J-A10004-20
NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37
IN RE: ADOPTION OF: C.M., A : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF MINOR : PENNSYLVANIA : : : APPEAL OF: J.C., FATHER : No. 3060 EDA 2019
Appeal from the Decree Entered September 27, 2019 In the Court of Common Pleas of Montgomery County Orphans’ Court at No(s): No. 2019-A0053
BEFORE: BOWES, J., SHOGAN, J., and PELLEGRINI, J.*
MEMORANDUM BY BOWES, J.: FILED SEPTEMBER 3, 2020
J.C. (“Father”) appeals the September 27, 2019 decree granting the
petition of D.M. and P.M. (“Maternal Grandparents”), joined by B.M. 1
(“Mother”) (collectively, “Appellees”), to involuntarily terminate his parental
rights to his daughter, C.M., who was born in January 2016. After review, we
reverse.
At the outset, we emphasize that this appeal does not involve a
challenge to Maternal Grandparents’ standing to file a petition for the
involuntary termination of Father’s parental rights, their averment that an
adoption is presently contemplated, their intent to assume custody of C.M.
pending the anticipated adoption, or whether Maternal Grandparents had to
____________________________________________
* Retired Senior Judge assigned to the Superior Court.
1 By separate decree dated and entered the same date, the orphans’ court terminated the parental rights of Mother pursuant to her voluntary relinquishment. While Mother has not filed an appeal from the termination of her parental rights, she has participated in the instant appeal, filing a brief in support of the termination of Father’s parental rights. J-A10004-20
demonstrate “good cause” pursuant to 23 Pa.C.S. § 2901 in order to complete
the adoption without satisfying the procedural requirements outlined in the
Adoption Act, 23 Pa.C.S. §§ 2101-2938. As is patently clear from our analysis,
none of the foregoing components of the Adoption Act is at issue in the instant
appeal.
What this appeal does concern, however, and what we address herein,
is Father’s assertion that Maternal Grandparents’ manipulation of the Adoption
Act is contrary to public policy. Stated plainly, this case is an unrestrained
custody dispute that belongs in family court, where Father filed the custody
petition that triggered Maternal Grandparent’s proposed adoption. As the
esteemed Justice David N. Wecht highlighted in his concurring opinion in In
re Adoption of M.R.D., 145 A.3d 1117, 1133-34 (Pa. 2016), which we
discuss infra, “Termination of parental rights is an extreme and last-ditch
measure. Its finality is striking. It is emphatically not a tool to be deployed
in custody disputes.” He continued, “To countenance [these] litigation tactics
would be to countenance corruption of our adoption laws.” Id. at 1134.
The following procedural history flows from the certified record. On
February 19, 2019, Father filed a custody complaint seeking shared physical
custody of his daughter, with whom he had not interacted since the fall of
2016. Father completed the necessary mediation and conciliation
requirements in custody court, including the conciliation counselor’s
recommendation of periods of supervised partial custody. However,
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conciliation was not fruitful, and with Mother’s assistance and approval,
Maternal Grandparents halted the custody proceedings on April 15, 2019, by
filing the underlying petition to involuntarily terminate Father’s parental rights
to C.M.
Mother joined Maternal Grandparents’ petition, and filed a petition to
voluntarily relinquish her rights to C.M. Maternal Grandparents shortly
thereafter filed an adoption petition. The petition regarding Father’s parental
rights sought termination pursuant to the Adoption Act section which provides
for termination of rights where “[t]the parent by conduct continuing for a
period of at least six months immediately preceding the filing of the petition
either has evidenced a settled purpose of relinquishing a parental claim to a
child or has refused or failed to perform parental duties.” 23 Pa.C.S.
§ 2511(a)(1).
The petition proceeded to a hearing conducted on June 10, 2019, and
July 17, 2019. Maternal Grandparents, represented by counsel, presented the
testimony of Father, Maternal Grandfather, and Mother, who was represented
by separate counsel. Father, represented by counsel, presented the testimony
of himself and his wife, A.S. Further, C.M. was represented during these
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proceedings by legal counsel, who was appointed pursuant to an order entered
on May 21, 2019.2
The evidence at the hearing revealed that Father has only seen C.M.
approximately six or seven times, including at her birth, and has not seen her
since the fall of 2016. N.T., 7/17/19, at 42-43; N.T., 6/10/19, at 13, 59, 108,
116-17. After successfully contacting Mother in December 2016 and
November 2017,3 Father was incarcerated from December 2017 to February
2018, after which he resided in Veterans Affairs transitional housing, where
visitation with minors was not allowed, until October 2018. N.T., 7/17/19, at
112-14, 159; N.T., 6/10/19, at 60-67. Thereafter, Father again contacted
Mother in February 2019. N.T., 7/17/19, at 114-15; N.T., 6/10/19, at 71.
