J-S36016-25
NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT O.P. 65.37
IN RE: ADOPTION OF C.G.S., A : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF MINOR : PENNSYLVANIA : : APPEAL OF: C.M.D., MOTHER : : : : : No. 338 WDA 2025
Appeal from the Decree Entered February 21, 2025 In the Court of Common Pleas of Fayette County Orphans' Court at No(s): 45-ADOPT-2024
BEFORE: PANELLA, P.J.E., NICHOLS, J., and FORD ELLIOTT, P.J.E.*
MEMORANDUM BY NICHOLS, J.: FILED: December 31, 2025
C.M.D. (Mother) appeals from the decree involuntarily terminating her
parental rights to C.G.S. (Child).1 Mother’s counsel, Tyler Schultz, Esq.
(Counsel) has filed an application for leave to withdraw and an
Anders/Santiago2 brief. After review, we deny the application and order
Counsel to submit an amended petition to withdraw.
____________________________________________
* Retired Senior Judge assigned to the Superior Court.
1 Child was aged one year and ten months at the time of entry of the decree
on February 21, 2025. See Trial Ct. Op., 6/2/25, at 1. The trial court decree is dated February 14, 2025 and was entered on the docket on February 21, 2025.
2 Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738 (1967); Commonwealth v. Santiago,
978 A.2d 349 (Pa. 2009); see also In re V.E., 611 A.2d 1267, 1275 (Pa. Super. 1992) (extending Anders to appeals involving the termination of parental rights). J-S36016-25
Briefly, Child was born in April of 2023 and was placed, pursuant to a
shelter care petition filed by Fayette County Children and Youth Services (the
Agency), in kinship foster care shortly after birth. See Trial Ct. Op., 6/2/25,
at 1, 3. Child was adjudicated dependent on May 25, 2023 and has remained
in the same kinship foster care placement throughout these proceedings. See
id. at 3; N.T., 2/14/25, at 36-38.
On July 2, 2024, the Agency filed a petition to involuntarily terminate
Mother’s parental rights. The trial court held a termination of parental rights
(TPR) hearing on February 14, 2025.3 On February 21, 2025, the trial court
3 At the time of the TPR hearing, Child was aged one year and ten months and
described as minimally verbal. See N.T., 2/14/25, at 15-16. The trial court had appointed Wendy O’Brien, Esq., “to represent the interests of [Child].” See Trial Ct. Order, 7/9/24. At the TPR hearing, Ms. O’Brien was identified as the guardian ad litem (GAL) for Child. See N.T., 2/14/25, at 4.
We note that trial courts must “appoint counsel to represent the child in an involuntary TPR proceeding[.]” 23 Pa.C.S. § 2313(a). “[W]here [a trial] court has appointed a GAL/Counsel to represent both the child’s best interests and legal interests, appellate courts should review sua sponte whether the [trial] court made a determination that those interests did not conflict[,]” as “a single attorney cannot represent a child’s best and legal interest if those interests conflict.” In re K.M.G., 240 A.3d 1218, 1235-36 (Pa. 2020) (citing In re T.S., 192 A.3d 1080, 1082 (Pa. 2018)). An attorney serving as GAL “representing a child’s best interests can properly fulfill the role of Section 2313(a) counsel where . . . the child at issue is too young to be able to express a preference as to the outcome of the proceedings.” T.S., 192 A.3d 1092. In other words, for a “child [who] is very young and pre-verbal, there can be no conflict between the child’s legal interests and his or her best interests” and, accordingly, Section 2313(a)’s mandate “is satisfied where the court has appointed [a GAL] who represents the child’s best interests during such proceedings.” Id. at 1092-93.
(Footnote Continued Next Page)
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entered a decree involuntarily terminating Mother’s parental rights. See Trial
Ct. Order, 2/21/25.
Mother timely filed a notice of appeal and a simultaneous concise
statement of errors complained of on appeal pursuant to Pa.R.A.P.
1925(a)(2)(i). The trial court complied with Pa.R.A.P. 1925(a).
On appeal, Counsel has filed an Anders/Santiago brief that identifies
the following issue: “Did the trial court err when it terminated the parental
rights of [Mother] pursuant to the Adoption Act and specifically 23 Pa.C.S. §
2511?” Anders/Santiago Brief at 7 (some formatting altered).
When faced with an Anders/Santiago brief, this Court must first
examine counsel’s request to withdraw before reviewing the merits of any
possible underlying issues. See In re X.J., 105 A.3d 1, 3 (Pa. Super. 2014).
