Adrian Tod Dearion v. State

• Court: Court of Appeals of Texas
• Decided: March 23, 2004
• Docket: 06-03-00202-CR
• Status: Published

Opinion

In The

Court of Appeals

Sixth Appellate District of Texas at Texarkana

______________________________

No. 06-03-00202-CR

ADRIAN TOD DEARION, Appellant

 

V.

THE STATE OF TEXAS, Appellee

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On Appeal from the 124th Judicial District Court

Gregg County, Texas

Trial Court No. 30675-B

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Before Morriss, C.J., Ross and Carter, JJ.

Memorandum Opinion by Justice Carter

MEMORANDUM OPINION

            Adrian Tod Dearion was indicted for possession of one to four grams of cocaine and for possession with intent to deliver cocaine. He was acquitted of the intent to deliver charge, but convicted for possession of cocaine. The range of punishment was enhanced to twenty-five to ninety-nine years by two prior felony convictions. See Tex. Pen. Code Ann. § 12.42(d) (Vernon Supp. 2004). At the punishment hearing, Dearion pled "true" to the enhancement allegations. The jury assessed punishment at fifty years' confinement. The court ordered the sentence to be served consecutively to another felony offense. Dearion's sole issue on appeal is that improper evidence was admitted and the trial court erred by failing to grant a mistrial. We affirm the judgment of the trial court.

            After the indictment was read, Dearion was asked to enter his plea and replied, "Sir, I plead guilty to the possession part." The court refused to allow him to plead guilty to one paragraph and not the other. Defense counsel stated, "He desires to enter a plea of not guilty to possession of intent to deliver and guilty to possession." The court entered a plea of not guilty to the indictment.

Factual Background

            Chris Clark, a patrolman for the City of Longview, Texas, Police Department, was dispatched to the Econo Lodge in Longview on February 8, 2003, to investigate a report of suspicious activity in room 221. Clark was informed that a person named Stoker had rented the room. During the direct examination by the State, the following occurred:

QWhat did you do after you found this out?

AWe were going to make contact to Room 221, but prior to doing so, the caller who reported this gave us the name of a person that was occupying that room and the name was Adrian Dearion, and we were informed by dispatch that this Mr. Dearion had an outstanding parole violation warrant.

            The trial court removed the jury and admonished the witness. Defense counsel moved for a mistrial. The court deferred ruling on the motion and instructed the jury to "completely disregard the last answer given by the witness in testifying. You will not consider that remark for any purpose whatsoever." Later, the court overruled the motion for mistrial.

            Clark testified that, on approaching room 221, he made contact with the occupant, Dearion. The officers detected an odor of burning marihuana emitting from the room, and Dearion admitted narcotics were in the room. A search of the room revealed some suspected crack cocaine, as well as other illegal substances. As each illegal substance was found, Dearion claimed it was his. Other officers testified as to the search and chain of custody of the evidence. A chemist testified one of the substances found in Dearion's possession contained cocaine in the form of cocaine base. The cocaine substance weighed 1.22 grams.

Motion for Mistrial

            Dearion alleges that the testimony concerning a "parole violation warrant" obviously referred to a prior criminal conviction and that it was highly prejudicial and incurable by an instruction to disregard. A denial of a mistrial is reviewed for an abuse of discretion. Ladd v. State, 3 S.W.3d 547, 567 (Tex. Crim. App. 1999). A trial court does not abuse its discretion when its decision is at least within the zone of reasonable disagreement. See Montgomery v. State, 810 S.W.2d 372, 391 (Tex. Crim. App. 1990) (op. on reh'g).

             An accused is entitled to be tried on the accusation in the State's pleading and should not be tried for some collateral crime or for being a criminal generally. Campos v. State, 589 S.W.2d 424, 427–28 (Tex. Crim. App. [Panel Op.] 1979) (citing Jones v. State, 568 S.W.2d 847 (Tex. Crim. App. 1978)).

            In Campos, evidence was introduced as to the defendant's previous incarceration and an instruction to disregard was given to the jury. The court held that a trial court's instruction to the jury to disregard cured the improper admission of such evidence except in extreme cases where it appeared the question or evidence was clearly calculated to inflame the minds of the jury and was of such character as to suggest the impossibility of withdrawing the impression produced on their minds. Campos, 589 S.W.2d at 428.

