NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION This opinion shall not "constitute precedent or be binding upon any court." Although it is posted on the internet, this opinion is binding only on the parties in the case and its use in other cases is limited . R. 1:36-3.
SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY APPELLATE DIVISION DOCKET NO. A-1218-25
ADRIAN EVANS and KENNETH HICKS, on behalf of themselves and all other similarly situated persons,
Plaintiffs-Respondents,
v.
CITY OF PATERSON, PATERSON FIRE DEPARTMENT, 1
Defendant-Appellant.
Submitted April 27, 2026 – Decided May 26, 2026
Before Judges Sabatino, Natali and Bergman.
On appeal from an interlocutory order of the Superior Court of New Jersey, Law Division, Passaic County, Docket No. L-1915-23.
Taylor Law Group LLC, attorneys for appellant (Christopher J. Buggy and Jeremy C. Washington, on the briefs).
1 We refer to the City of Paterson as "defendant" or "the City" as the Paterson Fire Department is part of the City and is not a separate governmental entity. Sattiraju & Tharney, LLP, attorneys for respondents (Ravi Sattiraju, of counsel and on the brief; Brendan P. McCarthy, on the brief).
PER CURIAM
Defendant City of Paterson appeals from a Law Division order granting
plaintiffs/firefighters Adrian Evans and Kenneth Hicks class certification under
Rule 4:32-1 concerning a wage and hour dispute complaint filed on behalf of
themselves and similarly situated firefighters. Defendant also appeals the trial
court's order denying its motion for reconsideration. Based on our review of the
record, the parties arguments, and the applicable legal principles, we affirm.
I.
Plaintiffs were employed as firefighters by the City and assigned to the
Paterson Fire Division. Plaintiffs were also members of the Paterson
Firefighters Association (the "Association"), which negotiated and entered into
a collective bargaining agreement ("CBA") with the City regarding the terms
and conditions of their employment. CBAs were entered into for the period
from July 1, 2010 through June 30, 2019, and then renewed from July 1, 2019
through December 31, 2023. 2
2 On May 31, 2022, the City and the Association entered into a Memorandum of Agreement that made certain changes to the CBA, but the pertinent provision
A-1218-25 2 Under Article XII Section A of the above-referenced CBAs, the work
schedule for the firefighters was as follows:
For Firefighters not assigned to the Chief's office, the work week schedule shall consist of twenty-four (24) hours on duty followed by seventy-two (72) hours off duty followed by twenty-four (24) hours on duty followed by seventy-two (72) hours off duty, etc.
Furthermore, Article XII Section C states:
Any member [o]f this bargaining unit assigned to staff positions shall receive the same wages and benefits as those members assigned to the forty-two (42) hour work schedule.
In terms of overtime pay, Article XIII provides overtime compensation,
approved in advance by the Fire Chief or the Fire Chief's designee through the approved chain of command[,] . . . will be paid at [one and one-half] at a rate determined by dividing by two . . . times the biweekly gross pay by one hundred sixty-eight . . . hours.
An employee chooses whether "[o]vertime at the end of the regular tour of duty
[is] paid in cash or compensatory time," an award of "time off . . . in lieu of cash
overtime payments," which is also accrued at "[one] and one-half . . . hours of
[compensatory time] for each hour of overtime work."
in this appeal, Article XII, Section C, Article XIII Section A(1), and Article XXX Section C, remained unchanged. A-1218-25 3 Additionally, Article XIII places limitations on the amount of
compensatory time an employee may accrue to a "maximum of sixty-four . . .
clock hours" whereby an employee thereafter is "paid cash overtime payments
for all approved overtime in excess of sixty-four clock hours maximum."
Finally, in the event an employee denies an opportunity to work overtime, the
CBA states they "shall be considered as having worked such overtime for the
sole purpose of maintaining a proper order of rotation for future overt ime
assignments and is entitled to no overtime pay."
On July 17, 2023, plaintiffs filed a class action complaint alleging certain
terms of the CBA violate their statutory rights under the New Jersey Wage and
Hour Law ("NJWHL"), N.J.S.A. 34:11-56a1 to -56a41, alleging it permits
defendants to pay overtime compensation contrary to the requirements in the
NJWHL. Plaintiffs claim they routinely worked over forty hours per week
without receiving the statutorily required overtime payment.
