NOTICE: Summary decisions issued by the Appeals Court pursuant to M.A.C. Rule 23.0, as appearing in 97 Mass. App. Ct. 1017 (2020) (formerly known as rule 1:28, as amended by 73 Mass. App. Ct. 1001 [2009]), are primarily directed to the parties and, therefore, may not fully address the facts of the case or the panel's decisional rationale. Moreover, such decisions are not circulated to the entire court and, therefore, represent only the views of the panel that decided the case. A summary decision pursuant to rule 23.0 or rule 1:28 issued after February 25, 2008, may be cited for its persuasive value but, because of the limitations noted above, not as binding precedent. See Chace v. Curran, 71 Mass. App. Ct. 258, 260 n.4 (2008).
COMMONWEALTH OF MASSACHUSETTS
APPEALS COURT
22-P-642
ADOPTION OF EVELYN (and a companion case1).
MEMORANDUM AND ORDER PURSUANT TO RULE 23.0
On September 15, 2021, a judge of the Juvenile Court found
the mother and the father unfit to parent their two children and
adjudicated the children in need of care and protection. The
judge terminated the parental rights of the mother and the
father, and granted custody of the children to the Department of
Children and Families (DCF), after considering the requisite
factors under G. L. c. 210, § 3 (c); finding factors (ii), (iv),
(vii), (viii), (x), and (xii) to be applicable to both parents;
and concluding that it was in each child's best interests to
terminate the parental rights of both parents. See G. L.
c. 119, § 26; G. L. c. 210, § 3 (c). Both the mother and the
father appealed from the judge's findings pertaining to the
mother, arguing that the finding of unfitness and the decree
terminating the mother's parental rights were not supported by
1 Adoption of Adam. The children's names are pseudonyms. clear and convincing evidence, violating the mother's due
process.2 We affirm.
Background. We summarize the judge's findings of fact,3
reserving some facts for the discussion.
Evelyn was born in 2011, and Adam was born in 2013. DCF
first became involved with the care of these children in 2015,
after two reports were filed pursuant to G. L. c. 119, § 51A
(51A reports), alleging neglect of both children by the parents
and sexual abuse of Evelyn by an unknown perpetrator.
Additional 51A reports alleging neglect and physical abuse of
the children by the parents were filed and investigated before
October 6, 2017, when DCF filed the instant care and protection
petition after receiving a 51A report alleging that the father
struck the mother in the face in the presence of the children on
October 5, 2017.4 Responding police noticed "a significant
bruise on [the mother's] eye" and arrested the father at the
2 On appeal, the father does not challenge the finding that he is unfit or the decree terminating his parental rights. Rather, he challenges the findings pertaining only to the mother, as his position at trial was that the children should be reunified with the mother; his position remains the same on appeal. 3 The judge made 318 findings of fact and thirty-five conclusions
of law that "are both specific and detailed, demonstrating, as we require, that close attention was given to the evidence." Adoption of Don, 435 Mass. 158, 165 (2001). 4 The judge noted that the 51A reports are "not taken for the
truth of the matter asserted, but merely to explain why DCF became involved, i.e., to set the stage." See Custody of Michel, 28 Mass. App. Ct. 260, 267 (1990).
2 scene. Four days later, at a temporary custody hearing, the
mother's eye was still black. On March 29, 2018, the parents
stipulated to their unfitness and that the children were in need
of care and protection, and DCF was awarded custody.
In support of its initial goal of reunification, DCF
updated the mother's and the father's preexisting family action
plans.5 More than one year after the children were removed,
during a December 2018 meeting with a DCF supervisor, the mother
demonstrated a lack of comprehension of why DCF had custody of
the children, denying the domestic violence in her relationship
with the father. Immediately thereafter, the father had his
meeting with the supervisor and became verbally aggressive, as
he had on a prior occasion when he stated while in DCF's office
"that if he was the same person he used to be, he'd shoot the
place up." In April 2018, DCF changed the children's goals to
adoption based on the parents' lack of engagement in services,
housing uncertainty, and the parents' decisions to move out of
Massachusetts for a time while the children were in foster care.
5 In summary, the action plans required the mother and the father to meet with DCF monthly; obtain stable housing; engage in mental health treatment; complete a medication and substance use evaluation; take an intimate partner abuse education program; abide by all court orders; remain substance free and provide screenings; abstain from domestic violence; complete a parenting plan and budget; abstain from all physical discipline; keep a parenting journal; and demonstrate a change in behavior. Additionally, the mother was to engage in domestic abuse counseling and come prepared to visits with the children.
