Adrian Tamilrah Moore a/k/a Adrian Moore a/k/a Adrin Moore v. State of Mississippi

• Court: Court of Appeals of Mississippi
• Decided: February 3, 2026
• Docket: 2024-KA-00507-COA
• Status: Published

Opinion

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF MISSISSIPPI

NO. 2024-KA-00507-COA

ADRIAN TAMILRAH MOORE A/K/A ADRIAN APPELLANT MOORE A/K/A ADRIN MOORE

v.

STATE OF MISSISSIPPI APPELLEE

DATE OF JUDGMENT: 04/17/2024 TRIAL JUDGE: HON. CALEB ELIAS MAY COURT FROM WHICH APPEALED: NEWTON COUNTY CIRCUIT COURT ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT: SANFORD E. KNOTT ATTORNEY FOR APPELLEE: OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL BY: BARBARA WAKELAND BYRD DISTRICT ATTORNEY: STEVEN SIMEON KILGORE NATURE OF THE CASE: CRIMINAL - FELONY DISPOSITION: AFFIRMED - 02/03/2026 MOTION FOR REHEARING FILED:

BEFORE WILSON, P.J., McDONALD AND WEDDLE, JJ.

WILSON, P.J., FOR THE COURT:

¶1. Following a jury trial, Adrian Moore was convicted of trafficking heroin, possession

of methamphetamine, and possession of phencyclidine (PCP). On appeal, Moore now

challenges the sufficiency of the evidence on all three counts. We conclude that the State

presented sufficient evidence for a rational juror to find Moore guilty of each crime beyond

a reasonable doubt. Therefore, we affirm.

FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

¶2. Deputy Barry Roberts and Deputy William Kennedy with the Newton County

Sheriff’s Department initiated a traffic stop on Interstate 20 East after they “observed a white sedan swerving in and out of traffic at high rates of speed without any kind of turn signal.”

When Roberts approached the vehicle, he “could smell the strong odor of marijuana coming

from inside the vehicle” and “observed what [he] thought was marijuana on the driver’s lap.”

Roberts identified the driver as Adrian Moore and the passenger as Tatiana Adams.

¶3. After Roberts asked Moore and Adams to exit the car, Kennedy searched the vehicle.

Kennedy found “a pill bottle that had pills in it inside a purse,” “a bottle of brown liquid,”

and “colorful different shaped pills.” Roberts testified that “Moore claimed all of it.” Moore

was subsequently arrested, and “Adams was released with the vehicle.”

¶4. After collecting the evidence, the items were transferred to the Mississippi Forensics

Laboratory for testing. Prior to trial, Moore expressly stipulated to the admission of the

report from the Forensics Laboratory, and it was admitted into evidence without objection

during Roberts’s testimony. The report stated that the items found in the car included 43

dosage units of heroin, 28 dosage units of methamphetamine, and 13 milliliters of

phencyclidine. Moore was indicted for trafficking heroin (Count I), possession of

methamphetamine (Count II), and possession of PCP (Count III).

¶5. At trial, Moore testified that she first met Adams when she stopped for gas in Jackson.

Moore testified that she was on her way to Atlanta and agreed to drive Adams to Meridian.

The subject traffic stop occurred on I-20 East in Newton County between Jackson and

Meridian. Moore testified that she was “honest” with Roberts and told him that she had

smoked marijuana about an hour earlier. However, Moore claimed that the purse and drugs

found in her car belonged to Adams. Moore claimed she told the officers that “the only

2 thing” in the car that belonged to her was “a Nike bag.” Moore testified that the officers

“never questioned” Adams. Moore also acknowledged that “the piece of blunt and the weed”

found in the car belonged to her. Moore testified that she did not know that there were any

pills or PCP in her vehicle.

¶6. The State called Roberts as a rebuttal witness. Moore’s written statement and footage

from Roberts’s body camera during the stop were admitted into evidence. Moore’s written

statement read, “I Adrian Moore didn’t know that the pills was what they was[.] I trade them

to help a Homeless guy name tommy[.]” In the video, Moore can be seen retrieving her

identification card from a purse in the front of the vehicle. After Kennedy found the bottle

of pills, Roberts asked Moore if they were hers. She stated that they were not hers, but that

someone had just given them to her. Moore told Roberts that she thought they were “regular

pharmacy pills.” Additionally, when Kennedy asked Moore if the purse was hers, she can

be heard responding, “Yes . . . . That’s my purse.” Kennedy then presented Moore with

several pills wrapped in plastic, and she responded, “I forgot about those . . . . I know what

that is.” When Roberts asked her if the pills were hers, Moore again responded, “Yes.”

Lastly, when Roberts showed Moore the bottle of liquid, she told him that it was called “wet”

and was used on cigarettes. Moore then told Roberts that she had a “drug problem.”

