Adoption of LAQ

• Court: Colorado Court of Appeals
• Decided: November 13, 2025
• Docket: 24CA2275
• Status: Unpublished

Opinion

24CA2275 Adoption of LAQ 11-13-2025

COLORADO COURT OF APPEALS

Court of Appeals No. 24CA2275 City and County of Broomfield District Court No. 24JA30007 Honorable Priscilla J. Loew, Judge

In re the Petition of F.C.J., IV, and C.C.J.,

Appellees,

for the Adoption of L.A.Q., a Child,

and Concerning J.J. and G.Q.,

Appellants.

JUDGMENT AFFIRMED

Division A Opinion by JUSTICE MARTINEZ* Román, C.J., and Hawthorne*, J., concur

NOT PUBLISHED PURSUANT TO C.A.R. 35(e) Announced November 13, 2025

Grob & Eirich, LLC, Andrew T. Fitzgerald, Lakewood, Colorado for Appellees

The Harris Law Firm, PLLP, Erika Carter, Denver, Colorado for Appellants

*Sitting by assignment of the Chief Justice under provisions of Colo. Const. art. VI, § 5(3), and § 24-51-1105, C.R.S. 2025. ¶1 In this custodial adoption proceeding, J.J. (mother) and G.Q.

(father) appeal the juvenile court’s judgment terminating their

parent-child legal relationships with L.A.Q. (the child). We affirm.

I. Background

¶2 The custodial parents, F.C.J., IV, and C.C.J., who are the

child’s maternal uncle and aunt, began caring for the child when

she was six days old in March 2019. In October 2019, the child

was returned to mother and father for four months but moved back

to maternal uncle and aunt when the parents relapsed. In October

2020, the district court entered a stipulated allocation of parental

responsibilities (APR) ordering physical custody and sole

decision-making responsibility to maternal uncle and aunt. The

APR judgment allowed mother and father to have weekly one-hour

in person visits and weekly fifteen-minute video visits, supervised

by a third party at parents’ expense. The APR judgment provided a

step-up procedure for the parents to expand parenting time if they

completed substance abuse treatment and submitted regular

monitored sobriety tests. The APR judgment also required that the

parents pay fifty dollars per month in child support.

1 ¶3 In May 2024, maternal uncle and aunt filed a petition for

custodial adoption under section 19-5-203(1)(k), C.R.S. 2025.

Following a hearing, the juvenile court terminated mother’s and

father’s parental rights and granted the adoption petition.

II. Lack of Oral Ruling Transcript

¶4 As the appellants, the parents are responsible for providing an

adequate record to support their claims of error. See Newport Pac.

Cap. Co., Inc. v. Waste, 878 P.2d 136, 139 (Colo. App. 1994). This

includes transcripts, if they are required for us to consider and

decide the issues on appeal. C.A.R. 10(d)(3). In cases where a

transcript of the proceedings is unavailable, the parties may file a

statement of the evidence or proceedings in lieu of a transcript.

C.A.R. 10(e).

¶5 Here, the parties agree that the juvenile court made an oral

ruling with specific factual findings, but that the hearing was not

recorded. The parents did not follow the procedure outlined in

C.A.R. 10(e) to provide a statement of the evidence or proceedings in

lieu of the transcript. Accordingly, we must presume that the

missing transcript would support the juvenile court’s judgment.

See In re Marriage of Tagen, 62 P.3d 1092, 1096 (Colo. App. 2002).

2 III. Custodial Adoption

¶6 Mother and father contend that the juvenile court erred when

it terminated their parental rights. Although they concede that they

failed to pay the court-ordered fifty dollars per month child support

for more than a year, they argue that they nonetheless paid

reasonable child support and that the court erred because it did not

consider whether they would support the child going forward.

Mother and father also contend that no evidence established that

they had abandoned the child. We disagree with their argument

about child support and do not address their second contention.

A. Legal Standard

¶7 In a custodial adoption proceeding, a child may be adopted if

(1) the birth parents have abandoned the child for a period of one

year or more; or (2) the birth parents have failed without cause to

provide reasonable support for the child for a period of one year or

more. § 19-5-203(1)(k). This criteria must be established by clear

and convincing evidence. D.P.H. v. J.L.B., 260 P.3d 320, 324 (Colo.

