Adoption of: C.M.; Apl of: B.M.

• Court: Supreme Court of Pennsylvania
• Decided: July 21, 2021
• Docket: 1 MAP 2021
• Status: Published

Opinion

[J-30-2021] IN THE SUPREME COURT OF PENNSYLVANIA MIDDLE DISTRICT

BAER, C.J., SAYLOR, TODD, DONOHUE, DOUGHERTY, WECHT, MUNDY, JJ.

IN RE: ADOPTION OF: C.M., A MINOR : No. 1 MAP 2021 : : Appeal from the Order of Superior APPEAL OF: B.M., MOTHER AND D.M. : Court at No. 3060 EDA 2019 dated AND P.M., MATERNAL GRANDPARENTS : September 3, 2020, reconsideration : denied October 14, 2020, Reversing : the Decree dated September 27, : 2019 by the Montgomery County : Orphans' Court at No. 2019-A0053 : and Remanding. : : ARGUED: April 14, 2021

OPINION

JUSTICE DOUGHERTY DECIDED: July 21, 2021 We granted discretionary review of the Superior Court’s decision invalidating the

involuntary termination of a father’s parental rights where the child’s mother voluntarily

relinquished her own rights but would continue to reside with the pre-adoptive maternal

grandparents and maintain her parental role. The panel viewed the matter to involve

unlawful custody gamesmanship in conflict with our decision in In re Adoption of M.R.D.,

145 A.3d 1117 (Pa. 2016). Although we discern no direct conflict between the proposed

adoption and M.R.D., and disapprove of the Superior Court’s holding to the contrary, we

affirm the panel’s disposition on the alternative grounds discussed herein.1

1 This Court may affirm the order of the court below if the result reached is correct without

regard to the grounds relied upon by that court. Fitzpatrick v. Natter, 961 A.2d 1229, 1244 n.17 (Pa. 2008), citing C.B. ex rel. R.R.M. v. Dep’t of Pub. Welfare, 786 A.2d 176, 178 I. Background

Appellee J.C. (Father) and appellant B.M. (Mother) are the natural parents of C.M.,

born in January of 2016. Father and Mother lived together in Texas for a period of time

prior to C.M.’s birth; however, the child was born in Pennsylvania, and Mother remained

with C.M. in Pennsylvania, residing with her parents (Grandparents). N.T. 6/10/2019 at

54, 56; N.T. 7/17/2019 at 9, 33, 55. Father was present at the hospital for C.M.’s birth

and purchased a crib and changing table for use at Grandparents’ home. N.T. 6/10/2019

at 41, 54; N.T. 7/17/2019 at 19, 55, 61, 95, 124, 128. He returned to Texas, but ultimately

moved back to Pennsylvania in late spring or summer of 2016. N.T. 6/10/2019 at 56,

116; N.T. 7/17/2019 at 54, 62, 99. Unable to reach Mother by phone and believing she

had blocked his calls, Father attempted to contact Mother in person at Grandparents’

home; Mother instructed Father he was not allowed on the property, but accommodated

his request to arrange visits. N.T. 6/10/2019 at 55-59, 117. Between August and

September or early October of that year, Mother brought C.M. to a park to visit with Father

approximately six times, then visits ceased. N.T. 6/10/2019 at 58-59, 116-17; 7/17/2019

at 99. According to Father, after several subsequent unsuccessful attempts to reach

Mother by calling or texting, he was able to reach her in December of 2016 using a

different phone number, and asked to arrange a visit to deliver Christmas presents to

C.M; Mother responded that he was not C.M.’s father and C.M. did not need anything,

and no visit was arranged nor presents delivered. N.T. 6/10/2019 at 15, 59-61, 91; N.T.

7/17/2019 at 106-07, 110-11, 151-52. Father did not attempt to reach Mother about visits

again until November 22, 2017, at which time Mother hung up the phone; Father

attempted to call back several times that day to no avail, and no visit occurred. N.T.

n.1 (Pa. 2001). As was the case in Natter, in this case, the alternative ground is one which appellee preserved below and urges on this appeal. Id.

[J-30-2021] - 2 6/10/2019 at 62-67, 118, 125; N.T. 7/17/2019 at 57, 108-10, 152-53, 169; Orphans’ Court

Exhibit F-3 (Father’s phone record). His next attempted contact with C.M. was in

February of 2019. N.T. 6/10/2019 at 71-72; N.T. 7/17/2019 at 57, 110, 112-14, 154-56.

Beginning in December of 2017, Father spent several weeks in jail following an

incident in which he assaulted and fled from a police officer responding to a request for

mental health assistance placed by Father’s mother. N.T. 6/10/2019 at 26; N.T.

7/17/2019 at 112, 158-59. He pleaded guilty and received a sentence of two years’

probation and a driver’s license suspension. N.T. 6/10/2019 at 26; N.T. 7/17/2019 at 158-

59. Upon his release in February of 2018, Father was hospitalized and received inpatient

treatment for post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD) through a Veterans Affairs (VA)

hospital until April 2018, and then resided in a transition house for veterans until October

2018 while his medication was monitored. N.T. 6/10/2019 at 17; N.T. 7/17/2019 at 113-

14. Since then, he has resided in a VA-subsidized home with his then-girlfriend, now-

wife, A.S., her two children, and their child together who was born in early 2019. N.T.

6/10/2019 at 11-12, 96, 99-100; N.T. 7/17/2019 at 114, 127. On weekends he has

custody of his two older children, born in 2012 and 2014. N.T. 6/10/2019 at 24, 40, 96-

97, 114; N.T. 7/17/2019 at 123. Mother is in contact with Father’s aunt as well as the

mother of Father’s older children; she has provided photographs of C.M. to Father’s aunt,

and the children have had some ongoing contact with C.M. who they know is their sibling.

N.T. 6/10/2019 at 39-42, 71-72, 105, 113; N.T. 7/17/2019 at 40-41, 53-54, 58, 115.

The next and final time Father attempted to reach Mother about visiting C.M. was

February 19, 2019, and after a brief exchange she hung up the phone; Father attempted

to call back several times, and Mother responded with a text instructing Father not to

contact her again. Orphans’ Court Exhibit F-3; N.T. 6/10/2019 at 71; N.T. 7/17/2019 at

57, 110, 112-16, 154-56. It is undisputed that Father has not seen C.M., or provided any

[J-30-2021] - 3 gifts, letters, supplies, or financial support, since autumn of 2016, while Mother and

Grandparents have shared caregiving responsibilities and provided generously for C.M.’s

needs and welfare since birth. Orphans’ Court Opinion, 9/26/2019, at 4, 8, 10, 13.

On February 28, 2019, Father filed a complaint for custody, seeking to establish

visitation with C.M. and gradually increase his involvement to shared custody. Orphans’

Court Exhibit F-4, Complaint for Custody at 3; N.T. 6/10/2019 at 68, 70; N.T. 7/17/2019

at 75, 78, 95-96, 118-19. On March 13, Mother filed a complaint for child support, and

Father complied with the order for paternity testing which confirmed his status as the

biological father of C.M. N.T. 6/10/2019 at 81, 83, 85-86; N.T. 7/17/2019 at 75-76, 116-

17. Father and Mother both participated in custody mediation required by the county’s

domestic relations court, but reached no agreement. N.T. 6/10/2019 at 74; N.T.

7/17/2019 at 96, 173. Father and Mother attended a custody conciliation conference

before a hearing officer, but again reached no agreement. N.T. 6/10/2019 at 74-76; N.T.

7/17/2019 at 96-97, 173. The conciliation report issued on April 3, 2019. N.T. 6/10/2019

at 76-77, 79-80.

On April 15, 2019, Grandparents, joined by Mother, filed a petition to involuntarily

terminate Father’s parental rights, averring grounds existed under Subsection 2511(a)(1)

of the Adoption Act, 23 Pa.C.S. §§2101-2938 (the Act), which allows termination of

parental rights if “[t]he parent by conduct continuing for a period of at least six months

immediately preceding the filing of the petition either has evidenced a settled purpose of

relinquishing parental claim to a child or has refused or failed to perform parental duties.”

Orphans’ Court Docket, entries 4/15/2019, 4/26/2019; Petition for Involuntary Termination

of Parental Rights of [J.C.], Biological Father at ¶5; 23 Pa.C.S. §2511(a)(1). On April 29,

2019, Mother withdrew her complaint for child support. N.T. 6/10/2019 at 86-87.

Thereafter, the domestic relations court issued a stay of the custody proceedings, Mother

[J-30-2021] - 4 filed a petition to voluntarily relinquish her parental rights to C.M., Grandparents filed a

petition to adopt, and the matter proceeded to orphans’ court for an evidentiary hearing

on the termination of parental rights petitions.2 N.T. 6/10/2019 at 86; N.T. 7/17/2019 at

85; Orphans’ Court Docket, entries 4/26/2019, 4/30/2019.

Regarding the reasons for pursuing the adoption by Grandparents, the orphans’

court found the testimony of Mother and maternal grandfather (Grandfather) credible.

Orphans’ Court Opinion, 9/26/2019, at 11. Mother testified she has lupus, a common

autoimmune disease that affects her kidneys, and scleroderma, a rare build-up of

collagen in the body that hardens skin and connective tissues including organs, joints,

and muscles; she stated there is not much known about scleroderma, she does not make

attempts to research it, and it is usually fatal within a period of ten years, though the

prognosis among different individuals varies. N.T. 7/17/2019 at 35-38. She testified she

receives treatment from three physicians approximately every three months which

includes medication, and she experiences some bad days when pain and stiffness make

it difficult to move, though currently she maintains a regular routine of school, work, and

sharing care for C.M. with Grandparents without physical impediments. Id. at 35-36, 40,

73-75. Regarding the need to pursue adoption, Mother testified, “[Grandparents] know

her routine. They know everything about her. She has full trust in them, and so do I,

about how they’re going to raise her. They have always helped both of us since she’s

been born, and they have helped me my whole life. And unlike [Father], they helped me

with everything, and I have no doubt that they will continue to do so.” Id. at 39. She

further provided that, because she does not know what her own future will be, she needed

to ensure C.M.’s future would be secure with her parents as she has no trust in Father.