¶7. The jury found Moore guilty of all counts. The court sentenced Moore to serve eight

years in the custody of the Department of Corrections for Count I and a concurrent term of

five years in custody for Count II. For Count III, the court imposed a consecutive five-year

suspended sentence with five years of post-release supervision.

3 ¶8. Moore’s trial counsel did not file a motion for a new trial or judgment notwithstanding

the verdict. On appeal, Moore was initially represented by the Indigent Appeals Division of

the Office of State Public Defender. Her appellate counsel filed a brief pursuant to Lindsey

v. State, 939 So. 2d 743 (Miss. 2005), representing that she could identify no arguable issues

for appeal. This Court then granted Moore three extensions of time to file a pro se

supplemental brief. Retained appellate counsel then entered an appearance for Moore and

requested an additional extension of time, which we also granted. Moore’s new counsel then

filed a brief arguing that the evidence was insufficient to support Moore’s convictions.

ANALYSIS

¶9. We review challenges to the sufficiency of the evidence de novo.1 Sanford v. State,

247 So. 3d 1242, 1244 (¶10) (Miss. 2018). “We view the evidence in the light most

favorable to the prosecution to determine whether rational, reasonable fair-minded jurors

could have found that the State proved each essential element of the crime.” Poole v. State,

46 So. 3d 290, 293 (¶20) (Miss. 2010) (quotation marks and brackets omitted). “[A]ll

credible evidence supporting a defendant’s guilt should be accepted as true, and all favorable

inferences drawn from the evidence must be reconciled in the prosecution’s favor.” Johnson

v. State, 904 So. 2d 162, 166 (¶7) (Miss. 2005). “We are not required to decide—and in fact

we must refrain from deciding—whether we think the State proved the elements.” Poole,

46 So. 3d at 293-94 (¶20). “Rather, we must affirm the conviction as long as there is

sufficient evidence for a rational juror to find that the State proved all elements of the

1 At trial, Moore moved for a directed verdict at the close of the State’s case-in-chief and renewed her motion and requested a peremptory instruction at the close of the evidence.

4 offense.” Williamson v. State, 375 So. 3d 1158, 1167 (¶19) (Miss. Ct. App. 2023) (citing

Poole, 46 So. 3d at 293-94 (¶20)).

I. Heroin

¶10. Count I of Moore’s indictment alleged that she trafficked “a controlled substance by

having in her possession or under her conscious control” heroin “in the amount of 40 dosage

units or more,” in violation of Mississippi Code Annotated section 41-29-139(f)(2)(C) (Rev.

2018). Moore now asserts that she must be acquitted of trafficking heroin because the crime

lab report “did not contain an expert opinion consistent with the legal standard to be

considered by the jury” and because “there was no evidence that 40 of the 43 dosage units

were even tested.”

¶11. Prior to trial, Moore expressly stipulated to the admission of the report from the

Forensics Laboratory, and Moore did not object to any of Roberts’s or Kennedy’s testimony

regarding what the forensic testing revealed. Moore cannot now complain that the report was

lacking. “If a defendant fails to timely object to an issue at trial, the issue is waived for

purposes of appeal. The trial court will not be held in error on a matter that was never

presented for its consideration.” Keys v. State, 33 So. 3d 1143, 1149-50 (¶22) (Miss. Ct.

App. 2009) (citation and quotation marks omitted) (quoting Bogan v. State, 754 So. 2d 1289,

1294 (¶19) (Miss. Ct. App. 2000)).

¶12. In her reply brief, Moore concedes that “there were no specific objections to the lack

of expert opinion or the sufficiency of the testing procedures and sampling techniques.”

However, she asks this Court to review for plain error. “Plain-error review is properly

5 utilized for correcting obvious instances of injustice or misapplied law.” Green v. State, 183

So. 3d 28, 31 (¶6) (Miss. 2016) (quotation marks omitted). Therefore, “in order to determine

if plain error has occurred, we must determine if the trial court has deviated from a legal

rule” and “whether that error is plain, clear, or obvious.” Id. (brackets and quotation marks

omitted). Moore cannot show that any plain error occurred. There is no “legal rule” that

precludes a party from stipulating to the admissibility of a drug analysis report.

¶13. Additionally, Moore’s argument is barred by the invited error doctrine. Prior to trial,

the district attorney informed the trial court that “the parties ha[d] stipulated to the crime lab

[report] so [there would not be] a crime lab witness.” Defense counsel then expressly

confirmed that Moore stipulated to the admission of the report. Under these circumstances,

the issue is not just waived but procedurally barred by the “invited error doctrine.” E.g.,

Wells v. State, 396 So. 3d 1084, 1086 (¶9) (Miss. 2024) (holding that the defendant’s

challenge to the sufficiency of counsel’s oral stipulation was procedurally barred by the

“invited error doctrine” because the defendant “made the tactical decision to enter into the

stipulation of his own volition and did not object to or challenge the stipulation before the

trial court”). “It is axiomatic that a defendant cannot complain on appeal of alleged errors

invited or induced by himself.” Thomas v. State, 249 So. 3d 331, 347 (¶55) (Miss. 2018)

(quotation marks omitted).