The putative class was defined as "all individuals employed by the City
whose primary responsibility was to perform firefighting duties, including those
with titles 'firefighter, captain and battalion chief' from July 2017 through the
present."
A-1218-25 4 On September 26, 2023, Paterson moved to dismiss plaintiffs' complaint
pursuant to Rule 4:6-2(a) for lack of subject matter jurisdiction and to compel
arbitration in accordance with the CBA, and Rule 4:6-2(e) for failure to state a
claim under the NJWHL. Relying on Atalese v. U.S. Legal Services Group,
L.P., 219 N.J. 430, 441 (2014), plaintiffs contended the "CBA says the contract
is not intended and shall not be construed as a waiver of any right or benefit to
which employees are entitled by law." Plaintiffs further asserted its NJWHL
claim presented "legal issue[s] that the [c]ourt ha[d] to decide . . . [and] not . . .
issue[s] that [could] be determined by an arbitrator at arbitration." The trial
court granted the City's motion and denied plaintiffs' subsequent motion for
reconsideration. Plaintiff appealed, and we reversed and remanded, concluding
"plaintiffs were not required to exhaust the administrative remedies available to
them prior to filing their complaint." Evans v. City of Paterson, No. A-1818-23
(App. Div. Jan. 28, 2025) (slip op. at 17) (Evans I). Following remand, the City
filed its answer and affirmative defenses on February 27, 2025.
In August 2025, plaintiffs moved for class certification and the City
opposed. Following oral argument, the trial court granted plaintiffs ' motion and
defined the class as follows:
All individuals employed by Defendant, City of Paterson, whose primary responsibility was to perform
A-1218-25 5 firefighting duties, including all individuals with the title firefighter, captain and battalion chief, from July 2017 through to the present.
In its order, the trial court designated plaintiffs Evans and Hicks as
representatives of the class.
After granting class certification, the trial court issued a written opinion
detailing its reasons for granting class certification under Rule 4:32-1(a). It
found numerosity, commonality, typicality, and adequacy of representation were
satisfied, relying on defendant's failure to respond to plaintiffs' requests for
admissions and the common employment conditions.
Concerning Rule 4:32-1(b), the trial court held that the common questions
in the case predominate over the individual ones and that a class action is the
superior method for resolving the controversy satisfying subsection (b)(3) of the
Rule. Plaintiffs argued that individual filings over the two common class
questions would waste judicial resources. The trial court agreed, stating, "on
balance, permitting class certification will best promote judicial efficiency and
the effective use of judicial resources, as it avoids the risk of inconsistent
outcomes and lack of uniformity."
Defendant moved for reconsideration and plaintiffs opposed. In
defendant's reply brief, it raised new arguments concerning amendments made
A-1218-25 6 to the definitions section of the NJWHL and that the class definition ordered
should not have included certain persons as per the amendments to the NJWHL.
In a written order, the trial court denied defendant's motion for reconsideration;
reaffirming its prior findings and holding that the requirements for class
certification were satisfied. The trial court did not address defendant's
arguments that were first raised in its reply brief, determining the arguments
were not properly brought before the court.
On appeal, defendant contends: (1) class certification was premature; (2)
the trial court improperly defined the class; (3) the trial court erred in ruling
plaintiffs established all prerequisites for class certification pursuant to Rule
4:32-1(a); and (4) the trial court erred in determining that plaintiffs had
established predominance and superiority under Rule 4:32-1(b).
II.
We review an order granting class certification for an abuse of discretion.
Dugan v. TGI Fridays, Inc., 231 N.J. 24, 50 (2017). Specifically, we "must
ascertain whether the trial court has followed [the standards set forth in Rule
4:32-1] and properly exercised its discretion in granting or denying class
certification." Lee v. Carter-Reed Co., LLC, 203 N.J. 496, 506 (2010). A trial
court abuses its discretion "when a decision is 'made without a rational
A-1218-25 7 explanation, inexplicably departed from established policies, or rested on an
impermissible basis.'" Est. of Kotsovska by Kotsovska v. Liebman, 221 N.J.