2 Counsel stated that, due to C.M.’s young age, C.M.’s preference was not ascertainable and that there was no conflict between C.M.’s best interests and legal interests. N.T., 7/17/19, at 177-78. See In re Adoption of L.B.M., 161 A.3d 172, 175, 180 (Pa. 2017) (plurality) (stating that, pursuant to 23 Pa.C.S. § 2313(a), a child who is the subject of a contested involuntary termination proceeding has a statutory right to counsel who discerns and advocates for the child’s legal interests, defined as a child’s preferred outcome).
3 Father reported difficulty contacting Mother and believed his telephone number had been blocked, finally getting through when he called from his work phone. N.T., 6/10/19, at 56, 60-61, 107, 117. He further indicated that he had previously been advised that he was not welcome at Mother’s residence, where she resided with her parents, and had received a warning from law enforcement against harassment of Mother. Id. at 34, 57, 100-04. The orphans’ court noted that Father did not present any evidence to corroborate the allegations that Mother called the police or threatened to have him charged with harassment. Orphans’ Court Opinion, 9/26/19, at 5.
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Mother hung up on him and texted him to “not contact her again.” N.T.,
7/17/19, at 115-16. Father then filed a custody petition on February 28,
2019. N.T., 7/17/19, at 116; N.T., 6/10/19, at 68.
While Father testified that Mother repeatedly denied that he was the
birth father, the orphans’ court rejected the notion that Father understood
Mother’s statements as actually questioning his paternity. See Orphans’ Court
Opinion at 6. Nevertheless, although Mother did not genuinely dispute
paternity, she pursued paternity testing with regard to a support matter she
instituted in March 2019.4 N.T., 7/17/19, at 116-17; N.T., 6/10/19, at 61,
65-67, 71, 83, 85.
By decree entered September 27, 2019, the orphan’s court involuntarily
terminated the parental rights of Father pursuant to 23 Pa.C.S. § 2511(a)(1)
and (b). By separate decree, the court also terminated the parental rights of
Mother pursuant to her voluntary relinquishment. Father filed a timely notice
of appeal on Monday, October 28, 2019,5 and both Father and the orphans’
court complied with Pa.R.A.P. 1925.
Father raises the following issues for our review:
4 Mother subsequently withdrew her support petition. N.T., 6/10/19, at 86.
5See Pa.R.A.P. 903(a) (notice of appeal shall be filed within 30 days after the entry of the order from which the appeal is taken); 1 Pa.C.S. 1908(2) (providing for the omission of the last day when it falls on a Saturday, Sunday, or legal holiday).
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1. Did the [orphans’] court commit an error of law and/or abuse of discretion by finding that termination of Father’s parental rights was warranted pursuant to 23 Pa.C.S. § 2511(a)(1)?
2. Did the [orphans’] court commit an error of law and/or abuse of discretion by terminating Father’s parental rights pursuant to 23 Pa.C.S. § 2511(a)(1) and (b)?
Father’s brief at 26 (suggested answer omitted).
In matters involving involuntary termination of parental rights, our
standard of review is as follows:
The standard of review in termination of parental rights cases requires appellate courts to accept the findings of fact and credibility determinations of the trial court if they are supported by the record. If the factual findings are supported, appellate courts review to determine if the trial court made an error of law or abused its discretion. A decision may be reversed for an abuse of discretion only upon demonstration of manifest unreasonableness, partiality, prejudice, bias, or ill-will. The trial court’s decision, however, should not be reversed merely because the record would support a different result. We have previously emphasized [the appellate court’s] deference to trial courts that often have first-hand observations of the parties spanning multiple hearings.
In re T.S.M., 71 A.3d 251, 267 (Pa. 2013) (cleaned up). “The trial court is
free to believe all, part, or none of the evidence presented and is likewise free
to make all credibility determinations and resolve conflicts in the evidence.”
In re M.G. & J.G., 855 A.2d 68, 73-74 (Pa.Super. 2004) (citation omitted).
“[I]f competent evidence supports the trial court’s findings, we will affirm even
6 Although Father stated the above issues somewhat differently than in his Rule 1925(b) statement, we conclude that he nevertheless has preserved them for our review.
