NOTICE: Summary decisions issued by the Appeals Court pursuant to M.A.C. Rule 23.0, as appearing in 97 Mass. App. Ct. 1017 (2020) (formerly known as rule 1:28, as amended by 73 Mass. App. Ct. 1001 [2009]), are primarily directed to the parties and, therefore, may not fully address the facts of the case or the panel's decisional rationale. Moreover, such decisions are not circulated to the entire court and, therefore, represent only the views of the panel that decided the case. A summary decision pursuant to rule 23.0 or rule 1:28 issued after February 25, 2008, may be cited for its persuasive value but, because of the limitations noted above, not as binding precedent. See Chace v. Curran, 71 Mass. App. Ct. 258, 260 n.4 (2008).
COMMONWEALTH OF MASSACHUSETTS
APPEALS COURT
25-P-356
ADOPTION OF KALID (and a companion case 1).
MEMORANDUM AND ORDER PURSUANT TO RULE 23.0
After a trial, a judge of the Juvenile Court found the
mother unfit to parent two of her children, Kalid and Toni, and
terminated her parental rights. The mother does not contest the
finding of unfitness but maintains that the Department of
Children and Families (department) failed to make reasonable
efforts to facilitate reunification. 2 We affirm.
Background. Both Kalid and Toni have intensive special
needs. Toni is diagnosed with autism (low-functioning), and, at
age five and six, was nonverbal, not toilet trained, and
required specialized education. In the department's custody, he
1 Adoption of Toni. The children's names are pseudonyms.
2The parental rights of Kalid's father were terminated in an earlier proceeding. The parental rights of the unknown, unnamed father of Toni were terminated in this proceeding. No notices of appeal were filed regarding these termination decisions. received applied behavioral analysis services six days a week.
Due to a pica diagnosis, he required full-time supervision.
Toni was born very prematurely at twenty-five weeks'
gestation and, for her early months, it was not clear she would
survive. For the first eight or so months of her life, she was
hospitalized at a Springfield hospital near the mother's
community and, for the first four months, the mother visited
regularly. The department filed this care and protection case
based on concerns about the mother's lack of engagement in
services, active paranoia, treatment of her mental illness
through medication to the exclusion of therapy, a report that
the mother vaped in the neonatal intensive care unit, and
hospital staff reports that the mother behaved inappropriately
with Toni.
After Toni spent the first eight months of her life in the
Springfield hospital, she was transferred to a hospital in
Boston. At the time of trial, the mother had not visited with
Toni since September 2023. The mother found it difficult to get
to the Boston hospital. The department provided bus passes, but
the mother asserted that the cost of transportation between the
bus terminal in Boston and the hospital was prohibitively high.
Further complicating visits, for some of this time, the mother
was on required bed rest at the end of her fourth pregnancy.
2 The judge found that the mother was unable to work with
professionals and providers to coordinate the services and
supports required by her high-needs children. Specific to Toni,
the judge found the mother had no real appreciation for Toni's
needs, that there was no evidence of any bond or connection
between the mother and Toni, and that the mother had never cared
for Toni independently due to Toni's lifelong hospitalization.
Should Toni be placed with the mother, the judge found, Toni
would be "gravely at risk of death or serious, permanent injury"
due to the mother's inability to meet her care needs.
Specific to Kalid, the judge found that the mother did not
ask about the services he receives, did not try to engage with
Kalid at monthly visits (sometimes falling asleep) and was a
passive observer during visits, showing minimal interest in
caring for him. The judge noted that, at trial, the mother was
unsure about the current status of Kalid's pica diagnosis and
had not sought an update. The mother's plan for Kalid, if he
were to be returned to her care, was to have him at school
during the school day and then have one of her family members
pick him up after school and keep him until the end of the
mother's work day at 11 P.M., which the judge characterized as a
plan to have "virtually no awake time" with Kalid. The judge
concluded that the mother was not capable of meeting Kalid's
3 special needs and that he would be "at great risk of serious
abuse and/or neglect" in her care.