            In Mathews v. State, 40 S.W.3d 179 (Tex. App.—Texarkana 2001, pet. ref'd), this Court addressed a situation in which an expert witness interjected that the defendant had been in the penitentiary for eight years on two different occasions. Defense counsel moved for a mistrial, but did not request an instruction for the jury to disregard the evidence. This Court held that such an instruction to the jury would have been adequate to cure any harm caused by such testimony. Id. at 183.

            Improper evidence will seldom call for a mistrial because, in most cases, any harm can be cured by an instruction to disregard. Id. (citing Ladd, 3 S.W.3d at 567).

            Dearion argues that this case is one of those extreme cases in which the improper testimony is inflammatory and cannot be withdrawn from the minds of the jury. We disagree. Here, some of the first words the jury heard at trial was Dearion attempting to plead guilty to the charge of possession of cocaine. The jury convicted Dearion of possession of cocaine, but acquitted him of possession with intent to deliver. It appears the jury was not inflamed toward Dearion, because he was acquitted of the only charge for which he denied guilt. Counsel for Dearion announced to the jury in his opening statement and in final argument that Dearion admitted guilt concerning the possession charge, but denied guilt as to the intent to deliver charge. The jury reached the decision Dearion sought. The impact of this evidence was also reduced because the jury had previously been advised by defense counsel in his opening statement regarding Dearion that there was "a warrant for his arrest."

            The trial court promptly and clearly advised the jury to disregard the statement of the officer for any purpose. We presume the jury followed this instruction and, based on the decision the jury reached, it is logical and reasonable to conclude that the jury in fact followed the court's instruction to disregard the evidence. The statement that a parole warrant existed likewise would not affect the jury's consideration of punishment, because Dearion pled true to the enhancement paragraphs and his prior convictions were properly in evidence for the jury's consideration.

Conclusion

            We find that the circumstances of this case do not show the evidence was calculated to inflame the minds of the jury and was not so extreme that it could not be cured by a proper instruction. The trial court's action in instructing the jury cured any error concerning the testimony. The trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying the motion for mistrial.

            We affirm the judgment of the trial court.

                                                                        Jack Carter

                                                                        Justice

Date Submitted:          March 19, 2004

Date Decided:             March 23, 2004

Do Not Publish

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In The

  Court of Appeals

                        Sixth Appellate District of Texas at Texarkana

                                                ______________________________

                                                             No. 06-09-00090-CR

                                                ______________________________

                                KEITH ASHLEY HUBBARD, Appellant

                                                                V.

                                     THE STATE OF TEXAS, Appellee

                                                                                                  

                                         On Appeal from the 5th Judicial District Court

                                                             Bowie County, Texas

                                                       Trial Court No. 08F0792-005

                                                                                                   

                                          Before Morriss, C.J., Carter and Moseley, JJ.

                                            Memorandum Opinion by Justice Moseley

                                                     MEMORANDUM  OPINION

            A Bowie County jury found Keith Ashley Hubbard guilty of seven counts^[1] of aggravated sexual assault of Tabitha Fowl,^[2] a child.  Hubbard was sentenced to fifty years’ imprisonment for each of the seven counts, the sentences to run consecutively.  During the trial on the merits, the trial court prohibited Hubbard from cross-examining several witnesses about whether the child had made accusations against others of sexual assault.

            On appeal, Hubbard contends that the exclusion of evidence that the child had lodged accusations against four other people (including two members of Hubbard’s household) of having sexually assaulted her was harmful error.

            We affirm the judgment.

Facts

            In June 2007, then five-year-old Tabitha resided in the same residence with Hubbard. Also living in the residence were Buffy Hubbard (Hubbard’s wife and the aunt of Tabitha) and Buffy’s three sons. 

            Bobby Mixon, a Wake Village police officer, was called to the Hubbard residence to investigate allegations of sexual assault on Tabitha.  Hubbard was prohibited from establishing by the testimony of Mixon that the allegation was not that Hubbard had committed an assault but, rather, that one of Buffy’s juvenile sons had done so.  

            Karrah Dickeson interviewed Tabitha at the Children’s Advocacy Center in Texarkana, Texas.  During that interview (and again at trial), the child described the different ways that Hubbard sexually assaulted her.  Tabitha testified that “white stuff” came out of Hubbard’s “wrong spot.”  However, Dickeson testified that Tabitha also twice denied that “white stuff” came out of Hubbard’s “private.”  During the interview, but not at trial, Tabitha identified one of Buffy’s sons as the source of the “white stuff.”^[3] 

            On voir dire outside the presence of the jury, or upon in camera examination, Mixon, Buffy, and Dickeson testified that the child had also made outcries of sexual assault against Buffy’s two juvenile sons.  Specifically, Hubbard sought to rebut Tabitha’s trial testimony that the “white stuff” came from Hubbard by introducing testimony that during her interview, Tabitha had identified one of Buffy’s sons as the source of the “white stuff.”

