Adoption of Urmi.

• Court: Massachusetts Appeals Court
• Decided: April 13, 2026
• Docket: 25-P-0703
• Status: Unpublished

Opinion

NOTICE: Summary decisions issued by the Appeals Court pursuant to M.A.C. Rule 23.0, as appearing in 97 Mass. App. Ct. 1017 (2020) (formerly known as rule 1:28, as amended by 73 Mass. App. Ct. 1001 [2009]), are primarily directed to the parties and, therefore, may not fully address the facts of the case or the panel's decisional rationale. Moreover, such decisions are not circulated to the entire court and, therefore, represent only the views of the panel that decided the case. A summary decision pursuant to rule 23.0 or rule 1:28 issued after February 25, 2008, may be cited for its persuasive value but, because of the limitations noted above, not as binding precedent. See Chace v. Curran, 71 Mass. App. Ct. 258, 260 n.4 (2008).

COMMONWEALTH OF MASSACHUSETTS

APPEALS COURT

25-P-703

ADOPTION OF URMI.1

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER PURSUANT TO RULE 23.0

After a mistrial and a second trial, a Juvenile Court judge

adjudicated Urmi in need of care and protection, found the

mother and the father unfit, awarded custody of the child to the

Department of Children and Families (department), and terminated

parental rights. The mother and the father appeal, and we

affirm.

We disagree with the mother's contention that the judge

violated her right to counsel by failing to treat counsel's

motion to withdraw as a "motion for substitution of counsel."

At no time did the mother request new counsel. Instead, the

mother repeatedly asked to represent herself: counsel informed

the judge on the first day of the first trial that the "[m]other

made a specific request that I withdraw"; the judge denied the

1 A pseudonym. motion after counsel failed to state any supporting reason in

her argument, motion, or affidavit; after conferring with

counsel, the mother filed a notice of appearance suggesting

self-representation; at the department's request after a witness

had offered testimony, the judge conducted a colloquy with the

mother; she repeated her desire to represent herself, filed a

second notice of appearance suggesting self-representation, and

completed a written waiver of counsel. The judge allowed the

mother's request to represent herself, and she agreed to have

counsel serve as standby counsel. The judge then declared a

mistrial and scheduled another trial date. Given this sequence

of events and applying de novo review, Adoption of Doretta, 106

Mass. App. Ct. 477, 485 (2026), we decline to construe counsel's

motion to withdraw in a manner that is inconsistent with the

mother's repeated requests to represent herself.

We also note that if the mother wanted new counsel, she had

ample time to make such a request, but she never did so. The

mistrial occurred on January 10, 2024. On February 1, 2024, the

parties appeared before the same judge for the second trial, and

the judge recapitulated the procedural background regarding the

mother's request to represent herself. Not only did the mother

not request counsel, but she continued to advocate for herself

regarding pretrial motions. Contrary to the mother's wide-

2 ranging allegations in her brief, we discern no facts from the

record to support that the judge deprived the mother of the

right to counsel, ignored her request for counsel, failed to

conduct an inquiry of counsel, forced her to represent herself,

deemed the mother to have forfeited her right to counsel, or

failed to appoint counsel to review the waiver of counsel form.

Nor do we discern any error in the manner which the judge

conducted the trial, particularly the order of witnesses and the

invitation to the mother to "tell me anything you want to tell

me." See Commonwealth v. Molino, 411 Mass. 149, 154 (1991)

(judge has discretion to impose "reasonable limitations" on

presentation with standby counsel). See also Maynard v.

Meachum, 545 F.2d 273, 279 (1st Cir. 1976) ("presenting a

defense is not a simple matter of telling one's story"); E.B.

Cypher, Criminal Practice and Procedure § 20:47 (4th ed. 2014)

("defendant should be informed that if he testifies, he will not

be permitted to give his testimony in a narrative form but

rather will have to answer questions asked of him by a 'standby'

counsel or ask himself questions then give the answers").

We also disagree with the father's contention that the

judge terminated his parental rights due to the "mother's

history" and otherwise misapplied G. L. c. 210, § 3 (c). The

record shows that the judge terminated the father's rights

3 because the father, who sought joint reunification, lacked

insight into the mother's substance use and her relationships

with former domestic violence perpetrators; failed to maintain

safe and stable housing; and failed to engage with individual

counseling, domestic violence services, and family stabilization

services. The judge was not required to give any special weight

to the "facts favorable to [f]ather," and we discern no error in

the judge's findings or conclusions. See Adoption of Kimberly,

414 Mass. 526, 529–530 (1993) (judge may consider mother placing

relationship with abusive boyfriend before needs of children);

Wilkins v. Wilkins, 324 Mass. 261, 264 (1949) (judge may

consider "parents, jointly, taken as a couple"); Adoption of

Serge, 52 Mass. App. Ct. 1, 8 (2001) (unfitness supported by

"lack of meaningful participation in recommended services");

Custody of Michel, 28 Mass. App. Ct. 260, 264 (1990) ("mother

displayed neither ability nor will to act independently of the

father").

Here, the father's loyalty to the mother (who he married

during the care and protection case) rendered him unable to

accept difficult facts showing that the mother had continuing

drug addictions and mental health needs and maintained harmful

relationships with prior partners. Despite evidence to the

contrary at trial, the father testified that there were no

4 barriers to the mother being the primary caretaker and no

concerns with her substance use, mental health, judgment, or

ongoing contact with prior, abusive partners. He further denied

the need for any services for himself or the mother. As the

judge found, both the mother and the father failed to appear on

one of the trial days, they demonstrated "an inability and

unwillingness to engage in the majority of the services

recommended by the [d]epartment," the father had a "lack of

concern with [m]other's unaddressed needs," and the father was

"frequently dismissive and steadfast in his belief that [m]other

was honest with him" despite the mother's own testimony that she

was dishonest.

Decrees affirmed.

By the Court (Meade, Hodgens & Allen, JJ.2),

Clerk

Entered: April 13, 2026.

2 The panelists are listed in order of seniority.