The mother's engagement with the department has been
characterized by inconsistency and lack of follow through. The
trial judge found that the mother had "refused to engage in any
services to any degree that might improve her ability to meet
the [c]hildren's needs." She had not scheduled home visits and,
at the time of trial, had not met with a social worker for over
six months. The trial judge found that the mother was aware
that the department viewed her as disengaged.
The mother uses marijuana twice a day to manage her
anxiety. Her drug use contributed to the removal of Kalid in
2019 when the mother described smoking a marijuana cigarette at
her apartment, then driving to her sister's apartment to collect
Kalid, then driving him home and feeling "funny." She did not
acknowledge the danger of consuming marijuana and then driving a
car, with her son as a passenger, while under the influence.
The judge also considered the mother's marijuana use in the
context of her mental health diagnoses. The mother disagreed
with a schizophrenia diagnosis but acknowledged diagnoses of
anxiety and depression. The judge recognized that the mother is
"generally . . . consistent" in taking her psychiatric
medication and has "maintained minimal engagement with an
individual therapist," but found that the mother showed "no
4 insight into the impact her mental health ha[d] on her
parenting," or the risk that her twice-daily habit of smoking
marijuana -- which the judge described as a coping mechanism --
could pose to her children.
Discussion. "In deciding whether to terminate a parent's
rights, a judge must determine whether there is clear and
convincing evidence that the parent is unfit and, if the parent
is unfit, whether the child's best interests will be served by
terminating the legal relation between parent and child."
Adoption of Ilona, 459 Mass. 53, 59 (2011). Clear and
convincing evidence means that "[t]he requisite proof must be
strong and positive; it must be 'full, clear and decisive.'"
Adoption of Chad, 94 Mass. App. Ct. 828, 838 (2019), quoting
Adoption of Iris, 43 Mass. App. Ct. 95, 105 (1997), S.C., 427
Mass. 582 (1998). "We give substantial deference to a judge's
decision that termination of a parent's rights is in the best
interest[s] of the child, and reverse only where findings of
fact are clearly erroneous or where there is a clear error of
law or abuse of discretion." Adoption of Ilona, supra. As
noted above, the mother does not contest the finding of
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NOTICE: Summary decisions issued by the Appeals Court pursuant to M.A.C. Rule 23.0, as appearing in 97 Mass. App. Ct. 1017 (2020) (formerly known as rule 1:28, as amended by 73 Mass. App. Ct. 1001 [2009]), are primarily directed to the parties and, therefore, may not fully address the facts of the case or the panel's decisional rationale. Moreover, such decisions are not circulated to the entire court and, therefore, represent only the views of the panel that decided the case. A summary decision pursuant to rule 23.0 or rule 1:28 issued after February 25, 2008, may be cited for its persuasive value but, because of the limitations noted above, not as binding precedent. See Chace v. Curran, 71 Mass. App. Ct. 258, 260 n.4 (2008).
COMMONWEALTH OF MASSACHUSETTS
APPEALS COURT
25-P-356
ADOPTION OF KALID (and a companion case 1).
MEMORANDUM AND ORDER PURSUANT TO RULE 23.0
After a trial, a judge of the Juvenile Court found the
mother unfit to parent two of her children, Kalid and Toni, and
terminated her parental rights. The mother does not contest the
finding of unfitness but maintains that the Department of
Children and Families (department) failed to make reasonable
efforts to facilitate reunification. 2 We affirm.
Background. Both Kalid and Toni have intensive special
needs. Toni is diagnosed with autism (low-functioning), and, at
age five and six, was nonverbal, not toilet trained, and
required specialized education. In the department's custody, he
1 Adoption of Toni. The children's names are pseudonyms.
2The parental rights of Kalid's father were terminated in an earlier proceeding. The parental rights of the unknown, unnamed father of Toni were terminated in this proceeding. No notices of appeal were filed regarding these termination decisions. received applied behavioral analysis services six days a week.
Due to a pica diagnosis, he required full-time supervision.