2011); In re R.H.N., 710 P.2d 482, 487 (Colo. 1985).

¶8 The appropriate time frame for these determinations is the

twelve months preceding the filing of the adoption petition.

3 See D.P.H., 260 P.3d at 324; R.H.N., 710 P.2d at 487. However, our

supreme court has stated that once a court has determined that a

birth parent has failed to provide child support during the relevant

twelve-month period, “the court must look beyond the twelve-month

period to determine whether there is any likelihood that the natural

parent will provide child support.” R.H.N., 710 P.2d at 487; see

also E.R.S. v. O.D.A., 779 P.2d 844, 848 (Colo. 1989) (court must

consider parent’s likelihood of providing future support to ensure a

fundamentally fair procedure). Parents are not excused from their

obligation to support their children merely because their incomes

are small. R.H.N., 710 P.2d at 487.

¶9 We will not disturb the juvenile court’s determination unless it

is clearly erroneous. D.P.H., 260 P.3d at 325.

B. Analysis

¶ 10 The parents assert that the juvenile court erred when it

concluded that they failed, without cause, to provide reasonable

support for the child for a period of one year or more. We are not

persuaded.

¶ 11 The parties stipulated that the parents had not paid child

support for the three-and-a-half-year period preceding the filing of

4 the petition. See id. at 324 (the relevant time period is the

twelve-month period preceding the filing of the adoption petition).

After the petition was filed, the parents made a lump sum child

support payment bringing them current on their obligation. But

after the parents paid the lump sum, they did not pay the next two

months of child support payments on time, according to maternal

uncle. Although both parents testified that it was now a priority for

them to continue making regular and timely child support

payments, neither explained how they would obtain the funds to

pay continuing support.

¶ 12 On appeal, the parents argue that they were justified in not

paying child support because maternal uncle told them they did not

need to pay it. Maternal uncle and mother testified that during a

mediation prior to the APR judgment being entered, maternal uncle

told mother that she “didn’t have to pay child support, that he

wasn’t looking for that.” Mother testified that she relied on that

statement and believed she did not have to pay child support.

However, mother also testified that she was aware that maternal

uncle later moved for a child support order, which the court

granted, and the APR judgment required that she pay fifty dollars

5 per month. Father provided no explanation for his non-payment of

child support.

¶ 13 The parents further contend that because they had to pay

between thirty and thirty-five dollars for each supervised visit with

the child, those payments should be considered reasonable child

support. However, they provide no legal support for such an

assertion. The stipulated APR judgment required both the payment

of fifty dollars for child support each month and supervised visits at

the parents’ expense. Accordingly, the juvenile court was not

required to find that payment for supervised visits was sufficient to

establish that the parents provided reasonable support to the child.

¶ 14 The parents contend that the payment for supervised visits

put them under great financial strain, and therefore they were

unable to also pay monthly child support. But parents are not

excused from paying some reasonable amount of child support

merely because of strained finances. R.H.N., 710 P.2d at 487. Also,

this assertion is somewhat belied by the fact that parents were able

to pay their three-and-a-half-year child support arrearages within a

matter of months after the petition to adopt was filed.

6 ¶ 15 Lastly, to the extent that the parents argue that evidence

supports they would pay child support in the future, it is for the

juvenile court to reconcile this evidence, not us. See People in

Interest of R.D., 2012 COA 35, ¶ 43 (the credibility of the witnesses

and the sufficiency, probative effect, and weight of the evidence, as

well as the inferences and conclusions to be drawn from it, are

within the discretion of the juvenile court).

¶ 16 Because of the lack of a transcript from the oral ruling, we

cannot confirm whether the juvenile court relied on the evidence we

related here or whether it made a specific finding that the parents

are unlikely to pay child support in the future. However, we may

presume that the juvenile court considered all the evidence at the

hearing when making its determination. See In re Marriage of Udis,

780 P.2d 499, 503-04 (Colo. 1989) (appellate court may presume

that the district court considered evidence presented, even if order

does not expressly say that it did so).