2 Father, Mother, and Grandparents were represented by counsel throughout the orphans’ court proceeding. Legal counsel was appointed for C.M. by court order dated May 21, 2019.

[J-30-2021] - 5 Id. at 63-64, 68. When asked why she sought termination of Father’s rights at this

juncture, as opposed to in either of the previous two years when he had been absent,

Mother testified, “[Father] had no interest in being in my child’s life for those years, so I

never had to worry about petitioning for the relinquishment of his parental rights[,]” and

further agreed it was not until Father filed in court to see C.M. that she decided to file the

termination petition. Id. at 84-85.

Grandfather testified he understands Mother’s prognosis can be debilitating and

fatal, but aside from a couple of bad days, Mother has had no problems caring for C.M.,

and there is no plan to for Mother to move out or change roles following the adoption. Id.

at 11, 13-14, 24, 27-31. Regarding his reason for wanting to adopt C.M., he stated, “I just

want to make sure she’s well taken care of and a [sic] stable home with us. We want to

be consistent with her routines in life and what she knows, with a loving family.” Id. at 14.

Responding to why it was important to secure C.M.’s fate through adoption, he stated, “I

would have no faith in [Father] after the first three years of her life not wanting to

participate with her, and me and my wife having brought her up from when she was a

baby” and “[w]e just want to make sure with education, she’s properly taken care of, all of

her wants and needs.” Id. Asked why the adoption was in C.M.’s best interests, he stated,

“[t]he consistency in her life right now. She is thriving where she’s at. She’s just

surrounded by a loving family, aunts, uncles. Anybody in our family would do anything

for her.” Id. at 23.

Father testified, as a result of his active military duty in 2014, he has PTSD and a

hip injury which required two surgeries; he receives veterans’ benefits and disability

payments due to the hip injury, and these are his only income sources. N.T. 6/10/2019

at 20-22, 25, 37, 43-53; N.T. 7/17/2019 at 101-05, 124-25, 146. He testified that each

time he attempted to contact Mother, she either would not answer, or told him he was not

[J-30-2021] - 6 C.M.’s father and hung up the phone; however, Father also conceded Mother had said

he was not “a” father, and “just a sperm donor,” and the orphans’ court found him not

credible regarding any of his testimony he questioned paternity. N.T. 6/10/2019 at 55-

56, 65-67, 106-07, 117; N.T. 7/17/2019 at 130-31; Orphans’ Court Opinion, 9/26/2019, at

6. Father testified he believed Mother would attempt to raise harassment charges against

him if he made more contact as a result of a phone call he received; the orphans’ court

found this claim to lack specificity and corroboration. Orphans’ Court Opinion, 9/26/2019,

at 5. Father did file to enforce custody of his older children when they were small, which

he achieved through agreement with their mother and without legal assistance; he admits

he knew how to pursue custody of C.M., but did not do so until February of 2019, then

believing it was his only option. N.T. 6/10/2019 at 97-98, 114-15; N.T. 7/17/2019 at 125.

He testified that children were not allowed to visit at the transition housing program where

he lived in 2018, and admits he did not attempt contact with C.M. immediately upon

returning home in October, waiting until February 2019. N.T. 7/17/2019 at 113-14. Father

and A.S. testified he has some physical limitations due to his hip injury, but he provides

care and support for all of their children. N.T. 6/10/2019 at 25, 100; N.T. 7/17/2019 at

123, 127-28, 144-49.

Father further testified he received photos and learned about C.M.’s activities

through his aunt who was in contact with Mother, and he wanted to begin seeing C.M.

gradually, amenable to a supervised setting. N.T. 7/17/2019 at 71-72, 115, 118-19.

Following his receipt of the conciliator’s April 3, 2019 report, Father began researching

options for reconciliation or reunification therapy with C.M., and made arrangements for

a VA program to subsidize a private therapy provider at no cost to Father or Mother. N.T.

6/10/2019 at 76-81. Father then received Grandparents’ petition to terminate his parental

rights in mid-April, and the therapy never began. N.T. 6/10/2019 at 11; N.T. 7/17/2019 at

[J-30-2021] - 7 97. Father agreed he had not been a father to C.M. in 2017 and 2018, and she had no

bond with him.3 N.T. 6/10/2019 at 109; N.T. 7/17/2019 at 143.

The orphans’ court believed “[t]he first factual question requiring resolution is

whether the birth father, for a period of more than six months, has failed or refused to

perform parental duties[,]” and — noting Father took no steps through legal channels to

seek custody or visitation of C.M. in 2016, 2017, or 2018 despite having done so

successfully, without the aid of an attorney, for his older two children — concluded Father

failed and refused to parent C.M. for a period of over two years. Orphans’ Court Opinion,

9/26/2019, at 2-5.

The orphans’ court then considered Father’s explanation for his failure to parent

his child, while noting settled jurisprudence requires a parent to affirmatively perform

parental duties and exercise reasonable firmness in the face of obstacles to maintaining

a place of importance in a child’s life. Id. at 2, 5-10, citing, inter alia, Matter of Adoption

of Charles E.D.M., II, 708 A.2d 88, 92 (Pa. 1998) (if evidence establishes failure to

perform parental duties or settled purpose of relinquishing parental rights, the court must

consider (1) the parent’s explanation for his or her conduct; (2) the post-abandonment

contact between parent and child; and (3) the effect of termination of parental rights on

the child pursuant to Section 2511(b)); In re Orwick’s Adoption, 347 A.2d 677, 680-81

(Pa. 1975) (evaluating totality of the circumstances, noncustodial parent’s four attempts

to contact child through the mail in the 22 months before the hearing did not demonstrate

reasonable firmness). The court found “[a]lthough birth mother, through her rejection of

his requests, contributed to his lack of contact with the child, birth father in this case made

no serious and sustained effort to create and maintain a relationship with the child or to

3 Father also objected to Mother’s voluntary relinquishment of her parental rights. N.T. 7/17/2019 at 202-03.

[J-30-2021] - 8 provide support to her in any way for a period of more than two years.” Id. at 8. The court

further observed,

[i]t is true that birth mother decided that she did not wish to continue a relationship with birth father and that after six or seven visits in 2016, she decided that she did not wish her child to have visits with the birth father. It is true that she did not answer all of his phone calls and communicated to him that she did not need his help and did not consider him to be acting as a father to her daughter, and that she did not desire any further communication from him. Nevertheless, birth father testified that he only tried to call her on two occasions in 2016 and 2017. He made no other efforts whatsoever to see or support his child. Even though he had successfully filed a petition as a self-represented litigant seeking visits with his two older children, and thus knew how to file such a complaint, he took no such action to file a custody complaint with respect to this child until she was over three years old in February of 2019. While mother was not cooperative with father and did not make it easy for him to see this child, this court simply cannot conclude that two phone calls in over two years constitute a diligent effort to act as a father.

Id. at 9-10. The orphans’ court thus determined Father did not exercise reasonable

firmness to establish a relationship with C.M. and there was no post-abandonment

contact with the child for the court to consider. The court further concluded clear and

convincing evidence demonstrated grounds to terminate his parental rights pursuant to

Subsection 2511(a)(1) of the Act. Id.

Addressing Father’s argument the proposed adoption was a contrived effort to

deprive him of his parental rights, the orphans’ court found the testimony of Mother and

Grandfather credible regarding their reasons for seeking the adoption, i.e., in light of

Mother’s diagnoses “which are debilitating and may prove fatal[,]” the proposed adoption

would provide C.M. with the stability of being raised by family members who have cared

for C.M. since birth. Id. at 10. Citing Father’s testimony admitting he shared no parental

bond with C.M., the court further determined C.M. would suffer no detriment as a result

of the termination of Father’s rights, and the proposed adoption arrangement would best

[J-30-2021] - 9 meet C.M.’s needs and welfare “under the unusual circumstances” of Mother’s medical

condition and voluntary relinquishment of her own rights to allow the adoption to proceed,

thereby meeting the Act’s additional requirements under Subsection 2511(b). Orphans’

Court Opinion, 10/31/2019, at 3 (opinion pursuant to Pa.R.A.P. 1925(a)); Orphans’ Court

Opinion, 9/26/2019, at 12, 13; see 23 Pa.C.S. §2511(b) (court “shall give primary

consideration to the developmental, physical and emotional needs and welfare of the

child”). By separate decrees issued September 27, 2019, the orphans’ court terminated

the parental rights of Father and Mother.

Father appealed, and in the pertinent part of his Rule 1925(a) statement of errors,

he generally challenged the sufficiency and weight of the evidence relied on to terminate

his parental rights pursuant to 23 Pa.C.S. §§2511(a)(1) and (b).4 See Concise Statement

of Errors Complained of on Appeal at ¶¶2, 3, 6. Father rephrased his statement of the

issues in his brief to the Superior Court, still challenging the sufficiency of the evidence

supporting the termination of his parental rights pursuant to Subsections 2511(a)(1) and

(b), but also arguing the termination did not promote the Adoption Act’s purpose or intent

as provided in this Court’s decision in M.R.D., which, according to Father, required the

proposed adoption to create a “new family unit” that was not evident in this case given

4 Specifically, Father claimed: “[t]he trial court committed an error of law and/or abused

its discretion by finding that Petitioners proved by clear and convincing evidence that termination of Respondent/Appellant’s parental rights was warranted pursuant to 23 Pa.C.S. §2511(a)(1)[;]” “[t]he trial court committed an error of law and/or abused its discretion by finding that C.M.’s developmental, physical and emotional needs and welfare are best served by terminating Respondent/Appellant’s parental rights, pursuant to 23 Pa.C.S. §2511(b)[;]” and “[t]he trial court abused its discretion by drawing unreasonable conclusions based on the record and/or failing to give appropriate weight or analysis to the evidence and testimony presented.” Concise Statement of Errors Complained of on Appeal at ¶¶2, 3, 6.