Toni was born very prematurely at twenty-five weeks'
gestation and, for her early months, it was not clear she would
survive. For the first eight or so months of her life, she was
hospitalized at a Springfield hospital near the mother's
community and, for the first four months, the mother visited
regularly. The department filed this care and protection case
based on concerns about the mother's lack of engagement in
services, active paranoia, treatment of her mental illness
through medication to the exclusion of therapy, a report that
the mother vaped in the neonatal intensive care unit, and
hospital staff reports that the mother behaved inappropriately
with Toni.
After Toni spent the first eight months of her life in the
Springfield hospital, she was transferred to a hospital in
Boston. At the time of trial, the mother had not visited with
Toni since September 2023. The mother found it difficult to get
to the Boston hospital. The department provided bus passes, but
the mother asserted that the cost of transportation between the
bus terminal in Boston and the hospital was prohibitively high.
Further complicating visits, for some of this time, the mother
was on required bed rest at the end of her fourth pregnancy.
2 The judge found that the mother was unable to work with
professionals and providers to coordinate the services and
supports required by her high-needs children. Specific to Toni,
the judge found the mother had no real appreciation for Toni's
needs, that there was no evidence of any bond or connection
between the mother and Toni, and that the mother had never cared
for Toni independently due to Toni's lifelong hospitalization.
Should Toni be placed with the mother, the judge found, Toni
would be "gravely at risk of death or serious, permanent injury"
due to the mother's inability to meet her care needs.
Specific to Kalid, the judge found that the mother did not
ask about the services he receives, did not try to engage with
Kalid at monthly visits (sometimes falling asleep) and was a
passive observer during visits, showing minimal interest in
caring for him. The judge noted that, at trial, the mother was
unsure about the current status of Kalid's pica diagnosis and
had not sought an update. The mother's plan for Kalid, if he
were to be returned to her care, was to have him at school
during the school day and then have one of her family members
pick him up after school and keep him until the end of the
mother's work day at 11 P.M., which the judge characterized as a
plan to have "virtually no awake time" with Kalid. The judge
concluded that the mother was not capable of meeting Kalid's
3 special needs and that he would be "at great risk of serious
abuse and/or neglect" in her care.
The mother's engagement with the department has been
characterized by inconsistency and lack of follow through. The
trial judge found that the mother had "refused to engage in any
services to any degree that might improve her ability to meet
the [c]hildren's needs." She had not scheduled home visits and,
at the time of trial, had not met with a social worker for over
six months. The trial judge found that the mother was aware
that the department viewed her as disengaged.
The mother uses marijuana twice a day to manage her
anxiety. Her drug use contributed to the removal of Kalid in
2019 when the mother described smoking a marijuana cigarette at
her apartment, then driving to her sister's apartment to collect
Kalid, then driving him home and feeling "funny." She did not
acknowledge the danger of consuming marijuana and then driving a
car, with her son as a passenger, while under the influence.
The judge also considered the mother's marijuana use in the
context of her mental health diagnoses. The mother disagreed
with a schizophrenia diagnosis but acknowledged diagnoses of
anxiety and depression. The judge recognized that the mother is
"generally . . . consistent" in taking her psychiatric
medication and has "maintained minimal engagement with an
individual therapist," but found that the mother showed "no
4 insight into the impact her mental health ha[d] on her
parenting," or the risk that her twice-daily habit of smoking
marijuana -- which the judge described as a coping mechanism --
could pose to her children.
Discussion. "In deciding whether to terminate a parent's
rights, a judge must determine whether there is clear and
convincing evidence that the parent is unfit and, if the parent
is unfit, whether the child's best interests will be served by
terminating the legal relation between parent and child."
Adoption of Ilona, 459 Mass. 53, 59 (2011). Clear and
convincing evidence means that "[t]he requisite proof must be
strong and positive; it must be 'full, clear and decisive.'"
Adoption of Chad, 94 Mass. App. Ct. 828, 838 (2019), quoting
Adoption of Iris, 43 Mass. App. Ct. 95, 105 (1997), S.C., 427
Mass. 582 (1998). "We give substantial deference to a judge's
decision that termination of a parent's rights is in the best
interest[s] of the child, and reverse only where findings of
fact are clearly erroneous or where there is a clear error of
law or abuse of discretion." Adoption of Ilona, supra. As
noted above, the mother does not contest the finding of
unfitness.