568, 588 (2015) (quoting Flagg v. Essex Cnty. Prosecutor, 171 N.J. 561, 571
(2002)). "When examining a trial court's exercise of discretionary authority, we
reverse only when the exercise of discretion was 'manifestly unjust' under the
circumstances." Newark Morning Ledger Co. v. N.J. Sports & Exposition Auth.,
423 N.J. Super. 140, 174 (App. Div. 2011) (quoting Union Cnty. Improvement
Auth. v. Artaki, LLC, 392 N.J. Super. 141, 149 (App. Div. 2007)).
A.
We begin by addressing defendant's initial argument that the trial court
erred by granting plaintiffs' motion for class certification because their request
was premature. At the time the trial court granted class certification, no formal
discovery had taken place. The City argues that "discovery is required regarding
all of the [Rule] 4:32-1(a) and (b) requirements." We are unpersuaded by
defendant's argument.
In Myska v. New Jersey Mfrs. Ins. Co., "we flatly reject[ed] [the request]
to impose a bright-line rule prohibiting examination of the propriety of class
certification until discovery is undertaken." 440 N.J. Super. 458, 478 (App. Div.
2015) (citing Local Baking Products, Inc. v. Kosher Bagel Munch, Inc., 421 N.J.
A-1218-25 8 Super. 268, 280 (App. Div. 2011)). We held that "the test does not merely turn
on the state of the litigation . . . [r]ather, dismissal is dependent on the nature of
the claims and the propriety of their presentation as a class action, in accordance
with the provisions of Rule 4:32-1." Id. at 477-78. Here, we are satisfied, as
pled in their complaint, that the nature of plaintiffs' claims related to alleged
violations of the NJWHL for themselves and other similarly situated firefighters
governed by the CBA was sufficient on its face to satisfy the rule.
B.
We next address defendant's contention that the trial court improperly
defined the proposed class. Defendant argues that (1) February 4, 2019 is the
earliest date that plaintiffs and the class members' claims could have arisen
because that is the effective date of the amendment of the definition section of
the NJWHL to include public entity employees; and (2) the class definition
should not include battalion chiefs and captains because those are executi ve
positions, which are exempt from the overtime requirement under the NJWHL.
We initially point to the fact that defendant raised these arguments in its
reply brief in its motion for reconsideration. Although this issue was discussed
at oral argument, the record reflects that the discussion centered around whether
it was fair for the court to hear this issue, especially since plaintiffs had no
A-1218-25 9 opportunity to adequately respond to the arguments. The trial court ultimately
determined defendant's contention "may be properly asserted as a defense to the
overall action . . . rather than challenging the issue within the reconsideration of
the class certification decision." The court thus concluded it would not make
any substantive findings on the issue, as it was not properly raised. We agree.
"Raising an issue for the first time in a reply brief is improper." Berardo
v. City of Jersey City, 476 N.J. Super. 341, 354 (App. Div. 2023) (quoting
Borough of Berlin v. Remington & Vernick Eng'rs, 337 N.J. Super. 590, 596,
767 A.2d 1030 (App. Div. 2001)). "[A]ppellate courts will decline to consider
questions or issues not properly presented to the trial court when an opportunity
for such a presentation is available 'unless the questions so raised on appeal go
to the jurisdiction of the trial court or concern matters of great public interest.'"
Nieder v. Royal Indem. Ins. Co., 62 N.J. 229, 234 (1973) (quoting Reynolds
Offset Co. v. Summer, 58 N.J. Super. 542, 548 (App. Div. 1959)). Based on the
above holdings, we conclude the trial court did not abuse its discretion by
determining it would not address this issue first raised in defendant's reply brief.
Additionally, even when deciding this issue on its merits, class
certification presupposes the existence of a properly defined class. Iliadis v.
Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 191 N.J. 88, 106 n.2 (2007). Although our courts do not
A-1218-25 10 require that every class member be ascertainable before certification is
permitted, a proposed class still must be "properly defined." Ibid. Thus, "[e]ven
before one reaches the four prerequisites for a class action, there must be an
adequately defined class." Ibid. (alterations in original) (citations omitted).
