested a hearing but asked that she be allowed
to appear by telephone because she lives in Montana. The court granted grandmother’s
request and scheduled an initial telephone hearing for May 20, 2015, but stated that
grandmother must appear in person for all future hearings. The district court also stated
2 that if grandmother “fail[ed] to be available by phone for the hearing, the court may grant
whatever [relief mother] has requested.”
On May 20, 2015, mother and J.G. appeared for the hearing, but grandmother did
not answer the district court’s telephone call. The district court granted an HRO, effective
for two years. In the May 20, 2015 order, the district court incorporated mother’s
allegations as its findings of fact and found that grandmother’s actions constituted
“harassment,” that “has or is intended to have a substantial adverse effect on [p]etitioner’s
safety, security, or privacy.”
In June 2015, grandmother moved to have the HRO dismissed. Grandmother stated
that she purchased a new telephone before the May 20 hearing, but it malfunctioned when
the district court tried to call. The district court granted grandmother’s request for a
telephone hearing and, after mother requested a continuance, scheduled a hearing for July
29, 2015.
It is unclear how long the July 29 hearing lasted, but the district court found that
both parties had notice of the hearing and that:
[Grandmother] stated that she will [not] appear in person in Minnesota for an evidentiary hearing. [Grandmother] has been on notice since the order dated May 15, 2015 that she would have to appear in person for all subsequent hearings. [Grandmother’s] request to appear by telephone at an evidentiary hearing should be denied as it does not allow for [grandmother’s] credibility to be fully assessed. [Grandmother’s] motion dated June 9, 2015 to dismiss this matter should be denied as [grandmother] stated that she will not be present in person if an evidentiary hearing is scheduled.
3 The district court denied grandmother’s motion to dismiss the HRO and ordered that the
May 20, 2015 HRO remain in effect. Grandmother appeals.
DECISION
“[T]he issuance of an HRO is reviewed for abuse of discretion.” Peterson v.
Johnson, 755 N.W.2d 758, 761 (Minn. App. 2008). We will not disturb the district court’s
findings of fact “unless [they are] clearly erroneous, and due regard is given to the district
court’s opportunity to judge the credibility of witnesses.” Id. (quotation omitted); see
Minn. R. Civ. P. 52.01. “The determination of what constitutes an adequate factual basis
for a harassment order is left to the discretion of the district courts.” Kush v. Mathison,
683 N.W.2d 841, 846 (Minn. App. 2004), review denied (Minn. Sept. 29, 2004). “[T]his
court will reverse the issuance of a restraining order if it is not supported by sufficient
evidence.” Id. at 844.
Grandmother contends that the district court’s findings of fact that incorporate the
allegations made in mother’s petition, are clearly erroneous. But grandmother refused to
appear for an evidentiary hearing, and there is no transcript or other evidentiary record that
she cites to establish errors in the findings. See Loth v. Loth, 227 Minn. 387, 392, 35
N.W.2d 542, 546 (1949) (stating that “[i]t is well to bear in mind that on appeal error is
never presumed. It must be made to appear affirmatively before there can be reversal.”
(quotation omitted)). Furthermore, the district court’s adoption of the allegations in
mother’s petition demonstrates an implied credibility determination. See Pechovnik v.
Pechovnik, 765 N.W.2d 94, 99 (Minn. App. 2009) (noting that the district court’s findings
“implicitly indicate[d]” that it found certain evidence credible). It is well settled that this
4 court defers to a district court’s credibility determinations. Minn. R. Civ. P. 52.01;
Peterson, 755 N.W.2d at 761. Without a transcript or other documents or exhibits to
review, we defer to the district court’s credibility determinations and its findings.
As part of her argument that the district court’s findings are clearly erroneous,
grandmother filed correspondence with this court, including medical records relating to
J.G., and a motion requesting “inspection of previously submitted medical records.”
Appellate courts generally do not consider new evidence, and appellate review is limited
to documents and exhibits that were filed in the district court, plus any transcripts from
district court proceedings. See Thiele v. Stich, 425 N.W.2d 580, 583 (Minn. 1988) (stating
that appellate courts do not consider new evidence on appeal); see also Minn. R. Civ. App.
P. 110.01 (defining the record on appeal). Our thorough review of the district court record
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This opinion will be unpublished and may not be cited except as provided by Minn. Stat. § 480A.08, subd. 3 (2014).
STATE OF MINNESOTA IN COURT OF APPEALS A15-1440
Adrianne Robbennolt and obo minor child, petitioner, Respondent,
vs.
Sandi Weigum, Appellant.
