IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF WASHINGTON
In the Matter of the Marriage of No. 87679-1-I ADRIAN TEYTUD CONTRERAS, DIVISION ONE Respondent, UNPUBLISHED OPINION and
PHUONG NGUYEN HOAI DANG,
Appellant.
HAZELRIGG, A.C.J. — Phuong Nguyen Hoai Dang appeals from the
parenting plan and child support orders following the dissolution of her marriage
with Adrian Teytud Contreras. Because she fails to demonstrate any error and
sufficient evidence supports the trial court’s findings, we affirm.
FACTS
Phuong Nguyen Hoai Dang and Adrian Teytud Contreras married on
February 17, 2017. They have one daughter, A, who was born in September 2017.
In the summer of 2019, Dang moved out but A remained with Teytud in the family
home. After their separation, Dang enlisted in the military in late October 2020.
The parties entered into a written agreement 1 that A would reside with Teytud who
would care for her and make any necessary parenting decisions.
1 While both parties reference this agreement in their respective briefs on appeal and pleadings filed in the trial court, the agreement itself is not in the record transmitted to this court on appeal. No. 87679-1-I/2
On December 8, 2020, Teytud filed for divorce and a restraining order after
Dang threatened to “send someone to take [A] away.” When Dang returned from
basic training, the parties adopted a new parenting plan under which A lived with
Teytud during the school year and spent alternating weekends with Dang. They
shared residential time in the summer and followed this schedule for two years
before trial.
By joint agreement, the matter was resolved by way of an informal trial in
September 2023. The trial court heard testimony from both parties and the
appointed guardian ad litem (GAL). It found no basis to impose RCW 26.09.191
limitations on the residential time of either parent and ordered joint decision-
making. The court deemed Teytud the primary residential parent and granted
Dang visitation every other weekend. It also ordered Dang to pay $7,934.40 in
back child support—$495.90 per month for 16 months. The parties agree that on
reconsideration the court increased Dang’s obligation to $9,715.55, her net
proportional share of A’s unpaid childcare expenses. 2
Dang timely appealed.
ANALYSIS
As a threshold matter, we note that Dang represents herself on appeal.
“[T]he law does not distinguish between one who elects to conduct [their] own legal
affairs and one who seeks assistance of counsel—both are subject to the same
2 Again, while both parties agree that Dang moved for reconsideration, the trial court denied
reconsideration, and as a result of this phase of litigation, Dang was ordered to pay back childcare expenses to Teytud, none of the related documents were designated for appeal. Accordingly, we rely on the assertions of the parties as to this aspect of the proceedings in the trial court solely for purposes of setting out the procedural history of the case.
-2- No. 87679-1-I/3
procedural and substantive laws.” In re Marriage of Olson, 69 Wn. App. 621, 626,
850 P.2d 527 (1993) (quoting In re Marriage of Wherley, 34 Wn. App. 344, 349,
661 P.2d 155 (1983)). RAP 10.3(a) governs the content of briefing on appeal and
requires an appellant to include a “fair statement of the facts and procedure
relevant to the issues presented for review, without argument,” with record citations
for each factual statement. RAP 10.3(a)(5). The parties, not the court, must
provide accurate record citations. See Mills v. Park, 67 Wn.2d 717, 721, 409 P.2d
646 (1966) (The court is “not required to search the record for applicable portions
thereof in support of the [appellant’s] arguments.”). The opening brief must also
contain “argument in support of the issues presented for review, together with
citations to legal authority and references to relevant parts of the record.” RAP
10.3(a)(6).
Here, Dang’s statement of the case and arguments lack record citations and
legal authority. Critically, she fails to identify or apply the relevant standard of
review and does not address the applicable statutory standards for parenting plans
or child support. This noncompliance with the RAPs limits the court’s ability to
consider each challenge she presents. However, an appellate court may consider
an improperly briefed legal or factual issue if its basis is apparent. DeHeer v.
Seattle Post-Intelligencer, 60 Wn.2d 122, 126, 372 P.2d 193 (1962) (courts will not
consider assignment of error without argument or authority unless “apparent
without further research”). We endeavor to reach the merits of Dang’s challenges
to the parenting plan and child support payments to the extent they are
discernable. See RAP 1.2(a).
