NOTICE: Summary decisions issued by the Appeals Court pursuant to M.A.C. Rule 23.0, as appearing in 97 Mass. App. Ct. 1017 (2020) (formerly known as rule 1:28, as amended by 73 Mass. App. Ct. 1001 [2009]), are primarily directed to the parties and, therefore, may not fully address the facts of the case or the panel's decisional rationale. Moreover, such decisions are not circulated to the entire court and, therefore, represent only the views of the panel that decided the case. A summary decision pursuant to rule 23.0 or rule 1:28 issued after February 25, 2008, may be cited for its persuasive value but, because of the limitations noted above, not as binding precedent. See Chace v. Curran, 71 Mass. App. Ct. 258, 260 n.4 (2008).
COMMONWEALTH OF MASSACHUSETTS
APPEALS COURT
25-P-755
ADOPTION OF HALEA (and a companion case1).
MEMORANDUM AND ORDER PURSUANT TO RULE 23.0
The father appeals from decrees issued by a judge of the
Juvenile Court following a trial finding the father unfit to
parent his children, Halea and Lacey, and terminating his
parental rights pursuant to G. L. c. 210, § 3.2 We affirm.
Background. We summarize the trial judge's findings of
fact, supplemented by uncontroverted evidence from the record,
and reserve certain facts for later discussion.
The Department of Children and Families (department) has
been involved with the family since Halea's birth in 2016. The
father has a long history of domestic violence and has been
1 Adoption of Lacey. The children's names are pseudonyms.
2The mother entered into a stipulation terminating her parental rights and is not a party to this appeal. diagnosed with a delusional disorder. In 2016, the father was
arrested for assault and battery against the mother, an incident
for which Halea was present. In May 2018, police responded to
an incident involving an argument between the parents in front
of the children, and the mother smashing the windshield of the
father's car. When the police told the father that they were
arresting the mother and asked him if he could care for the
children, he replied that he could not. On September 15, 2018,
police responded to a domestic violence altercation between the
parents at which the children were present.
On August 1, 2022, just one month before trial commenced,
officers were dispatched to perform "a wellbeing check" and
found the father asleep in a vehicle that was "in drive and
running, sitting at a green light." The father became "irate
and argumentative" after the officer told him that the vehicle
would have to be towed because the insurance had been revoked.
The father clenched his right hand, took a "fighting stance,"
and walked toward the officer shouting profanities and
threatening to beat up the officer. When the officer attempted
to place the father under arrest, the father struggled,
resisted, and got into a physical altercation with the officers,
injuring one of them.
2 On September 17, 2018, the department filed the present
care and protection petition pursuant to G. L. c. 119, § 24, and
the children were placed in the department's custody where they
remained at the time of trial.
The father started attending a domestic violence group, a
task on his department action plan, but stopped after ten
sessions. Because the father denied having any issues with
domestic violence, the department agreed that the father could
instead participate in an anger management program. At the time
of trial, the father had completed two anger management classes.
The father consistently visited with the children from 2018
until the end of 2019. After that, the father did not visit the
children for over two years. When COVID-19 restrictions were in
place, the father was offered video visits but did not
participate in any.
Lacey was four years old, and Halea was six, at the time of
trial. The children are placed with a family member, who is
their foster parent and proposed preadoptive parent. Both
children have been diagnosed with developmental delays. Lacey
has been diagnosed with autism. The foster parent facilitates
Lacey's participation in Applied Analysis services. There are
concerns that Halea is autistic, but she has not yet been
diagnosed. Both children have individualized education plans in
3 school to address their developmental delays. The foster parent
has advocated for the services and ensures that the children
consistently receive them. She also works with service
providers to develop strategies to respond to the children's
behavioral challenges.
Discussion. 1. The judge's comments during trial. The
father contends that the judge made comments during trial
suggesting that she had improperly prejudged the case. After
the children's cross-examination of the department's second
witness, the judge stated:
"I do want to say prior to beginning the case today, I did have an opportunity to review all of the exhibits that were uploaded . . . . Considering those exhibits . . . , as well as the testimony so far, I would encourage people to use the lunchbreak to reconsider the agreements that have been proposed."
The father did not object to the comments at trial, did not
move for a mistrial, and did not ask the judge to recuse
herself. Because the issue was not properly raised in the trial
court, it is waived, and we decline to address it. See Adoption
of Leland, 65 Mass. App. Ct. 580, 588 (2006).
2. The evidence at trial. The father also argues that the
judge's findings were tainted by her prejudgment of the case and
that the evidence did not demonstrate that he would likely
remain unfit for the foreseeable future. We are not persuaded.
4 On review, "we must determine whether the trial judge
abused [her] discretion or committed a clear error of law."
