NOTICE: Summary decisions issued by the Appeals Court pursuant to M.A.C. Rule 23.0, as appearing in 97 Mass. App. Ct. 1017 (2020) (formerly known as rule 1:28, as amended by 73 Mass. App. Ct. 1001 [2009]), are primarily directed to the parties and, therefore, may not fully address the facts of the case or the panel's decisional rationale. Moreover, such decisions are not circulated to the entire court and, therefore, represent only the views of the panel that decided the case. A summary decision pursuant to rule 23.0 or rule 1:28 issued after February 25, 2008, may be cited for its persuasive value but, because of the limitations noted above, not as binding precedent. See Chace v. Curran, 71 Mass. App. Ct. 258, 260 n.4 (2008).
COMMONWEALTH OF MASSACHUSETTS
APPEALS COURT
24-P-1417
ADOPTION OF RYA (and a companion case1).
MEMORANDUM AND ORDER PURSUANT TO RULE 23.0
This appeal involves the mother's parental rights to her
children, Rya and Lois (collectively, the children). A Juvenile
Court judge found the mother unfit to care for her children and
terminated her parental rights.2 On appeal, the mother
challenges those determinations.3 We affirm.
1 Adoption of Lois. The children's names are pseudonyms.
2Rya's father executed an adoption surrender on the first day of trial. Lois does not have a legal father.
3At trial, the children stated that their preference is "to return home to [the mother's] care and custody." The judge found, however, that despite the children's caring and loving connection to the mother, it would not be in the children's best interests to return them to their mother. On appeal, Lois filed a brief supporting the judge's decision. Rya did not file a brief. Her appellate counsel, however, noting that Rya had changed her mind, filed a motion requesting that Rya be allowed to join the mother's brief. We allowed that motion. We leave Background. We summarize the relevant facts from the
judge's findings, reserving certain details for later
discussion. The mother's two youngest children are the subject
of this care and protection petition.4 Rya was born in November
2013. Rya has no unique medical issues or needs out of the
range of a child her age. Lois was born in January 2018. Lois
has attention deficit hyperactivity disorder and demonstrates
behaviors that challenge her caretakers such as defiance,
hitting, kicking, throwing things, and stealing. As a result of
her social and emotional needs, Lois has an individualized
education plan.
The mother has a history of involvement with the Department
of Children and Families (the department), as well as a long
history of poorly managed mental health problems. She has been
diagnosed with depression, posttraumatic stress disorder, and
bipolar disorder. Her mental illnesses have exposed the
children to violent, erratic behaviors and culminated in
it to the sound discretion of the trial judge whether, upon motion of the child, to reconsider visitation in light of this change.
4 The mother has five total children; her eldest three children were the subject of a separate care and protection petition. The oldest turned eighteen and was dismissed from the petition; the mother signed a stipulation for judgment terminating her rights to twin boys born in 2009.
2 neglect, discord, and chaos for the children. The mother's
mental illnesses are not stable, as she has failed to take her
medications consistently resulting in multiple psychiatric
hospitalizations and in removal of her children. Consequently,
the mother's ability to parent her children is limited; she is
unable to provide independent care and protection for her
children and she lacks insight into the harm to the children
caused by her unmanaged mental illness.
In November 2023, a trial regarding the mother's fitness as
to her children took place in the Juvenile Court. At the time
of trial, Rya was nine years old, and Lois was five years old.
Ultimately, the judge held the mother unfit to parent her
children and terminated her parental rights, awarding permanent
custody of the children to the department.
Discussion. The mother argues that the judge's findings do
not establish that she was unfit by clear and convincing
evidence because the judge relied on stale evidence. We are not
persuaded. "To terminate parental rights to a child, the judge
must find, by clear and convincing evidence, that the parent is
unfit and that the child's 'best interests will be served by
terminating the legal relation between parent and child.'"
Adoption of Luc, 484 Mass. 139, 144 (2020), quoting Adoption of
Ilona, 459 Mass. 53, 59 (2011). "We give substantial deference
3 to a judge's decision that termination of a parent's rights is
in the best interest of the child and reverse only where the
findings of fact are clearly erroneous or where there is a clear
error of law or abuse of discretion." Adoption of Ilona, supra.
In determining parental fitness, "a judge must consider 'a
parent's character, temperament, conduct, and capacity to
provide for the child in the same context with the child's
particular needs, affections, and age.'" Adoption of Garret, 92
Mass. App. Ct. 664, 671 (2018), quoting Adoption of Mary, 414
Mass. 705, 711 (1993). "Mental disorder is relevant only to the
extent that it affects the parent['s] capacity to assume
parental responsibility, and ability to deal with a child's
special needs" (citation omitted). Adoption of Luc, 484 Mass.
at 146. Also "relevant to the determination of unfitness" is a
parent's failure "to recognize the need for or to engage
consistently in treatment" (citation and quotation omitted).