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if the record could also support the opposite result.” In re Adoption of
T.B.B., 835 A.2d 387, 394 (Pa.Super. 2003) (citation omitted).
The termination of parental rights is governed by § 2511 of the Adoption
Act and requires a bifurcated analysis of the grounds for termination followed
by the needs and welfare of the child.
Our case law has made clear that under [§] 2511, the court must engage in a bifurcated process prior to terminating parental rights. Initially, the focus is on the conduct of the parent. The party seeking termination must prove by clear and convincing evidence that the parent’s conduct satisfies the statutory grounds for termination delineated in [§] 2511(a). Only if the court determines that the parent’s conduct warrants termination of his or her parental rights does the court engage in the second part of the analysis pursuant to [§] 2511(b): determination of the needs and welfare of the child under the standard of best interests of the child. One major aspect of the needs and welfare analysis concerns the nature and status of the emotional bond between parent and child, with close attention paid to the effect on the child of permanently severing any such bond.
In re L.M., 923 A.2d 505, 511 (Pa.Super. 2007) (citations omitted). We have
defined clear and convincing evidence as that which is so “clear, direct,
weighty and convincing as to enable the trier of fact to come to a clear
conviction, without hesitance, of the truth of the precise facts in issue.” In re
C.S., 761 A.2d 1197, 1201 (Pa.Super. 2000) (internal quotation marks
omitted).
The orphans’ court concluded that there was sufficient evidence to
warrant termination of Father’s parental rights under to § 2511(a)(1). Prior
to reaching Father’s claim that the record does not contain clear and
convincing evidence sufficient to terminate his parental rights, we address the
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preliminary question of whether a valid proposed adoption was before the
orphans’ court. See Adoption of J.D.S., 763 A.2d 867 (Pa.Super. 2000)
(holding that proposed adoption by stepparent who was separated from the
child’s mother was not valid, and that, as a result, termination of the father’s
parental rights was inappropriate).
Instantly, in addressing the motivation for Maternal Grandparents’
adoption and Mother’s voluntary relinquishment, the orphans’ court reasoned,
This [c]ourt concluded that the birth mother’s voluntary relinquishment so that the child may be raised by her parents, the maternal grandparents[,] was reasonable under the unusual circumstances of birth mother, and suited to the needs and welfare of the child. Given birth mother’s medical [diagnoses of lupus and scleroderma], her decision to relinquish her parental rights and provide for stability, permanency, security and continuity for her child is understandable. This [c]ourt rejected the implication by birth father that birth mother’s voluntary relinquishment of her parental rights was contrived and concluded that termination of birth mother’s parental rights on a voluntary basis, together with a contemplated adoption, are in the best interests of the child and will best serve the needs and welfare of the child.
Orphans’ Court Opinion, 11/1/19, at 3. While descriptive of Mother’s decision
to relinquish her parental rights, the foregoing discussion does not expressly
account for the involuntary termination of Father’s parental rights. In
addition, as we highlight infra, Maternal Grandparents’ noble desire to care for
C.M. in Mother’s absence can be accomplished without terminating the
parental rights of either parent.
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Father argues that the termination of his parental rights pursuant to
§ 2511(a)(1) and (b) does not promote the statutory intent or legislative
purpose of the Adoption Act. Father’s brief at 22. He states,
Custody gamesmanship is precisely what occurred in this matter. Mother’s testimony was clear that it was not until Father pursued a claim for custody of the child that she decided it was time to file for termination of his parental rights. While Appellees have procedurally complied with the Adoption Act, the testimony of both [M]aternal [G]randfather and Mother was clear that there is no new family unit being created as a result of this adoption, as the parties’ roles in the child’s life will not change. Mother testified that she has no intentions or plans to move out of Grandparents’ home. Mother specifically testified that she did not foresee any change in her daily care of and routines with the child whether or not termination was granted.
Id. at 23 (citations to the record omitted).
We agree. This case exemplifies what our High Court envisioned in In
re Adoption of L.J.B., 18 A.3d 1098, 1110 (Pa. 2011) (OAJC) in considering
the potential for parties to use the Adoption Act as an artifice to gain an
advantage in a custody dispute. As articulated by the learned Justice Max
Baer’s lead opinion, “one can imagine routine cross-petitions for termination
as part of custody battles[.]” Id. at 1110.