Adoption of Elena, 446 Mass. 24, 30 (2006). The judge's fitness
determination must be supported by "specific and detailed"
findings that demonstrate parental unfitness by clear and
convincing evidence. Custody of Eleanor, 414 Mass. 795, 799
(1993). "We accord deference to a trial judge's assessment of
the credibility of witnesses and the weight of the evidence."
Adoption of Olivette, 79 Mass. App. Ct. 141, 157 (2011).
"In deciding whether to terminate a parent's rights, a
judge must determine whether there is clear and convincing
evidence that the parent is unfit and, if the parent is unfit,
whether the child's best interests will be served by terminating
the legal relation between parent and child." Adoption of
Ilona, 459 Mass. 53, 59 (2011). Recognizing that termination of
parental rights is an "extreme step, a judge must decide both
whether the parent is currently unfit and whether, on the basis
of credible evidence, there is a reasonable likelihood that the
parent's unfitness at the time of trial may be only temporary"
(quotations and citations omitted). Id.
The evidence supported the judge's conclusion that the
father's unfitness was not temporary and was likely to continue
indefinitely. See Adoption of Ilona, 459 Mass at 59-60
5 ("Because childhood is fleeting, a parent's unfitness is not
temporary if it is reasonably likely to continue for a prolonged
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NOTICE: Summary decisions issued by the Appeals Court pursuant to M.A.C. Rule 23.0, as appearing in 97 Mass. App. Ct. 1017 (2020) (formerly known as rule 1:28, as amended by 73 Mass. App. Ct. 1001 [2009]), are primarily directed to the parties and, therefore, may not fully address the facts of the case or the panel's decisional rationale. Moreover, such decisions are not circulated to the entire court and, therefore, represent only the views of the panel that decided the case. A summary decision pursuant to rule 23.0 or rule 1:28 issued after February 25, 2008, may be cited for its persuasive value but, because of the limitations noted above, not as binding precedent. See Chace v. Curran, 71 Mass. App. Ct. 258, 260 n.4 (2008).
COMMONWEALTH OF MASSACHUSETTS
APPEALS COURT
25-P-755
ADOPTION OF HALEA (and a companion case1).
MEMORANDUM AND ORDER PURSUANT TO RULE 23.0
The father appeals from decrees issued by a judge of the
Juvenile Court following a trial finding the father unfit to
parent his children, Halea and Lacey, and terminating his
parental rights pursuant to G. L. c. 210, § 3.2 We affirm.
Background. We summarize the trial judge's findings of
fact, supplemented by uncontroverted evidence from the record,
and reserve certain facts for later discussion.
The Department of Children and Families (department) has
been involved with the family since Halea's birth in 2016. The
father has a long history of domestic violence and has been
1 Adoption of Lacey. The children's names are pseudonyms.
2The mother entered into a stipulation terminating her parental rights and is not a party to this appeal. diagnosed with a delusional disorder. In 2016, the father was
arrested for assault and battery against the mother, an incident
for which Halea was present. In May 2018, police responded to
an incident involving an argument between the parents in front
of the children, and the mother smashing the windshield of the
father's car. When the police told the father that they were
arresting the mother and asked him if he could care for the
children, he replied that he could not. On September 15, 2018,
police responded to a domestic violence altercation between the
parents at which the children were present.
On August 1, 2022, just one month before trial commenced,
officers were dispatched to perform "a wellbeing check" and
found the father asleep in a vehicle that was "in drive and
running, sitting at a green light." The father became "irate
and argumentative" after the officer told him that the vehicle
would have to be towed because the insurance had been revoked.
The father clenched his right hand, took a "fighting stance,"
and walked toward the officer shouting profanities and
threatening to beat up the officer. When the officer attempted
to place the father under arrest, the father struggled,
resisted, and got into a physical altercation with the officers,
injuring one of them.
2 On September 17, 2018, the department filed the present
care and protection petition pursuant to G. L. c. 119, § 24, and
the children were placed in the department's custody where they
remained at the time of trial.
The father started attending a domestic violence group, a
task on his department action plan, but stopped after ten
sessions. Because the father denied having any issues with
domestic violence, the department agreed that the father could
instead participate in an anger management program. At the time
of trial, the father had completed two anger management classes.
The father consistently visited with the children from 2018
until the end of 2019. After that, the father did not visit the
children for over two years. When COVID-19 restrictions were in
place, the father was offered video visits but did not
participate in any.
Lacey was four years old, and Halea was six, at the time of
trial. The children are placed with a family member, who is
their foster parent and proposed preadoptive parent. Both
children have been diagnosed with developmental delays. Lacey
has been diagnosed with autism. The foster parent facilitates
Lacey's participation in Applied Analysis services. There are
concerns that Halea is autistic, but she has not yet been
diagnosed. Both children have individualized education plans in
3 school to address their developmental delays. The foster parent
has advocated for the services and ensures that the children
consistently receive them. She also works with service
providers to develop strategies to respond to the children's
behavioral challenges.