Id. at 146-147.
The mother challenges the judge's analysis, claiming that
it was error for the judge to speculate about future harm to her
children and to consider the mother's fitness as to her children
collectively. The mother also asserts that the judge abused her
discretion in terminating the mother's parental rights because
the permanency plan proposed by the department was not adequate.
4 1. Unfitness. The evidence that mother's mental illness
has negatively impacted her ability to parent her children is
compelling. She has been psychiatrically hospitalized eight
times in twelve years. The mother takes medications for her
mental illnesses, but she does not take the medications
consistently, achieving only temporary management. The mother
also struggles "to maintain stable, healthy relationships" and
to provide "a safe, stable lifestyle" that is suitable for her
children.
The trial judge acknowledged that the mother has engaged in
some services to address her mental health, parenting skills,
and domestic violence and the judge was "convinced that [the
mother] loves [Rya and Lois] deeply." However, the mother's
efforts "did not result in any substantial and material or
permanent change" and the mother's love "is simply not enough to
prevent [the children] from harm in her care." Because her
"energy is consumed with trying to manage her own needs and
mental health," the mother remains unable to understand and meet
her children's current needs. Thus, the judge did not clearly
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NOTICE: Summary decisions issued by the Appeals Court pursuant to M.A.C. Rule 23.0, as appearing in 97 Mass. App. Ct. 1017 (2020) (formerly known as rule 1:28, as amended by 73 Mass. App. Ct. 1001 [2009]), are primarily directed to the parties and, therefore, may not fully address the facts of the case or the panel's decisional rationale. Moreover, such decisions are not circulated to the entire court and, therefore, represent only the views of the panel that decided the case. A summary decision pursuant to rule 23.0 or rule 1:28 issued after February 25, 2008, may be cited for its persuasive value but, because of the limitations noted above, not as binding precedent. See Chace v. Curran, 71 Mass. App. Ct. 258, 260 n.4 (2008).
COMMONWEALTH OF MASSACHUSETTS
APPEALS COURT
24-P-1417
ADOPTION OF RYA (and a companion case1).
MEMORANDUM AND ORDER PURSUANT TO RULE 23.0
This appeal involves the mother's parental rights to her
children, Rya and Lois (collectively, the children). A Juvenile
Court judge found the mother unfit to care for her children and
terminated her parental rights.2 On appeal, the mother
challenges those determinations.3 We affirm.
1 Adoption of Lois. The children's names are pseudonyms.
2Rya's father executed an adoption surrender on the first day of trial. Lois does not have a legal father.
3At trial, the children stated that their preference is "to return home to [the mother's] care and custody." The judge found, however, that despite the children's caring and loving connection to the mother, it would not be in the children's best interests to return them to their mother. On appeal, Lois filed a brief supporting the judge's decision. Rya did not file a brief. Her appellate counsel, however, noting that Rya had changed her mind, filed a motion requesting that Rya be allowed to join the mother's brief. We allowed that motion. We leave Background. We summarize the relevant facts from the
judge's findings, reserving certain details for later
discussion. The mother's two youngest children are the subject
of this care and protection petition.4 Rya was born in November
2013. Rya has no unique medical issues or needs out of the
range of a child her age. Lois was born in January 2018. Lois
has attention deficit hyperactivity disorder and demonstrates
behaviors that challenge her caretakers such as defiance,
hitting, kicking, throwing things, and stealing. As a result of
her social and emotional needs, Lois has an individualized
education plan.
The mother has a history of involvement with the Department
of Children and Families (the department), as well as a long
history of poorly managed mental health problems. She has been
diagnosed with depression, posttraumatic stress disorder, and
bipolar disorder. Her mental illnesses have exposed the
children to violent, erratic behaviors and culminated in
it to the sound discretion of the trial judge whether, upon motion of the child, to reconsider visitation in light of this change.
4 The mother has five total children; her eldest three children were the subject of a separate care and protection petition. The oldest turned eighteen and was dismissed from the petition; the mother signed a stipulation for judgment terminating her rights to twin boys born in 2009.
2 neglect, discord, and chaos for the children. The mother's
mental illnesses are not stable, as she has failed to take her
medications consistently resulting in multiple psychiatric
hospitalizations and in removal of her children. Consequently,
the mother's ability to parent her children is limited; she is
unable to provide independent care and protection for her
children and she lacks insight into the harm to the children
caused by her unmanaged mental illness.
