COURT OF APPEALS OF VIRGINIA
Present: Judges O’Brien, AtLee and Senior Judge Clements PUBLISHED
Argued by teleconference
ADRIAN DONNEL ALEY OPINION BY v. Record No. 0693-21-4 JUDGE RICHARD Y. ATLEE, JR. JUNE 14, 2022 COMMONWEALTH OF VIRGINIA
FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF STAFFORD COUNTY J. Bruce Strickland, Judge
(G. Price Koch; Spencer Meyer & Koch PLC, on brief), for appellant. Appellant submitting on brief.
Lindsay M. Brooker, Assistant Attorney General (Jason S. Miyares, Attorney General, on brief), for appellee.
A jury convicted appellant Adrian Donnel Aley of felony hit-and-run involving personal
injury and felony eluding, in violation of Code §§ 46.2-894 and 46.2-817(B), respectively.1 The
trial court denied Aley’s subsequent motion to set aside the verdict and sentenced Aley to serve six
months and thirty days in jail. On appeal, Aley challenges the sufficiency of the evidence to sustain
his convictions. For the following reasons, we affirm the trial court’s judgment.
I. BACKGROUND
In accordance with familiar principles of appellate review, we state the facts “in the light
most favorable to the Commonwealth, the prevailing party at trial.” Gerald v. Commonwealth, 295
Va. 469, 472 (2018) (quoting Scott v. Commonwealth, 292 Va. 380, 381 (2016)). In doing so, we
1 Aley does not challenge his convictions for reckless driving by endangerment and reckless driving by speed arising from the same incident. At trial, the circuit court dismissed an abduction charge and a second reckless driving by endangerment charge. discard any of Aley’s conflicting evidence and regard as true all credible evidence favorable to the
Commonwealth and all inferences that may reasonably be drawn from that evidence. Id. at 473.
At 12:20 a.m. on May 6, 2020, Stafford County Sheriff’s Deputies Scott Fulford and Colby
Thomas were driving eastbound along White Oak Road2 when a “white sedan,”3 traveling in the
same direction as the deputies, “blew past” their patrol vehicle “at an extremely high rate of speed.”
The highway had a posted speed limit of fifty miles per hour. The road had meandering curves and
was “extremely dark at night” because it had “no lights on it.” The deputies lost sight of the
speeding car before they could begin pursuit and, instead, began searching for a crash because they
believed the driver had been traveling too fast to negotiate the curves in the road.
At 12:38 a.m., the deputies encountered the white car again, as it “came around [a] corner”
on White Oak Road, accelerating toward them at what radar confirmed was ninety miles an hour,
before turning right at an intersection. Deputies Fulford and Thomas performed a U-turn and
attempted to initiate a traffic stop, activating their patrol car’s emergency lights, but not its siren, as
they pursued the speeding car down Bethel Church Road. The deputies accelerated “up to a
hundred miles an hour” and approached to within “a couple hundred yards” of the car, but it “kept
pulling away” until they “eventually lost sight of it.”
Aley’s girlfriend, Krista Jacobs, testified at trial that at 12:15 a.m. that same morning, Aley
picked her up from her house in his “S5 white Audi” to drive her to his parents’ house near Bethel
Church Road. Sitting in the front passenger seat as Aley drove eastbound along White Oak Road,
The witnesses at trial referred to this highway interchangeably as “White Oak Road” 2
and “VA-218.” For consistency, we refer to the highway as White Oak Road. 3 Aley emphasizes that his vehicle was an Audi S5 coupe, not a “sedan” like the deputies observed; however, viewing the evidence as we must, it is reasonable to infer that the deputies did not focus on the number of doors on a car being driven at such a dangerous speed, and instead simply took notice that Aley’s car was shaped like a sedan. -2- Jacobs noticed that Aley began “driving very fast,” exceeding sixty-five miles per hour along the
winding highway.
