NOTICE: Summary decisions issued by the Appeals Court pursuant to M.A.C. Rule 23.0, as appearing in 97 Mass. App. Ct. 1017 (2020) (formerly known as rule 1:28, as amended by 73 Mass. App. Ct. 1001 [2009]), are primarily directed to the parties and, therefore, may not fully address the facts of the case or the panel's decisional rationale. Moreover, such decisions are not circulated to the entire court and, therefore, represent only the views of the panel that decided the case. A summary decision pursuant to rule 23.0 or rule 1:28 issued after February 25, 2008, may be cited for its persuasive value but, because of the limitations noted above, not as binding precedent. See Chace v. Curran, 71 Mass. App. Ct. 258, 260 n.4 (2008).
COMMONWEALTH OF MASSACHUSETTS
APPEALS COURT
24-P-1325
ADOPTION OF SERAPHINA.1
MEMORANDUM AND ORDER PURSUANT TO RULE 23.0
The mother appeals from a decree issued by a judge of the
Juvenile Court finding her unfit and terminating her parental
rights to her daughter, Seraphina. We affirm.
Background. Seraphina was born in November 2021. She is
the mother's fifth child. The mother's parental rights have
been terminated for each of her older four children. The day
after Serafina's birth, the Department of Children and Families
(department) filed a petition alleging that Seraphina was in
need of care and protection based on persistent, negative
symptoms of the mother's mental health conditions and the
mother's history of substance use and domestic abuse. At a
court hearing four days after Seraphina's removal, the mother
waived her right to temporary custody. Since her removal,
1 A pseudonym. Seraphina has remained in the department's custody and lived
with her maternal great aunt and two of her half-siblings, whom
the great aunt has adopted. Seraphina enjoys a significant,
positive bond with each of them. The great aunt also plans to
adopt Seraphina. A trial on the department's petition and
request to terminate parental rights was held on three
nonconsecutive days beginning February 20, 2024.2 The judge
heard from four witnesses and considered twenty exhibits. The
judge subsequently issued detailed findings supporting her
conclusions that the department had met its burden of
demonstrating by clear and convincing evidence that the mother
was unfit to parent Seraphina and was likely to remain so, and
that termination of the mother's parental rights was in
Seraphina's best interests. See Adoption of Nancy, 443 Mass.
512, 515 (2005).
Discussion. To terminate parental rights to a child and to
dispense with parental consent to adoption, "a judge must find
by clear and convincing evidence, based on subsidiary findings
proved by at least a fair preponderance of evidence, that the
parent is unfit to care for the child and that termination is in
the child's best interests" (citation omitted). Adoption of
Oren, 96 Mass. App. Ct. 842, 844 (2020). "[T]he 'parental
2 The putative father established paternity in April 2022, but he died before the date of trial.
2 fitness' test and the 'best interests of the child test' are not
mutually exclusive, but rather 'reflect different degrees of
emphasis on the same factors.'" Adoption of Garret, 92 Mass.
App. Ct. 664, 671 (2018), quoting Care & Protection of Three
Minors, 392 Mass. 704, 714 (1984). "The judge must also find
that the current parental unfitness is not a temporary
condition" (quotation and citation omitted). Adoption of
Arianne, 104 Mass. App. Ct. 716, 720 (2024). "We give
substantial deference to the judge's decision to terminate
parental rights and 'reverse only where the findings of fact are
clearly erroneous or where there is a clear error of law or
abuse of discretion'" (citation omitted). Id. "An abuse of
discretion exists where the decision amounts to a clear error of
judgment [in weighing the relevant factors, such] that [the
decision] falls outside the range of reasonable alternatives"
(citation omitted). Id.
1. Unfitness standard. The mother argues that the judge
failed to conclude that the department proved she was unfit by
clear and convincing evidence, and that the judge instead
focused solely on whether termination of her parental rights was
in Seraphina's best interests. In doing so, she contends, the
judge implicitly lowered the department's burden. To support
her argument, the mother points to a portion of paragraph four
of the judge's rulings of law stating that the department
3 "established by clear and convincing evidence that returning
[Seraphina] to [the mother's] care is contrary to [Seraphina's]
best interest." However, within the same paragraph, the judge
also found that "[t]here is clear and convincing evidence of
[the mother's] parental unfitness." See Adoption of Oren, 96
Mass. App. Ct. at 844.