3 Evelyn and Adam struggled in foster care after the 2017
removal. However, since late 2020 and through the time of
trial, while in their respective preadoptive homes, both
children demonstrated an improvement in their health and
behavior.
At trial, which commenced on April 29, 2021, the father
testified using a video conferencing platform. However, his
limited testimony was vague and his answers often demonstrated
an unwillingness to cooperate. He eventually disconnected from
the proceedings and intentionally did not make himself available
at any subsequent date to complete his testimony. The judge
drew a negative inference from the father's abandonment of the
trial, as well as from his unwillingness to engage in a process
that could have reunified him with his children.
The mother did engage in the trial and provided extensive
testimony punctuated by periods of crying and yelling that, the
judge found, "went beyond the understandable level of upset of a
trial, and show[ed the mother's] inability to regulate her
emotions, and that her mental health struggles continue[d] to
the present day."6 The mother testified to the domestic violence
6 The mother was diagnosed at age twelve with posttraumatic stress disorder (PTSD) and anxiety, and continued to experience symptoms of PTSD and anxiety, and panic attacks. She receives Social Security benefits "because, as she described it, she has 'mental problems.'"
4 incident of October 5, 2017, in which the father hit her in the
presence of the two children, but she minimized the incident by
saying that "the children were in the back seat and they weren't
paying attention." In fact, the judge found, "even to this date
[the mother] does not see that [the father] hitting her in front
of the children was a harmful event." The mother struggled to
communicate a coherent timeline of her residences during the
pendency of the care and protection case but was able to
articulate that, at the time of trial, she resided with her
mother and brother and pooled her money with theirs to spend
$800 per month on marijuana for the group. The judge found that
the mother was untruthful during the trial about her housing
situations in an attempt to create the illusion that she had
broken off her relationship with the father. In fact, the
mother shared a phone plan with the father; the mother's
videoconferencing platform account for virtual visits with the
children featured the father's name; and the mother never filed
for a divorce from the father despite saying she intended to.
Discussion. "To terminate parental rights to a child and
to dispense with parental consent to adoption, a judge must find
by clear and convincing evidence, based on subsidiary findings
proved by at least a fair preponderance of evidence, that the
parent is unfit to care for the child and that termination is in
the child's best interests." Adoption of Jacques, 82 Mass. App.
5 Ct. 601, 606 (2012). See Adoption of Kimberly, 414 Mass. 526,
528-529 (1993); Care & Protection of Martha, 407 Mass. 319, 327
(1990). "Parental unfitness is determined by considering a
parent's character, temperament, conduct, and capacity to
provide for the child's particular needs, affections, and age."
Care & Protection of Vick, 89 Mass. App. Ct. 704, 706 (2016).
Essentially, parental unfitness "means 'grievous shortcomings or
handicaps' that put the child's welfare 'much at hazard.'"
Adoption of Katharine, 42 Mass. App. Ct. 25, 28 (1997), quoting
Petition of the New England Home for Little Wanderers to
Dispense with Consent to Adoption, 367 Mass. 631, 646 (1975).
"A parent may be found unfit because of mental deficiencies, but
only where it is shown that such 'deficiencies impaired [their]
ability to protect and care for the children.'" Adoption of
Chad, 94 Mass. App. Ct. 828, 838 (2019), quoting Adoption of
Quentin, 424 Mass. 882, 888-889 (1997). "[T]he trial judge must
make specific and detailed findings demonstrating that close
attention has been given the evidence," Adoption of Leland, 65
Mass. App. Ct. 580, 583 (2006), and those findings "left
undisturbed absent a showing that the findings were clearly
erroneous." Care & Protection of Vieri, 92 Mass. App. Ct. 402,
404-405 (2017), quoting Care & Protection of Stephen, 401 Mass.
144, 151 (1987). "A finding is clearly erroneous when there is
no evidence to support it, or when, 'although there is evidence
6 to support it, the reviewing court on the entire evidence is
left with the definite and firm conviction that a mistake has
been committed'" (citation omitted). Custody of Eleanor, 414
Mass. 795, 799 (1993).