Shortly before 12:30 a.m., Jacobs grew “afraid for [their] safety” as Aley passed the turn for
their destination and “the speed seemed to increase.” Aley briefly pulled over, and Jacobs
admonished him to “[never] do that with [her] in the car ever again.” In response, Aley told Jacobs
that driving like that was “an adrenaline rush,” checked her safety belt to ensure that it was secured,
and reclined Jacobs’ chair “as if to relax [her]” before resuming driving. Aley drove in “the
opposite direction” and, again, passed the turn for their destination. Jacobs felt “really scared and
nervous.” Aley reassured her that he “just want[ed] to drive around and listen to a couple songs”
before going home.
Jacobs became apprehensive when Aley, again, increased his speed to over sixty-five miles
per hour as they drove westbound on White Oak Road. Aley continued to accelerate and “came up
very quickly behind a car,” prompting Jacobs to “yell[] his name” in fear that he was “going to
rear-end” the motorist. Aley “just looked at [Jacobs] and swerved around the vehicle.” Aley then
exclaimed “oh shit . . . there is cops, I have got to run” as he took a “sharp right-hand turn” onto
Bethel Church Road.
Jacobs “turned around and looked over [her] shoulder” to discover flashing blue lights,
which she understood meant that “there was a police officer” pursuing them. Jacobs testified that
“it didn’t seem like [the police] were very far” behind their car when she first noticed them; later,
the “blue lights” appeared more distant when Jacobs looked in the mirror, but she still could see
them. Aley refused to pull over despite Jacobs urging him to do so.
At approximately 12:45 a.m., Aley “hit the brakes a little bit” as the car “came around a
turn.” He exclaimed “oh, no, we are going to crash” and “threw his arm over [Jacobs]” as they went
off the road. At that point, Jacobs surmised that the car “flipped” because she could see “objects
-3- flying up in the car” and “everything sort of inverted.” A hard object struck the left side of Jacobs’
head and face while the vehicle was airborne. The car eventually “landed right side up,” Jacobs saw
“airbags everywhere,” and the couple got out of the car.
Jacobs discovered that she had “somehow lost one of [her] shoes” during the crash. Her
“head hurt,” and the upper part of her left arm was “throbbing.” Jacobs noticed Aley’s head was
bleeding, which “kept getting worse” and blood was “pouring out.” Aley apologized to Jacobs and
“asked if [she] was okay.” He told her to follow him to an adjacent wooded area. Jacobs initially
refused, citing her missing shoe as an excuse to remain at the scene because she “was afraid to
actually say no to him.” Aley attempted to carry Jacobs, but he abandoned the effort after failing to
lift her. The couple ran over to a small clearing in the woods, but they had to return to the car so
Aley could “get[] some things out” and Jacobs could retrieve her cell phone. They then returned to
the woods to hide, with Aley telling Jacobs that “if the cops show up[,] we have to run.”
Jacobs told Aley they “need[ed] to go to the hospital several times, because [she] knew that
[she] was hurt, [she] could see that he was hurt, and [they] both needed medical attention.” Aley
repeatedly refused. Jacobs tried to call her friend, Connor Buchanan, for medical assistance because
he was a trained paramedic, but Aley “yelled at [her] to get off [her] phone.” Aley called his
brother, who arrived approximately ten minutes later and drove the couple to his parents’ house.
During that time, Jacobs was too “afraid” to call 911 or the police to report the crash because Aley
kept “saying [they] had to run from the cops.”
Around 1:15 a.m., the couple arrived at Aley’s parents’ residence. Aley spoke to his brother
in the kitchen “about what had happened” while Jacobs requested a first aid kit to clean Aley’s head
wound. Jacobs called Buchanan, told him that she had been in a car accident, described her injuries,
and requested that he “take [her] to the hospital.” He agreed, but she later changed her mind when
she realized that Aley would not come with her because she “felt like [she] couldn’t just leave
-4- without knowing that he was okay. So [she] wanted him to stay awake and not go to sleep so [she]
could make sure nothing was seriously wrong” as a result of Aley’s head wound. Jacobs treated
Aley’s wounds and encouraged him to go to the hospital, but Aley “kept insisting that he wasn’t
going.”