We disagree with the mother's contention that the judge's
analysis was limited to the length of separation between the
mother and Seraphina, the bond between Seraphina and her great
aunt, and the ability of the great aunt to "be a better
caretaker" for Seraphina. To the contrary, the judge reviewed
each factor required to assess parental fitness in her detailed
and comprehensive findings and rulings. See G. L. c. 210
§ 3 (c). To the extent the judge infused some of her findings
with discussion of Seraphina's best interests, we discern no
error, where the judge examined each of the fourteen enumerated
statutory factors and applied eight in support of termination
being in Seraphina's best interests, before concluding that the
department "met its burden by clear and convincing evidence of
[proving the mother's] parental unfitness, and established such
unfitness is not merely a temporary condition." See Adoption of
Ilona, 459 Mass. 53, 59 (2011).
2. The mother's unfitness. The finding of the mother's
unfitness resulted from the judge's proper consideration of a
4 "constellation of factors." Adoption of Greta, 431 Mass. 577,
588 (2000). The parent's fitness is "determined by taking into
consideration a parent's character, temperament, conduct, and
capacity to provide for the child in the same context with the
child's particular needs, affections, and age." Adoption of
Mary, 414 Mass. 705, 711 (1993). "The inquiry is whether the
parent's deficiencies place the child at serious risk of peril
from abuse, neglect, or other activity harmful to the child"
(quotation and citation omitted). Adoption of Olivette, 79
Mass. App. Ct. 141, 157 (2011).
a. Mental health conditions. The mother has been
diagnosed with mental health conditions including substance use
disorder. The judge found that manifestations of the mother's
conditions persisted even though she cooperated to an extent
with the department's service plans by taking medications and
attending counseling, and that these manifestations negatively
affected her ability to parent Seraphina. Notwithstanding the
mother's efforts to address the symptoms of her mental health
conditions, her participation in treatment was inconsistent, and
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NOTICE: Summary decisions issued by the Appeals Court pursuant to M.A.C. Rule 23.0, as appearing in 97 Mass. App. Ct. 1017 (2020) (formerly known as rule 1:28, as amended by 73 Mass. App. Ct. 1001 [2009]), are primarily directed to the parties and, therefore, may not fully address the facts of the case or the panel's decisional rationale. Moreover, such decisions are not circulated to the entire court and, therefore, represent only the views of the panel that decided the case. A summary decision pursuant to rule 23.0 or rule 1:28 issued after February 25, 2008, may be cited for its persuasive value but, because of the limitations noted above, not as binding precedent. See Chace v. Curran, 71 Mass. App. Ct. 258, 260 n.4 (2008).
COMMONWEALTH OF MASSACHUSETTS
APPEALS COURT
24-P-1325
ADOPTION OF SERAPHINA.1
MEMORANDUM AND ORDER PURSUANT TO RULE 23.0
The mother appeals from a decree issued by a judge of the
Juvenile Court finding her unfit and terminating her parental
rights to her daughter, Seraphina. We affirm.
Background. Seraphina was born in November 2021. She is
the mother's fifth child. The mother's parental rights have
been terminated for each of her older four children. The day
after Serafina's birth, the Department of Children and Families
(department) filed a petition alleging that Seraphina was in
need of care and protection based on persistent, negative
symptoms of the mother's mental health conditions and the
mother's history of substance use and domestic abuse. At a
court hearing four days after Seraphina's removal, the mother
waived her right to temporary custody. Since her removal,
1 A pseudonym. Seraphina has remained in the department's custody and lived
with her maternal great aunt and two of her half-siblings, whom
the great aunt has adopted. Seraphina enjoys a significant,
positive bond with each of them. The great aunt also plans to
adopt Seraphina. A trial on the department's petition and
request to terminate parental rights was held on three
nonconsecutive days beginning February 20, 2024.2 The judge
heard from four witnesses and considered twenty exhibits. The
judge subsequently issued detailed findings supporting her
conclusions that the department had met its burden of
demonstrating by clear and convincing evidence that the mother
was unfit to parent Seraphina and was likely to remain so, and
that termination of the mother's parental rights was in
Seraphina's best interests. See Adoption of Nancy, 443 Mass.
