Adoption of: M.F.H., Appeal of: R.L.H.

• Court: Superior Court of Pennsylvania
• Decided: August 27, 2025
• Docket: 36 WDA 2025
• Status: Unpublished

Opinion

J-S18017-25

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT O.P. 65.37

IN RE: ADOPTION OF M.F.H., A : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF MINOR : PENNSYLVANIA : : APPEAL OF: R.L.H., MOTHER : : : : : No. 36 WDA 2025

Appeal from the Order Entered November 26, 2024 In the Court of Common Pleas of Westmoreland County Orphans' Court at No(s): 062-2024

BEFORE: DUBOW, J., NICHOLS, J., and STEVENS, P.J.E.*

MEMORANDUM BY NICHOLS, J.: FILED: August 27, 2025

R.L.H. (Mother) appeals from the order terminating her parental rights

to M.F.H. (Child).1 On appeal, Mother argues that T.J.H. (Father) and O.A.H.

(Stepmother) (collectively, “Petitioners”) failed to establish grounds to

terminate Mother’s parental rights by clear and convincing evidence. Mother

also claims that the orphans’ court erred by excluding evidence of Father’s

past conduct. We affirm.

The orphans’ court summarized the relevant facts and procedural

history of this matter as follows:

____________________________________________

* Former Justice specially assigned to the Superior Court.

1 Child was born in June of 2022, and was two years and five months old at

the time of the November 7, 2024 termination of parental rights hearing. See N.T., 11/7/24, at 6. J-S18017-25

Mother and Father had separated approximately two months before the birth of [] Child. Mother had suffered a traumatic event when another child of hers was tragically killed.[2] Almost immediately following [] Child’s birth, Father filed a complaint for custody in September 2022. The current custody order between the parties has been in place since [December 13, 20223], with Father maintaining primary physical custody [and sole legal custody]. At that time, and since that point, Mother [was] allotted supervised partial physical custody with supervision to be provided by a licensed agency.

Orphans’ Ct. Op., 2/14/25, at 2.

On July 3, 2024, Petitioners filed a petition to involuntarily terminate

Mother’s parental rights to Child pursuant to 23 Pa.C.S. § 2511(a)(1), (a)(2),

and (b) of the Adoption Act.4

The orphans’ court conducted a hearing on the petition to involuntarily

terminate Mother’s parental rights November 7, 2024. Mother appeared at

the hearing with counsel. Child was represented by Patricia Elliott-Rentler,

Esq., who served both as Child’s guardian ad litem (GAL) and as Child’s legal

counsel.5 ____________________________________________

2 Father is not the father of Mother’s deceased child. See N.T., 11/7/24, at 11, 64.

3 See Hr’g Ex. 1 at 1 (Custody Order, 1541-2022-D, 12/13/22).

4 23 Pa.C.S. §§ 2101-2938.

5 We note that children have a statutory right to counsel in contested involuntary termination of parental rights proceedings. See In re K.R., 200 A.3d 969, 984 (Pa. Super. 2018) (en banc); 23 Pa.C.S. § 2313(a). It is well settled that “a single attorney cannot represent a child’s best interests and legal interests if those interests conflict.” In re Adoption of K.M.G., 240 A.3d 1218, 1236 (Pa. 2020) (citation omitted). However, “during contested (Footnote Continued Next Page)

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The orphans’ court summarized the evidence presented at the

termination of parental rights hearing (TPR hearing) as follows:

Mother has not taken advantage of [the custody order’s provision] for supervised partial physical custody; it is reported by Father that Mother has not seen [] Child since December 2022 when [] Child was only six months old.[6] Mother’s testimony indicated that she was able to obtain some financial support that she was planning to allocate to pay for periods of supervised custody, but the majority of those funds were put toward supervised custody scheduling with [] Child’s sibling. According to Father’s testimony, Mother has sporadically contacted him to ask if she can provide ____________________________________________

termination-of-parental-rights proceedings, where there is no conflict between a child’s legal and best interests, an attorney-guardian ad litem representing the child’s best interests can also represent the child’s legal interests.” In re T.S., 192 A.3d 1080, 1092 (Pa. 2018). Therefore, before appointing the GAL to also serve as a child’s legal counsel, a trial court must “make [a] determination” that “counsel does not have a conflict representing the child’s best and legal interests[.]” K.M.G., 240 A.3d at 1236-37.