Around 7:00 a.m., a passerby noticed a “heavily damaged” vehicle “off the road into the tree
line” abutting Bethel Church Road approximately two miles from White Oak Road. “[B]ecause of
the significance of the damage to the vehicle,” the citizen called the Stafford County Sheriff’s
Office out of “concern[] that people . . . may be trapped in the vehicle.” In response, Captain Lee
Peters, III, arrived at Bethel Church Road to discover a totaled white “2019 Audi”—Aley’s car—
in the woods by the highway with its hazard lights activated. The car was unoccupied. From “the
[car’s] significant damage,” along with the fact that its “four-ways were still flashing” and “every
airbag” had deployed, Captain Peters concluded that the collision “was relatively recent.”
Relying on his training and experience in vehicular accident reconstruction, Captain Peters
determined from the presence of “yaw marks”4 in the terrain that Aley’s car had “slid” off the
pavement and careened through several trees and nearby fencing before crashing approximately 300
feet from the roadway. The lengthy distance and absence of tire marks between “where the tires
first left the road to where the vehicle stopped” indicated that the car “was traveling rapidly” when it
ran off the road, and the driver had not pressed on the brakes or turned the steering wheel to avoid
the crash.
Captain Peters searched the car and found the driver’s side seatbelt in an “out and locked”
position, “blood on the driver airbag,” a “seatbelt hanging out of the passenger door,” and “specks
of blood on the passenger side of the seatbelt.” Captain Peters concluded from that evidence that a
Captain Peters testified that the term “yaw mark” refers to disturbances in the ground 4
resulting from “tires moving in a direction trying to gain traction where there is none, as the vehicle continues in a certain direction.” -5- driver and front passenger had recently occupied the vehicle and were both injured. Later at trial,
Captain Peters emphasized that it was obvious that the collision involved personal injury, testifying
“if you look at the car, you look at the seatbelts, and look at the blood, you look at the damage to the
car, you understand the human body is not designed to take that type of trauma in a crash.”
Using information from the car’s license plate and associated DMV records, Captain Peters
ascertained that Aley was its registered owner. Shortly thereafter, Captain Peters ordered a tow
truck to remove the car and traveled to Aley’s last known address, where he spoke to Aley’s father.
Captain Peters informed the father that he was searching for injured parties from the crash but
departed to continue his investigation after Aley’s father “told [him] that [the car’s occupants]
weren’t there.”
At some point that morning, Aley went upstairs to speak to his father. From downstairs,
Jacobs heard Aley say, “I didn’t do it, it was my friend driving.” Aley returned downstairs and told
Jacobs that the police had come to the house looking for him twice that morning. He said that the
first time, his brother told the police that Aley was in Harrisonburg. The second time, Aley’s father
spoke to the police. He informed Aley that “the police knew that he was the one driving, that it was
his vehicle,” and “that they were aware of what had happened.” When Jacobs told Aley that he
should “just tell the truth,” he became angry and said, “I’m not talking to no cops.” Jacobs
described his demeanor as “upset, and almost like a child that was being scolded.”
Around noon, Buchanan picked Jacobs up and drove her to her parents’ home. While en
route, Jacobs passed the crash scene and saw that Aley’s car was no longer there. Thinking that her
personal belongings, including her wallet and keys, may still be inside the vehicle, Jacobs sent Aley
a text message requesting that he “find out where [his car] went.” Aley replied, “I just have some
things to do first.” Buchanan briefly stopped at Jacobs’ parents’ home before driving her to the
hospital emergency room.