"[T]he proposed class must be sufficiently identifiable without being overly
broad" and "may not be amorphous, vague, or indeterminate" but
"administratively feasible to determine whether a given individual is a member
of the class." Ibid. (citations omitted).
Concerning this point, our Supreme Court has held, in a class action, the
ultimate factual issues are not decided when a trial court considers whether to
grant or deny class certification, when it stated:
[i]n deciding whether to grant or deny class certification, a trial court does 'not decid[e] the ultimate factual issues' underlying the plaintiff's cause of action . . . [r]ather, at the class certification stage, a court must 'accept as true all of the allegations in the complaint' . . . and consider [any] remaining pleadings, discovery (including interrogatory answers, relevant documents, and depositions), and any other pertinent evidence in a light favorable to plaintiff[.]
[Lee, 203 N.J. at 505 (internal citations omitted).]
Should there be any factual issues regarding the defined class, the trial court
may later alter or amend the class to accommodate such issues. See R. 4:32-2;
A-1218-25 11 see also Iliadis, 191 N.J. at 106 n.2 (agreeing with the trial court's determination
that a "class may later be altered or amended to accommodate any definitional
problems.").
Here, the trial court defined the class as:
All individuals employed by Defendant, City of Paterson, whose primary responsibility was to perform firefighting duties, including all individuals with the title firefighters, captain and battalion chief, from July 2017 through to the present[.]
Defendant argues that this definition is legally and factually incorrect. In
response, plaintiffs point to the certifications submitted showing that captains
and battalion chiefs regularly performed firefighting duties and were paid full -
time uniformed firefighters who were subject to the terms and conditions in the
CBA.
In accordance with the deferential standard that applies, we conclude the
trial court did not abuse its discretion in defining the class based on the evidence
before it, including the factual bases in plaintiffs' complaint. Defendant's
contentions are premature at this stage of the litigation because they venture
beyond the factual assertions of the class set forth in the complaint and the
submitted evidence, including the factual assertions deemed admitted based on
defendant's failure to respond to plaintiffs' Requests for Admissions.
A-1218-25 12 C.
We next turn to defendant's contention that the court erred in granting
class certification because plaintiffs failed to satisfy all of the requirements set
forth in Rule 4:32-1. In summary, defendant asserts the trial court did not
conduct a thorough analysis of the facts and evidence and did not have sufficient
evidence to support its ruling due to the lack of discovery.
"A 'class action is "an exception to the usual rule that litigation is
conducted by and on behalf of the individual named parties only."'" Dugan, 231
N.J. at 46 (quoting Iliadis, 191 N.J. at 103). A class action "furthers numerous
practical purposes, including judicial economy, cost-effectiveness, convenience,
consistent treatment of class members, protection of defendants from
inconsistent obligations, and allocation of litigation costs among numerous,
similarly-situated litigants." Ibid. (quoting Iliadis, 191 N.J. 104). The court
"must undertake a 'rigorous analysis' to determine if the Rule's requirements
have been satisfied." Iliadis, 191 N.J. at 106-07. If the allegations in the
complaint do not lend themselves to class certification, dismissal of the class
action allegations is appropriate. Myska, 440 N.J. Super. at 477. When a court
denies class certification, it would not "prevent any party's singular pursuit of
relief," if appropriate. See id. at 466.
A-1218-25 13 There are four initial requirements for class action certification,
"frequently termed 'numerosity, commonality, typicality[,] and adequacy of
representation,'" as set forth in Rule 4:32-1(a). Dugan, 231 N.J. at 47 (quoting
Lee, 203 N.J. 519). The Rule provides:
One or more members of a class may sue or be sued as representative parties on behalf of all only if (1) the class is so numerous that joinder of all members is impracticable, (2) there are questions of law or fact common to the class, (3) the claims or defenses of representative parties are typical of the claims or defenses of the class, and (4) the representative parties will fairly and adequately protect the interests of the class.
[R. 4:32-1(a).]