[J-30-2021] - 10 mother’s uninterrupted parental role despite the relinquishment of her rights. See

Appellant’s Brief to the Superior Court at i, 2, 21-25. Grandparents, Mother, and Child’s

counsel each echoed the orphans’ court’s analysis, arguing Father’s lack of effort since

2016, his minimal attempted phone calls, his lack of contact with the child during the six

months preceding the filing of the termination petition, his failure to pursue custody

sooner, and his own admission he had not been a father to C.M. despite caring for his

other children constituted a statutory failure of parental duty and did not demonstrate

reasonable firmness to maintain a place of importance in C.M.’s life. In addition, they

argued C.M. would not be harmed by the termination of Father’s rights because she had

no bond with him, and the adoption by Grandparents was in her best interests due to their

ability and desire to continue to provide an established, safe, and loving home for C.M. in

the event Mother is unable to care for her. See Appellee-Grandparents Brief to the

Superior Court at 7-9, 11-13; Appellee-Mother’s Brief to the Superior Court at 15-18, 20-

24, 26-29; Child’s Counsel’s Brief to the Superior Court at 12-15, 18-20.5

5 Following the submission of briefs to the Superior Court, the scheduled oral argument

session was canceled due to court closures resulting from the COVID-19 pandemic. Father requested a continuance to reschedule the argument rather than submit the case on briefs. See 3060 EDA 2019, Father’s Application for Continuance of Oral Argument. Each of the appellees objected to the request, averring all parties had fully briefed the issue, the issue was not novel or unusual, the applicable legal principles are well-settled, and the child’s need for resolution of the matter outweighed any benefit of further argument. See 3060 EDA 2019, Mother’s Answer to Application for Continuance at 2- (“All parties submitted full, substantial, and carefully argued positions and made abundantly clear . . . the legal assertions of each party[;]” the matter “does not raise any novel or unusual issues, is quite similar to other parental termination matters, [and] includes only arguments by parties which have been raised similarly and addressed by this [c]ourt hundreds of times[.]”), Child’s Counsel’s Answer to Application for Continuance at 2-3 (“It is not in the best interest for the child for there to be any further delay in this matter.”), Grandparents’ Letter in Lieu of Answer (joining Mother’s and Child’s Counsel’s Answers). The Superior Court denied Father’s request and proceeded on briefs. See 3060 EDA 2019, Order dated 4/17/2020.

[J-30-2021] - 11 In an unpublished opinion, a divided panel of the Superior Court vacated the order

terminating Father’s parental rights. In re Adoption of C.M., 3060 EDA 2019, 2020 WL

5269235 (Pa. Super., Sept. 3, 2020) (unpublished memorandum). The panel majority did

not address Father’s claim the evidence was insufficient to support the involuntary

termination of his parental rights, but instead viewed his argument that the termination

did not promote the legislative intent of the Adoption Act as implicating a preliminary

question of whether a valid proposed adoption was before the orphans’ court. Id. at *4.

The majority regarded the case as “an unrestrained custody dispute that belongs in family

court,” and opined the termination of Father’s parental rights to effect the proposed

adoption arrangement was contrary to public policy as articulated in M.R.D. Id. at *1, *5

n.7.

The majority explained M.R.D. involved a similar issue, i.e., the involuntary

termination of a father’s parental rights to allow the maternal grandfather to adopt the

grandchildren he helped to raise, except the unmarried mother in that case sought to

retain her own parental rights. Id. at *6. The M.R.D. Court reversed the termination of

father’s parental rights, reasoning, in part, “‘[t]he purpose behind the termination or

relinquishment of an existing parent’s rights prior to an adoption is to facilitate a new

parent-child relationship between the child and the adoptive parent, and to protect the

integrity and stability of the new family unit’” and, “‘[t]hus, where no new parent-child

relationship is contemplated, the involuntary termination of parental rights is not permitted

under the Adoption Act.’” Id. at *7 (emphasis omitted), quoting M.R.D., 145 A.3d at 1120,

1127-28. The M.R.D. Court additionally commented that permitting the grandfather to

adopt and co-parent children as a legal parent along with mother would “open the door

[J-30-2021] - 12 for misuse of adoption proceedings by spiteful parents as a means to involuntarily

terminate the rights of unwanted parents[,]” and, “[g]iven that the complete and

irrevocable termination of parental rights is one of the most serious and severe steps a

court can take, we must ensure that we do not open the floodgates to such

gamesmanship.” Id., quoting M.R.D., 145 A.3d at 1129. Relying on these statements

from the majority opinion in M.R.D., and noting the orphans’ court specifically endorsed

the credibility of Mother’s and Grandfather’s testimony — which indicated Mother’s

parental role would not change as a result of the adoption, and Mother did not consider

attempting to terminate Father’s parental rights until he attempted to enforce them — the

panel majority concluded the termination of Father’s rights in anticipation of adoption by

C.M.’s grandparents was against public policy pursuant to M.R.D., both because it was

gamesmanship triggered by Father’s custody claim to exclude Father if Mother’s health

falters, and because the proposed adoption would not create a new family unit or new

parent-child relationship. Id. at *5-8, *8 n.9.

Judge Pellegrini dissented, viewing the majority’s opinion as improperly adding a

public policy requirement to the Adoption Act, specifically, that the proposed adoption

must form a “new family unit,” where no such requirement appears in the text of the

statute. Id. at *9, *11, *12 (Pellegrini, J., dissenting). The dissent distinguished M.R.D.,

observing the discrete issue in that case was whether the mother could be excused from

the Act’s requirement that her parental rights be terminated in order to free the children

for adoption. The dissent noted the M.R.D. Court recognized mother had to show the

circumstances met the “cause” exception to the Act’s requirements pursuant to Section

2901 in order to avoid relinquishing her own parental rights, and the Court determined

[J-30-2021] - 13 cause was not shown. Id. at *11; see 23 Pa.C.S. §2901 (“Unless the court for cause

shown determines otherwise, no decree of adoption shall be entered unless the natural

parent or parents’ rights have been terminated . . . and all other legal requirements have

been met.”). Because Mother relinquished her parental rights in this case, the dissent

reasoned there was no such defect in the proposed adoption requiring a cause analysis,

and considered the majority’s requirement of a “new family unit” as improper where the

statutory criteria are explicitly met and the adoption petitioners were otherwise entitled to

proceed. Id. at *12. In addition, noting the orphans’ court in the present case found

Mother’s and Grandfather’s reasons for pursuing the adoption to be credible, but found

Father not credible, the dissent viewed the majority’s analysis as disturbing the lower

court’s credibility determinations and factual findings in contravention of an appellate

court’s standard of review, and would have deferred to the orphans’ court’s findings that

the statutory grounds for involuntarily terminating Father’s parental rights were met. Id.

at *13-15.6

We granted the petition for allowance of appeal filed by Mother and Grandparents

(together, appellants) to consider the propriety of the Superior Court’s decision, and

specifically to consider whether the panel majority misapplied the holding of M.R.D., or

improperly disturbed the factual and credibility findings of the orphans’ court to discern

the proposed adoption was custody gamesmanship. In re Adoption of C.M., 243 A.3d

970 (Pa. 2021) (per curiam).

II. Arguments

6 Grandparents, Mother, and Child’s Counsel each filed an application for reargument

before an en banc panel, which the Superior Court denied. See 3060 EDA 2019, Order dated 10/14/2020 (per curiam).

[J-30-2021] - 14 Appellants argue M.R.D. involved only “‘whether a parent and a grandparent . . .

may establish cause under Section 2901 [of the Adoption Act] to waive the requirement

that the parent relinquish her parental rights when the grandparent seeks to adopt that

parent's children — his grandchildren[,]’” whereas here, there is no request for good-

cause relief because Mother voluntarily relinquished her rights and all of the Act’s other

requirements are met. Appellants’ Brief at 22-23 (ellipses added), quoting M.R.D., 145

A.3d at 1127. Further distinguishing their case from M.R.D., in which the Court

considered the confusing relationships resulting from the proposed adoption in its refusal

to apply the cause exception, appellants argue, here, Grandparents are in a lateral marital

relationship, and the adoption does form a new family unit — that is, Mother and Father

would no longer have legal ties to the child, and Grandparents become the new legal

parents with all the parental rights and obligations that entails. Id. at 24-25, 36-40, citing

In re B.E., 377 A.2d 153, 156 (Pa. 1977) (“Termination of parental rights permits the child

and the adoptive parent or parents to establish a new parent-child relationship through

adoption.”) (emphasis added by appellants). They contend the panel majority’s

determination below that a new family unit is required by the public policy of the Adoption

Act, and was not demonstrated through the proposed adoption by Grandparents in this

case, created a new standard that is not part of the statute, is contrary to the Act’s

pronouncement that “‘[a]ny individual may become an adoptive parent[,]’” and constructs

a public policy that prevents permanency and stability for children who are already being

cared for by their prospective adopters when parental rights are terminated or

relinquished, simply because there would be no new family roles formed. Id. at 16

(brackets added), quoting 23 Pa.C.S. §2312; id. at 51. In appellants’ view, the panel

[J-30-2021] - 15 majority incorrectly determined custody law should apply to this matter, as their petitions

sought a termination of parental rights, not custody, and they were therefore entitled to

judgment on the grounds established by the Adoption Act, not the custody statute. Id. at

40-44. Appellants further assert the panel majority “improperly ignored and totally

disregarded and disturbed the credibility findings of the [t]rial [c]ourt that this adoption was

sought for a proper purpose and would promote the child’s needs and welfare, all of which

is contrary to and beyond the bounds of traditional and longstanding appellate review

standards.” Id. at 45. Reiterating the orphans’ court’s findings supporting the grounds

for termination under the Act’s Subsections 2511(a)(1) and (b) — specifically: Father

failed to perform parental duties for over two years, Father’s explanation was “inadequate

and inconsistent[,]” there was no bond between child and Father, the child’s needs and

welfare were already met by Grandparents and would continue to be met by the adoption,

the proposed adoption appropriately provided stability for C.M. given Mother’s medical

conditions, and that Mother and Grandfather were “credible regarding their reasons for

seeking to have the grandparents adopt this child” — appellants argue the Superior Court

was required to accept these determinations but the panel majority improperly

disregarded them in support of Father’s claim the adoption was contrived and

inappropriate without addressing the merits of his appeal. Id. at 45-49 (appellants’

emphasis removed), quoting Orphans’ Court Opinion, 9/26/2019, at 6, 11.