We agree with the department that the mother's reasonable
efforts claim was waived. "It is well-established that a parent
must raise a claim of inadequate services in a timely manner."
5 Adoption of Daisy, 77 Mass. App. Ct. 768, 781 (2010), S.C., 460
Mass. 72 (2011). "The parent should assert the claim 'either
when the parenting plan is adopted, when [s]he receives those
services, or shortly thereafter.'" Adoption of West, 97 Mass.
App. Ct. 238, 242 (2020), quoting Adoption of Gregory, 434 Mass.
117, 124 (2001). "A parent cannot raise a claim of inadequate
services for the first time on appeal, as the department would
not have had the opportunity to address it." Adoption of West,
supra. The mother waived this issue by failing to raise it at
or before trial.
Were we to consider the reasonable efforts argument,
however, we would not be persuaded. The record supports the
judge's conclusion that the mother engaged only inconsistently
with the department and failed to comply, in substantial part,
with her action plans. "Evidence of parents' refusal to
cooperate with the department, including failure to maintain
service plans . . . is relevant to the determination of
unfitness." Adoption of Rhona, 63 Mass. App. Ct. 117, 126
(2005). Furthermore, "[t]he department's obligation to make
reasonable efforts to reunify the child with the mother is
contingent upon her obligation to substantially fulfill her
parental responsibilities (including seeking and using
appropriate services)." Adoption of Yalena, 100 Mass. App. Ct.
542, 554 (2021). The mother faults the department for failing
6 to "escalate its involvement or provide more robust supports,"
but fails to acknowledge her own refusal to engage with the
department, respond to outreach from department social workers,
accept additional post-hospitalization supports, or take the
steps recommended on her action plans.
The evidence supported the judge's conclusions that the
mother refused or ignored proffered department services, failed
to make progress on her action plans, used marijuana at
inappropriate and dangerous times, and engaged inconsistently
with her special needs children. She had not visited her
daughter for about eight months at the time of trial and had
only a limited understanding of her son's diagnoses and needs.
This evidence amply supported the judge's determination that the
department met its obligations and "complied with its duty to
make 'reasonable efforts . . . to prevent or eliminate the need
for removal [of the children] from the home.'" Adoption of
Ilona, 459 Mass. at 61, quoting G. L. c. 119, § 29C. See
Adoption of Daisy, 77 Mass. App. Ct. at 782 (mother's delay in
obtaining therapy for herself undermined her inadequate services
claim); Adoption of Eduardo, 57 Mass. App. Ct. 278, 282 (2003)
("Because the mother failed to make use of the services offered
to strengthen and then reunify her family and denied her mental
health needs by refusing both evaluation and treatment, she
cannot successfully argue that [the department's] reasonable
7 efforts failed to accommodate properly her mental health needs
or to strengthen her family").
A "judge is not required to grant [a parent] an indefinite
opportunity for reform." Adoption of Cadence, 81 Mass. App. Ct.
162, 169 (2012). "Stability in the lives of children is
important, particularly in a case that has continued for a long
period of time in the hope that the [mother] could and would
successfully rehabilitate [herself]." Adoption of Nancy, 443
Mass. 512, 517 (2005). We are mindful that "the focus of
proceedings that terminate or curtail parental rights should be
the best interest[s] of the child." Adoption of Olivia, 53
Mass. App. Ct. 670, 677 (2002). The judge's thoughtful findings
and conclusions properly focused on these children and their
needs, and her decision that termination was in their best
interests was supported by clear and convincing evidence. 3 Decrees affirmed.
By the Court (Singh, Hershfang & Wood, JJ. 4),
Clerk
Entered: February 9, 2026.
3 To the extent that we do not discuss other arguments raised by the mother in her brief, they have not been overlooked. "We find nothing in them that requires discussion." Commonwealth v. Domanski, 332 Mass. 66, 78 (1954).
4 The panelists are listed in order of seniority.