-3- No. 87679-1-I/4
I. Parenting Plan
We review a trial court’s parenting plan for abuse of discretion. In re
Marriage of Katare, 175 Wn.2d 23, 35, 283 P.3d 546 (2012). “An abuse of
discretion occurs when a decision is manifestly unreasonable or based on
untenable grounds or untenable reasons.” Id. We accept the trial court’s findings
of fact as verities on appeal if they are supported by substantial evidence. In re
Marriage of Chandola, 180 Wn.2d 632, 642, 327 P.3d 644 (2014). “‘Substantial
evidence’ is evidence sufficient to persuade a fair-minded person of the truth of the
matter asserted.’” Id. (quoting Katare, 175 Wn.2d at 35). We defer to trial courts
as the finder of fact to make credibility determinations and weigh evidence. State
v. Merritt, 200 Wn. App. 398, 408, 402 P.3d 862 (2017), aff’d, 193 Wn.2d 70, 434
P.3d 1016 (2019). A trial court has broad discretion in crafting a permanent
parenting plan, but it must follow the provisions of chapter 26.09 RCW. Katare,
175 Wn.2d at 35-36.
Dang avers in her briefing that the trial court improperly dismissed the GAL’s
concerns regarding Teytud’s transparency and undermined the fairness of the
custody determination. She asserts that “[i]t is evident that children benefit from
having both parents involved in their lives. Therefore, a 50/50 custody
arrangement should be considered to ensure both parents have equal parental
rights.” But she fails to identify, much less analyze, the mandatory statutory factors
that must be considered when a parenting plan is established or otherwise
demonstrate that no reasonable judge would have reached the same conclusion
based on the facts and record before the trial court.
-4- No. 87679-1-I/5
Here, the trial court considered each of the seven factors set forth in RCW
26.09.187 and determined that equal residential time was inappropriate due to the
high level of conflict between the parents. Dang does not specifically assign error
to any of these findings, making them verities on appeal. Id. at 35. Our review,
therefore, is limited to determining whether these findings support the court’s
conclusions of law.
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IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF WASHINGTON
In the Matter of the Marriage of No. 87679-1-I ADRIAN TEYTUD CONTRERAS, DIVISION ONE Respondent, UNPUBLISHED OPINION and
PHUONG NGUYEN HOAI DANG,
Appellant.
HAZELRIGG, A.C.J. — Phuong Nguyen Hoai Dang appeals from the
parenting plan and child support orders following the dissolution of her marriage
with Adrian Teytud Contreras. Because she fails to demonstrate any error and
sufficient evidence supports the trial court’s findings, we affirm.
FACTS
Phuong Nguyen Hoai Dang and Adrian Teytud Contreras married on
February 17, 2017. They have one daughter, A, who was born in September 2017.
In the summer of 2019, Dang moved out but A remained with Teytud in the family
home. After their separation, Dang enlisted in the military in late October 2020.
The parties entered into a written agreement 1 that A would reside with Teytud who
would care for her and make any necessary parenting decisions.
1 While both parties reference this agreement in their respective briefs on appeal and pleadings filed in the trial court, the agreement itself is not in the record transmitted to this court on appeal. No. 87679-1-I/2
On December 8, 2020, Teytud filed for divorce and a restraining order after
Dang threatened to “send someone to take [A] away.” When Dang returned from
basic training, the parties adopted a new parenting plan under which A lived with
Teytud during the school year and spent alternating weekends with Dang. They
shared residential time in the summer and followed this schedule for two years
before trial.
By joint agreement, the matter was resolved by way of an informal trial in
September 2023. The trial court heard testimony from both parties and the
appointed guardian ad litem (GAL). It found no basis to impose RCW 26.09.191
limitations on the residential time of either parent and ordered joint decision-
making. The court deemed Teytud the primary residential parent and granted
Dang visitation every other weekend. It also ordered Dang to pay $7,934.40 in
back child support—$495.90 per month for 16 months. The parties agree that on
reconsideration the court increased Dang’s obligation to $9,715.55, her net
proportional share of A’s unpaid childcare expenses. 2
Dang timely appealed.
ANALYSIS
As a threshold matter, we note that Dang represents herself on appeal.
“[T]he law does not distinguish between one who elects to conduct [their] own legal
affairs and one who seeks assistance of counsel—both are subject to the same
2 Again, while both parties agree that Dang moved for reconsideration, the trial court denied
reconsideration, and as a result of this phase of litigation, Dang was ordered to pay back childcare expenses to Teytud, none of the related documents were designated for appeal. Accordingly, we rely on the assertions of the parties as to this aspect of the proceedings in the trial court solely for purposes of setting out the procedural history of the case.