Child’s counsel advances substantially similar arguments on behalf of C.M.,

agreeing with appellants that the orphan’s court specifically and deliberately considered,

addressed, and rejected Father’s claim the adoption was contrived or pretextual based

upon the evidence, and further arguing the panel majority’s reversal of that determination

[J-30-2021] - 16 supplants its own interpretation of the significance of Father’s custody filing after his

lengthy absence, reflecting a departure from judicial standards and undermining the trial

court’s role as factfinder. Child’s Counsel’s Brief at 16. Child’s counsel asserts the

panel’s holding sets a problematic precedent which would prevent grandparents or other

kinship caregivers from adopting the children in their care if a natural parent whose rights

are terminated or relinquished remains involved, impacting not only cases like C.M.’s, but

also the myriad of cases involving children whose parents are afflicted by other

incapacities such as parental substance abuse, mental illness, incarceration, or domestic

violence, or which result from child abuse or neglect. Id. at 17-19.

In response, Father acknowledges the ultimate legal issue addressed in M.R.D.

involved the Adoption Act’s cause exception which is not invoked in this case due to

Mother’s voluntary relinquishment; however, he argues there is otherwise no

considerable factual difference due to Mother’s admission her maternal role will not

change as a result of her forfeiture of parental rights. Appellee’s Brief at 10. He

characterizes this case as the next step in an evolution of cases striking down one

parent’s efforts to evade custody court and dispose of unwanted involvement by the other

parent. Specifically, Father points to B.E., where an unmarried mother petitioned to

terminate the father’s rights with no proposed adoption pending, and M.R.D., where an

unmarried mother petitioned to terminate the father’s rights, while retaining her own, with

maternal grandfather as the proposed adoptive co-parent; in both cases, this Court

rejected the petitioning parent’s attempts, and Father requests we likewise “rebuff

Mother’s attempt to terminate his parental rights in retaliation for his pursuit of custody

and in promotion of an adoption which fails to create any new familial roles or

[J-30-2021] - 17 relationships.” Id. at 11-13, citing B.E., 377 A.2d at 154-56 (termination of parental rights

not permitted where no adoption was pending; purpose of involuntary termination

provisions of Adoption Act “is not to punish an ineffective or negligent parent”); M.R.D.,

145 A.3d at 1118, 1129-30 (upholding principles from B.E.; termination of parental rights

not permitted where contemplated adoption did not create new family unit). Noting the

panel’s reliance on M.R.D.’s warning against custody gamesmanship, Father argues such

gamesmanship is evident here, where Father not only filed a custody complaint but fully

participated in the court’s requirements, and Mother’s testimony confirmed it was not until

he asserted the custody claim that she considered the termination of his parental rights.

Id. at 12-13, citing M.R.D. 145 A.3d at 1129. Recognizing his parental rights are

fundamental rights, Father contends the Adoption Act is being used against its purpose

here, not for the best interests of C.M., but to punish him for not being a model parent,

and to reward Mother for alienating him. Id. at 14.

Furthermore, Father asserts the custody gamesmanship he and the panel majority

describe would have been thwarted had the orphans’ court not erred by concluding there

was clear and convincing evidence to terminate Father’s parental rights pursuant to

Subsection 2511(a)(1) of the Act, which he raised in his appeal below and the Superior

Court did not address. He thus argues, even if this Court decides the panel majority erred

in its application of M.R.D., the evidence did not support the termination of his parental

rights because the orphans’ court did not properly consider the obstacles he faced, or his

initiation and active participation in custody proceedings as post-abandonment contact.

Id. at 16-17. He indicates, while the orphans’ court may assess the entire history of a

case, the most critical period, by statute, is the six months immediately preceding the

[J-30-2021] - 18 filing of the termination petition — during which time his attempts to enforce his parental

rights had never been more assertive — yet the court focused on his conduct outside of

that period. Id. at 17-18, citing In re D.J.S., 737 A.2d 283, 286 (Pa. Super. 1999) (“[I]t is

the six months immediately preceding the filing of the petition that is most critical to [the

court’s] analysis” under Subsection 2511(a)(1)). Father argues the orphans’ court did not

properly consider Mother’s intentional obstruction of his relationship with C.M. Id. at 19-

23, citing, inter alia, In re B., N.M., 856 A.2d 847, 855-56 (Pa. Super. 2004), appeal

denied, 856 A.2d 847 (Pa. 2005) (per curiam) (“Where a non-custodial parent is facing

termination of his or her parental rights, the court must consider the non-custodial parent’s

explanation . . . including situations in which a custodial parent has deliberately created

obstacles and has by devious means erected barriers intended to impede free

communication and regular association between the non-custodial parent and his or her

child.”); In re E.S.M., 622 A.2d 388, 393 (Pa. Super. 1993) (“[I]f the failure to perform

parental duties is the result of obstructive tactics, such failure is excused[;] to obtain the

benefit to that excuse, a parent must exhibit reasonable firmness in attempting to

overcome the obstructive behavior.”) (citations and quotations omitted).

Father further argues his actions and delay in filing for custody “may not be

commendable, [but] were reasonable given his circumstances, particularly in light of

Mother’s resolve to keep Father out of the child’s life[,]” as well as his incarceration,

hospitalization, inability to have visits with minors at his transitional housing program, and

limited income of VA benefits and military disability. Id. at 23-25, citing In re Adoption of

C.M.W., 603 A.2d 622, 626 (Pa. Super. 1992) (court “cannot sanction termination of the

rights of imperfect parents” absent “clear intent to relinquish his rights[;]” court cannot

[J-30-2021] - 19 permit such intrusion into the child’s rights, including “the right to know her father with all

his flaws”) (internal citation, quotation, and brackets omitted). Finally, Father argues, if

his active pursuit of custody is considered to be insufficient effort, this will encourage

alienated parents to force themselves into their children’s lives using more distasteful

methods, e.g., initiating a “custody grab” from school or daycare without the other parent’s

knowledge. Id. at 27.

III. Analysis

A parent’s right to make decisions concerning the care, custody, and control of his

or her children is among the oldest of fundamental rights. In re D.C.D., 105 A.3d 662,

667 (Pa. 2014); Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57, 65 (2000), citing, inter alia, Meyer v.

Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 399, 401 (1923) (“liberty” protected by Due Process Clause

includes right of parents to “establish a home and bring up children” and “to control the

education of their own”). The time-tested law of the Commonwealth requires that we

balance this intrinsic parental interest within the context of a child’s essential needs for a

parent’s care, protection, and support. See, e.g., In re T.S.M., 71 A.3d 251, 271 (Pa.

2013) (children’s needs and welfare necessitated termination of parental rights despite

strong but damaging bonds). We readily comprehend the significant gravity of a

termination of parental rights, which has far-reaching and intentionally irreversible

consequences for the parents and the child. See In re P.G.F., 247 A.3d 955, 963 (Pa.

2021); B.E., 377 A.2d at 155-56 (purpose of termination of parental rights is to allow for

adoption); see also T.S.M., 71 A.3d at 268 (termination of parental rights creates legal

orphans). For these reasons, the burden of proof is upon the party seeking termination

to establish by “clear and convincing” evidence the existence of the statutory grounds for

[J-30-2021] - 20 doing so. Matter of Adoption of G.T.M., 483 A.2d 1355, 1356 (Pa. 1984); In re T.R., 465

A.2d 642, 642-43 (Pa. 1983) (applying the standard articulated in Santosky v. Kramer,

455 U.S. 745 (1982)). “[C]lear and convincing evidence is defined as testimony that is so

‘clear, direct, weighty, and convincing as to enable the trier of fact to come to a clear

conviction, without hesitance, of the truth of the precise facts in issue.’” Charles E.D.M.,

708 A.2d at 91, quoting Adoption of Atencio, 650 A.2d 1064, 1066 (Pa. 1994). Because

of this serious impact attending the termination of parental rights, “‘it is important that a

judicial decree extinguishing such rights be based solely on competent evidence.’” In re

A.J.R.-H., 188 A.3d 1157, 1171 (Pa. 2018), quoting In re Sanders Children, 312 A.2d 414,

417 (Pa. 1973).

In cases concerning the involuntary termination of parental rights, appellate review

is limited to a determination of whether the decree of the termination court is supported

by competent evidence. See In re Adoption of L.J.B., 18 A.3d 1098, 1107 (Pa. 2016)

(Opinion Announcing the Judgment of the Court), citing Adoption of B.D.S., 431 A.2d 203,

207 (Pa. 1981). This standard of review corresponds to the standard employed in

dependency cases, and requires appellate courts to accept the findings of fact and

credibility determinations of the trial court if they are supported by the record, but it does

not require the appellate court to accept the lower court’s inferences or conclusions of

law. See In re Adoption of S.P., 47 A.3d 817, 826 (Pa. 2012); In re R.J.T., 9 A.3d 1179,

1190 (Pa. 2010). That is, if the factual findings are supported, we must determine whether

the trial court made an error of law or abused its discretion. See S.P., 47 A.3d at 826.

An abuse of discretion does not result merely because the reviewing court might have

reached a different conclusion; we reverse for an abuse of discretion “only upon

[J-30-2021] - 21 demonstration of manifest unreasonableness, partiality, prejudice, bias, or ill will.” Id.

Thus, absent an abuse of discretion, an error of law, or insufficient evidentiary support for

the trial court’s decision, the decree must stand. See id. at 821; Atencio, 650 A.2d at

1066. “We have previously emphasized our deference to trial courts that often have first-

hand observations of the parties spanning multiple hearings.” T.S.M., 71 A.3d at 267.

However, “[w]e must employ a broad, comprehensive review of the record in order to

determine whether the trial court’s decision is supported by competent evidence.” S.P.,

47 A.3d at 821 (internal citation and quotation omitted).

Subsections 2511(a) and (b) of the Adoption Act set forth the grounds a petitioner

must prove in order for the court to grant an involuntary termination of parental rights.