All four requirements of subsection (a) must be satisfied to maintain a class
action. Baskin v. P.C. Richard & Son, LLC, 246 N.J. 157, 173 (2021).
If the plaintiff satisfies each requirement under Rule 4:32-1(a), the motion
court must next consider Rule 4:32-1(b). That Rule requires the court find:
(1) the prosecution of separate actions by or against individual members of the class would create a risk either of:
(A) inconsistent or varying adjudications with respect to individual members of the class that would establish incompatible standards of conduct for the party opposing the class, or
A-1218-25 14 (B) adjudications with respect to individual members of the class that would as a practical matter be dispositive of the interests of the other members not parties to the adjudications or substantially impair or impede their ability to protect their interests; or
(2) the party opposing the class has acted or refused to act on grounds generally applicable to the class, thereby making appropriate final injunctive relief or corresponding declaratory relief with respect to the class as a whole; or
(3) the court finds the questions of law or fact common to the members of the class predominate over any questions affecting only individual members, and that a class action is superior to other available methods for the fair and efficient adjudication of the controversy. The factors pertinent to the findings include:
(A) the interest of members of the class in individually controlling the prosecution or defense of separate actions;
(B) the extent and nature of any litigation concerning the controversy already commenced by or against members of the class;
(C) the desirability or undesirability in concentrating the litigation of the claims in the particular forum; and
(D) the difficulties likely to be encountered in the management of a class action.
[R. 4:32-1(b).]
A-1218-25 15 The party seeking class certification bears the burden of proof in establishing
the requirements of Rule 4:32-1. Myska, 440 N.J. Super. at 475.
We address the prongs of Rule 4:32-1(a) in turn, applying the evidence in
the motion record.
Numerosity
Class actions were "'an invention of equity' that enabled litigation to
proceed 'in suits where the number of those interested in the subject of the
litigation is so great that their joinder as parties in conformity to the usual rules
of procedure is impracticable.'" Iliadis, 191 N.J. at 103 (quoting Hansberry v.
Lee, 311 U.S. 32, 41 (1940)). Class actions typically involved large numbers of
potential claimants. E.g., Dugan, 231 N.J. at 64 (263,000 class members); Lee,
203 N.J. at 512 (10,000 class members); In re Cadillac V8-6-4 Class Action, 93
N.J. 412, 425 (1983) (7,500 class members); Delgozzo v. Kenny, 266 N.J. Super.
169, 184 (App. Div. 1993) (35,000 class members); Atl. Ambulance Corp. v.
Cullum, 451 N.J. Super. 247, 252 (App. Div. 2017) (36,000 class members);
Lusky v. Capasso Bros., 118 N.J. Super. 369, 372 (App. Div. 1972) (7,000 class
members).
However, New Jersey courts have not set a numerical requirement to meet
the numerosity prerequisite. Our Supreme Court recently spoke on this issue in
A-1218-25 16 Baskin reiterating this point. The Court noted that "Rule 4:32-1 does not specify
a minimum number of class members necessary to satisfy the numerosity
requirement . . . ." Baskin, 246 N.J. at 173. Instead, the Court looked to federal
standards for numerosity, stating "'[a]s a general rule . . . classes of [twenty] are
too small, classes of [twenty]-[forty] may or may not be big enough depending
on circumstances of each case, and classes of [forty] or more are numerous
enough.'" Ibid. (alteration in original) (citing In re Toys "R" Us, 300 F.R.D.
347, 367-68 (C.D. Cal. 2013)).
The trial court agreed with plaintiffs' assessment that the numerosity
requirement was admitted based on defendant's failure to respond to question
three of plaintiffs' Requests for Admissions. Question three stated that "[f]rom
2017 through the present, [the City] has employed more than forty (40)
firefighters within the Paterson Fire Division." This question went unanswered,
which results in the numerosity requirement being undisputed as admitted.
Rule 4:22-1, governing requests for admissions, allows a party to seek
"the truth of any matter of fact within the scope of R[ule] 4:10-2 . . . ." "The
matter is admitted unless, within [thirty] days after service of the request . . . the
party to whom the request is directed serves upon the party requesting the
admission a written answer or objection addressed to the matter . . . ." "The
A-1218-25 17 purpose of a request for admissions is to establish matters to be true for purposes
of trial when there is not a real controversy concerning them[,] yet their proof
may be difficult or expensive." Essex Bank v. Capital Resources Corp., 179
N.J. Super. 523, 532 (App. Div. 1981).