512, 515 (2005).
Discussion. To terminate parental rights to a child and to
dispense with parental consent to adoption, "a judge must find
by clear and convincing evidence, based on subsidiary findings
proved by at least a fair preponderance of evidence, that the
parent is unfit to care for the child and that termination is in
the child's best interests" (citation omitted). Adoption of
Oren, 96 Mass. App. Ct. 842, 844 (2020). "[T]he 'parental
2 The putative father established paternity in April 2022, but he died before the date of trial.
2 fitness' test and the 'best interests of the child test' are not
mutually exclusive, but rather 'reflect different degrees of
emphasis on the same factors.'" Adoption of Garret, 92 Mass.
App. Ct. 664, 671 (2018), quoting Care & Protection of Three
Minors, 392 Mass. 704, 714 (1984). "The judge must also find
that the current parental unfitness is not a temporary
condition" (quotation and citation omitted). Adoption of
Arianne, 104 Mass. App. Ct. 716, 720 (2024). "We give
substantial deference to the judge's decision to terminate
parental rights and 'reverse only where the findings of fact are
clearly erroneous or where there is a clear error of law or
abuse of discretion'" (citation omitted). Id. "An abuse of
discretion exists where the decision amounts to a clear error of
judgment [in weighing the relevant factors, such] that [the
decision] falls outside the range of reasonable alternatives"
(citation omitted). Id.
1. Unfitness standard. The mother argues that the judge
failed to conclude that the department proved she was unfit by
clear and convincing evidence, and that the judge instead
focused solely on whether termination of her parental rights was
in Seraphina's best interests. In doing so, she contends, the
judge implicitly lowered the department's burden. To support
her argument, the mother points to a portion of paragraph four
of the judge's rulings of law stating that the department
3 "established by clear and convincing evidence that returning
[Seraphina] to [the mother's] care is contrary to [Seraphina's]
best interest." However, within the same paragraph, the judge
also found that "[t]here is clear and convincing evidence of
[the mother's] parental unfitness." See Adoption of Oren, 96
Mass. App. Ct. at 844.
We disagree with the mother's contention that the judge's
analysis was limited to the length of separation between the
mother and Seraphina, the bond between Seraphina and her great
aunt, and the ability of the great aunt to "be a better
caretaker" for Seraphina. To the contrary, the judge reviewed
each factor required to assess parental fitness in her detailed
and comprehensive findings and rulings. See G. L. c. 210
§ 3 (c). To the extent the judge infused some of her findings
with discussion of Seraphina's best interests, we discern no
error, where the judge examined each of the fourteen enumerated
statutory factors and applied eight in support of termination
being in Seraphina's best interests, before concluding that the
department "met its burden by clear and convincing evidence of
[proving the mother's] parental unfitness, and established such
unfitness is not merely a temporary condition." See Adoption of
Ilona, 459 Mass. 53, 59 (2011).
2. The mother's unfitness. The finding of the mother's
unfitness resulted from the judge's proper consideration of a
4 "constellation of factors." Adoption of Greta, 431 Mass. 577,
588 (2000). The parent's fitness is "determined by taking into
consideration a parent's character, temperament, conduct, and
capacity to provide for the child in the same context with the
child's particular needs, affections, and age." Adoption of
Mary, 414 Mass. 705, 711 (1993). "The inquiry is whether the
parent's deficiencies place the child at serious risk of peril
from abuse, neglect, or other activity harmful to the child"
(quotation and citation omitted). Adoption of Olivette, 79
Mass. App. Ct. 141, 157 (2011).
a. Mental health conditions. The mother has been
diagnosed with mental health conditions including substance use
disorder. The judge found that manifestations of the mother's
conditions persisted even though she cooperated to an extent
with the department's service plans by taking medications and
attending counseling, and that these manifestations negatively
affected her ability to parent Seraphina. Notwithstanding the
mother's efforts to address the symptoms of her mental health
conditions, her participation in treatment was inconsistent, and
she continued to struggle with anger management. About twice a
month while the case was pending, the mother had outbursts of
anger where she yelled, punched objects, and threw things. The
mother also engaged in abuse of alcohol, cocaine, and opiates,
beginning when she was seventeen years old. Although the judge
5 credited the mother's testimony that she had not abused
substances since 2019, the mother overdosed on prescribed pills
in 2021. The mother also continued to expose herself to drugs
and alcohol by associating with substance users and permitting
substance use in her home without appreciating the risks these
exposures posed to her sobriety and to her child. On this
evidence, we discern no error in the judge's determination that
there was a nexus between the mother's mental health and
substance use challenges and her inability to parent Seraphina.