See 23 Pa.C.S. §2511. Subsection (a) provides eleven enumerated grounds describing

particular conduct of a parent which would warrant involuntary termination including, as

is relevant herein, the requisite criteria for establishing parental abandonment pursuant

to Subsection 2511(a)(1). Id. §2511(a). If the trial court finds clear and convincing

evidence supporting the existence of one of the grounds for termination set forth in

Subsection 2511(a), the court must then consider whether termination would best serve

“the developmental, physical and emotional needs and welfare of the child” under

Subsection 2511(b). Id. §2511(b); M.R.D., 145 A.3d at 1120. Section 2512 sets forth the

parties who may file a petition for involuntary termination, including, inter alia, a parent,

an individual standing in loco parentis, or an agency. Id. §2512(a). Where a parent or

other individual — as opposed to an agency — petitions to terminate the rights of the

[J-30-2021] - 22 child’s parent, the petitioner must demonstrate an adoption of the child is anticipated. 7

See M.R.D., 145 A.3d at 1120; L.J.B., 18 A.3d at 1107; B.E., 377 A.2d at 155.

With these settled principles in mind, we turn to the issues presented in the matter

before the Court.

A. M.R.D.8

As the parties and the opinions of the panel below describe, this Court’s decision

in M.R.D. reversed the involuntary termination of a father’s parental rights on the basis

the proposed adoption it would facilitate was not a valid one where the unmarried mother

petitioning for the termination sought to retain her parental rights and the prospective

adoptive parent was the children’s maternal grandfather, i.e., the mother’s father, who

regularly shared parental duties. See M.R.D., 145 A.3d at 1118. In accordance with the

7 Effective December 28, 2020, the General Assembly amended the Adoption Act to

provide an additional exception to this rule, not relevant to the present case, which applies when the petitioner is a parent and the child is conceived as a result of rape or incest. See 23 Pa.C.S. §§2512(b)(3), 2514. 8 Initially we note, as explained supra, the statement of errors filed by Father pursuant to

Pa.R.A.P. 1925(a)(2) did not reference this Court’s decision in M.R.D. or claim the proposed adoption would not facilitate the creation of a new family unit. Because the orphans’ court lacked the opportunity to fairly consider this argument in light of the evidence before it, the specific argument might properly be deemed waived. See Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b)(4)(ii) (Statement shall identify each error appellant intends to assert “with sufficient detail to identify the issue to be raised for the judge”), (vii) (issues not included in the Statement are waived); see, e.g., M.G. v. L.D., 155 A.3d 1083, 1092 (Pa. Super. 2017) (same), appeal denied, 169 A.3d 522 (Pa. 2017) (per curiam). However, because the Superior Court, sua sponte, decided only this issue in its reversal of the orphan’s court decision, the issue presents a legal question which does not require further factual development, and the issue is now fully and adequately briefed before this Court as a result of our grant of allocatur, we address the panel majority’s application of M.R.D. in this posture in the interest of expedient clarification of a substantially important issue impacting children awaiting permanency across the Commonwealth.

[J-30-2021] - 23 Adoption Act and settled jurisprudence, the M.R.D. Court observed a parent seeking to

terminate the rights of another parent must demonstrate a valid adoption is anticipated

for the termination petition to be cognizable, and must strictly comply with all pertinent

provisions of the Act in order for the adoption to be valid. See id. at 1120, citing B.E., 377

A.2d at 155, In re Adoption of R.B.F., 803 A.2d 1195, 1199 (Pa. 2002), and 23 Pa.C.S.

§2512. Further, the Act requires the petitioning parent to consent to the adoption and

relinquish his or her rights, unless the prospective adopter is the petitioning parent’s

spouse. See id. at 1120-21, citing 23 Pa.C.S. §§2711, 2903. Where a petitioner does

not strictly comply with the Act’s requirements but demonstrates cause for

noncompliance, the trial court typically has the discretion to enter an adoption decree,

pursuant to Section 2901 of the Act. See id. at 1121, citing 23 Pa.C.S. §2901 (“Unless

the court for cause shown determines otherwise, no decree of adoption shall be entered

unless the natural parent or parents’ rights have been terminated . . . and all other legal

requirements have been met.”); R.B.F., 803 A.2d at 1201-02. Because the mother in

M.R.D. wished to be excused from strict compliance with the Act’s requirement she

terminate her own rights to allow the adoption, and the prospective adopter — her own

father — was not (and could not be) her spouse, the sole issue before the Court was

whether such a proposed adoption could constitute “cause shown” under Section 2901.

See id. at 1123, 1127. Despite the orphans’ court’s specific determination that the

proposed adoption of M.R.D. was legitimate and in the children’s best interests, we held

Section 2901 cause could not be shown in such an instance and, therefore, the proposed

adoption was not valid, which precluded involuntary termination of the father’s parental

rights. See id. at 1130. In addition to the host of unique legal and practical complications

[J-30-2021] - 24 arising from the situation in M.R.D., we reasoned the purpose of the termination or

relinquishment of parental rights requirement is to “‘establish a new parent-child

relationship through adoption’” and to “protect ‘the integrity and stability of the new family

unit[,]”’ and we further explained the new, single, family “unit” was one family involving a

horizontal relationship between two parents and freed from the legal encumbrances of

the former legal family, which was not the case where the prospective adopter-

grandfather would continue to share a separate family unit, with all its appurtenant legal

ramifications, with the children’s mother through their separate vertical parent-child

relationship. See id. at 1128-29, quoting respectively, B.E., 377 A.2d at 156, Adoption of

J.D.S., 763 A.2d 867, 871 (Pa. Super. 2000).

Specifically anticipating a situation such as the one now before us, the M.R.D.

Court stated, “[i]f Mother had desired to relinquish her rights to Children, and

assuming arguendo that an adoption by Grandfather and the termination of Father’s

parental rights were in Children’s best interests, Grandfather would be permitted to

adopt Children, and termination of Father’s parental rights would have been

proper, ending our inquiry.” Id. at 1126 (emphasis added). In addition, as keenly

observed by then-Justice, now Chief Justice Baer in his concurrence, the test requiring a

“new family unit” employs “language [ ] not present in Section 2901 or any other provision

in the Adoption Act.” Id. at 1131 (Baer, J., concurring). Furthermore, as we recently

explained in In re Adoption of K.M.G., “[i]t is inappropriate and, indeed, unwise for this

Court to engage in the judicial creation of what amounts to new statutory duties[;]” and

“we must not ‘add, by interpretation, a requirement not included by the General

Assembly.’” 240 A.3d 1218, 1237 (Pa. 2020), quoting Commonwealth v. Giulian, 141

[J-30-2021] - 25 A.3d 1262, 1268 (Pa. 2016). Accordingly, we agree with appellants’ contention the

Superior Court majority erred in its application of M.R.D. Although the new legal parent-

child relationship that would be created through the proposed adoption of C.M. by her

grandparents, despite the anticipated continuing role of Mother insofar as she is able,

appears to meet the parameters of a single new family unit as set forth in M.R.D. —

indeed, it reflects one of the most relied-upon permanency options for children cared for

by kin when parents are incapacitated or unavailable — an assessment for such a

component was not relevant here, where Mother voluntarily relinquished her parental

rights, the proposed adoption would strictly adhere to the provisions of the Adoption Act,

and no cause analysis under Section 2901 is implicated. The Superior Court’s scrutiny

of the prospective post-adoption family unit for adequate “newness” was therefore

erroneous here.

Having determined the panel below improperly applied the M.R.D. cause analysis

principles in this case, we now consider its invocation of M.R.D.’s admonition against

gamesmanship. Commenting on the broader foreseeable consequence of allowing the

maternal grandfather in M.R.D. to adopt and become the legal parent of his grandchildren

while his daughter retained her legal parental rights and obligations — when the Adoption

Act anticipates a parent’s retention of her rights only in an adoption by a spouse — we

observed such an exception to the Act’s provisions would

open the door for misuse of adoption proceedings by spiteful parents as a means to involuntarily terminate the rights of unwanted parents, potentially allowing . . . a litany of other individuals who have a close relationship with a child to stand in as prospective adoptive parents so that termination may be achieved. Given that the complete and irrevocable termination of parental rights is one of the most serious and severe steps a court can take, we must ensure that we do not open the floodgates to such gamesmanship.

[J-30-2021] - 26 M.R.D., 145 A.3d at 1129 (internal citations and quotations omitted). The

“gamesmanship” of potentially any third party standing in as an adoptive parent, as

forecast in M.R.D., is perhaps a more nuanced quagmire than the retributive filing of a

termination of parental rights petition described by Father and the panel majority in the

present case, but we recognize the danger of approving such petitions filed in the midst

of acrimonious custody battles or in short sequence after a non-custodial parent files a

complaint in custody, as was the case in M.R.D. though it was not then an issue before

the Court. See id. at 1118; id. at 1134-35 (Wecht, J., concurring) (proposed adoption

“lacked the required integrity, inasmuch as it appears to have been initiated merely to

stave off and defeat Father’s claim for custody[;]” custody court has “robust discretionary

authority” to limit or curtail a parent’s custody rights “without resort to the draconian

remedy of termination of parental rights under the adoption laws”); see also L.J.B., 18

A.3d at 1110 (Opinion Announcing the Judgment of the Court) (termination petition filed

by parent absent stepparent adoption would provide parents with “a new, and in our view

dangerous, tactic in heated custody disputes”).

Nevertheless, to the extent the panel majority relied upon aspects of the record not

addressed by the orphans’ court to conclude the termination and adoption petitions

constituted reversible custody gamesmanship — in contravention of the orphans’ court’s

specific determination that credible testimony demonstrated the proposed adoption was

not contrived, and without further analysis — it did so in error.9 See S.P., 47 A.3d at

9 However, we also note, to the extent the orphan’s court made particular credibility

determinations, they related only to Mother’s and Grandfather’s (credible) testimony “regarding their reasons for seeking to have the grandparents adopt[,]” and Father’s (not credible) testimony “that he understood birth mother to question his paternity.” Orphans’

[J-30-2021] - 27 826-27 (“[E]ven where the facts could support an opposite result, as is often the case in

dependency and termination cases, an appellate court must resist the urge to second

guess the trial court and impose its own credibility determinations and judgment; instead

we must defer to the trial judges so long as the factual findings are supported by the

record and the court’s legal conclusions are not the result of an error of law or an abuse

of discretion.”); Adoption of S.H., 383 A.2d 529, 532 & n.2 (Pa. 1978) (task of the orphans’

court is to resolve conflicting testimony of witnesses; appellate court may not reweigh the

credibility of witnesses).

