Adoption of Eduardo.
This text of Adoption of Eduardo. (Adoption of Eduardo.) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Massachusetts Appeals Court primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.
Opinion
NOTICE: Summary decisions issued by the Appeals Court pursuant to M.A.C. Rule 23.0, as appearing in 97 Mass. App. Ct. 1017 (2020) (formerly known as rule 1:28, as amended by 73 Mass. App. Ct. 1001 [2009]), are primarily directed to the parties and, therefore, may not fully address the facts of the case or the panel's decisional rationale. Moreover, such decisions are not circulated to the entire court and, therefore, represent only the views of the panel that decided the case. A summary decision pursuant to rule 23.0 or rule 1:28 issued after February 25, 2008, may be cited for its persuasive value but, because of the limitations noted above, not as binding precedent. See Chace v. Curran, 71 Mass. App. Ct. 258, 260 n.4 (2008).
COMMONWEALTH OF MASSACHUSETTS
APPEALS COURT
23-P-858
ADOPTION OF EDUARDO. 1
MEMORANDUM AND ORDER PURSUANT TO RULE 23.0
The father entered into a stipulation for judgment
declaring him unfit to parent Eduardo and terminating his
parental rights. 2 The stipulation preserved the father's right
to seek a hearing on posttermination and postadoption
visitation. The judge declined to enter an order for
visitation, and the father appeals. We affirm.
We review a judge's decision not to order posttermination
or postadoption visitation with the biological parent for abuse
of discretion. See Adoption of Xarissa, 99 Mass. App. Ct. 610,
623-624 (2021). In determining whether such visitation is in
the child's best interests, the judge must consider whether the
child has a "significant, existing bond with the biological
1 A pseudonym. 2 The mother also stipulated to the termination of her parental rights. She entered into an open adoption agreement that allows three visits with Eduardo each year. She is not a party to this appeal. parent" and whether the child "has formed, strong, nurturing
bonds" with the preadoptive family. Adoption of Ilona, 459
Mass. 53, 63-64 (2011), quoting Adoption of Vito, 431 Mass. 550,
563 (2000). The judge should also weigh "considerations beyond
bonding," Adoption of Rico, 453 Mass. 749, 759 (2009), including
"other circumstances of the actual personal relationship of the
child and the biological parent," id., quoting Adoption of Vito,
supra at 562. Only if postadoption visitation with the
biological parent is in the child's best interests does the
judge proceed to evaluate whether entering an order instead of
leaving visitation to the discretion of the adoptive family is
necessary to protect the child's best interests. See Adoption
of Ilona, supra at 65-66; Adoption of Vito, supra at 563.
The record amply supports the judge's determination that
postadoption visitation with the father would not be in
Eduardo's best interests. Eduardo has never lived with the
father and had no significant bond with him at the time of the
hearing. Eduardo never explicitly or implicitly identified the
father as his biological parent to the social worker. Because
of the father's threats to Department of Children and Families
(department) social workers, supervised visits occurred either
virtually or at the department's office in the presence of a
police detail. Eduardo consistently appeared uncomfortable and
withdrawn during visits with the father.
2 Before and after the pandemic, the father was inconsistent
about confirming or attending visitation appointments, whether
online or in person. The father failed to confirm or attend
visits scheduled in February, March, and April 2022. He had not
seen Eduardo since November 2021, more than one year before the
hearing on postadoption visitation. He informed the department
that he had skipped the visits because he "was detoxing himself"
and did not want his son to see him in that condition. The
judge concluded that the father "has not demonstrated an ability
to maintain consistency in visitation, stability in his
relationship with Eduardo, and dependability in meeting
Eduardo's needs." By contrast, the judge credited the testimony
of a department social worker who had observed Eduardo with his
preadoptive parents that he "is a completely different person
with them. He's playful. He's talkative."
The father asks us to look beyond his lack of a significant
bond with Eduardo and consider several other circumstances,
including that (1) Eduardo's mother, despite having similar
deficiencies as the father in her parental bond and past
visitation pattern, enjoys visitation with him through an open
adoption agreement with the adoptive parents, see note 2, supra;
(2) the father did not have an opportunity to enter into an open
adoption agreement; (3) the father currently lives with the
mother (now his wife) and shares legal and physical custody of
3 their daughter in New Hampshire; (4) because the mother is
unable to drive, the father must drive her to visits with
Eduardo; (5) the father demonstrated sensitivity to Eduardo's
best interests by consenting to his adoption and ending visits
early when Eduardo was uncomfortable; and (6) the father
believes it is in Eduardo's best interests to know that both of
his biological parents love him.
The first four circumstances, which concern the fairness of
the order to the father, are unrelated to the question of
Eduardo's best interests. See Adoption of Vito, 431 Mass. at
562 ("an order for postadoption contact is grounded in the over-
all best interests of the child, based on emotional bonding and
other circumstances of the actual personal relationship of the
child and the biological parent, not in the rights of the
biological parent nor the legal consequences of their natural
relation").
As to the father's contention that he was concerned with
Eduardo's best interests, when asked why postadoption visitation
with Eduardo would be important, the father told the judge,
"because in the state of New Hampshire, at thirteen years old, a
child can decide where they want to live. Not at eighteen,
thirteen." He predicted Eduardo's decision at the age of
thirteen if permitted to visit with the father: "Give me until
then, and I'll guarantee my son will want to stay with us." The
4 judge rejected the father's reasoning, stating correctly that
"post-termination visitation is not determined by the potential
for future reunification with a parent whose rights to the child
have already been terminated." See Adoption of Vito, 431 Mass.
at 564-565 (purpose of posttermination contact "not to
strengthen the bonds between the child and his biological mother
or father, but to assist the child as he negotiates, often at a
very young age, the tortuous path from one family to another").
The record supports the judge's conclusion that
postadoption contact between Eduardo and the father was not in
Eduardo's best interests. Accordingly, there was no reason for
the judge to make findings about whether the preadoptive parents
would permit visitation and no error in failing to do so. The
judge did not abuse her discretion in denying the father's
request for a visitation order.
Decree affirmed.
By the Court (Milkey, Massing & Neyman, JJ. 3),
Assistant Clerk
Entered: March 6, 2024.
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