Discussion. 1. The judge's comments during trial. The
father contends that the judge made comments during trial
suggesting that she had improperly prejudged the case. After
the children's cross-examination of the department's second
witness, the judge stated:
"I do want to say prior to beginning the case today, I did have an opportunity to review all of the exhibits that were uploaded . . . . Considering those exhibits . . . , as well as the testimony so far, I would encourage people to use the lunchbreak to reconsider the agreements that have been proposed."
The father did not object to the comments at trial, did not
move for a mistrial, and did not ask the judge to recuse
herself. Because the issue was not properly raised in the trial
court, it is waived, and we decline to address it. See Adoption
of Leland, 65 Mass. App. Ct. 580, 588 (2006).
2. The evidence at trial. The father also argues that the
judge's findings were tainted by her prejudgment of the case and
that the evidence did not demonstrate that he would likely
remain unfit for the foreseeable future. We are not persuaded.
4 On review, "we must determine whether the trial judge
abused [her] discretion or committed a clear error of law."
Adoption of Elena, 446 Mass. 24, 30 (2006). The judge's fitness
determination must be supported by "specific and detailed"
findings that demonstrate parental unfitness by clear and
convincing evidence. Custody of Eleanor, 414 Mass. 795, 799
(1993). "We accord deference to a trial judge's assessment of
the credibility of witnesses and the weight of the evidence."
Adoption of Olivette, 79 Mass. App. Ct. 141, 157 (2011).
"In deciding whether to terminate a parent's rights, a
judge must determine whether there is clear and convincing
evidence that the parent is unfit and, if the parent is unfit,
whether the child's best interests will be served by terminating
the legal relation between parent and child." Adoption of
Ilona, 459 Mass. 53, 59 (2011). Recognizing that termination of
parental rights is an "extreme step, a judge must decide both
whether the parent is currently unfit and whether, on the basis
of credible evidence, there is a reasonable likelihood that the
parent's unfitness at the time of trial may be only temporary"
(quotations and citations omitted). Id.
The evidence supported the judge's conclusion that the
father's unfitness was not temporary and was likely to continue
indefinitely. See Adoption of Ilona, 459 Mass at 59-60
5 ("Because childhood is fleeting, a parent's unfitness is not
temporary if it is reasonably likely to continue for a prolonged
or indeterminate period.") During the four years that the case
had been pending, the father failed to consistently engage in
services. He stopped attending a domestic violence class and
did not consistently attend therapy. In 2018, the father
refused to work with the department because he felt the social
workers and others in the department were "trying to set him up
or keep him away from his family." He demonstrated an
unwillingness to address domestic violence and mental health
concerns and an unwillingness to reengage in therapeutic
services. The father did not think he needed parent education
because he believed he was an "excellent parent."
The father's extensive history of unacknowledged and
unaddressed domestic violence is further evidence that the
father's unfitness was not temporary. Children exposed to
domestic violence "suffer[ ] a distinctly grievous kind of harm"
that is relevant to parental fitness. Custody of Vaughn, 422
Mass. 590, 595 (1996). Although the father now concedes that he
had a "serious history of domestic violence," he contends that
the issue is stale because the last domestic violence incident
with the mother took place three years before the trial. We are
not persuaded. As noted supra, the father and mother had a
6 relationship characterized by domestic violence. This violence
continued after the children were removed from their care. In
May 2019, police officers responded to a call from the mother.
When they arrived, they saw the father holding the mother down
on the ground. The mother told the police that the father
choked her and poured chemicals all over her.
The father's domestic violence issues were longstanding and
predated his relationship with the mother, characterizing his
previous relationships. Dating back to February 1999, the
father perpetrated numerous acts of domestic violence against
two prior girlfriends which were the basis for criminal charges
and allegations including rape, domestic abuse, threats, and
violation of G. L. c. 209A restraining orders. Despite his
extensive history of domestic violence, including six
restraining orders issued against him, the father denied
engaging in any domestic violence and testified that he "knew
[he] didn't need" services for domestic violence.
The evidence supported the judge's finding that the father
failed to productively engage in services. Despite the father's
participation in two anger management classes, he continued to
display volatile behavior. The record supported the judge's
finding that the father's "inability to manage his anger
persists, as evidenced by his arrest" for charges including
7 threats, resisting arrest, assault and battery on a police
officer, and assault by means of a dangerous weapon "just a
month before trial commenced." "Even if a parent engages in
some of the services offered by the department, mere
participation in the services does not render a parent fit
without evidence of appreciable improvement in [the parent's]
ability to meet the needs of the child[ren]" (quotations and
citations omitted). Adoption of Breck, 105 Mass. App. Ct. 652,
660 (2025).