Because the class size was at least forty members, the trial court found
that such a class size would render joinder "impracticable," and that requiring
the proposed members to pursue individual claims would be "financially
impracticab[le]." Additionally, the trial court determined the identities of other
class members may be easily determined if defendant discloses such
information. The trial court lastly found that defendant has not identified any
additional discovery that would further address or challenge this issue.
Defendant argues that an "in-depth" analysis is required and that the trial
court simply relied on plaintiffs' proffer of the number of potential plaintiffs
without more. Notwithstanding the fact that defendant has not provided what
additional information concerning the numerosity requirement would be gleaned
through further discovery, we conclude, as found by the trial court, its failure to
respond to plaintiffs' Requests for Admissions is dispositive of the issue. By
admitting that over forty fire fighters were employed by the City since 2017, we
A-1218-25 18 conclude the amount of forty fire fighters satisfies the numerosity requirement
as determined by the court and there was no abuse of discretion.
Typicality
Typicality requires the claims asserted by the plaintiff "have the essential
characteristics common to the claims of the class." In re Cadillac, 93 N.J. at 425
(quoting 3B Moore's Federal Practice ¶ 23.06-2 (1982)). "If the class
representative's claims arise from the same events, practice, or conduct, and are
based on the same legal theory, as those of other class members, the typicality
requirement is satisfied." Laufer v. U.S. Life Ins. Co. in City of N.Y., 385 N.J.
Super. 172, 180-81 (App. Div. 2006) (quoting 5 Moore's Federal Practice
¶ 23.24[2] (3d ed. 1997)).
The trial court held that the typicality requirement was satisfied because
"[p]laintiffs and [the] Putative Class Members are employed by [d]efendant and
as such are subject to the same work requirements, including similar work
schedules." Defendant argues that by failing to allow for pre-certification
discovery, there were insufficient proofs for the trial court to find that the
typicality requirement was satisfied.
Again, defendant failed to show how additional discovery would aid in
the resolution of the typicality requirement. Furthermore, as defendant is the
A-1218-25 19 current employer of plaintiffs and the other class members, it was in possession
of information relevant to this requirement, yet failed to provide a factual basis
to support its argument.
We conclude because the trial court properly relied on plaintiff's
complaint in determining the named plaintiffs and the class members are
similarly situated; there was a rational basis for holding that the typicality
requirement was satisfied. For these reasons, the trial court did not abuse its
discretion.
Adequacy of Representation
Generally, a "class [representative] 'must be part of the class and possess
the same interest and suffer the same injury as the class members.'" In re Pet
Food Prods. Liab. Litig., 629 F.3d 333, 343 (2010) (quoting Amchem Prods.,
Inc. v. Windsor, 521 U.S. 591, 625 (1997)). A class representative must "be
able to 'fairly and adequately protect the interests of the class[,]' as required by
Rule 4:32-1(a)(4)." Laufer, 385 N.J. Super. at 181. This requirement is "closely
related to the requirement of typicality." Id. at 182. "To satisfy this requirement,
'the plaintiff must not have interests antagonistic to those of the class. '" Ibid.
(citing Delgozzo v. Kenny, 266 N.J. Super. 169, 188 (App. Div. 1993)).
However, those interests need not be identical. Id. (citing Moore's Federal
A-1218-25 20 Practice § 23.25[4][b][i]). "[T]he named representative only needs to be
adequate[.]" Ibid.
Courts also consider whether the potential class members have individual
recourse to represent their own interests. Class actions are appropriate where
individual clams "are, in isolation, 'too small . . . to warrant recourse to
litigation.'" Iliadis, 191 N.J. at 104 (quoting In re Cadillac, 93 N.J. at 435). "The
policy at the very core of the class action mechanism is to overcome the problem
that small recoveries do not provide the incentive for any individual to bring a
solo action prosecuting his or her rights." Amchem Prods. Inc., 521 U.S. at 617
(quoting Mace v. Van Ru Credit Corp., 109 F.3d 338, 344 (7th Cir. 1997)). Class
actions also serve to equalize adversaries, "a purpose that is even more
compelling when the proposed class consists of people with small claims."