¶ 17 Given that the record supports the juvenile court’s conclusion

that the parents failed without cause to provide support for the

child for a period of one year or more, we need not address the

parents’ argument that the court erred because evidence did not

7 establish that they had abandoned the child for a period of one year

or more because it is merely an alternative way of showing that a

child is available for adoption. See Lombard v. Colo. Outdoor Educ.

Ctr., Inc., 187 P.3d 565, 571 (Colo. 2008) (“Generally, we presume

the disjunctive use of the word ‘or’ marks distinctive categories.”).

IV. Best Interests

¶ 18 Finally, mother and father contend that the juvenile court did

not consider the child’s best interests. We perceive no reversible

error.

¶ 19 When considering a petition for custodial adoption of a child

eligible for adoption, the court must also determine whether

termination and adoption are in the child’s best interests.

§ 19-5-210(2)(d), C.R.S. 2025; E.R.S., 779 P.2d at 847. The court

must make this determination because focusing solely on parental

fault ignores the fact that termination may be detrimental to the

child. See R.H.N., 710 P.2d at 486. The court “may consider,

among other factors, family stability, the present and future effects

of adoption, including the detrimental effects of termination of

parental rights, the child’s emotional ties to and interaction with

the [parties], the adjustment of the child to the living situation, the

8 child’s age, and the mental and physical health of the parties.” Id.

Moreover, a court may not terminate the parent-child legal

relationship and grant an adoption solely because the child’s

condition would be improved. People in Interest of E.A., 638 P.2d

278, 285 (Colo. 1981).

¶ 20 The parents argue that the juvenile court “failed to provide any

analysis or findings of fact” when it concluded that adoption was in

the child’s best interests. They assert that the court failed to

consider the impact of termination on the child and her younger

siblings, who live with their parents.

¶ 21 Because the juvenile court’s written judgment lacks findings to

support its conclusion, and we have no transcript of its oral ruling,

we must again assume that its oral ruling supported its final

determination. See Tagen, 62 P.3d at 1096. We may presume that

the juvenile court considered the evidence presented by the parents

about the child’s relationship with them and her younger siblings

and the impact of termination on those relationships, even if it did

not make specific findings. See Udis, 780 P.2d at 503-04. To the

extent that the parents argue that the juvenile court must consider

and make findings on the factors listed in R.H.N., we disagree. See

9 R.H.N., 710 P.2d at 486 (the court may consider factors such as the

detrimental effects of termination and more); see also Kailey v.

Chambers, 261 P.3d 792, 795 (Colo. App. 2011) (use of the word

“may” in a statute generally denotes discretion and a choice

between two or more courses of action).

¶ 22 Moreover, the record supports the juvenile court’s conclusion

that adoption was in the child’s best interest and would support

specific findings explaining that conclusion. For example, maternal

uncle testified that the child had lived with him, his wife, and the

child’s cousin — who she considered a brother — for the majority of

her life. He testified that the child had questions about why she

had a different last name and that she wanted to be included in the

family. He testified that he and maternal aunt wanted to adopt the

child so that she would have continued permanence of safety and

stability.

¶ 23 Maternal uncle, mother, and mother’s adult son all testified

about mother’s long-term substance use problems. Also, evidence

established that the parents had not moved past supervised visits

because they had not demonstrated sobriety or provided

10 documentation that they participated in substance abuse

treatment.

¶ 24 Maternal uncle and aunt testified that the parents did not

have consistent visits after the APR judgment was entered and had

not visited with the child in more than six months at the time of the

adoption hearing. Maternal uncle testified that when the child had

visits, she felt frustrated. Maternal aunt testified that the child had

“behaviors” after visits with the parents, including being “mean to

other kids.” The visitation supervisor testified that during visits

occurring in early 2024, the child was very angry with father, yelled

at him, and was frustrated and anxious. When the visitation

supervisor tried to coach father to help him to investigate the

reasons for the child’s behavior, father did not follow her

suggestions.

¶ 25 Because this evidence supports the juvenile court’s conclusion

that termination and adoption by maternal uncle and aunt were in

the child’s best interests, we cannot disturb it. D.P.H., 260 P.3d at

325.

V. Disposition

¶ 26 We affirm the judgment.

11 CHIEF JUDGE ROMÁN and JUDGE HAWTHORNE concur.