At the outset, we highlight that the orphans’ court made a credibility
determination in favor of Mother and the maternal grandfather, which we do
not disturb. See Orphans’ Court Opinion, 9/26/19, at 11. The motivation for
the adoption is obvious from the credible testimony that they sought to
terminate Father’s parental rights in order to ensure that C.M. remains with
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Maternal Grandparents in the event that Mother’s health deteriorates.7 The
maternal grandfather testified, “I just want to make sure [C.M. is] well taken
care of and [in] a stable home with us. We want to be consistent with her
routines in life and what she knows, with a loving family.” N.T., 7/17/19, at
14. In answering why it is important to secure C.M.’s future through adoption,
the grandfather phrased it bluntly, “Well, I would have no faith in [Father]
after the first three years of her life not wanting to participate with her, and
me and [maternal grandmother] having brought her up from when she was a
baby.” Id.
Mother’s explanation for the adoption is equally frank. “I don’t know
what my future is going to be. . . . I love my daughter with everything I have
in me, and I need to make sure that her future is completely secure and that
I have no doubts about her life . . . as long as she has my parents there for
her. Id. at 63-64. She later expounded, “If I were . . . to pass away
tomorrow, I would have no trust in [Father] raising my child, but I have all
the trust in the world [in] my parents. . . [.]” Id. at 68. Indeed, when asked
about the seemingly urgent need to terminate Father’s parental rights at this
7 Notwithstanding the learned dissent’s characterization of our rationale, we do not find that the proposed adoption is pretextual. We acknowledge that Appellees’ actions are born of love for the child. We simply hold that Appellees cannot utilize the Adoption Act to achieve the desired result because it is contrary to the purpose of the Adoption Act as the High Court articulated in In re Adoption of M.R.D., 145 A.3d 1117, 1120 (Pa. 2016) (“where no new parent-child relationship is contemplated, the involuntary termination of parental rights is not permitted under the Adoption Act.”).
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juncture, as opposed to the three years before he filed the custody petition,
Mother responded, “But he had no interest in being in [C.M.’s] life for those
years, so I never had to worry about petitioning for the [termination] of his
parental rights.” Id. 84. Instead, she waited until Father initiated the custody
proceedings. The following exchange is telling. When Counsel inquired, “So
when he uses the court in 2019 to say I want to see my daughter, that’s when
you file the petition; is that correct?” Mother replied “Correct.” Id.at 85.
Thus, as demonstrated by the foregoing evidence proffered by two witness
whose credibility the orphans’ court specifically endorsed, the acknowledged
motivation for the adoption is entirely prophylactic. Appellees want to ensure
that, if something unfortunate happened to Mother, C.M. has a secure future
with Maternal Grandparents, as opposed to Father, who had recently invoked
his custodial rights. Phrased differently, the proposed adoption was intended
to “secure” C.M.’s future with Maternal Grandparents and “protect” her from
Father’s intervention, as evidence by his attempt to exercise custody.
As we explain infra, the instant petition to terminate Father’s parental
rights in anticipation of Maternal Grandparents’ adoption lacks integrity for
two reasons. First, it was triggered primarily by Father’s reappearance and
custody claim. Second, it does not create a new family unit or a new parent-
child relationship.
As Mother testified, she did not believe it imperative to terminate
Father’s parental rights in order to secure C.M.’s future until after Father
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demonstrated a resolve to pursue his custody rights. Tellingly, although
Mother is legitimately concerned about her daughter’s future, Mother did not
request that the custody court determine whether she can designate her
parents as standby guardians, pursuant to the Standby Guardianship Act. 23
Pa.C.S. §§ 5601-5625. This measure would have been particularly
appropriate in the case at bar considering both Father’s lack of contact with
C.M. and, as evidenced by his ultimate request for supervised partial custody,
his inability to exercise primary physical custody of a daughter whom he does
not know. See 23 Pa.C.S. § 5611(a)(3) (noting that written designation of
standby guardian is not appropriate where non-consenting parent is “willing
and able to make and carry out the day-to-day child-care decisions concerning
the minor”).
Likewise, Maternal Grandparents did not attempt to intervene in the
underlying custody dispute or seek a conditional legal guardianship of their
grandchild. Instead, rather than pursue a less invasive method of securing
C.M.’s future, or simply defending against Father’s custody claim in family
court based upon his three years of inaction, Appellees sought the
exceptionally severe remedy of terminating Father’s parental rights and the
orphans’ court obliged. This result is untenable.