In November 2023, a trial regarding the mother's fitness as
to her children took place in the Juvenile Court. At the time
of trial, Rya was nine years old, and Lois was five years old.
Ultimately, the judge held the mother unfit to parent her
children and terminated her parental rights, awarding permanent
custody of the children to the department.
Discussion. The mother argues that the judge's findings do
not establish that she was unfit by clear and convincing
evidence because the judge relied on stale evidence. We are not
persuaded. "To terminate parental rights to a child, the judge
must find, by clear and convincing evidence, that the parent is
unfit and that the child's 'best interests will be served by
terminating the legal relation between parent and child.'"
Adoption of Luc, 484 Mass. 139, 144 (2020), quoting Adoption of
Ilona, 459 Mass. 53, 59 (2011). "We give substantial deference
3 to a judge's decision that termination of a parent's rights is
in the best interest of the child and reverse only where the
findings of fact are clearly erroneous or where there is a clear
error of law or abuse of discretion." Adoption of Ilona, supra.
In determining parental fitness, "a judge must consider 'a
parent's character, temperament, conduct, and capacity to
provide for the child in the same context with the child's
particular needs, affections, and age.'" Adoption of Garret, 92
Mass. App. Ct. 664, 671 (2018), quoting Adoption of Mary, 414
Mass. 705, 711 (1993). "Mental disorder is relevant only to the
extent that it affects the parent['s] capacity to assume
parental responsibility, and ability to deal with a child's
special needs" (citation omitted). Adoption of Luc, 484 Mass.
at 146. Also "relevant to the determination of unfitness" is a
parent's failure "to recognize the need for or to engage
consistently in treatment" (citation and quotation omitted).
Id. at 146-147.
The mother challenges the judge's analysis, claiming that
it was error for the judge to speculate about future harm to her
children and to consider the mother's fitness as to her children
collectively. The mother also asserts that the judge abused her
discretion in terminating the mother's parental rights because
the permanency plan proposed by the department was not adequate.
4 1. Unfitness. The evidence that mother's mental illness
has negatively impacted her ability to parent her children is
compelling. She has been psychiatrically hospitalized eight
times in twelve years. The mother takes medications for her
mental illnesses, but she does not take the medications
consistently, achieving only temporary management. The mother
also struggles "to maintain stable, healthy relationships" and
to provide "a safe, stable lifestyle" that is suitable for her
children.
The trial judge acknowledged that the mother has engaged in
some services to address her mental health, parenting skills,
and domestic violence and the judge was "convinced that [the
mother] loves [Rya and Lois] deeply." However, the mother's
efforts "did not result in any substantial and material or
permanent change" and the mother's love "is simply not enough to
prevent [the children] from harm in her care." Because her
"energy is consumed with trying to manage her own needs and
mental health," the mother remains unable to understand and meet
her children's current needs. Thus, the judge did not clearly
err or abuse her discretion in concluding, based on the clear
and convincing evidence, that the mother was unfit.
2. Predictive Evidence. In determining parental fitness,
a judge is "entitled to consider the evidence of [a] mother's
5 most recent improvements within the context of her earlier and
continuing deficits." Adoption of Jacques, 82 Mass. App. Ct.
601, 608 (2012). Accordingly, a judge "is permitted to assess
prognostic evidence derived from prior patterns of parental
neglect or misconduct in determining future fitness and the
likelihood of harm to the child." Custody of Two Minors, 396
Mass. 610, 621 (1986). See Adoption of Knox, 102 Mass. App. Ct.
84, 94-95 (2023), quoting Care and Protection of Bruce, 44 Mass.
App. Ct. 758, 761 (1998) (judge may "use past conduct, medical
history, and present events to predict future ability and
performance as a parent").
Here, the judge considered the mother's participation in
individualized therapy and the fact that she has a medication
provider whom she sees every four-to-six weeks. The judge also
credited that, by the time of trial, the mother had maintained
housing and attended a domestic violence education program for
approximately one month. However, the mother has resisted more
intensive, longer-term treatment. She still possesses "little
insight into the cyclical pattern she has established of
stability followed by chaos," and her recent improvements were
"not significant enough to offset the substantial risk posed by
[her] unstable mental health[] and the likely psychiatric
hospitalizations in the future."
6 The judge's consideration of the mother's predicted conduct
was proper. The judge did not err or abuse her discretion in
relying on the mother's past, present, and predicted conduct to
conclude that the mother was unfit, a conclusion supported by
clear and convincing evidence. See Care and Protection of
Bruce, 44 Mass. App. Ct. at 761.
3. Individualized approach. In determining whether
termination of parental rights is in a child's best interests, a
judge must consider a parent's fitness regarding each child.