Filed April 18, 2016 Affirmed; motion denied Peterson, Judge
Ramsey County District Court File No. 62-HR-CV-15-130
Adrianne Robbennolt, St. Paul, Minnesota (pro se respondent)
Sandi Weigum Grob, Kalispell, Montana (pro se appellant)
Considered and decided by Ross, Presiding Judge; Peterson, Judge; and Reyes,
Judge.
UNPUBLISHED OPINION
PETERSON, Judge
Pro se appellant challenges a harassment restraining order (HRO) granted to pro se
respondent and her minor child. Appellant also filed a motion in this court asking us to
consider materials that were not filed in the district court. We deny appellant’s motion and
affirm the HRO. FACTS
Appellant Sandi Weigum Grob is the paternal grandmother of respondent-mother
Adrianne Robbennolt’s minor child, J.G. On April 1, 2015, mother petitioned for an HRO
on behalf of herself and J.G. Mother alleged that grandmother, while falsely claiming to
be mother’s mother, baselessly called the Saint Paul Police Department to request a welfare
check on mother’s home, and the police found the check unwarranted. According to
mother, this was the second such call to the Saint Paul Police Department in the past year,
and grandmother also called the West Saint Paul Police Department and Dakota County
Child Protection in 2013, which resulted in two more welfare checks. Mother also alleged
that, in a telephone conversation with mother, grandmother stated that she would continue
to make such calls in the future.
Mother further alleged that (1) J.G. expressed to her that he does not desire a
relationship with grandmother and he has anxiety because of grandmother’s phone calls
and the welfare checks, and (2) J.G. does not want to speak with grandmother by phone
because he does not need to be “saved” and does not like the negative things grandmother
says about mother and her family.
On April 1, 2015, the district court granted a temporary ex parte HRO (THRO).
Within days, grandmother was served with a copy of the THRO and was informed of her
right to request a hearing. Grandmother requested a hearing but asked that she be allowed
to appear by telephone because she lives in Montana. The court granted grandmother’s
request and scheduled an initial telephone hearing for May 20, 2015, but stated that
grandmother must appear in person for all future hearings. The district court also stated
2 that if grandmother “fail[ed] to be available by phone for the hearing, the court may grant
whatever [relief mother] has requested.”
On May 20, 2015, mother and J.G. appeared for the hearing, but grandmother did
not answer the district court’s telephone call. The district court granted an HRO, effective
for two years. In the May 20, 2015 order, the district court incorporated mother’s
allegations as its findings of fact and found that grandmother’s actions constituted
“harassment,” that “has or is intended to have a substantial adverse effect on [p]etitioner’s
safety, security, or privacy.”
In June 2015, grandmother moved to have the HRO dismissed. Grandmother stated
that she purchased a new telephone before the May 20 hearing, but it malfunctioned when
the district court tried to call. The district court granted grandmother’s request for a
telephone hearing and, after mother requested a continuance, scheduled a hearing for July
29, 2015.
It is unclear how long the July 29 hearing lasted, but the district court found that
both parties had notice of the hearing and that:
[Grandmother] stated that she will [not] appear in person in Minnesota for an evidentiary hearing. [Grandmother] has been on notice since the order dated May 15, 2015 that she would have to appear in person for all subsequent hearings. [Grandmother’s] request to appear by telephone at an evidentiary hearing should be denied as it does not allow for [grandmother’s] credibility to be fully assessed. [Grandmother’s] motion dated June 9, 2015 to dismiss this matter should be denied as [grandmother] stated that she will not be present in person if an evidentiary hearing is scheduled.
3 The district court denied grandmother’s motion to dismiss the HRO and ordered that the
May 20, 2015 HRO remain in effect. Grandmother appeals.
DECISION
“[T]he issuance of an HRO is reviewed for abuse of discretion.” Peterson v.
Johnson, 755 N.W.2d 758, 761 (Minn. App. 2008). We will not disturb the district court’s
findings of fact “unless [they are] clearly erroneous, and due regard is given to the district
court’s opportunity to judge the credibility of witnesses.” Id. (quotation omitted); see
Minn. R. Civ. P. 52.01. “The determination of what constitutes an adequate factual basis
for a harassment order is left to the discretion of the district courts.” Kush v. Mathison,
683 N.W.2d 841, 846 (Minn. App. 2004), review denied (Minn. Sept. 29, 2004). “[T]his
court will reverse the issuance of a restraining order if it is not supported by sufficient
evidence.” Id. at 844.