            April Graves (who identified herself as Tabitha’s adoptive mother) testified, in camera, that Tabitha “has mentioned all three in different sexual acts against her,” referencing two of Buffy’s sons by name and Hubbard by inference.  In accord with Rule 412 of the Texas Rules of Evidence, Hubbard made clear his intention to question several witnesses (including Mixon, Dickeson, and Graves) regarding accusations of sexual assault made by Tabitha against other persons, including Buffy’s two juvenile sons; Hubbard also wanted to bring out that Tabitha had identified someone other than Hubbard as the source of the “white stuff.”  After proper in camera hearings as well as hearings and offers of proof outside the presence of the jury, the trial court ruled that such evidence was inadmissible under Rules 403 and 412 of the Texas Rules of Evidence.

Standard of Review

            We review a trial court’s decision to admit or exclude evidence for abuse of discretion.  Mozon v. State, 991 S.W.2d 841, 846–47 (Tex. Crim. App. 1999); Sherman v. State, 20 S.W.3d 96, 100 (Tex. App.—Texarkana 2000, no pet.).  Such an inquiry necessarily depends on the facts of each case.  Sherman, 20 S.W.3d at 100.  While an appellate court may decide it would have ruled differently from the trial court on a particular evidentiary issue, such disagreement does not inherently demonstrate an abuse of discretion.  Manning v. State, 114 S.W.3d 922, 926 (Tex. Crim. App. 2003).  Instead, the appellate court may only find an abuse of discretion when the trial court’s decision “is so clearly wrong as to fall outside the zone of reasonable disagreement or when the trial court acts arbitrarily and unreasonably, without reference to any guiding rules or principles.”  Reynolds v. State, 227 S.W.3d 355, 371 (Tex. App.—Texarkana 2007, no pet.).

Analysis

            The trial court prohibited several attempts by Hubbard to offer general evidence the child had accused four other people of sexually assaulting her and, more specifically, that the child previously identified someone other than Hubbard as the source of the “white stuff.”  Hubbard argues that the exclusion of this evidence violated his rights to confrontation by limiting his ability to cross-examine the witnesses against him, and was improper because the probative value of the evidence outweighed any potential prejudicial effect it may have created.

            Rule 403

            As part of his second point of error, Hubbard argues that the trial court erred in excluding the evidence because the probative value of the evidence outweighed the danger of unfair prejudice.

            Generally, our rules favor admission of all relevant evidence, and we presume relevant evidence to be more probative than prejudicial.  See, e.g., Tex. R. Evid. 402; Fletcher v. State, 852 S.W.2d 271, 277 (Tex. App.––Dallas 1993, pet. ref’d).  Most relevant evidence offered by one party will be prejudicial to the opposing party.  Id.  The trial court can exclude relevant evidence if its unfair prejudice substantially outweighs its probative value.  Tex. R. Evid. 403; Montgomery v. State, 810 S.W.2d 372, 389 (Tex. Crim. App. 1990) (op. on reh’g); Fletcher, 852 S.W.2d at 277.  “‘Unfair prejudice’ . . .  refers to an ‘undue tendency to suggest decision on an improper basis, commonly, though not necessarily, an emotional one.’”  Cohn v. State, 849 S.W.2d 817, 820 (Tex. Crim. App. 1993).  Under Rule 403, the trial court may also exclude relevant evidence that would confuse the issues, mislead the jury, cause undue delay, or needlessly present cumulative evidence.

            In determining whether the potential prejudice of evidence outweighs its probative value, we consider:  (1) how compellingly the evidence makes a consequential fact more or less probable, (2) the evidence’s potential to impress the jury in an irrational way, (3) the time needed to develop the evidence, and (4) whether other evidence is available to prove the consequential fact at issue.  Mozon, 991 S.W.2d at 847.