As Justice Wecht observed in expressing his disapproval of a similar
misuse of the Adoption Act as a strategy to circumvent a custody dispute,
While Mother's alternative response [to the custody complaint] . . . may have shown creativity and determination, it
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did not comport with Pennsylvania law. This is especially so given the demonstrable fact that the [custody] court in this case, like trial courts all across this Commonwealth, has robust discretionary authority to limit and even completely curtail Father's custody rights under the custody statutes without resort to the draconian remedy of termination of parental rights under the adoption laws.
In re Adoption of M.R.D., supra at 1134-35 (Wecht concurring). As the
custody court had an array of alternatives to decide C.M.’s best interest in the
custody dispute between Mother and Father, we do not condone Appellees’
use of the Adoption Act in order to evade the custody court’s authority.
Furthermore, the proposed adoption does not promote the purpose of
the Adoption Act insofar as it does not create a new family unit or a new
parent-child relationship. Our Supreme Court addressed a similar issue in In
re Adoption of M.R.D., supra, in the context of whether a grandparent may
stand in the stead of an adopting spouse. The Supreme Court reversed the
termination of a father’s parental rights where an unmarried mother sought
termination and adoption by the maternal grandfather while retaining her
parental rights. In finding there was not a valid adoption, the Court
recognized, in part:
Because a termination petition filed by one parent against the other must occur in the context of an anticipated adoption, and because adoption is a statutory right, we note that the parent seeking termination must strictly comply with all pertinent provisions of the Adoption Act in order for the adoption to be valid. While the Adoption Act provides that any individual may become an adopting parent, relevant to the instant matter, Section 2711 of the Act requires the parent seeking termination to consent to the adoption and to relinquish his or her parental rights. Requiring parental consent to the adoption and the relinquishment of his or her parental rights permits the child and the adoptive parent or
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parents to establish a new parent-child relationship. Thus, where no new parent-child relationship is contemplated, the involuntary termination of parental rights is not permitted under the Adoption Act.
....
The purpose behind the termination or relinquishment of an existing parent’s rights prior to an adoption is to facilitate a new parent-child relationship between the child and the adoptive parent, and to protect the integrity and stability of the new family unit.
In re Adoption of M.R.D., supra at 1120, 1127-28 (cleaned up, emphases
added). In support of its decision, the Court further stated:
although the orphans’ court rejected the possibility in the instant case, permitting Grandfather to adopt and co-parent Children with mother would nevertheless open the door for misuse of adoption proceedings by spiteful parents as a means to involuntarily terminate the rights of unwanted parents, potentially allowing grandparents, cousins, pastors, coaches, and a litany of other individuals who have a close relationship with a child to stand in as prospective adoptive parents so that termination may be achieved. Given that the complete and irrevocable termination of parental rights is one of the most serious and severe steps a court can take, we must ensure that we do not open the floodgates to such gamesmanship.
Id. at 1129 (cleaned up).
To be clear, our Supreme Court’s express holding in In re Adoption
of M.R.D., supra is not dispositive of the case at bar because the issue that
the High Court addressed related to “whether a legal parent may establish
cause under Section 2901 to excuse the relinquishment requirement and
proceed with a proposed adoption by a grandparent.” That is not the issue
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we confront herein.8 Nevertheless, the rationale the Supreme Court
employed in In re Adoption of M.R.D., is instructive because, in order to
reach its ultimate holding, the Supreme Court had to determine what
constituted a new parent–child relationship. As the High Court observed,
“where no new parent-child relationship is contemplated, the involuntary
termination of parental rights is not permitted under the Adoption Act.” Id.
at 1120 (cleaned up) (citations omitted). As framed by the Supreme Court,
it had to decide whether “Mother and Grandfather . . . can establish that
permitting Grandfather to adopt Children while Mother retains her parental
rights will promote a new family unit or that it is otherwise unnecessary to
require Mother to relinquish her parental rights under the circumstances of
this case.” Id. at 1128.
The present case does not involve the anticipation of a valid adoption
that promotes a new parent-child relationship or creates a new family unit.
Appellees simply desire to secure C.M.’s future should something happen to
Mother, i.e., maintain the status quo without Father’s interference. Mother
will continue to share a maternal relationship with C.M., whom she
8 We note that the Supreme Court did not disturb the authority that permits a grandparent from seeking to adopt a grandchild in cases where the child’s parent relinquishes his or her parental rights. In re Adoption of M.R.D., 145 A.3d 1117, 1126, 1129 n.4. (Pa. 2016). However, the Court’s acknowledgment of a grandparent’s ability to adopt in that situation presupposes facts that are missing herein, i.e., that the proposed adoption will create a new parent-child relationship and promote a new family unit.