Little v. Kia Motors Am., Inc., 242 N.J. 557, 581 (2020). Equalization
"remedies the incentive problem facing litigants who seek only a small
recovery." Muhammad v. Cnty. Bank of Rehobeth Beach, 189 N.J. 1, 17 (2006).
In this instance the trial court found that the adequacy requirement was
satisfied for the same reasons it found that plaintiffs met the typicality
requirement. The named class representatives were firefighters that alleged they
were wrongfully denied wages for hours worked in excess of forty hours per
A-1218-25 21 week, the same as the remainder of proposed class members. We conclude,
based on the factual assertions of the complaint, plaintiffs representatives were
adequately defined, both being firefighters that allegedly worked over forty
hours per week and the trial court did not abuse its discretion in determining
plaintiffs met the adequacy of representation prong of the cited rule.
Commonality
Commonality depends on whether a "common nucleus of operative facts"
controls the outcome of the class members' claims. In re Cadillac, 93 N.J. at
431. "Although all issues need not be identical among all class members,
common questions must predominate." Carroll v. Cellco P'ship, 313 N.J. Super.
488, 499 (App. Div. 1998). "Commonality is not affected by the fact that each
of the plaintiffs in the class must prove individual damages." R. 4:32-5, n.2.2.3
(citing Lee, 203 N.J. at 531).
The factual assertions plaintiffs alleged were common to all class
members were:
1. Whether [p]laintiffs and the class members were paid overtime after they worked forty (40) hours per week?
2. Whether [d]efendant was required to pay overtime to [p]laintiffs and the class members after they worked forty (40) hours per week under the NJWHL?
A-1218-25 22 Although defendant concedes that all plaintiffs assert violations of the
NJWHL, it argues that the trial court erred by failing to conduct a more thorough
analysis of individual questions. However, the individual questions that
defendant refers to appear to simply be the amount of damages each plaintiff has
suffered. Defendant asserted there were multiple individual issues of fact and
law that predominate over common ones, including:
(1) the number of hours worked by each putative class member; (2) the number of hours of compensation time provided; and (3) the number of hours of overtime paid.
We determine these individual issues relate to the quantity of damages each
plaintiff has suffered, which we deem irrelevant to the commonality issue.
Because the damages caused by defendant's alleged violations of the NJWHL
were common to all class members, we conclude the trial court did not err in
finding the commonality element was satisfied.
D.
We now turn to defendant's contention that the trial court erred in finding
plaintiffs satisfied the requirements of Rule 4:32-1(b), determining that
plaintiffs had established predominance and superiority. Defendant argues that
the trial court based its holding solely on the claims of unpaid overtime
stemming from a common employment policy and that the court's analysis was
A-1218-25 23 insufficient. Defendant also asserts a substance-based argument regarding the
Federal Labor Standards Act ("FLSA"), 29 U.S.C. § 207, and that this Act
should have guided the court's analysis. We conclude these arguments lack
merit.
If a determination is made that a plaintiff has satisfied the four
prerequisites under Rule 4:32-1(a), the court must then consider the criteria set
forth in Rule 4:32-1(b). "To determine predominance under subsection (b)(3),
the court decides 'whether the proposed class is "sufficiently cohesive to warrant
adjudication by representation."'" Dugan, 231 N.J. at 48 (citing Iliadis, 191 N.J.
at 108). Cohesion does not require that there be no individual issues, that
resolution of common issues will resolve the entire dispute, or that class
members be affected in exactly the same way. Ibid.