-6- At the hospital, clinicians performed a physical examination of Jacobs’ wounds and ordered
blood work, a CT scan of Jacobs’ chest, and an “X-ray of [her] left humerus.” After leaving the
hospital, Jacobs sent Aley a text message indicating that her CT scan and X-ray “were good” and
she was “okay.” Buchanan then transported Jacobs to his parents’ home, where she discussed what
had taken place and ultimately “let [Buchanan] and his father call the police.”
A little after 5:00 p.m., Captain Peters arrived at the Buchanan residence to meet with
Jacobs. Jacobs “was in tears” and “appeared scared,” “uncomfortable,” and “injured” during their
conversation. Her face was “red” and “swollen,” and “it looked like a boxer had punched her in the
face.” Jacobs also had visible, red “seatbelt marks” cutting diagonally across her body from right to
left, suggesting to Captain Peters that she had been “a passenger seat victim in a crash.” Another
deputy photographed Jacobs’ injuries, which included “a cut on [Jacobs’] back near the right
shoulder” and “swelling” on the upper part of her arm that “was very painful with every
movement.” Additionally, Jacobs had “scrapes on [her] arm,” a “cut on [her] forehead,” “bruising
on [her] leg,” and “a cut on [her] knee.” Her left eye was swollen, and the left side of her jaw “hurt
very much,” such that she could not chew or eat “for at least a week.” Jacobs testified that none of
these injuries existed before the crash.
After meeting with Jacobs, Captain Peters sent a text message to Aley advising him to return
his call. In the text message, Captain Peters warned Aley, “I’m about to get warrants for your arrest
as well as the folks who lied to me to protect you this morning.” Aley did not respond to the text
but subsequently turned himself in to authorities.
At trial, following the conclusion of the Commonwealth’s case-in-chief, Aley moved to
strike. He argued that the evidence failed to prove the felony eluding charge because the police
cruiser “was a hundred to a couple hundred yards behind [Aley],” a “distance [that] is just as a
matter of law too far” for emergency lights alone to qualify as “a signal to bring a vehicle to a stop
-7- specific to this car.” The trial court overruled the motion, concluding that there was sufficient
evidence for the matter to go forward to the jury. Aley declined to present evidence, and the trial
court denied Aley’s renewed motion to strike on the same grounds. The jury convicted Aley of
felony hit-and-run and felony eluding.
At a hearing on Aley’s subsequent motion to set aside the verdicts, Aley argued that the
Commonwealth failed to prove that he knew or should have known of Jacobs’ injuries because she
never “communicated her injuries” to him and they were “not visible” the day of the incident. Aley
also reiterated his argument that police were “never within the required distance [of him] to actually
signal that this car must pull over or received a signal.” The trial court denied the motion,
concluding that it “cannot find that as a matter of law the jury’s verdict is contrary to the existing
law or the facts that were presented.” This appeal follows.
II. ANALYSIS
Aley challenges the sufficiency of the evidence to sustain his convictions. Relying on
our decisions in Brannon v. Commonwealth, 52 Va. App. 800 (2008), and Neel v.
Commonwealth, 49 Va. App. 389 (2007), Aley argues that the Commonwealth failed to prove he
knew or should have known that the accident involved personal injury as required for a
conviction of felony hit-and-run. Aley also contends that “nothing on the record indicated” that
he received “a visible or audible signal from any law-enforcement officer to bring his motor
vehicle to a stop,” which was necessary to establish felony eluding. We address each argument
in turn.
A. Standard of Review
“When reviewing the sufficiency of the evidence, ‘[t]he judgment of the trial court is
presumed correct and will not be disturbed unless it is plainly wrong or without evidence to support
it.’” McGowan v. Commonwealth, 72 Va. App. 513, 521 (2020) (alteration in original) (quoting
-8- Smith v. Commonwealth, 296 Va. 450, 460 (2018)). “In such cases, ‘[t]he Court does not ask itself
whether it believes that the evidence at the trial established guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.’” Id.