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characterizes as “like a little mini[-]me.” N.T., 7/17/19, at 65. In fact, Mother
testified that she and C.M. are “inseparable,” and C.M. falls asleep in Mother’s
bed “every single night.” Id. at 66. Undeniably, Mother confirmed that her
care of C.M. will not change regardless of whether the court grants or denies
the petition to terminate Father’s rights in anticipation of the proposed
adoption. Id. at 89. Moreover, regardless of her own petition for voluntary
relinquishment, Mother admitted that she remains able and willing to care for
C.M. Id. at 195. She testified, “I am very willing to care for my child.” Id.
Like Mother, maternal grandfather testified that he already considered
himself and his wife as “like parents” based on the level of care they provide
to C.M. Id. at 26. Nevertheless, Mother continues to provide C.M. daily
parental care without any problems and Maternal Grandfather anticipates that
Mother would continue in that role after the proposed adoption to secure the
continuity of C.M.’s care. Id. at 27-29, 31. Similarly, Maternal Grandparents’
current role will not change unless Mother’s condition worsens, and there is
no plan for Mother to leave the household that she and C.M. have lived in
since the child’s birth.9 Id. at 24, 29, 31.
9 We do not base our conclusion on the fact that Mother will continue to reside in Maternal Grandparent’s home. The relevant factor is not Mother’s post- adoption residence but the reality that she will continue to perform her parental duties. As neither Mother nor Maternal Grandparents expects to alter their current roles after the adoption, nothing new is being created. We also note the inaptness of the learned dissent’s attempt to compare the current scenario with an adoption of a foster child. Assuming, arguendo, that
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Although it is also undisputed that Maternal Grandparents have a close
and loving relationship with C.M., the evidence indicates that they are nothing
more than “stand in[s] as prospective adoptive parents so that termination
may be achieved.” M.R.D., supra at 1129. Though they would share paternal
rights between themselves, Maternal Grandparents’ demonstrated roles will
not change. They will become C.M.’s legal parents but they will continue to
act in their ancillary childrearing roles as grandparents. Moreover, while
Mother and C.M. would become siblings, at least nominally, Mother’s function
as C.M.’s parent will endure the absence of formal recognition. The proposed
changes to Appellees’ family dynamic are entirely titular and constitute neither
a “new family unit” nor a “new parent-child relationship.” See In re Adoption
of M.R.D., supra at 1120 (“where no new parent-child relationship is
contemplated, the involuntary termination of parental rights is not permitted
under the Adoption Act”); id. at 1127-28 (purpose behind termination or
relinquishment of parental rights prior to adoption is to facilitate new parent-
pre-adoption residence is dispositive of whether an adoption creates a new family unit, which it is not, the two scenarios are incongruous. Unlike Mother and Maternal Grandparents, a foster parent does not have any form of custody or legal right to the child until the entry of an adoption decree. Prior to that date, the county agency retains both legal and physical custody of the child under the supervision of the juvenile court. Foster parents perform their stewardship roles entirely at the agency’s pleasure. Hence, in contrast to the instant situation, which produces nothing more than a contingency for Maternal Grandparents to exclude Father if Mother’s health falters, the eventual adoption of a foster child does, in fact, facilitate a new parent-child relationship and the decree promotes the integrity of the new family unit.
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child relationship between child and adoptive parent, and to protect integrity
and stability of new family unit).
Accordingly, we find that the proposed adoption by Maternal
Grandparents is not valid. As a valid adoption is not anticipated, the
termination petition as to Father is not cognizable and the termination of his
rights is precluded. Id. at 1118 (“[A]s the contemplated adoption cannot
proceed, we reverse the order affirming the termination of the father's
parental rights.”). Hence, we do not address the merits of Maternal
Grandparents’ petition to terminate Father’s parental rights pursuant to
§ 2511(a)(1) and (b).
For the foregoing reasons, we reverse the September 27, 2019 decree
and remand to the orphans’ court for further proceedings consistent with this
memorandum.
Decree reversed. Case remanded. Jurisdiction relinquished.
Judge Shogan joins the memorandum.
Judge Pellegrini files a dissenting memorandum.
Judgment Entered.
Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq. Prothonotary
Date: 9/3/2020
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