¶14. Moore correctly notes that the crime lab report states that only three of the 43 dosage

units of heroin were tested. However, this Court has held that “a forensic chemist is

generally not required to test all of the suspected narcotic substance to opine that the

6 recovered substance as a whole contains narcotics.” O’Kelly v. State, 267 So. 3d 282, 290

(¶27) (Miss. Ct. App. 2018) (quotation marks omitted) (quoting Fay v. State, 133 So. 3d 841,

844-45 (¶¶7-11) (Miss. Ct. App. 2013)). “Rather, random testing is permissible when the

seized samples are sufficiently homogeneous so that one may infer beyond a reasonable

doubt that the untested samples contain the same substance as those that are conclusively

tested.” Id. (quotation marks omitted) (quoting Fay, 133 So. 3d at 845 (¶9)).

¶15. We have rejected similar arguments in prior cases, including Fay and O’Kelly. In

Fay, the defendant asserted that there was insufficient evidence to convict him of possessing

the charged weight of methadone because only one of several pill fragments was tested. Fay,

133 So. 3d at 844 (¶8). We held that the evidence was sufficient for the jury to find that the

pill fragments were all methadone “[b]ased on the relatively homogeneous nature of the pill

fragments.” Id. at 845 (¶11). Similarly, the defendant in O’Kelly argued “that the State

failed to prove that he possessed a sufficient quantity of NBOMe because the State tested

only eight of the approximately 425 perforated squares found.” O’Kelly, 267 So. 3d at 289

(¶26). We held that the evidence was sufficient to support O’Kelly’s conviction because

there was “nothing in the record to suggest that the approximately 417 squares not tested

were different in kind from the eight that were tested.” Id. at 290 (¶28); accord, e.g., Alford

v. State, 367 So. 3d 1013, 1020-21 (¶¶26-31) (Miss. Ct. App. 2023).

¶16. The same reasoning applies here. The 43 pills at issue were all found in the same

glass vial in Moore’s purse. Deputy Kennedy described them at trial as pink and clear

pharmaceutical capsules containing a substance (later determined to be heroin). There is

7 nothing in the record to suggest that the pills were not homogeneous. Therefore, the

evidence presented was sufficient for a rational juror to find beyond a reasonable doubt that

Moore possessed forty or more dosage units of heroin.

II. Methamphetamine

¶17. Count II of Moore’s indictment alleged that she possessed methamphetamine “in an

amount of 20 dosage units or more, but less than 40 dosage units,” in violation of Mississippi

Code Annotated section 41-29-139(c)(1)(D) (Rev. 2018). Moore similarly argues that her

conviction for possession of methamphetamine must be reversed because the forensic

examiner tested only three of 28 dosage units.

¶18. This argument fails for the same reasons discussed just above. Kennedy testified that

he found these pills in a clear plastic bag inside Moore’s purse. There is nothing in the

record to suggest that the 28 pills were not homogeneous. Accordingly, there was sufficient

evidence for a rational juror to find beyond a reasonable doubt that Moore possessed at least

20 dosage units of methamphetamine.

III. Phencyclidine (PCP)

¶19. Count III of Moore’s indictment alleged that she possessed PCP “in an amount of 10

dosage units or more, but less than 20 dosage units,” in violation of Mississippi Code

Annotated section 41-29-139(c)(1)(C) (Rev. 2018). Moore argues that the proof at trial

showed that the PCP “was in a liquid form” and that “there was never a motion filed by the

State to amend the indictment to conform to the evidence.” Therefore, Moore argues, the

evidence “demonstrated that she never had any dosage units of the controlled substance.”

8 ¶20. Moore is correct that the evidence showed that the PCP in her car was in liquid form

in the amount of 13 milliliters. Section 41-29-139(c) states that a “[d]osage unit . . . means

a tablet or capsule, or in the case of a liquid solution, one (1) milliliter.” (Emphasis added).

Further, a jury instruction informed the jury that a “dosage unit . . . means in the case of a

liquid solution, one (1) milliliter.” Accordingly, Moore was properly indicted and convicted

for possessing ten or more dosage units of PCP.

¶21. For the reasons discussed above, Moore’s convictions and sentences are AFFIRMED.

BARNES, C.J., CARLTON, P.J., WESTBROOKS, McDONALD, LAWRENCE, McCARTY, EMFINGER, WEDDLE AND LASSITTER ST. PÉ, JJ., CONCUR.