We acknowledge the solemn reality that a decree terminating parental rights is

widely regarded as the civil law equivalent to the death penalty, forever obliterating the

fundamental legal relationships between parent and child. See, e.g., Kimock v. Jones,

47 A.3d 850, 855 (Pa. Super. 2012) (“termination of parental rights for all practical

purposes ends the parent/child relationship as unequivocally as the death of the child”)

(emphasis omitted); Administrative Office of Pennsylvania Court’s Office of Children and

Families in the Courts, Pennsylvania Dependency Benchbook, “Termination of Parental

Rights” at §17.1 (3d ed. 2019) (Termination of parental rights “has often been called the

‘death penalty’ of dependency court, because of the seriousness and finality of a

termination order severing all ties between a child and the biological parents.”). Where

simultaneously litigated custody matters conjure the specter of gamesmanship in a

termination proceeding, such a significant final decree warrants the courts’ closest

consideration of whether competent evidence clearly and convincingly proves the precise

Court Opinion, 9/26/2019, at 6, 11. Thus, the Superior Court appears to have relied upon testimony credited by the orphans’ court to reach the opposite conclusion of the orphans’ court on the specific issue for which the orphans’ court credited the testimony.

[J-30-2021] - 28 elements of the grounds at issue, in a manner “so clear, direct, weighty and convincing”

it betrays no hesitance regarding the truth of the facts in issue.10 Charles E.D.M., 708

A.2d at 91 (internal citation and quotation omitted).

In this case, Father accurately asserts he preserved his claim challenging the

sufficiency of the evidence underlying the termination of his parental rights pursuant to

Subsections 2511(a)(1) and (b) of the Adoption Act. As this issue was fully briefed and

argued by all parties before the Superior Court, but addressed only in dissent, we must

now determine whether we should remand to the Superior Court for consideration of

Father’s sufficiency claim in the first instance, or whether we should resolve it now.

We have explained, appellate review is a review of “the judgment or order before

the appellate court, rather than any particular reasoning or rationale employed by the

lower tribunal[,]” A.J.R.- H., 188 A.3d at 1176 (internal citation and quotation omitted);

therefore, this Court has discretionary authority to affirm an order of a lower court “for any

valid reason appearing from the record[,]” Ario v. Ingram Micro, Inc., 965 A.2d 1194, 1200

(2009). See also A.J.R.- H., 188 A.3d at 1176, quoting Sec. & Exch. Comm’n v. Chenery

Corp., 318 U.S. 80, 88 (1943) (“‘The reason for this rule is obvious. It would be wasteful

to send a case back to a lower court to reinstate a decision which it had already made

but which the appellate court concluded should properly be based on another ground

within the power of the appellate court to formulate.’”). Father, as appellee in this Court,

10 Moreover, given the finality that results following the termination of one’s parental rights,

and given that litigants have used termination proceedings as a strategic tactic in custody proceedings, we take this opportunity to admonish any litigant who engages in such behavior. This type of gamesmanship is intolerable. The use of these tactics should not be cultivated by counsel, and must stop. Courts should not hesitate to impose sanctions on those participating in schemes involving the improper use of termination proceedings.

[J-30-2021] - 29 was not aggrieved by the Superior Court’s judgment and was therefore not required to

file a cross-petition for allowance of appeal to protect his unaddressed sufficiency claim.

See Lebanon Valley Farmers Bank v. Commonwealth, 83 A.3d 107, 113 (Pa. 2013)

(“Protective cross-appeals by a party who received the relief requested are not favored.”).

Despite the fact that a considerable portion of Father’s present argument is devoted to

the sufficiency of the evidence underlying the termination of his parental rights, neither

the appellants nor child’s counsel submitted a reply brief providing further response to the

claim. Moreover, C.M., who was three years old at the onset of this litigation, will be

grade-school age by the filing of this decision; we are ever-mindful “[c]hildren are young

for a scant number of years, and we have an obligation to see to their healthy

development quickly.” T.S.M., 71 A.3d at 269. Given the complete record forwarded from

the court below, the very nature of this case, in which the proper legal status of a child

has swayed in the balance for over a third of her lifetime, weighs heavily in favor of a final

resolution without further delay.11 See R.R.M, 786 A.2d at 185. We therefore turn to the

merits of Father’s insufficiency claim.

B. Sufficiency of the Evidence

11 As described supra at note 5, the complete Superior Court record contains appellants’

supplementary assurances their responsive arguments to Father’s sufficiency claim were fully briefed and involved settled principles such that further argument on the issue was both unnecessary and detrimental to the child. We agree, and for this as well as the aforementioned reasons, we view the record as complete on this issue. Moreover, we are keenly aware of the gravity and time-sensitive nature of the issue, and these are significant factors in our use of the right-for-any-reason doctrine here. See supra, slip op. at 29. Notably, a decision to affirm the reversal of a termination of parental rights does not bear the same finality as a decision to affirm the termination itself, as it does not bar the filing of a future petition.

[J-30-2021] - 30 A petitioner seeking to prove grounds for termination under Subsection 2511(a)(1)

must demonstrate by competent, clear and convincing evidence, “[t]he parent by conduct

continuing for a period of at least six months immediately preceding the filing of the

petition either has evidenced a settled purpose of relinquishing parental claim to a child

or has refused or failed to perform parental duties.” 23 Pa.C.S. §2511(a)(1). 12

Though we do not adhere to any strict definition of “parental duty,” a child has a

right to essential parental care, and our jurisprudence reveals certain irreducible qualities

of a parent’s attendant obligation. Foremost, it is a positive duty requiring affirmative

performance. In re Bowman, 666 A.2d 274, 279 (Pa. 1995) (opinion in support of

reversal), quoting In re Adoption of Smith, 194 A.2d 919, 922 (Pa. 1963).

“‘[C]ommunication and association are essential to the performance of parental duty[.]’”

In re K.Z.S., 946 A.2d 753, 761 n.2 (Pa. Super. 2008), quoting In re Adoption of Faith M.,

501 A.2d 1105, 1108-09 (Pa. 1985). “‘[P]arental duty requires that a parent exert himself

to take and maintain a place of importance in the child’s life.’” In re Adoption of R.W.G.,

431 A.2d 274, 277 (Pa. 1981), quoting In re Burns, 379 A.2d 535, 540 (Pa. 1977) (internal

citations and quotation omitted). A parent must “‘exercise reasonable firmness’” in

resisting obstacles placed in the path of maintaining the parent-child relationship, or his

“‘rights may be forfeited.’” S.P., 47 A.3d at 828, quoting In re Adoption of McCray, 331

A.2d 652, 655 (Pa. 1975). “‘Parental rights are not preserved by waiting for a more

suitable or convenient time to perform one’s parental responsibilities while others provide

the child with his or her physical and emotional needs.’” In re Adoption of C.J.A., 204

12 The law does not require a settled purpose of relinquishing a parental claim and a

refusal or failure to perform parental duties, but one or the other. See In re Burns, 379 A.2d at 539 & n.7.

[J-30-2021] - 31 A.3d 496, 504 (Pa. Super. 2019), quoting B., N.M., 856 A.2d at 855; Adoption of Smith,

194 A.2d at 922.

However, even where the evidence clearly establishes a parent has failed to

perform affirmative parental duties for a period in excess of six months, the court “must

examine the individual circumstances and any explanation offered by the parent to

determine if that evidence, in light of the totality of circumstances, clearly warrants

permitting the involuntary termination [of parental rights].” Orwick, 347 A.2d at 680; see

Charles E.D.M., 708 A.2d at 92; Atencio, 650 A.2d at 1066; Bowman, 666 A.2d at 276

(opinion in support of reversal). We have consistently emphasized “the law regarding

termination of parental rights should not be applied mechanically but instead always with

an eye to the best interests and the needs and welfare of the particular children involved.”

T.S.M., 71 A.3d at 268-69; see Bowman, 666 A.2d at 276 n.2 (opinion in support of

reversal) (legislature’s use of the term “at least six months” indicates evidence of parental

conduct preceding the six-month period may be considered), see also Baby Boy A. v.

Catholic Social Services, 517 A.2d 1244, 1247 (Pa. 1986) (“Once we have determined

that the statutory grounds for involuntary termination of parental rights have been proved,

it is the child’s welfare that is paramount.”) (internal citation and quotation omitted). In

this vein, a wealth of Superior Court jurisprudence instructs trial courts deciding

Subsection 2511(a)(1) cases to consider the whole history of a given case and “not

mechanically apply the six-month statutory provision[,]” although “it is the six months

immediately preceding the filing of the petition that is most critical to the analysis.” B.,

N.M., 856 A.2d at 855; see also In re D.J.S., 737 A.2d 283, 286 (Pa. Super. 1999) (same);

C.J.A., 204 A.3d at 504 (same); In re Adoption of Hamilton, 549 A.2d 1291, 1294 (Pa.

[J-30-2021] - 32 Super. 1988) (“Pennsylvania courts have wisely refused to apply the statutory six-month

requirement mechanically.”).