See Adoption of Luc, 484 Mass. 139, 146 & n.17 (2020) (mental
health conditions and substance use can be factors in finding of
parental unfitness where there is sufficient nexus between
conditions and parent's ability to provide for child).
b. Domestic abuse. The mother experienced domestic abuse
in multiple past intimate relationships. During her
relationship with Seraphina's father, he inflicted mental,
emotional, and physical abuse on the mother. In 2021, while she
was pregnant with Seraphina, she sustained spinal fractures and
a laceration to her head during an altercation with the father.
Shortly thereafter, while still pregnant with Seraphina, the
mother sprayed chemicals on the father and tried to light him on
fire. Although the mother obtained a G. L. c. 209A restraining
order against the father after these incidents, she later
modified the conditions of the order to maintain contact with
6 the father. Despite working with a domestic violence program
where she received education and counselling for over a decade
beginning in 2011, the mother remained unaware of the risks or
warning signs of domestic abuse. See Adoption of Ulrich, 94
Mass. App. Ct. 668, 677 (2019) (parent's failure to benefit from
services "relevant to the determination of unfitness" [citation
omitted]). We thus discern no error in the judge's conclusion
that the mother's history of domestic abuse, and particularly
her lack of insight into its potential impact on Seraphina,
contributed to the mother's unfitness. See Care & Protection of
Lillith, 61 Mass. App. Ct. 132, 139 (2004) (discussing harm to
children of witnessing or being victim of domestic abuse).
c. The mother's efforts to improve her parenting capacity.
To the extent that the mother contends that the judge failed to
consider her efforts to work with the department to improve her
parenting capacity, we are not persuaded. The judge
acknowledged the mother's efforts to improve her parenting
capacity but found that the mother "has not been able to make
lasting change in her judgement or behavior to be able to safely
parent her child full time." The mother engaged with many of
the services on her action plans, but she did not provide her
social worker with a safety plan for domestic abuse or complete
a parental fitness and psychological evaluation. Her apartment
remained unsuitable for a child because of lead paint and
7 clutter. Starting in 2023, the mother became very inconsistent
with visiting Seraphina and asked to reduce the length of the
visits. She did not have a parenting plan for if she were
granted custody of Seraphina, and she was reluctant to change
her schedule to accommodate Seraphina's needs. We discern no
error in the judge's conclusion that despite her efforts to
improve her parenting capacity, the mother remained unfit to
parent Seraphina. See Adoption of Lorna, 46 Mass. App. Ct. 134,
143 (1999) ("The judge was not obliged to believe that the
parenting skills of the mother . . . had improved simply because
of [her] recent cooperation with the department").
3. The mother's future unfitness. The mother briefly
argues that the judge erred by failing to explain why the mother
could not continue to improve her parental capacity. The judge
addressed this issue with "specific and detailed findings"
supporting her conclusion that the mother's unfitness was not
temporary. Adoption of Quentin, 424 Mass. 882, 888 (1997). See
Adoption of Virgil, 93 Mass. App. Ct. 298, 301 (2018) (judge
must "find that the current parental unfitness is not a
temporary condition"). Those findings include, as discussed,
the persistent manifestations of the mother's mental health
conditions and history of substance use, volatile behavior, and
domestic abuse; as well as her lack of insight into how each of
those could negatively impact Seraphina. Furthermore, the judge
8 found that the mother had failed to improve her parenting
capacity substantially, even after her engagement with services
recommended by the department. Considered in their entirety,
the judge's findings and conclusions established by clear and
convincing evidence that the mother's unfitness was not
temporary.
Decree affirmed.
By the Court (Henry, Hand & Brennan, JJ.3),
Clerk
Entered: October 16, 2025.
3 The panelists are listed in order of seniority.