-2- No. 87679-1-I/3
procedural and substantive laws.” In re Marriage of Olson, 69 Wn. App. 621, 626,
850 P.2d 527 (1993) (quoting In re Marriage of Wherley, 34 Wn. App. 344, 349,
661 P.2d 155 (1983)). RAP 10.3(a) governs the content of briefing on appeal and
requires an appellant to include a “fair statement of the facts and procedure
relevant to the issues presented for review, without argument,” with record citations
for each factual statement. RAP 10.3(a)(5). The parties, not the court, must
provide accurate record citations. See Mills v. Park, 67 Wn.2d 717, 721, 409 P.2d
646 (1966) (The court is “not required to search the record for applicable portions
thereof in support of the [appellant’s] arguments.”). The opening brief must also
contain “argument in support of the issues presented for review, together with
citations to legal authority and references to relevant parts of the record.” RAP
10.3(a)(6).
Here, Dang’s statement of the case and arguments lack record citations and
legal authority. Critically, she fails to identify or apply the relevant standard of
review and does not address the applicable statutory standards for parenting plans
or child support. This noncompliance with the RAPs limits the court’s ability to
consider each challenge she presents. However, an appellate court may consider
an improperly briefed legal or factual issue if its basis is apparent. DeHeer v.
Seattle Post-Intelligencer, 60 Wn.2d 122, 126, 372 P.2d 193 (1962) (courts will not
consider assignment of error without argument or authority unless “apparent
without further research”). We endeavor to reach the merits of Dang’s challenges
to the parenting plan and child support payments to the extent they are
discernable. See RAP 1.2(a).
-3- No. 87679-1-I/4
I. Parenting Plan
We review a trial court’s parenting plan for abuse of discretion. In re
Marriage of Katare, 175 Wn.2d 23, 35, 283 P.3d 546 (2012). “An abuse of
discretion occurs when a decision is manifestly unreasonable or based on
untenable grounds or untenable reasons.” Id. We accept the trial court’s findings
of fact as verities on appeal if they are supported by substantial evidence. In re
Marriage of Chandola, 180 Wn.2d 632, 642, 327 P.3d 644 (2014). “‘Substantial
evidence’ is evidence sufficient to persuade a fair-minded person of the truth of the
matter asserted.’” Id. (quoting Katare, 175 Wn.2d at 35). We defer to trial courts
as the finder of fact to make credibility determinations and weigh evidence. State
v. Merritt, 200 Wn. App. 398, 408, 402 P.3d 862 (2017), aff’d, 193 Wn.2d 70, 434
P.3d 1016 (2019). A trial court has broad discretion in crafting a permanent
parenting plan, but it must follow the provisions of chapter 26.09 RCW. Katare,
175 Wn.2d at 35-36.
Dang avers in her briefing that the trial court improperly dismissed the GAL’s
concerns regarding Teytud’s transparency and undermined the fairness of the
custody determination. She asserts that “[i]t is evident that children benefit from
having both parents involved in their lives. Therefore, a 50/50 custody
arrangement should be considered to ensure both parents have equal parental
rights.” But she fails to identify, much less analyze, the mandatory statutory factors
that must be considered when a parenting plan is established or otherwise
demonstrate that no reasonable judge would have reached the same conclusion
based on the facts and record before the trial court.
-4- No. 87679-1-I/5
Here, the trial court considered each of the seven factors set forth in RCW
26.09.187 and determined that equal residential time was inappropriate due to the
high level of conflict between the parents. Dang does not specifically assign error
to any of these findings, making them verities on appeal. Id. at 35. Our review,
therefore, is limited to determining whether these findings support the court’s
conclusions of law.
The trial court properly applied the statutory considerations for a residential
schedule and exercised its discretion in establishing the parenting plan. It
thoroughly evaluated each of the seven factors required by RCW 26.09.187(3)(a),
considered the evidence adduced by the parties at trial, and issued detailed
findings for each factor. Specifically, the court found that “the dynamics that would
need to be present for this court to find a 50/50 parenting plan to be in [A]’s best
interest are not present, and I’m not finding that a 50/50 parenting plan is in her
best interest.”