(alteration in original) (quoting Secret v. Commonwealth, 296 Va. 204, 228 (2018)). “Rather, the
relevant question is whether ‘any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the
crime beyond a reasonable doubt.’” Vasquez v. Commonwealth, 291 Va. 232, 248 (2016) (quoting
Williams v. Commonwealth, 278 Va. 190, 193 (2009)). “If there is evidentiary support for the
conviction, ‘the reviewing court is not permitted to substitute its own judgment, even if its opinion
might differ from the conclusions reached by the finder of fact at the trial.’” McGowan, 72
Va. App. at 521 (quoting Chavez v. Commonwealth, 69 Va. App. 149, 161 (2018)).
B. The evidence proved Jacobs requested that Aley help her seek medical treatment.
Aley addresses the narrow issue of whether he reasonably knew or should have known
that Jacobs suffered any injury from the accident. Specifically, he contends that “there is no
evidence that [Jacobs’] injuries were known to Aley at the time of the accident or shortly
thereafter” because Jacobs never told Aley she was injured and her wounds were not apparent.
We disagree.
Code § 46.2-894 provides, in pertinent part, as follows:
The driver of any vehicle involved in an accident in which a person is killed or injured . . . shall immediately stop as close to the scene of the accident as possible without obstructing traffic, as provided in § 46.2-888, and report his name, address, driver’s license number, and vehicle registration number forthwith to the State Police or local law-enforcement agency, to the person struck and injured if such person appears to be capable of understanding and retaining the information, or to the driver or some other occupant of the vehicle collided . . . . The driver shall also render reasonable assistance to any person injured in such accident, including taking such injured person to a physician, surgeon, or hospital if it is apparent that medical treatment is necessary or is requested by the injured person.
-9- A violation of the statute that results in “the injury or death of any person” is punishable as Class
5 felony. Code § 46.2-894(i).
Our case law discussing Code § 46.2-894 has primarily analyzed what it means for it to
be “apparent that medical treatment is necessary,” discussing factors indicating that an appellant
knew or should have known to seek medical treatment. See Brannon, 52 Va. App. at 804
(“[K]nowledge of injury may be imputed to a driver ‘where the fact of personal injury is visible
or where the seriousness of the collision would lead a reasonable person to assume there must
have been resulting injuries.’” (quoting Neel, 49 Va. App. at 395)). Yet the statute also provides
that the duty to render reasonable assistance, including obtaining medical attention, exists not
only “if it is apparent that medical treatment is necessary” but also if it “is requested by the
injured person.” Code § 46.2-894 (emphasis added). The statute uses the disjunctive “or,”
meaning that either condition may satisfy that element of the offense. See Williams v.
Commonwealth, 61 Va. App. 1, 8 (2012) (“[T]he use of the disjunctive word ‘or,’ rather than the
conjunctive ‘and,’ signifies the availability of alternative choices.” (alteration in original)
(quoting Rose v. Commonwealth, 53 Va. App. 505, 514 (2009))); Wright v. Commonwealth, 53
Va. App. 266, 282 (2009) (“The word ‘or’ connects two parts of a sentence, ‘but disconnects
their meaning.’” (quoting Smoot v. Commonwealth, 37 Va. App. 495, 501 (2002))).
Here, the evidence is overwhelming that Jacobs repeatedly asked Aley to take her to the
hospital in the hours following the crash. Jacobs testified that she told Aley they “need[ed] to go
to the hospital several times, because [she] knew that [she] was hurt, [she] could see that he was
hurt, and [they] both needed medical attention.” Aley repeatedly, and often angrily, refused.
Furthermore, Aley yelled at Jacobs when she tried to call Buchanan, a trained paramedic, for
assistance right after the crash. Contrary to Aley’s assertions before the trial court and on appeal,
Jacobs did not have to detail the exact nature and extent of her injuries to trigger the “reasonable
- 10 - assistance” provisions under Code § 46.2-894. It is sufficient that she clearly and repeatedly
requested that Aley take her to receive medical attention and that Aley refused to do so.