The mother asserts that she was deprived of due process of
law when the judge relied on evidence of domestic violence that
the mother claims was stale; evidence of marijuana use that the
mother says had no nexus to her parenting; and the mother's
mental health struggles, evidence of which, the mother says, was
"wholly lacking." She also faults the judge for relying on the
children's bonds with their preadoptive parents to conclude that
termination was in the children's best interests. The father
contends that the evidence of the mother's unfitness was not
clear and convincing when one "properly consider[s] that the
mother was a victim of, as opposed to a perpetrator of domestic
violence."7
As set forth below, the Juvenile Court judge's decision was
firmly rooted in subsidiary findings that were proved by a
preponderance of the evidence and clearly and convincingly
demonstrated that the mother was unfit, such that termination of
7 We question whether the father has standing to raise issues on behalf of the mother. See Adoption of Paula, 420 Mass. 716, 723 n.8 (1995) ("We decline to address allegations of error raised by the father having relevance only to the fitness of the mother"). Our decision would remain the same even were we to consider the issue raised by the father.
7 her parental rights was in the children's best interests. There
was no due process violation.
1. Domestic violence. The judge did not err in finding
that the children were at risk from further exposure to domestic
violence if reunited with the mother. The judge did not base
her decision solely on the October 5, 2017 incident as the
mother claims, although that could have been enough. See
Adoption of Zak, 87 Mass. App. Ct. 540, 543 (2015). There was
evidence that more than one year after the children were
removed, a police officer arrested the father in response to a
report from the mother that the father had punched her in the
mouth, but that the mother refused to make a written statement.
"Instances of such familial violence are compelling evidence for
a finding of parental unfitness." Adoption of Talik, 92 Mass.
App. Ct. 367, 374 (2017). The mother also told a social worker
that "there was domestic violence in her prior relationship with
the father of her older children, with broken bones."8 See
Adoption of Don, 435 Mass. 158, 166 (2001) ("Prior history . . .
has prognostic value" [citation omitted]).
The October 5, 2017 incident was not stale where the mother
engaged in some domestic violence counseling, especially in the
months preceding trial, but then denied at trial that violence
8 The mother's older children are not involved in these proceedings.
8 occurred and expressed confusion as to why DCF advised domestic
violence services. See Adoption of Xarissa, 99 Mass. App. Ct. 610,
619 (2021). Children have an "absolute right to be free from
abuse or neglect." Care & Protection of Lillian, 445 Mass. 333,
340 (2005). Since "the proper focus of termination proceedings
is the welfare of the child[ren]," Adoption of Gregory, 434
Mass. 117, 121 (2001), it does not matter whether the mother was
a victim or a perpetrator; "[f]ault . . . is not the focus of
the inquiry." Adoption of Nicole, 40 Mass. App. Ct. 259, 261
(1996). "It is well documented that witnessing domestic violence
. . . has a profound impact on children" and causes "a distinctly
grievous kind of harm," Custody of Vaughn, 422 Mass. 590, 595, 599
(1996), regardless of who inflicts it. Here, it was "the mother's
consistent failure to address [that] issue[] [that] supported
the judge's conclusion that her unfitness would continue
indefinitely," because she would not be able to protect the
children from the harmful effects of future exposure. Adoption
of Xarissa, supra at 619.
The judge properly considered as part of the equation that
the mother and the father had not permanently separated, and did
not err in so finding. The couple frequently moved together in
and out of Massachusetts during the time when DCF had custody of
the children; the mother decided not to expand her living
situation to create more space for the children; the mother
9 tried to mislead the judge about her contact with the father;
and the mother failed to file for divorce. The mother's phone
and videoconferencing platform accounts also featured the
father's name even though the mother claimed she stopped sharing
a phone plan with the father, and the mother told a DCF social
worker that she (the mother) could see the father returning to
her life once the mother had secured custody of the children.
She even made a comment that she was worried about her recovery
if she left the father.9 Where the mother did not acquire the
necessary insights regarding her abusive relationship with the
children's father to ensure that the children would not be exposed
to future domestic violence, there was no error in the trial
judge's assessment. See Adoption of Ulrich, 94 Mass. App. Ct.
668, 677 (2019) (mere participation in services insufficient; there
must be evidence of appreciable improvement in parent's ability to
meet children's needs); Guardianship of Estelle, 70 Mass. App.
Ct. 575, 579 (2007) ("judge who hears the evidence, observes the
parties, and is most familiar with the circumstances remains in
the best position to make the judgment").