In further consideration of the totality of circumstances, if competent evidence

establishes the statutory criteria under Subsection 2511(a)(1), we then require three lines

of inquiry: (1) the parent’s explanation for his or her absence; (2) the post-abandonment

contact between parent and child, including a parent’s efforts to re-establish contact; and

(3) consideration of the effect of termination of parental rights on the child pursuant to

Subsection 2511(b). See Charles E.D.M., 708 A.2d at 92 (addressing three lines of

inquiry and reversing termination of parental rights where record contained no evidence

of anticipated effect on children’s well-being), citing, inter alia, Atencio, 650 A.2d at 1066-

67 (upholding orphans’ court’s denial of termination of father’s rights where mother

refused correspondence, gifts, and phone calls from father to child, and would not permit

child to visit father along with siblings), Hamilton, 549 A.2d at 1295-96 (reversing

termination where trial court failed to consider father’s legal efforts to enforce visitation

for three years following two years of absence, and record did not suggest termination

was necessary or served child’s welfare). Unlike grounds for termination predicated on

incapacity of the parent, the focus under Subsection 2511(a)(1) is not the degree of

success a parent may have had in reaching the child, but examines whether, under the

circumstances, the parent has utilized all available resources to preserve the parent-child

relationship. See S.P., 47 A.3d at 828, 830; see also In re Z.P., 994 A.2d 1108, 1117

(Pa. Super. 2010) (“[W]hile sincere efforts to perform parental duties[ ] can preserve

parental rights under subsection [2511](a)(1), those same efforts may be insufficient to

remedy parental incapacity under subsection [2511](a)(2).”) (internal citation and

[J-30-2021] - 33 quotation omitted); In Interest of D.F., 165 A.3d 960 (Pa. Super. 2017) (same), appeal

denied, 170 A.3d 991 (Pa. 2017) (per curiam); In re D.J.Y., 408 A.2d 1387, 1390 (Pa.

1979) (“A finding of abandonment will[ ] not be predicated upon parental conduct which

is reasonably explained or which resulted from circumstances beyond the parent’s

control. It may only result when a parent has failed to utilize all available resources to

preserve the parental relationship.”) (internal citations, quotations, and ellipses omitted);

In re M.A.K., 414 A.2d 1052, 1054 (Pa. 1980) (termination not warranted where

competent evidence supported finding parent’s mental health crisis following traumatic

event caused temporary failure to perform parental duties); B.D.S., 431 A.2d at 207

(where custodial parent prevents contact, noncustodial parent’s performance must be

measured in light of what would be expected by an individual under similar circumstances

of the parent).

Furthermore, while the inquiry at every step must assess the absent parent’s

exercise of reasonable firmness to obstacles, we strenuously condemn obstructive

conduct by the noncustodial parent seeking termination. See B.D.S., 431 A.2d at 208

(“[O]bstructive behavior on the part of the custodial parent aimed at thwarting the other

parent’s maintenance of a parental relationship will not be tolerated, and certainly will not

provide a sound basis for the involuntary termination of parental rights.”); S.H., 383 A.2d

at 532-33 (where evidence showed custodial parent “consistently attempted at all times

to prevent the [non-custodial parent] from . . . exercising any parental rights[,]” the fact

parent “could conceivably have pursued legal action more promptly cannot justify

termination”). Finally, should sufficient evidence not exist to support the necessity of the

[J-30-2021] - 34 termination decree, the trial court will be deemed to have committed an abuse of

discretion, thus mandating reversal of the decree. See Atencio, 650 A.2d at 1068.

Applying these foundational tenets to the involuntary termination of Father’s

parental rights, we conclude the orphans’ court’s decree is not supported by sufficient

competent evidence. As described supra, the court found Father failed to perform any

parental duties for a period of more than six months — for a period of over two years from

October 2016 to the date of the filing of the termination petition on April 15, 2019 —

concluding “[t]wo isolated phone calls to birth mother in December of 2016 and November

of 2017 do not demonstrate that birth father exercised reasonable firmness[,]” and “[a]s a

result of father’s failure to take further action to have contact with his child, there is no

post-abandonment contact with the child for this court to consider.” Orphans’ Court

Opinion, 9/26/2019, at 8, 10. The court drew an analogy to this Court’s 1975 decision in

Orwick’s Adoption which, acknowledging the court’s obligation to consider the totality of

the circumstances, upheld the termination of the parental rights of a father whose extent

of contact with the child included only one (returned) gift, two cards, and a $50 savings

bond over the course of two years, observing the father had adequate financial means

but did not exercise reasonable firmness and failed to support or visit the child for the

twenty-two months just prior to the hearing. Id. at 9; see Orwick, 347 A.2d at 680-81.

The orphans’ court acknowledged Father’s February 19, 2019 attempted phone call to

Mother and his subsequent custody petition, but the court ultimately reasoned Father had

previously made no written follow up or legal action as a result of his two unsuccessful

phone calls in 2016 and 2017. The court thus deemed Father’s legal efforts were too

[J-30-2021] - 35 late, as he had “sat on his rights” for more than two years. Id. at 11. Our careful review

of the record and the relevant law reveals this was error.

Notably, at the time the Court decided Orwick, the relevant provision of the

Adoption Act enabled involuntary termination of parental rights where the parent’s

“conduct continuing for a period of at least six months either has evidenced a settled

purpose of relinquishing parental claim to a child, or has refused or failed to perform

parental duties[,]” and made no reference to when the six month period was to commence

or expire. Adoption Act of July 24, 1970, P.L. 620, 1 P.S. §311(1) (emphasis added).

Indeed, much of our case law has developed in response to this particular text, under

which grounds for termination exist as the result of any six-or-more-month period of

parental abdication of duty regardless of when during the child’s lifetime it occurred, and

thus necessitated the court’s consideration of a parent’s post-abandonment contact. See

Bowman, 666 A.2d at 276 n.2. (opinion in support of reversal); see generally Hamilton,

549 A.2d at 1295. The General Assembly repealed and replaced that version of the law

with the Adoption Act of October 15, 1980, P.L. 934, now codified at 23 Pa.C.S. §2511,

and in 1992, further amended the text of Subsection 2511(a)(1) to its current form,

enabling involuntary termination of rights when a parent’s “conduct continuing for a period

of at least six months immediately preceding the filing of the petition either has

evidenced a settled purpose of relinquishing parental claim to a child or has refused or

failed to perform parental duties.” 23 Pa.C.S. §2511(a)(1) (emphasis added). This last

change qualified the six-month period of abandonment by adding a specific parameter,

i.e., “immediately preceding the filing of the petition.”

[J-30-2021] - 36 The orphans’ court in this case set forth its first critical inquiry under Subsection

2511(a)(1) as “whether the birth father, for a period of more than six months, has failed

or refused to perform parental duties.” Orphans’ Court Opinion, 9/26/2019, at 2. It is

clear this was an incomplete statement of the statutory inquiry depicting the text of the

prior version of the provision, and further reflects the orphans’ court’s misguided focus on

Father’s conduct during the period he was absent, prior to the six months preceding the

petition, as well as the court’s lack of consideration for his conduct during the period

immediately preceding the petition. Appellants urge us to overlook this omission in light

of our obligation to avoid mechanical application of statutory time periods. However,

where the General Assembly proactively amends a statute and adds an express,

unambiguous qualifier to existing criteria, we cannot simply ignore it. See 1 Pa.C.S.

§1921. Consequently, though orphans’ courts assessing evidence under Subsection

2511(a)(1) should not apply the relevant six-month period mechanically — but with an

eye to the child’s best interests, see T.S.M., 71 A.3d at 268-69, while acknowledging the

purpose of the provision is not to punish an ineffective parent, see B.E., 377 A.2d at

154 — we reinforce the view that the six-month period immediately preceding the filing of

the petition is the most critical period to evaluate for affirmative conduct or its absence,

and courts must address it. See C.J.A., 204 A.3d at 504-05 (“Because the Adoption Act

require[s] the court to focus its attention on the six months immediately preceding the

filing of the petition, and because the record supports the court’s decision that Father

made substantial efforts to perform his parental duties during that time, [p]etitioners are

not entitled to relief.”).

[J-30-2021] - 37 It is crystal clear, and of vital importance in the present case, that a parent’s legal

efforts to enforce custodial rights demonstrate affirmative performance of a positive

parental duty. For example, in the Superior Court’s oft-cited opinion, Adoption of

Hamilton, a father petitioned the court for visitation following two years of inexplicable

absence, which he was granted; he further successfully petitioned to enforce visitation

when the mother did not cooperate, and when, two months later, the child’s mother filed

a petition to terminate the father’s parental rights, which was granted, he successfully

petitioned to continue visitation pending the termination matter. See Hamilton, 549 A.2d

at 1295. The Superior Court reversed the decree, viewing the records from the custody

court proceedings as evidence of the father’s “affirmative demonstration of his intention

to assume parental responsibilities[,]” despite his earlier two-year absence, and

concluding the orphans’ court erred in not evaluating the father’s post-abandonment

behavior.13 Id. Hence, though an appropriate analysis will differ from case to case, when

undertaken in earnest to establish meaningful contact with a child who is otherwise

withheld from access by the custodial parent, a noncustodial parent’s legal attempts to

enforce custodial rights will usually be highly relevant evidence. See id. (analysis must

also include whether parent’s attempt to reaffirm parental duties after a period of absence

will be harmful to child); see also C.M.W., 603 A.2d at 622 (reversing termination of

parental rights where record contained clear and convincing evidence of parent’s

13 Though we approve of Hamilton’s analysis regarding its reversal of the termination of

parental rights decree on Subsection 2511(a)(1) grounds, we note the case, decided in 1988, is subject to the same shortcomings as Orwick and its progeny decided prior to the 1992 enactment of the provision in its current form, that is, at the time, a petitioner established grounds by a showing parental abandonment for any six-month period in the child’s life. See Bowman, 666 A.2d at 276 n.2 (opinion in support of reversal); Hamilton, 549 A.2d at 1294-96; Orwick, 347 A.2d 679 n.3, 680.

[J-30-2021] - 38 attempts to locate child through Domestic Relations Office and IRS after custodial parent

changed name and moved to unlisted address in another county without notice).

Importantly, we are also intensely cognizant of the duplicity enfranchised when a custodial

parent’s conduct both causes the need for legal intervention and faults the noncustodial

parent for failing to take legal action more swiftly, and we are loath to require a parent’s

prosecution of legal proceedings as a mechanism for preserving parental rights. See

D.J.Y., 408 A.2d at 1390 (where absence of communication results from deliberate

conduct of the opposing parent, failure to pursue legal action may not be used as a basis

for termination of parental rights); S.H., 383 A.2d at 533 (“mere showing that [noncustodial

parent] could conceivably have pursued legal action more promptly cannot justify

termination”).