C. The evidence proved that Aley received a visible signal from a law enforcement officer to bring his motor vehicle to a stop.
Aley next argues that the evidence failed to demonstrate that he received “a visible or
audible signal from any law-enforcement officer to bring his motor vehicle to a stop,” which is
necessary to establish felony eluding. On brief, as in the trial court, Aley argues that police were
too far behind his car during the pursuit for him to have “receive[d] any valid signal . . . to yield
or stop.” We disagree.
Code § 46.2-817(B) provides, in pertinent part:
Any person who, having received a visible or audible signal from any law-enforcement officer to bring his motor vehicle to a stop, drives such motor vehicle in a willful and wanton disregard of such signal so as to interfere with or endanger the operation of the law-enforcement vehicle or endanger a person is guilty of a Class 6 felony.
Under that statute, the Commonwealth must prove that “the accused received a visible or audible
signal from a law enforcement officer to bring the motor vehicle to a stop.” Jones v.
Commonwealth, 64 Va. App. 361, 367 (2015).
Here, the record firmly supports the trial court’s finding that Aley received a visible
signal to stop within the meaning of the statute. Deputy Fulford testified that he and his partner
attempted to initiate a traffic stop by activating their patrol car’s “emergency lights” as they
pursued Aley’s car down Bethel Church Road. The deputies tried to catch up to the vehicle,
driving 100 miles per hour to do so, and approached to within “a couple hundred yards, a
hundred yards” of the car before it “pull[ed] away” and they “eventually lost sight of it.”
Furthermore, just before the pursuit, Aley exclaimed, “Oh shit . . . there is cops, I have got to
run.” Immediately thereafter, Jacobs “turned around and looked over [her] shoulder” to discover
- 11 - flashing blue lights, indicating that the police were pursuing them. Jacobs testified that the
police were not “very far” behind their car when she initially noticed them, and she was able to
see them even as the officers lost ground during pursuit. Moreover, during the chase, Aley
insisted, “I can’t pull over,” despite Jacobs’ pleas that he do so. That collective testimony
overwhelmingly establishes that Aley received a visible signal from law enforcement to stop his
motor vehicle as required for conviction under Code § 46.2-817(B). Cf. Jones, 64 Va. App. at
368-69 (finding sufficient evidence of defendant’s receipt of a visible signal to stop where police
activated their patrol car’s emergency lights, which “remained activated” throughout the
encounter).
Additionally, the trial court could reasonably infer Aley’s “consciousness of guilt” from
his efforts to avoid detection following the wreck. See Palmer v. Commonwealth, 14 Va. App.
346, 348‑49 (1992) (“[I]t is today universally conceded that the fact of an accused’s flight,
escape from custody, resistance to arrest, concealment, assumption of a false name, and related
conduct are admissible as evidence of consciousness of guilt, and thus of guilt itself.” (alteration
in original) (quoting Langhorne v. Commonwealth, 13 Va. App. 97, 102 (1991))). Immediately
after the crash, Aley told Jacobs to follow him from the accident into the woods because “if the
cops show up[,] we have to run.” Later, Aley attempted to conceal himself from authorities at
his parents’ house and allowed his relatives to lie to police on his behalf. Aley’s brother told
police that Aley “was in Harrisonburg,” and his father told police that no one involved in the
crash was at the house when Aley was actually hiding with Jacobs in his downstairs bedroom.
Furthermore, when Jacobs encouraged Aley to abandon his efforts to escape and “just tell the
truth” to the police, he angrily responded, “I’m not talking to no cops.” That testimony
establishing Aley’s efforts to escape, conceal himself, and allow others to lie to the police
- 12 - evinces his “consciousness of guilt,” Palmer, 14 Va. App. at 349, and further supports the trial
court’s finding Aley guilty of felony eluding.
III. CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, we affirm Aley’s convictions.
Affirmed.
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