ADOPTION OF PADRAIC (And Two Companion Cases).

• Court: Massachusetts Appeals Court
• Decided: May 9, 2024
• Docket: 23-P-0956
• Status: Unpublished

Opinion

NOTICE: Summary decisions issued by the Appeals Court pursuant to M.A.C. Rule 23.0, as appearing in 97 Mass. App. Ct. 1017 (2020) (formerly known as rule 1:28, as amended by 73 Mass. App. Ct. 1001 [2009]), are primarily directed to the parties and, therefore, may not fully address the facts of the case or the panel's decisional rationale. Moreover, such decisions are not circulated to the entire court and, therefore, represent only the views of the panel that decided the case. A summary decision pursuant to rule 23.0 or rule 1:28 issued after February 25, 2008, may be cited for its persuasive value but, because of the limitations noted above, not as binding precedent. See Chace v. Curran, 71 Mass. App. Ct. 258, 260 n.4 (2008).

COMMONWEALTH OF MASSACHUSETTS

APPEALS COURT

23-P-956

ADOPTION OF PADRAIC (and two companion cases1).

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER PURSUANT TO RULE 23.0

The mother appeals from decrees issued by a Juvenile Court

judge terminating her parental rights with respect to the three

children. On appeal, the mother claims that (1) the Department

of Children and Families (DCF) failed to establish by clear and

convincing evidence that mother is unfit, and that the

termination of mother's parental rights was in each child's best

interests; (2) the judge failed to address whether termination

of the mother's parental rights was in each individual child's

best interests; and (3) the judge made numerous clearly

erroneous findings. We affirm.

Discussion. "When reviewing a decision to terminate

parental rights, we must determine whether the trial judge

1Adoption of Robert and Adoption of Steven. The children's names are pseudonyms. abused his discretion or committed a clear error of law."

Adoption of Elena, 446 Mass. 24, 30 (2006). "[T]he judge's

assessment of the weight of the evidence and the credibility of

the witnesses is entitled to deference" (citation omitted).

Adoption of Quentin, 424 Mass. 882, 886 (1997).2

"To terminate parental rights to a child and to dispense

with parental consent to adoption, a judge must find by clear

and convincing evidence, based on subsidiary findings proved by

at least a fair preponderance of evidence, that the parent is

2 The mother claims that the judge's findings of fact and conclusions of law are not entitled to deference because she omitted numerous facts deemed favorable to the mother, thereby failing to make an "even-handed assessment of the evidence." See Adoption of Imelda, 72 Mass. App. Ct. 354, 365 (2008), quoting Petition of the Dep't of Pub. Welfare to Dispense with Consent to Adoption, 376 Mass. 252, 260-261 (1978). Viewing the record as a whole, the judge's findings and conclusions do not "suggest[] a purposeful attempt to stack the facts to support its predetermined outcome," as the mother suggests. See Adoption of Anton, 72 Mass. App. Ct. 667, 673 (2008), quoting Adoption of Helen, 429 Mass. 856, 859 (1999) ("The judge's findings are both 'specific and detailed,' demonstrating, as we require, that close attention was given to the evidence" [footnote omitted]). The judge did credit and include several positive facts in her findings. Notably, many of the general, underlying facts claimed to be omitted were mentioned in the judge's findings and conclusions, including that the mother was taking medication and seeing a psychiatrist; the home was observed to be neat and clean and adequately furnished; and the children were up to date medically. It matters little that an additional instance in which these facts were supported was omitted where evidence of the mother's unfitness was overwhelming, as discussed below. Moreover, given the voluminous record in this case and similar cases spanning years of DCF involvement, we cannot expect judges to include every detail that bears some relevance in their findings and conclusions.

2 unfit to care for the child and that termination is in the

child's best interests." Adoption of Jacques, 82 Mass. App. Ct.

601, 606 (2012). "Clear and convincing evidence is evidence

that is 'strong, positive and free from doubt.'" Adoption of

Lisette, 93 Mass. App. Ct. 284, 293 n.14 (2018), quoting Stone

v. Essex County Newspapers, Inc., 367 Mass. 849, 871 (1975). In

other words, the evidence "must be sufficient to convey a high

degree of probability that the proposition is true" (quotation

and citation omitted). Adoption of Rhona, 57 Mass. App. Ct.

479, 488 (2003), S.C., 63 Mass. App. Ct. 117 (2005).

Here, the main reasons underlying the judge's conclusions

that mother is unfit and that termination of her parental rights

was in each child's best interests include, but are not limited

to, that (1) the mother has had consistent interpersonal issues

that resulted in domestic abuse and frequent police intervention

at her residence; (2) her "diagnosed mental illness and apparent

substance misuse issues have directly impacted her ability to

provide adequate supervision and otherwise keep the [c]hildren

free from neglect and abuse while in her care"; (3) her "limited

engagement in some services has not adequately improved these

barriers to reunification"; (4) she has refused to cooperate

with DCF's home visits and has failed to attend visits regularly

without a credible excuse; (5) she has "demonstrated an

inability to keep negative influences and relationships out of

3 her home on a long-term basis"; (6) "[t]he boys each have their

own social, behavioral, and emotional challenges that were

complicated by the chaotic dynamic of [the m]other's home"; (7)

she "presents as unable to fully appreciate each of the boys'

deficits and needs"; and (8) that the children have received

consistent support for their social, emotional, academic, and

developmental needs, while also maintaining a meaningful bond

and contact while in substitute care. The judge also noted how

the mother stipulated to current unfitness in July of 2022, and

determined that her circumstances remained unimproved at the

time of trial, which was only eight months after the

stipulation. These findings were supported by both the

documentary evidence and testimony at trial, and they clearly

and convincingly demonstrate that the mother is unfit, and

termination is in each child's best interests.

The mother also claims that the judge failed to assess each

individual child's best interests, and instead "simply lumped

them all together," which was inappropriate because " [a]

determination of parental unfitness must be child-specific."

Adoption of Ramona, 61 Mass. App. Ct. 260, 263 (2004). Although

the overwhelming majority of the evidence supporting the

determination that termination of the mother's parental rights

would be in the children's best interests was not specific to

any particular child, the judge did single the children out

4 where meaningful to the findings and conclusions. Therefore, we

discern no abuse of discretion or error of law.

Finally, the mother claims that the judge made clearly

erroneous findings that warrant a new trial. "A subsidiary

factual finding will only be set aside when it is unsupported by

any evidence or when, 'although there is evidence to support it,

a reviewing court on the entire evidence is left with the

definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been

committed.'" Adoption of Peggy, 436 Mass. 690, 702 (2002),

quoting Custody of Eleanor, 414 Mass. 795, 799 (1993). "[W]here

a decision terminating parental rights contains a small number

of minor factual errors, we may nonetheless affirm the decree

without recourse to a remand to the trial court." Adoption of

Eden, 88 Mass. App. Ct. 293, 297 (2015). See Adoption of Peggy,

supra; Adoption of Sherry, 435 Mass. 331, 336 (2001). Here, any

5 factual errors the judge may have made were minor, and there is

no reason to remand this case to the trial court.

Decrees affirmed.

By the Court (Meade, Englander & Hodgens, JJ.3),

Assistant Clerk

Entered: May 9, 2024.

3 The panelists are listed in order of seniority.