2. Mental health. There was ample evidence to support the
judge's conclusions regarding the mother's mental health. "[I]n
the best position to evaluate all the evidence," Adoption of
Hugo, 428 Mass. 219, 229 (1998), cert. denied, 526 U.S. 1034
9 Both parents had a "lengthy history of drug abuse."
10 (1999), the judge found that the mother's difficulty regulating
her emotions during the trial evidenced a continuing struggle.
The mother may disagree with the judge's characterizations of
her behavior, but we give the judge's findings "substantial
deference." Adoption of Lisette, 93 Mass. App. Ct. 284, 292
(2018).
In addition to the mother's presentation at trial, the
judge considered that the mother "did not meaningfully engage in
any services for the vast majority of the case," and therefore
was not in compliance with her action plan, which was tailored
to address mental health concerns. Finally, the judge
considered that, in November of 2018, a police officer
transported the mother to a hospital for evaluation after the
mother told the officer that "she was 'always' suicidal and
thinks about killing [the] Father." The record allows us to
conclude that the judge's findings concerning the mother's
mental health did not fall "outside the range of reasonable
alternatives." L.L. v. Commonwealth, 470 Mass. 169, 185 n.27
(2014).
There was sufficient evidence to connect the mother's
mental health concerns with her ability to parent the children,
one of whom was diagnosed with a behavioral disorder that DCF
noticed the mother struggling to manage while interacting with
both children. The mother also acknowledged hitting the
11 children, including in the face, after getting overwhelmed when
they did not listen to her. See Adoption of Luc, 484 Mass. 139,
146 (2020), quoting Adoption of Frederick, 405 Mass. 1, 9 (1989)
(mental health relevant to extent it affects parent's "ability
to deal with a child's special needs"). The other child,
Evelyn, had special dietary needs, and while the mother
acknowledged that Evelyn had "food issues," she had no realistic
plan for meeting the children's special needs, and "[a]t no
point . . . did it appear that she was near ready to resume full
responsibility for her [children]." Adoption of Paula, 420
Mass. 716, 730 (1995). Where the children exhibited unsafe and
aggressive behaviors in the past, the mother's inability to
provide a stable and appropriate environment was particularly
relevant to the fitness analysis. See Petitions of the Dep't of
Social Servs. to Dispense with Consent to Adoption, 399 Mass. 279,
289 (1987); Adoption of Oliver, 28 Mass. App. Ct. 620, 625-626
(1990) (parental unfitness established where child had special
needs and parent has little or no understanding of those needs, or
willingness or ability to meet them). Taken with evidence that the
children's behaviors drastically improved in the supportive and
stable environments of their preadoptive homes, the judge had
ample basis to conclude that the mother's untreated mental
health challenges impeded her ability to provide for the
12 children's particular needs. See Care & Protection of Vick, 89
Mass. App. Ct. at 708-709.10
3. Marijuana use. Next, the mother argues that the
evidence did not establish that her marijuana use was a concern,
and that a nexus between her marijuana use and her ability to
parent the children was never established. We need not dwell on
this argument, because the judge did not rely on this factor in
the decision to terminate the mother's parental rights.
4. Children's bonds with preadoptive parents. Lastly, the
mother argues that the trial judge wrongly considered the
children's bonds with their preadoptive parents as a dispositive
factor, but that is not the case. Instead, the judge considered
the bonding as one factor out of several when making the
required determinations. The bonding was "not dispositive," but
was "a factor that ha[d] weight in the ultimate balance."
10Despitethe moral overtones of the statutory term "unfit," the judge's decision was not a moral judgment or a determination that the mother and father do not love the child. Here, the judge specifically noted that the mother loves the children. But the inquiry at issue is whether the parents' deficiencies or limitations "place the child at serious risk of peril from abuse, neglect, or other activity harmful to the child. Adoption of Bianca, 91 Mass. App. Ct. 428, 432 n.2 (2017), quoting Care & Protection of Bruce, 44 Mass. App. Ct. 758, 761 (1998).
13 Adoption of Daniel, 58 Mass. App. Ct. 195, 202-203 (2003),
quoting Adoption of Nicole, 40 Mass. App. Ct. at 262-263.
Decrees affirmed.
By the Court (Milkey, Walsh & Smyth, JJ.11),
Clerk
Entered: August 10, 2023.
11 The panelists are listed in order of seniority.