Grandmother contends that the district court’s findings of fact that incorporate the
allegations made in mother’s petition, are clearly erroneous. But grandmother refused to
appear for an evidentiary hearing, and there is no transcript or other evidentiary record that
she cites to establish errors in the findings. See Loth v. Loth, 227 Minn. 387, 392, 35
N.W.2d 542, 546 (1949) (stating that “[i]t is well to bear in mind that on appeal error is
never presumed. It must be made to appear affirmatively before there can be reversal.”
(quotation omitted)). Furthermore, the district court’s adoption of the allegations in
mother’s petition demonstrates an implied credibility determination. See Pechovnik v.
Pechovnik, 765 N.W.2d 94, 99 (Minn. App. 2009) (noting that the district court’s findings
“implicitly indicate[d]” that it found certain evidence credible). It is well settled that this
4 court defers to a district court’s credibility determinations. Minn. R. Civ. P. 52.01;
Peterson, 755 N.W.2d at 761. Without a transcript or other documents or exhibits to
review, we defer to the district court’s credibility determinations and its findings.
As part of her argument that the district court’s findings are clearly erroneous,
grandmother filed correspondence with this court, including medical records relating to
J.G., and a motion requesting “inspection of previously submitted medical records.”
Appellate courts generally do not consider new evidence, and appellate review is limited
to documents and exhibits that were filed in the district court, plus any transcripts from
district court proceedings. See Thiele v. Stich, 425 N.W.2d 580, 583 (Minn. 1988) (stating
that appellate courts do not consider new evidence on appeal); see also Minn. R. Civ. App.
P. 110.01 (defining the record on appeal). Our thorough review of the district court record
shows that these materials were not filed in or considered by the district court when it
issued the HRO. Therefore, the materials are not properly before us, and we deny
grandmother’s motion.
Grandmother also argues that the district court’s findings do not support the
issuance of an HRO. We disagree. A district court may issue an HRO if the district court
finds “that there are reasonable grounds to believe that the respondent has engaged in
harassment.” Minn. Stat. § 609.748, subd. 5(b)(3) (2014). The statute defines
“harassment,” in relevant part, as:
[R]epeated incidents of intrusive or unwanted acts, words, or gestures that have a substantial adverse effect or are intended to have a substantial adverse effect on the safety, security, or privacy of another, regardless of the relationship between the actor and the intended target.
5 Minn. Stat. § 609.748, subd. 1(a)(1) (2014).
“Harassment,” as defined by the statute, requires proof of (1) “objectively
unreasonable conduct or intent on the part of the harasser,” and (2) “an objectively
reasonable belief on the part of the person subject to harassing conduct.” Peterson, 755
N.W.2d at 764 (quotations omitted). “[W]hether certain conduct constitutes harassment
may be judged from both an objective standard, when assessing the effect the conduct has
on the typical victim, and a subjective standard, to the extent the court may determine the
harasser’s intent.” Kush, 683 N.W.2d at 845. In its May 20, 2015 order, the district court
incorporated the “contents of [mother’s] petition . . . as findings of fact,” and found that
the allegations met the statutory threshold for harassment.
Mother’s petition states that grandmother’s actions have resulted in four unwanted,
and unfounded, visits from the authorities to mother’s home, resulting in distress to mother
and her children and intrusion into their home. Mother also alleged that grandmother stated
to her that she would continue to make such calls. Mother’s petition also claims that
grandmother has called J.G.’s maternal grandmother in the past and has threatened to “take
[J.G.]” the next time he visits Montana.
With respect to J.G., mother’s petition states that J.G. has been distressed because
of (1) the erroneous welfare checks, (2) the feeling that he “has” to speak with grandmother,
and (3) the negative things that grandmother says about mother and her family. J.G. has
also expressed that he does not want a relationship or further contact with grandmother.
6 The allegations in mother’s petition support the district court’s order granting the
HRO. Grandmother’s repeated calls to the authorities constitute “repeated incidents of
intrusive or unwanted acts” that have had a substantial adverse effect on the “privacy” of
mother and J.G. See Minn. Stat. § 609.748, subd. 1(a)(1). The district court’s
determination that grandmother’s actions constituted “harassment” warranting an HRO
was not an abuse of discretion. See Kush, 683 N.W.2d at 846.
Grandmother argues that, because she is J.G.’s paternal grandmother, an HRO is not
warranted. But the statute’s definition of harassment explicitly applies “regardless of the
relationship between the actor and the intended target.” Minn. Stat. § 609.748, subd.
1(a)(1). Because the district court had reasonable grounds to believe that grandmother has
engaged in harassment, it did not abuse its discretion in granting the HRO.
Affirmed; motion denied.