As stated above, the orphans’ court appointed Attorney Elliott-Rentler as Child’s GAL. See Order Appointing Legal Counsel, 8/26/24. At the TPR hearing, Attorney Elliott-Rentler noted on the record that there was no conflict between Child’s best and legal interests, and the orphans’ court responded “Okay.” N.T., 11/7/24, at 3-4. Therefore, we are constrained to conclude that the orphans’ court’s one word reply to GAL, was not an on-the-record determination that Attorney Elliott-Rentler could represent Child’s best interests and legal interests without conflict. See, e.g., K.M.G., 240 A.3d at 1236-37; In re A.C.M., 333 A.3d 704, 708 (Pa. Super. 2025) (vacating the decree terminating parental rights where the orphans’ court delegated the responsibility to determine if a conflict existed to counsel). However, our Supreme Court has recognized that there is a presumption that there is no conflict between a child’s best interests and legal interest when a child is too young to articulate a preference in the outcome of the proceedings. T.S., 192 A.3d at 1088-90. Because Child was only two years and five months old at the time of the termination hearing, we conclude that the presumption of no- conflict from T.S. applies. See id.

6 Mother acknowledged that she last had contact with Child during a period of

supervised physical custody on December 27, 2022 when Child was six months old. See N.T., 11/7/24, at 6-7, 9-10, 13.

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formula or other items — even after [] Child was developmentally beyond such needs.

Father testified that Stepmother has shared in performing the parental duties for [] Child with him in Mother’s absence. Father and Stepmother believe they are in the best position to care for [] Child’s special needs, as she has a cyst on her pituitary gland. [] Child identifies Stepmother as her mother; it is unclear if [] Child would recognize Mother, since her last in-person contact with [] Child would have been over two years ago.

Orphans’ Ct. Op., 2/14/25, at 2-3.

We add that Father testified that he has denied Mother’s requests to see

Child outside of a supervised visitation setting because that is not permitted

under the custody order. See N.T., 11/7/24, at 20, 36. Father testified that

when Child was born, he and Mother shared childcare responsibilities equally.

See id. at 29. Father denied ever physically abusing Mother. See id. at 28-

29.

Stepmother testified that she has assisted Father with caring for Child

since she began dating Father, which was when Child was about four months

old.7 See id. at 43. Stepmother further explained that she and Father share

parental responsibilities equally. See id. at 43-44, 48. Stepmother testified

that she has a strong bond with Child, who calls Stepmother “mommy” and

“momma.” See id. at 43, 46. Further, Child follows Stepmother around and

mimics Stepmother. See id. at 46. Stepmother stated that she does not

treat Child any differently than her biological child. See id.

7 Father and Stepmother were married shortly before the TPR hearing. See N.T., 11/7/24, at 47.

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Petitioners explained that Child has had multiple doctor’s visits to

monitor the growth of the cyst on her pituitary gland including visits to an

endocrinologist and a neurologist every three to six months. See id. at 22-

23, 28, 31, 44-45, 49.

Mother testified that when Child was born, she performed nearly all

parental duties and that Father performed almost no parental duties because

he was constantly away from home. See id. at 55, 58-60, 74-75. Mother

stated that when Child was born, doctors told her that Child has a cyst on her

pituitary gland but “it was nothing to worry about. That it would not cause

any problems or like anything[.]” Id. at 66. Mother explained that she last

had supervised visitation with Child on December 27, 2022. See id. at 6-7,

9-10, 13, 69.

Mother explained that she asked Father to see Child “countless times”

outside of a supervised visitation setting but Father denied her requests. Id.

at 70. Mother also testified that she cannot afford to pay for supervised

visitation sessions with Child and she has been unable to obtain financial

assistance for the visitation except for a grant of $2,000 that went to the

agency supervising her visitation with her other child. See id. at 10, 57-58,

68, 72, 77-79. Mother’s counsel asked Mother if Father had ever been

physically abusive towards her. See id. at 62-63. Petitioners’ counsel

objected to the relevance of the question, and Mother’s counsel responded

that it was relevant to Child living with Father. See id. The orphans’ court

sustained the objection. See id. Lastly, Mother claimed that that the court

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system had failed her and Child because the courts favor “bad people” and

“psychos” over “perfectly sane and normal people and parents.” Id. at 81.

