Adrian Medrano v. the State of Texas

• Court: Court of Appeals of Texas
• Decided: March 28, 2024
• Docket: 13-23-00137-CR
• Status: Published

Opinion

NUMBERS 13-23-00136-CR, 13-23-00137-CR

COURT OF APPEALS

THIRTEENTH DISTRICT OF TEXAS

CORPUS CHRISTI – EDINBURG

ADRIAN MEDRANO, Appellant,

v.

THE STATE OF TEXAS, Appellee.

ON APPEAL FROM THE 105TH DISTRICT COURT OF NUECES COUNTY, TEXAS

CONCURRING MEMORANDUM OPINION Before Justices Benavides, Tijerina, and Silva Concurring Memorandum Opinion by Justice Benavides

I believe the majority should address the merits of Medrano’s constitutional

challenge to the community supervision condition at issue. Because it does not, I

respectfully concur.

In terms of error preservation, first, the majority suggests that Medrano was

required to object to the trial court’s general requirement that he “comply with all the rules and regulations, treatment programs[,] and contracts of [SATF]” at the time the condition

was imposed, or upon his entering the facility. But Dansby v. State is directly on point and

conflicts with the majority’s assertion. See 448 S.W.3d 441, 448–52 (Tex. Crim. App.

2014) (“Appellant . . . cannot be faulted for failing to assert an objection on Fifth

Amendment grounds to the trial court’s order requiring compliance with general sex

offender conditions.”). Next, the majority contends that Medrano “did not argue that rule

2.8 is unconstitutional as applied to him, facially invalid, or overbroad. Therefore, he has

not preserved these arguments.” However, Medrano specifically argued below, “Major

Rule 2.8, is a violation—or violates Mr. Medrano’s constitutional right to free speech.” The

trial court heard and denied this argument. I would hold that this is sufficient to preserve

an as-applied constitutional challenge. See TEX. R. APP. P. 33.1; Thomas v. State, 505

S.W.3d 916, 924 (Tex. Crim. App. 2016) (“The standards of procedural default are not to

be implemented by splitting hairs in the appellate courts.” (quoting Lankston v. State, 827

S.W.2d 907, 909 (Tex. Crim. App. 1992))); Clarke v. State, 270 S.W.3d 573, 581 (Tex.

Crim. App. 2008).

Further, the issue that this Court should address is whether the revocation of

Medrano’s community supervision for failing to follow SATF’s rule passes constitutional

muster, not whether SATF’s rule is constitutional in a vacuum. Though appellant primarily

frames the issue as one involving the constitutionality of the treatment facility’s internal

rules, the substance of his argument is clear: He believes that revocation based on this

condition of his community supervision was not constitutional.1 See Few v. State, 230

1In his brief, Medrano provides examples of hypothetical probationers who fail to comply with SATF’s rules and states, “Under the [rule] as written, either, both, or neither could be penalized with the 2 S.W.3d 184, 190 (Tex. Crim. App. 2007).

This is an interesting and important question, and one that the court of criminal

appeals has flagged as warranting judicial review. See Leonard v. State, 385 S.W.3d 570,

577 (Tex. Crim. App. 2012) (“It would surely offend due process if a defendant were

discharged from his therapy program for a wholly inappropriate reason—such as illegal

discrimination or mere caprice—and the bare fact of that discharge were used as a basis

to revoke the defendant’s community supervision.”). Nonetheless, I would ultimately

conclude that the condition was constitutional, both as-applied to Medrano and in terms

of vagueness, and the trial court did not err by revoking Medrano’s community

supervision. See Crab v. State, 754 S.W.2d 742, 745 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.]

1988, pet. ref’d); see also Archer v. State, No. 13-18-00059-CR, 2019 WL 2221677, at *3

(Tex. App.—Corpus Christi–Edinburg May 23, 2019, no pet.) (mem. op., not designated

for publication). Therefore, I write separately to concur in the judgment.

GINA M. BENAVIDES Justice

Do not publish. TEX. R. APP. P. 47.2(b).

Delivered and filed on the 28th day of March, 2024.

revocation of their probation and remand to the Texas Department of Criminal Justice, at the whim of the SATF staff.” 3