            The first factor mentioned in Mozon (how compelling the evidence makes a consequential fact more or less likely) and the fourth factor (whether other evidence is available to prove the consequential fact at issue) weigh heavily in favor of excluding the evidence.  “There is no purely legal test to determine whether evidence will tend to prove or disprove a proposition—it is a test of logic and common sense.”  Miller v. State, 36 S.W.3d 503, 507 (Tex. Crim. App. 2001).  The key here is the “consequential fact” element of both factors.  Accusations against third parties, even other members of Tabitha’s family or household, of different and separate sexual assaults are inconsequential and not probative of the accusations against Hubbard.  That the child testified that she saw “white stuff” come out of one of Buffy’s sons is likewise not probative of whether she saw “white stuff” come from Hubbard and there is no evidence that the two instances are the same event. 

            The second factor (the potential of the evidence to impress the jury in an irrational way) weighs in favor of exclusion.  All evidence prejudices one party or the other.  However, evidence that the child has accused others of separate sexual assaults is, at best, of questionable relevance to the question of whether Hubbard assaulted the child and it could easily have the effect of confusing or misleading the jury.   

            Very little time would be needed to develop the evidence; therefore, the third factor weighs in favor of admission.

            In support of his appeal, Hubbard relies primarily on the case of Kesterson v. State, where the defendant was accused of sexually assaulting his five-year-old stepdaughter.  997 S.W.2d 290, 292 (Tex. App.––Dallas 1999, no pet.).  During the child’s interview with the State’s psychologist, she accused a different male relative of the very assault with which the defendant was charged, but, at trial, the child testified that the other relative never touched her.  The other male relative had access to the child and disappeared before trial.  The defendant sought to introduce the child’s statement through cross-examination of the psychologist.^[4]  The State argued that Rule 412 excluded any references to any other sexual abuse and the trial court excluded the evidence, relying on both Rule 412 and Rule 403.

            In Kesterson, the court of appeals held that the evidence was admissible under Rule 403, noting that the child’s testimony of the events varied depending on who was questioning her, that the child had a low IQ and suffered from attention deficit disorder, that several witnesses testified to the child’s reputation for telling false stories, and that the defendant’s defensive theory directly related to the excluded evidence.  Id. at 294–95.  The court also held the evidence admissible under Rule 412, finding that the evidence was probative of the defendant’s theory and that “no rational jury would conclude a five year old child was promiscuous or consented, in any way, to sexual assault.”^[5]  Id. at 295.  Finding the erroneous exclusion harmful to the defendant, the court of appeals reversed the trial court and remanded the matter for a new trial.  Id. at 295–96.

            The distinguishing facts of Kesterson are absent in the present case.  In Kesterson, the child had accused two different men of the same assault.  Here, the child accused three different males of separate and distinct assaults on her that occurred at different times; on appeal, Hubbard does not dispute that other and separate offenses of a like nature were committed by others against the child.  Therefore, we find Kesterson distinguishable.

            Introducing the evidence of other alleged assaults risked misleading the jury or confusing the issues.  For the foregoing reasons, we find that the probative value of the excluded evidence was substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice.  We overrule Hubbard’s point of error pertaining to the applicability of Rule 403 in the exclusion of evidence.

            Rule 412 and Confrontation Clause Issues

            Hubbard raises the question of whether the trial court could have excluded the complainant’s statement under the balancing test within Rule 412.^[6]  Rule 412, the “rape shield law,” governs the admissibility of a complainant’s previous sexual conduct in a sexual assault prosecution.  Tex. R. Evid. 412; see Wofford v. State, 903 S.W.2d 796, 798 (Tex. App.––Dallas 1995, pet. ref’d).  It protects a complainant’s previous sexual conduct from exposure, except in limited circumstances.  Tex. R. Evid. 412; see Wofford, 903 S.W.2d at 798.^[7]  The rule includes an exception for testimony “constitutionally required to be admitted.”  Tex. R. Evid. 412(b)(2)(E).  As with the pertinent test examined above as it relates to Rule 403, to be admitted into evidence through one of Rule 412’s exceptions, the probative value of the evidence must still outweigh its prejudicial effect.^[8]

            Hubbard argues that the excluded evidence is “constitutionally required to be admitted” under the Confrontation Clause of the United States Constitution and that the probative value outweighs the evidence’s prejudicial effect.  Applying the same analysis we applied to the court’s Rule 403 ruling, and observing that evidence of the child’s conduct in other circumstances was of little relevance to the cogent question in the trial, we likewise hold that the probative value of the evidence is outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice and that the trial court properly excluded it under the balancing test of Rule 412.  One should comprehend that Rule 412 restricts certain evidence which might otherwise be admissible; its exception from application to evidence “that is constitutionally required to be admitted”^[9] does nothing to trump the admissibility standards of Rule 403 because both rules are subject to the same Constitutional constraints.