On November 26, 2024, the orphans’ court filed an order granting the

petition to involuntarily terminate Mother’s parental rights to Child pursuant

to 23 Pa.C.S. § 2511(a)(1), (a)(2), and (b). Mother filed a timely notice of

appeal, and both the orphans’ court and Mother complied with Pa.R.A.P. 1925.

On appeal, Mother presents the four issues, which we reorder as follows:

1. Whether the [orphans’] court erred by not allowing Mother to introduce evidence of past and present conduct of Father as it impacts the best interests of [] Child.

2. Whether the [orphans’] court erred in finding by clear and convincing evidence that [Petitioners] met [their] burden as to terminating the parental rights of Mother under 23 Pa.C.S. § 2511(a)(1).

3. Whether the [orphans’] court erred in finding by clear and convincing evidence that [Petitioners] met [their] burden as to terminating the parental rights of Mother under 23 Pa.C.S. § 2511(a)(2).

4. Whether the [orphans’] court erred in finding by clear and convincing evidence that [Petitioners] met [their] burden under 23 Pa.C.S. § 2511(b) that the best interests of [] Child are met by terminating Mother’s parental rights.

Mother’s Brief at 4-5 (some formatting altered).8

8 We note that in her Rule 1925(b) statement, Mother also claimed that the

orphans’ court erred by denying her motion to sequester Stepmother. See Rule 1925(b) Statement, 12/24/24, at ¶5. Mother has not raised this issue in her appellate brief; therefore, Mother has abandoned it on appeal. See Pa.R.A.P. 2116(a), 2119(a); see also Allied Envtl. Serv., Inc. v. Roth, 222 A.3d 422, 424 n.1 (Pa. Super. 2019) (stating that “[a]n issue identified on appeal but not developed in the appellant’s brief is abandoned and, therefore, waived” (citation omitted)).

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Exclusion of Evidence

In her first issue, Mother argues that the orphans’ court abused its

discretion by excluding evidence of Father’s past conduct. Mother’s Brief at

23-25. Specifically, Mother contends that the orphans’ court should have

admitted evidence of Father’s past physical and emotional abuse of Mother.

Id. at 24. Mother claims that this evidence is relevant to Child’s health, safety,

welfare, and best interests in Father’s home. Id. at 24-25.

Before we address the merits of this issue, we must first determine if

Mother has preserved it for appeal. This Court may raise this issue of waiver

sua sponte. See Tucker v. R.M. Tours, 939 A.2d 343, 346 (Pa. Super.

2007). “The issue of waiver presents a question of law, and, as such, our

standard of review is de novo and our scope of review is plenary.” Trigg v.

Children’s Hosp. of Pittsburgh of UPMC, 229 A.3d 260, 269 (Pa. 2020)

(citation omitted).

Issues that are not raised in an appellant’s concise statement are waived

on appeal. See Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b)(4)(vii) (providing that issues not included

in a Rule 1925 concise statement are waived); see also Dietrich v. Dietrich,

923 A.2d 461, 463 (Pa. Super. 2007).

Further, this Court has stated that

a concise statement which is too vague to allow the court to identify the issues raised on appeal is the functional equivalent to no concise statement at all.

* * *

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When a court has to guess what issues an appellant is appealing, that is not enough for meaningful review. When an appellant fails adequately to identify in a concise manner the issues sought to be pursued on appeal, the trial court is impeded in its preparation of a legal analysis which is pertinent to those issues.

In essence, the purpose of requiring a concise statement of matters complained of on appeal under Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b) is to allow the trial court to easily discern the issues an appellant intends to pursue on appeal and to allow the court to file an intelligent response to those issues in an opinion pursuant to Pa.R.A.P. 1925(a).

S.S. v. T.J., 212 A.3d 1026, 1031-32 (Pa. Super. 2019) (citations omitted

and formatting altered).