In this case, two months prior to the April 15, 2019 filing of the termination petition,

Father attempted contact, Mother refused, and in response, on February 28, 2019, Father

initiated and actively pursued a complaint for custody, seeking a visitation arrangement

that could gradually increase to shared custody. Father’s perception this action was his

only remaining option to establish a relationship with C.M. is buttressed by the orphans’

court’s recognition of Mother’s settled resistance to a relationship between Father and

C.M. since his last visit in 2016. See Orphans’ Court Opinion, 9/26/2019, at 8, 9-10,

supra. Father attended the court-ordered mediation and conciliation proceedings,

suggesting he begin contact gradually, and complied with the court’s requirements in the

support case until Mother withdrew her complaint. Because no agreement was reached

through mediation or conciliation, Father had no contact with C.M. during that time. The

custody conciliator issued a report on April 3, 2019, and Father began arranging his

[J-30-2021] - 39 veterans’ benefits to secure reunification therapy with C.M. But, before the custody

matter and Father’s contact with C.M. could progress any further, appellants filed their

termination petition.

Thus, consistent with Hamilton, despite Father’s prior lengthy absence, his

proactive participation in the custody court’s measured requirements during the time the

case was active demonstrates affirmative performance of Father’s parental duties to the

maximum extent apparent at the time under these circumstances, as well as an interest

in and respect for the young child’s safety and emotional needs. The orphans’ court’s

finding Father “fail[ed] to take further action to have contact with his child” is not supported

by the record, and conflicts with the court’s additional finding the action he did take to

attempt contact — i.e., pursuing a legal proceeding to enforce his custodial rights — was

too late, which conclusion is not supported by the law. Orphan’s Court Opinion,

9/26/2019, at 10, 11; see D.J.Y., 408 A.2d at 1390; S.H., 383 A.2d at 533; Hamilton, 549

A.2d at 1295. These determinations were therefore erroneous. Consequently, because

the record demonstrates Father continuously exercised parental duties during the two

months preceding the filing of the petition, appellants did not meet their burden to

establish by clear and convincing evidence he failed or refused to perform parental duties,

or a settled purpose of relinquishment, for “a period of at least six months immediately

preceding the filing of the petition.” 23 Pa.C.S. §2511(a)(1); see C.J.A., 204 A.3d at 504-

05.

C. Additional Analytical Observations

Because we conclude the orphans’ court failed to consider the requisite statutory

period and the evidence during that period does not establish grounds for termination

[J-30-2021] - 40 according to the express requirements of Subsection 2511(a)(1), further review of

Father’s explanation for his absence,14 and consideration of C.M.’s needs and welfare

pursuant to Subsection 2511(b), are not dispositive and do not compel our result in this

case. However, given the rare occasion for this Court to engage in error review of such

an important matter, and as a consequence of our broad scope of review, we make the

following observations.

Unlike termination of parental rights cases stemming from dependency

proceedings — in which the trial court often has observed the parties through multiple

hearings over the course of several months or years, and which typically feature the

somewhat objective testimony of at least one caseworker whose professional duties

include, at a minimum, facilitating parents’ visits with the child and documenting parental

efforts — when a parent pursues the termination petition as in this case, the record may

be wholly comprised of the subjective testimony of one parent against another. Where

the interests at stake for each witness are so uniquely fraught, such testimony is

qualitatively different from the testimony provided in agency-initiated cases. Indeed, we

would not fathom approving the termination of parental rights where an orphans’ court

described an agency’s response to a noncustodial parent’s request for contact as it

describes Mother’s response in this case. Orphans’ Court Opinion, 9/26/2019, at 8

(“mother, through her rejection of his requests, contributed to his lack of contact with the

child”), 10 (“mother was not cooperative with father and did not make it easy for him to

14 We note that once the grounds are established under Subsection 2511(a)(1), even an

incarcerated parent has a duty to utilize those resources at his or her command to continue a meaningful relationship with his or her child, or parental rights may be forfeited. See S.P., 47 A.3d at 828; McCray, 331 A.2d at 655.

[J-30-2021] - 41 see this child”); see, e.g., In Interest of T.J.J.M., 190 A.3d 618, 631 (Pa. Super. 2018)

(reversing termination of parental rights where, inter alia, agency did not provide visits at

times parent could reasonably attend). Yet the clear and convincing evidentiary standard

remains the same. For this reason, specificity and corroboration are crucial to the

foundation of competent evidence.

As one critical illustration, the orphans’ court relied on the credible testimony of

Mother regarding her medical conditions, which it found were “debilitating and may prove

fatal,” to conclude the proposed adoption was suited to C.M.’s needs and welfare under

these “unusual circumstances.” Id. at 10; Orphans’ Court Opinion, 10/31/2019, at 3. Fully

crediting Mother’s testimony, as the orphans’ court did, establishes only that Mother’s

understanding of her illness and prognosis — that it might be fatal — was truthful, which

is certainly relevant for the court’s assessment of her motivations, but not competent to

establish the diagnoses and prognosis are accurate or correct, particularly in light of

further testimony indicating not much is known about scleroderma, its impact varies,

Mother resists researching it, and it currently provides little interference with her ability to

care for C.M.15 Appellants, who bear the burden of proof, offered no corroborating

evidence. Credibility is not a substitute for competency. Because we are left to speculate

about whether Mother’s understanding of her dire ultimate prognosis is in fact correct,

and if not, whether the proposed adoption plan remains reasonably calculated to C.M.’s

15 See Mother’s Testimony, N.T. 7/17/2019 at 36 (Question: “[H]ave you also spent some

time doing your own medical research on these kind of conditions?” Answer: “I try not to.”), 37 (Scleroderma is “very rare” and not much is published about it; it “usually ends up being fatal within a period of ten years[;]” “I’m aware that many people can be treated for a number of years, but it varies between people.”); Grandfather’s Testimony, id. at 11 (“[Mother]’s doing very well right now. She does all of her duties, schooling, taking care of [C.M.], day-to-day chores.”).

[J-30-2021] - 42 needs and welfare, we observe there is significant room to foster hesitancy regarding the

orphans’ court’s conviction of Mother’s uncertain future in its conclusion this termination

was necessary.

In further contrast to dependency-related termination cases, which involve the

ever-looming threat of harm to a child returned to parents who have already demonstrated

an inability to provide proper basic care, there is no evidence or argument in this record

suggesting any harm might befall C.M. in the event Father’s custody case proceeds, or

even that her current home environment and routine would change in any way. Unlike a

child in foster care, C.M.’s consequence is not zero-sum; she remains with her known

family either way, but only one possible outcome to this litigation includes an opportunity

to establish a meaningful relationship with her biological father and siblings. See

Hamilton, 549 A.2d at 1296 (despite prospective second-parent adoption by custodial

parent’s spouse after father’s two-year absence, “nothing in the record . . . suggests that

termination of [father’s] relationship with his daughter is necessary . . . [o]n the contrary,

the record reveals [his] repeated petitions and assertions of visitation rights [with his

daughter] have led to the resurgence of their father-daughter relationship”). As Justice

Wecht insightfully observed in his concurring opinion in M.R.D., the custody court has

robust discretionary authority to enforce the restriction or allowance of contact with Father

in a manner curated to C.M.’s best interests. See M.R.D., 145 A.3d at 1134-35 (Wecht,

J., concurring). Custody proceedings additionally provide an opportunity to consider

objective criteria by which to measure future performance of Father’s parental duties

should he again disappear from C.M.’s world. Accordingly, we have significant difficulty

viewing the evidence in this case as competent to establish the weighty and

[J-30-2021] - 43 consequential conclusion that, faced with the possibility of the loss of Mother at some

point in the future, C.M.’s need for permanency requires the termination of Father’s

parental rights and the severance of his branch of the family tree. As a further result of

our analysis, we strenuously encourage courts to view these life-altering cases through

an appropriate lens in light of the substance and objectivity of the evidence presented,

and always with an eye toward the individual child’s best interests. See T.S.M., 71 A.3d

at 269.

IV. Conclusion

For the foregoing reasons, we hold the evidence was insufficient to establish the

grounds for termination of Father’s parental rights pursuant to 23 Pa.C.S. §2511(a)(1).

Thus, though we disapprove of the Superior Court’s analysis, we reach the same result.

The order of the Superior Court is therefore affirmed: the decree terminating Father’s

parental rights is vacated. In addition, we vacate the decree terminating Mother’s rights

by voluntary relinquishment, and return the parties to the status quo ante.16 We remand

to the orphans’ court for proceedings consistent with this opinion.

16 Because we vacate the decree terminating Father’s rights, Grandparents’ petition for

the adoption of C.M. is not cognizable without Father’s consent. See 23 Pa.C.S. §§2701, 2702, 2711. As we have described herein, where the petitioner for an involuntary termination of parental rights is not an agency, if a valid adoption is not anticipated, the termination petition is not cognizable. See M.R.D., 145 A.3d at 1120, 1126, citing 23 Pa.C.S. §2512(b). We recognize the public policy of preventing the state’s creation of orphans may be just as sound for invalidating a voluntary relinquishment under these particular, aberrant circumstances where, without a valid adoption pending, the purpose of Mother’s voluntary relinquishment is vitiated. See T.S.M., 71 A.3d at 268 (petition to terminate parental rights filed by a biological parent is “only cognizable” when accompanied by valid prospective adoption; “public policy behind this provision is to prevent state-created orphans”) (internal citation and quotations omitted); see also Petition for Voluntary Relinquishment of Parental Rights of [B.M.] at ¶7 (“Your petitioner intends to relinquish her parental rights only in connection with the adoption of the child by her parents, [D.M.] and [P.M.].”).

[J-30-2021] - 44 Chief Justice Baer and Justices Saylor, Donohue and Mundy join this opinion.

Justice Todd files a concurring and dissenting opinion.

Justice Wecht files a concurring and dissenting opinion.

[J-30-2021] - 45