The father failed to consistently visit the children during
the four years the case was pending, allowing two years to pass
without seeing his children at all. He blamed the department
for his lack of visits even though the department attempted to
contact him and engage him. He only resumed visits five months
before trial commenced. See Adoption of Darla, 56 Mass. App.
Ct. 519, 522 (2002) (failure to visit child supports finding of
parental unfitness). The children have exhibited emotional
dysregulation following the visits. When they asked the father
if they could call him by his first name, he started calling
Halea by different names, causing her to become upset. The
evidence supported the judge's finding that the father declined
the opportunity to have visits facilitated by a program that
provided additional supervised parent-child visits and parenting
8 education. At the intake for the program, the father stated
that he did not feel he needed supervision or education.
The evidence supported the judge's finding that the
children "require a structured, child-centered environment where
their basic needs and special needs are consistently anticipated
and met without fail." As the judge found, the children's
special needs "require consistent engagement in necessary
services, as well as monitoring for possible future services."
The father argues that the judge erred by finding that he did
not have the necessary skills to address the children's special
needs and that he should not have been "faulted . . . for
lacking those skills" where the department "had not offered the
father any specialized training to address his daughter[s]’
needs." The judge did not err. The father had not parented the
children in four years and the judge found that he could not
explain his understanding of what autism is and what it
requires. See Adoption of Jacques, 82 Mass. App. Ct. 601, 608-
609 (2012) (sufficient nexus between shortcomings and ability to
care for child's special needs where parent exhibited limited
understanding of child's diagnoses and had not parented child in
five years); Petitions of the Dept. of Social Servs. to Dispense
with Consent to Adoption, 18 Mass. App. Ct. 120, 125 (1984)
("The specialized needs of a particular child when combined with
9 the deficiencies of a parent's character, temperament, capacity,
or conduct may clearly establish parental unfitness”).
Furthermore, "[a] parent cannot raise a claim of inadequate
services for the first time on appeal." Adoption of West, 97
Mass. App. Ct. 238, 242 (2020). See id. ("Raising the issue at
an early stage in the proceedings allows the department to
remedy the inadequate services").
The father also contends that the judge's findings ignored
evidence favorable to him. This argument lacks merit. The
judge's findings acknowledged evidence favorable to the father
including the father's participation in anger management
classes, a parenting assessment, a psychological evaluation, and
a "Fathers in Trust" program. However, the judge properly
concluded that this favorable evidence was undermined by the
father's failure to take responsibility for his actions and
persisting violent behavior. See Adoption of Jacques, 82 Mass.
App. Ct. at 608 ("[T]he judge was entitled to consider the
evidence of [the father's] recent improvements within the
context of [his] earlier and continuing deficits"). Although
the judge did not specifically find all the favorable facts the
father raises in his brief, she was not required to make
specific findings about every piece of evidence presented where
the evidence of unfitness, for the reasons discussed above, was
10 overwhelming. See Adoption of Franklin, 99 Mass. App. Ct. 787,
799 (2021).
The father argues that numerous findings of the judge are
"not factual findings but statements of opinion without the
necessary factual analysis of the trial record to support them."
It is true that the judge's finding that the "father's
delusional disorder heightened his anxiety about the mother's
late return home" does not appear to be supported by evidence in
the record. However, the error was harmless in light of the
overwhelming evidence of his unfitness. See Adoption of Peggy,
436 Mass. 690, 702 (2002). See also Adoption of Franklin,
supra. We agree with the father that some of the statements in
the judge's "findings of fact" section appear to be legal
conclusions, but those conclusions are supported by clear and
convincing evidence and we discern no error of law or abuse of
discretion. See Adoption of Luc, 484 Mass. 139, 144 (2020);
Custody of Eleanor, 414 Mass. at 799.
The remainder of the father's arguments "amount to no more
than a disagreement with the judge's weighing of the evidence
and credibility determinations regarding witnesses." Adoption
of Don, 435 Mass. 158, 166-167 (2001). The father testified at
trial, and the judge was able to assess his credibility. She
found that some of his answers "simply did not make logical
11 sense" and that he "refused to answer questions that might have
cast him in a negative light." "[T]he judge's assessment of the
credibility of the witnesses and the weight of the evidence is
entitled to deference." Adoption of Elena, 446 Mass. at 31.
Accordingly, we do not disturb the judge's "specific and
detailed [findings] . . . demonstrat[ing] that close attention
was given to the evidence." Adoption of Georgia, 433 Mass. 62,
66 (2000).
Conclusion. We conclude that the judge did not abuse her
discretion or commit a clear error of law in determining that
the father was unfit, that his unfitness was not temporary, and
that termination of his parental rights served the children's
best interests.
Decrees affirmed.
By the Court (Blake, C.J., Meade & Tan, JJ.3),
Clerk
Entered: February 26, 2026.
3 The panelists are listed in order of seniority.