            The United States Constitution provides, in part, “[i]n all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right . . . to be confronted with the witnesses against him.”  U.S. Const. amend. VI.  The Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution makes the right to confrontation applicable to the states.  Pointer v. Texas, 380 U.S. 400, 403 (1965).  The Confrontation Clause ensures “the reliability of the evidence against a criminal defendant by subjecting it to rigorous testing in the context of an adversary proceeding before the trier of fact.”  See Maryland v. Craig, 497 U.S. 836, 845 (1990).  Cross-examining an adverse party allows the jury to assess a witness’s credibility and exposes facts which the jury may use in its assessment.  See Carroll v. State, 916 S.W.2d 494, 497 (Tex. Crim. App. 1996).

            Each Confrontation Clause issue must be weighed on a case-by-case basis, carefully taking into account the defendant’s right to cross-examine and the risk factors associated with admission of the evidence.  Hoyos v. State, 951 S.W.2d 503, 510 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 1997), aff’d, 982 S.W.2d 419 (Tex. Crim. App. 1998).  In speaking of the interplay of the Texas Rules of Evidence and the United States Constitution, the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals has recently observed:

Generally, the right to present evidence and to cross-examine witnesses under the Sixth Amendment does not conflict with the corresponding rights under state evidentiary rules.  Thus, most questions concerning cross-examination may be resolved by looking to the Texas Rules of Evidence.  In those rare situations in which the applicable rule of evidence conflicts with a federal constitutional right, Rule 101(c) requires that the Constitution of the United States controls over the evidentiary rule.  Rule 101(c) also states, “Where possible, inconsistency is to be removed by reasonable construction” as well as by reasonable application of the rule.  Thus, compliance with the reasonable construction and application of a rule of evidence will, in most instances, avoid a constitutional question.

Hammer v. State, 296 S.W.3d 555, 561 (Tex. Crim. App. 2009) (footnote omitted).

            Even though it does not recite such a restriction within its body, Rule 403 would be subject to the same Constitutional considerations as Rule 412.  Our analysis of the trial court’s application of Rules 403 and 412 reflect that it was within the trial court’s discretion to rule that the probative value of the excluded evidence was outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice and that admitting the evidence presented a valid risk of jury confusion.  While the Sixth Amendment protects an accused’s right to cross-examine witnesses, it does not prevent a trial judge from limiting cross-examination on concerns about, among other things, “harassment, prejudice, confusion of the issues, the witness’ safety, or interrogation that is repetitive or only marginally relevant.”  Hammer, 296 S.W.3d at 561 & n.7 (quoting Delaware v. Van Arsdall, 475 U.S. 673, 679 (1986)).  Therefore, the trial court did not abuse its discretion.

            We affirm the judgment of the trial court.

                                                                        Bailey C. Moseley

                                                                        Justice

Date Submitted:          March 19, 2010

Date Decided:             May 7, 2010

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^[1]Although Hubbard was originally charged by indictment with nine counts of aggravated sexual assault of a child, two of those counts were dismissed at the instance of the State.

^[2]Tabitha Fowl is the pseudonym used by the trial court to protect the child’s privacy.

               

^[3]The video recorded interview is referenced outside the presence of the jury.  The recorded interview was not included in the record on appeal, but it was entered in the trial court as a record exhibit only.

^[4]The defendant also sought, unsuccessfully, to have the child’s statement admitted through direct examination of the defendant’s retained psychologist and the child.

^[5]The Kesterson court also held that in the event “rule 412 was ever intended to classify sexual assault of a five year old child as ‘past sexual behavior of a victim,’ the facts in [the Kesterson] case meet the exception of 412(b)(2)(E).”  Kesterson, 997 S.W.2d at 295 n.4.

^[6]Tex. R. Evid. 412(b)(3).

^[7]Rule 412(c) also requires an in camera proffer of evidence of prior sexual conduct and a ruling on its admissibility before it can be introduced.  This procedure was meticulously followed by the trial court.

^[8]The balancing test of Rule 412(b)(3) provides that a victim’s “past sexual behavior” is not admissible unless “its probative value outweighs the danger of unfair prejudice.”  The language of this test differs from Rule 403, which provides relevant evidence may be excluded “if its probative value is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice . . . .”

^[9]Tex. R. Evid. 412(b)(2)(E).