Here, in her Rule 1925(b) statement, Mother claimed that the orphans’

court “erred by not allowing Mother to introduce evidence of past and present

conduct of Father as it impacts the best interests of [] Child.” Rule 1925(b)

Statement, 12/24/24, at ¶4.

In its Rule 1925(a) opinion, the orphans’ court discussed its decision to

allow Mother, over Petitioners’ objection, to present evidence regarding

Father’s role in childcare prior to the parents’ separation. See Orphans’ Ct.

Op., 2/14/25, at 5. The orphans’ court did not discuss its decision to exclude

Mother’s testimony about Father’s alleged past physical abuse of Mother at all

in its Rule 1925(a) opinion. Therefore, we conclude that Mother’s Rule

1925(b) statement was too vague to identify her claim that the orphans’ court

erred by excluding evidence regarding Father’s alleged past physical abuse.

See S.S., 212 A.3d at 1031-32. Accordingly, this issue is waived.

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Termination of Parental Rights

In her remaining issues, Mother argues that the orphans’ court erred by

terminating her parental rights. Mother’s Brief at 13-23.

We begin with our well-settled standard of review:

The standard of review in termination of parental rights cases requires appellate courts to accept the findings of fact and credibility determinations of the trial court if they are supported by the record. If the factual findings are supported, appellate courts review to determine if the trial court made an error of law or abused its discretion. A decision may be reversed for an abuse of discretion only upon demonstration of manifest unreasonableness, partiality, prejudice, bias, or ill-will. The trial court’s decision, however, should not be reversed merely because the record would support a different result. We have previously emphasized our deference to trial courts that often have first-hand observations of the parties spanning multiple hearings.

In re H.H.N., 296 A.3d 1258, 1263 (Pa. Super. 2023) (citations omitted);

see also In re Q.R.D., 214 A.3d 233, 239 (Pa. Super. 2019) (explaining that

“the trial court is free to believe all, part, or none of the evidence presented,

and is likewise free to make all credibility determinations and resolve conflicts

in the evidence” (citation omitted and some formatting altered)).

Termination of parental rights is governed by § 2511 of the Adoption Act. Subsection (a) provides eleven enumerated grounds describing particular conduct of a parent which would warrant involuntary termination. In evaluating whether the petitioner proved grounds under § 2511(a), the trial court must focus on the parent’s conduct and avoid using a balancing or best interest approach. If the trial court determines the petitioner established grounds for termination under § 2511(a) by clear and convincing evidence, the court then must assess the petition under § 2511(b), which focuses on the child’s needs and welfare.

In re M.E., 283 A.3d 820, 830 (Pa. Super. 2022) (citations omitted and some

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formatting altered); see also Q.R.D., 214 A.3d at 239 (explaining that if “the

court determines the parent’s conduct warrants termination of his or her

parental rights, the court then engages in the second part of the analysis

pursuant to Section 2511(b): determination of the needs and welfare of the

child under the standard of best interests of the child” (citation omitted and

formatting altered)).

In its Rule 1925(a) opinion, the orphans’ court thoroughly explained its

reasons for terminating Mother’s parental rights and its conclusion that

termination was in Children’s best interests. See Orphans’ Ct. Op. at 2-6.

Following our review of the record, the parties’ briefs, the relevant law,

and the orphans’ court’s well-reasoned analysis, we affirm on the basis of the

orphans’ court’s opinion. Specifically, we agree with the orphans’ court that

termination of Mother’s parental rights was warranted under Section

2511(a)(1). See id. at 3-4, 6. Further, we agree with the orphans’ court’s

conclusion that termination was in Child’s best interest pursuant to Section

2511(b). See Orphans’ Ct. Op. at 5-6. Additionally, we conclude that

Petitioners presented clear and convincing evidence in support of termination

and the orphans’ court did not abuse its discretion in granting the petition to

terminate Mother’s parental rights. See H.H.N., 296 A.3d at 1263. Mother

is not entitled to relief on her remaining claims. Accordingly, we affirm.9

9 The parties are directed to attach a copy of the orphans’ court’s opinion in

the event of further proceedings.

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Order affirmed. Jurisdiction relinquished.

DATE: 08/27/2025

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