The trial court also addressed the GAL’s concerns about Teytud’s candor
regarding Dang’s involvement in A’s life and his accuracy about Dang’s departure,
and gave the GAL an opportunity to supplement her report. In its ruling, the court
specified that it was not deferring to the GAL’s recommendation, calling it “[j]ust
one data point in the record.” Again, Dang fails to carry her burden on appeal as
to this claimed error. It is well established that a court is “free to ignore the guardian
ad litem’s recommendations if they are not supported by other evidence or it finds
other testimony more convincing.” Fernando v. Nieswandt, 87 Wn. App. 103, 107,
940 P.2d 1380 (1997); see also RCW 26.12.175(1)(b) (“[T]he court may consider
-5- No. 87679-1-I/6
and weigh [the GAL’s recommendation] in conjunction with the recommendations
of all of the parties.”).
The trial court properly applied the law and substantial evidence supports
its findings. Accordingly, Dang fails to show an abuse of discretion and her claim
that the trial court erred when it decided the parenting plan does not warrant
appellate relief.
II. Child Support
Dang next argues that the trial court erred when it awarded backdated child
support from July 2019 to October 2020 to Teytud. She contends that there was
no concrete evidence that Teytud assumed exclusive financial responsibility during
this period and his delayed disclosure of childcare expenses unfairly burdened her.
We review the court’s child support decision for abuse of discretion. In re
Marriage of Condie, 15 Wn. App. 2d 449, 472, 475 P.3d 993 (2020). “‘This court
will not substitute its own judgment for that of the trial court where the record shows
that the trial court considered all relevant factors and the award is not
unreasonable under the circumstances.’” Id. (quoting In re Marriage of Fiorito, 112
Wn. App. 657, 664, 50 P.3d 298 (2002)).
Here, Dang only makes conclusory arguments and presents no evidence
that the backdated award of child support was improper. Even under a generous
reading of her brief, she fails to provide reasoned argument or record citations
supporting her claim. We do not consider conclusory arguments that are
unsupported by citation to authority. Cowiche Canyon Conservancy v. Bosley, 118
Wn.2d 801, 809, 828 P.3d 549 (1992). “Passing treatment of an issue or lack of
-6- No. 87679-1-I/7
reasoned argument is insufficient to merit judicial consideration.” Brownfield v.
City of Yakima, 178 Wn. App. 850, 876, 316 P.3d 520 (2014).
Because Dang neither adequately cites to the record nor provides
substantive argument to support her argument that the trial court erred in awarding
backdated child support, we decline to consider her claim. 3
III. Attorney Fees
Teytud requests attorney fees under RAP 18.9 for having to respond to
Dang’s appeal. He argues that she presents a one-sided narrative without a single
citation to the record, and her “arguments do not provide any legal support or any
real argument.”
RAP 18.9(a) permits an award of attorney fees as a sanction for filing a
frivolous appeal. An appeal is frivolous if, considering the whole record, the court
is convinced there are no debatable issues on which reasonable minds may differ
and it is totally devoid of merit. See Fiorito, 112 Wn. App. at 669-70. “‘An appeal
that is affirmed simply because an appellant’s arguments are rejected is not
frivolous.’” Brett v. Martin, 9 Wn. App. 2d 303, 316, 445 P.3d 568 (2019) (quoting
In re Est. of Pesterkoff, 37 Wn. App. 418, 424, 680 P.2d 1062 (1984)). “All doubts
as to whether the appeal is frivolous should be resolved in favor of the appellant.”
In re Marriage of Schnurman, 178 Wn. App. 634, 644, 316 P.3d 514 (2013).
3 Dang also assigns error to the award of past childcare expenses in favor of Teytud,
however, the parties appear to agree that this award is contained in the order denying Dang’s motion for reconsideration. Not only is the record on appeal devoid of any of the pleadings and order related to reconsideration, Dang did not designate the order denying reconsideration in her notice of appeal. Accordingly, that order and any other award contained therein is beyond the scope of her appeal.
-7- No. 87679-1-I/8
Although there is no legal or factual support for Dang’s appeal, Teytud’s briefing
demonstrates that Dang’s failure to follow the requirements of RAP 10.3(a) did not
hamper his ability to respond fully to her claims. While Dang does not prevail, her
appeal is not so totally devoid of merit as to be frivolous. Accordingly, the request
for attorney fees on appeal is denied.
Affirmed.
WE CONCUR:
-8-