See Petitions of Dep't of Social Servs. to Dispense with Consent
to Adoption, 20 Mass. App. Ct. 689, 698 (1985) ("judge erred in
considering the children's best interests collectively only
rather than also individually"). "The specialized needs of a
particular child when combined with the deficiencies of a
parent's character, temperament, capacity, or conduct may
clearly establish parental unfitness" (citation omitted). Care
& Protection of Thomasina, 75 Mass. App. Ct. 563, 576 (2009).
Here, the judge made specific findings about the status of
each individual child at trial, including each child's
individual needs and the mother's impact on each. However, the
judge issued inconsistent findings about Rya; the conclusions
that Rya has "special needs" "beyond the typical needs of
children of [her] age" clearly contradicted both the evidence
7 and other findings that "[s]he has no special education needs
and no behavioral issues to speak of."5 While this may have been
error, it was ultimately harmless; the mother's demonstrated
"pattern of dangerous and unstable behavior" and inability to
break her "cyclical pattern of stability, followed by chaos and
hospitalization," have created an "instability [that] would
place the [c]hildren's welfare at great hazard." As a result,
"[the mother's] own mental health needs . . . eclipse the
normal, developmental needs" of each child.
That the judge also made findings about the children's
shared needs does not render her decision improper. The judge
listed the children's shared need for "safe and stable housing,
consistent access to food and medical care, . . . assistance and
supervision in their daily activities such as eating, bathing,
playing, and sleeping, . . . constant supervision for their
safety and support for their social, emotional, and educational
growth and development." These and others were noted by the
judge to be "typical needs of youngsters of their ages." That
those particular needs overlap does not mean that the judge
failed to consider their individual needs as well. The judge
noted that her conclusion that the mother is currently unfit to
5 The judge did note that Rya is engaged in individual therapy and that this should continue.
8 parent either of the children arises from consideration of each
of the children's "age-appropriate and typical needs, as well as
their special educational and developmental needs."
Findings to support a termination of parental rights must
be by "clear and convincing evidence, based on subsidiary
findings proved by at least a fair preponderance of evidence."
Adoption of Darlene, 99 Mass. App. Ct. 696, 702 (2021), quoting
Adoption of Jacques, 82 Mass. App. Ct. 601, 606 (2012).
"Parental unfitness . . . means more than ineptitude, handicap,
character flaw, conviction of a crime, unusual life style, or
inability to do as good a job as the child's foster parent.
Rather, the idea of parental unfitness means grievous
shortcomings or handicaps that put the child's welfare much at
hazard. Darlene, supra, quoting Adoption of Leland, 65 Mass.
App. Ct. 580, 584 (2006).
Although the judge's findings about the children's shared
needs was regrettable, there was clear and convincing evidence
for the judge to conclude that the mother was unfit. The judge
considered evidence of the mother's mental health problems, as
well as the best interests of Rya and Lois to determine that the
mother was unfit. The judge's conclusions do not reflect any
"clear error of law or abuse of discretion." Adoption of Ilona,
459 Mass. at 59.
9 4. Permanency plan. Prior to determining whether it would
be in a child's best interest to terminate parental rights, "the
judge must consider the adoption plan proposed by [the
department]." Adoption of Dora, 52 Mass. App. Ct. 472, 474
(2001). That "adoption plan need not be fully developed to
support a termination order; it need only provide sufficient
information about the prospective adoptive placement 'so that
the judge may properly evaluate the suitability of the
department's proposal.'" Adoption of Willow, 433 Mass. 636, 652
(2001), quoting Adoption of Vito, 431 Mass. 550, 568 n.28
(2000).
Here, the department's plan at the time of trial was to
"recruit an adoptive home for both [c]hildren together." The
department planned to recruit a "family prepared to keep the
[c]hildren together and support the healing they need through
on-going services[,]" including continued individualized therapy
for the children. See Adoption of Lars, 46 Mass. App. Ct. 30,
31-32 (1998) (department's abbreviated adoption plan was
sufficient where it contained "content and substance enough to
permit the court meaningfully to evaluate and consider" the
department's proposal [citation omitted]). As the department's
plan provided sufficient information for the judge to properly
10 evaluate the department's proposal, there was no abuse of
discretion. See Adoption of Willow, supra at 652-653.
Conclusion. Based on the evidence, we discern no error in
the judge's finding that the mother is unfit to parent her
children and that termination of her parental rights was in the
best interests of her children.
Decrees affirmed.
By the Court (Rubin, D'Angelo & Toone, JJ.6),
Clerk
Entered: October 17, 2025.
6 The panelists are listed in order of seniority.