Nonetheless, "[t]he predominance factor . . . is far more demanding than
Rule 4:32-1(a)(2)'s requirement that there be questions of law or fact common
to the class." Ibid. (citations omitted). When considering the question of
predominance, a court "should conduct a 'pragmatic assessment' of various
factors." Lee, 203 N.J. at 519 (citing Iliadis, 191 N.J. at 108). Such an
evaluation includes "a qualitative assessment of the common and individual
questions rather than a mere mathematical quantification of whether there are
A-1218-25 24 more of one than the other." Id. at 519-20 (citing Iliadis, 191 N.J. at 108). That
is because "the answer to the issue of predominance is found . . . in a close
analysis of the facts and law." Iliadis, 191 N.J. at 109 (alteration in original)
(quoting In re Cadillac, 93 N.J. at 434).
Rule 4:32-1(b)(3) also requires a finding that "a class action is superior to
other available methods for the fair and efficient adjudication of the
controversy." In making that inquiry, a court "must undertake '(1) an informed
consideration of alternative available methods of adjudication of each issue, (2)
a comparison of the fairness to all whose interests may be involved between
such alternative methods and a class-action, and (3) a comparison of the
efficiency of adjudication of each method.'" Dugan, 231 N.J. at 49 (quoting
Iliadis, 191 N.J. at 114-115). "In making the predominance and superiority
assessments, a certifying court must undertake a 'rigorous analysis' to determine
if the Rule's requirements have been satisfied." Iliadis, 191 N.J. at 106-107
(quoting Carroll, 313 N.J. Super. at 495).
In its initial decision, concerning the predominance element, the court
found that the claims of unpaid overtime stem from a common employment
policy under the CBA. The court further determined that plaintiffs' and all
putative class members' claims arose from their employment at the Paterson Fire
A-1218-25 25 Division and involved two common questions, which the court concluded
directly implicate the entire putative class and that the only differences between
the claims are the damages sustained. The court found that the common
questions that predominate over individual ones were: (1) whether plaintiffs
and the putative class members were paid overtime after they worked forty hours
per week; and (2) whether defendant was required to pay overtime to plaintiffs
and the putative class members after they worked forty hours per week under
the NJWHL.
As to the superiority element, the court determined class certification will
best promote judicial efficiency and the effective use of judicial resources, as it
avoids the risk of inconsistent outcomes and lack of uniformity. The court
reasoned that the filing of individual actions to answer the two common class
questions would be a waste of judicial resources and concluded that a class
action is the superior method for resolving the controversy.
On reconsideration, the court supplemented it original findings, first
stating that it undertook a "rigorous analysis" in determining that the
predominance requirement was satisfied because the claims of unpaid overtime
stem from a common employment policy under the CBA and plaintiffs' claims
are common to all members, with the only differences being the damages
A-1218-25 26 sustained. The court rejected defendant's argument that individual issues—
including FLSA regulations, accrual, and compensatory time—predominate,
finding instead that the essential claims and facts are shared by all class
members.
As to the superiority element, on reconsideration, the court analyzed
alternative methods of adjudication and found that a class action is superior
because judicial economy and fairness support class litigation, and that
manageability concerns do not outweigh the benefits of class certification. The
court further found that individual class members lacked financial wherewithal
to pursue separate claims, making it financially impractical for them. The court
added that individual lawsuits would be less efficient and risk inconsistent
outcomes because the alternative to a class action would be over forty, and up
to one hundred individual lawsuits involving duplicative issues, which would
unreasonably burden the court system.
The court rejected defendant's contention that plaintiffs' claims could be
asserted through the Union at no cost, which it found was unsupported by
documentation or under the terms of the CBA. The court also determined that
plaintiffs were not required to exhaust administrative remedies, as we previously
held in our prior remand.
A-1218-25 27 After our review of the record and findings by the court, we conclude its
two written decisions, in combination, made exhaustive factual findings and
applied the correct legal principles as set forth in Rule 4:32-1(b) to support its
determination to certify the class. Both of the court's decisions set forth several
reasons outlining how the factual allegations in plaintiff's complaint satisfied
subsection (b)(3)'s requirements and were supported by substantial evidence in
the record. As such, the court's findings were not an abuse of discretion.
To the extent we have not addressed any of defendant's remaining
arguments, we conclude those arguments are without sufficient merit to warrant
discussion in a written opinion. R. 2:11-3(e)(1)(E).
Affirmed.
A-1218-25 28