As this Court has stated:
To withdraw pursuant to Anders, counsel must:
1) petition the court for leave to withdraw stating that, after making a conscientious examination of the record, counsel has determined that the appeal would be frivolous; 2) furnish a copy of the [Anders] brief to the [appellant]; and 3) advise the [appellant] that he or she has the right to
Although it is unclear whether Attorney O’Brien served as both GAL and Section 2313(a) counsel or whether the trial court determined that there was no conflict between Child’s best and legal interests, we nevertheless apply the T.S. presumption that Child’s preferred outcome in the TPR proceedings could not be ascertained due to Child’s very young age and minimal verbal ability. See T.S., 192 A.3d at 1092-93. Accordingly, we conclude that Section 2313(a)’s mandate was satisfied in the proceedings below. See 23 Pa.C.S. § 2313(a); K.M.G., 240 A.3d at 1235-36; T.S., 192 A.3d at 1092-93.
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retain private counsel or raise additional arguments that the [appellant] deems worthy of the court’s attention.
With respect to the third requirement of Anders, that counsel inform the appellant of his or her rights in light of counsel’s withdrawal, this Court has held that counsel must “attach to their petition to withdraw a copy of the letter sent to their client advising him or her of their rights.”
In re J.D.H., 171 A.3d 903, 907 (Pa. Super. 2017) (citations and quotation
marks omitted); see also X.J., 105 A.3d at 4 (explaining that under Anders,
counsel must send their client a letter which advises the client of his or her
right to “(1) retain new counsel to pursue the appeal; (2) proceed pro se on
appeal; or (3) raise any points that the appellant deems worthy of the court’s
attention in addition to the points raised by counsel in the Anders brief”
(citations omitted and some formatting altered)); In re X.S., 555 EDA 2020,
2020 WL 4386767, at *2 (Pa. Super. filed July 31, 2020) (unpublished mem.)
(striking counsel’s Anders brief and ordering counsel to send a new letter to
the mother where counsel’s letter failed to inform the mother of her right to
raise any additional points she deemed worthy of this Court’s attention).4
Additionally, counsel must file a brief that meets the following
requirements established by the Pennsylvania Supreme Court in Santiago:
(1) provide a summary of the procedural history and facts, with citations to the record; (2) refer to anything in the record that counsel believes arguably supports the appeal; (3) set forth counsel’s conclusion that the appeal is frivolous; and (4) state ____________________________________________
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J-S36016-25
NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT O.P. 65.37
IN RE: ADOPTION OF C.G.S., A : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF MINOR : PENNSYLVANIA : : APPEAL OF: C.M.D., MOTHER : : : : : No. 338 WDA 2025
Appeal from the Decree Entered February 21, 2025 In the Court of Common Pleas of Fayette County Orphans' Court at No(s): 45-ADOPT-2024
BEFORE: PANELLA, P.J.E., NICHOLS, J., and FORD ELLIOTT, P.J.E.*
MEMORANDUM BY NICHOLS, J.: FILED: December 31, 2025
C.M.D. (Mother) appeals from the decree involuntarily terminating her
parental rights to C.G.S. (Child).1 Mother’s counsel, Tyler Schultz, Esq.
(Counsel) has filed an application for leave to withdraw and an
Anders/Santiago2 brief. After review, we deny the application and order
Counsel to submit an amended petition to withdraw.
____________________________________________
* Retired Senior Judge assigned to the Superior Court.
1 Child was aged one year and ten months at the time of entry of the decree
on February 21, 2025. See Trial Ct. Op., 6/2/25, at 1. The trial court decree is dated February 14, 2025 and was entered on the docket on February 21, 2025.
2 Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738 (1967); Commonwealth v. Santiago,
978 A.2d 349 (Pa. 2009); see also In re V.E., 611 A.2d 1267, 1275 (Pa. Super. 1992) (extending Anders to appeals involving the termination of parental rights). J-S36016-25
Briefly, Child was born in April of 2023 and was placed, pursuant to a
shelter care petition filed by Fayette County Children and Youth Services (the
Agency), in kinship foster care shortly after birth. See Trial Ct. Op., 6/2/25,
at 1, 3. Child was adjudicated dependent on May 25, 2023 and has remained
in the same kinship foster care placement throughout these proceedings. See
id. at 3; N.T., 2/14/25, at 36-38.
On July 2, 2024, the Agency filed a petition to involuntarily terminate
Mother’s parental rights. The trial court held a termination of parental rights
(TPR) hearing on February 14, 2025.3 On February 21, 2025, the trial court
3 At the time of the TPR hearing, Child was aged one year and ten months and
described as minimally verbal. See N.T., 2/14/25, at 15-16. The trial court had appointed Wendy O’Brien, Esq., “to represent the interests of [Child].” See Trial Ct. Order, 7/9/24. At the TPR hearing, Ms. O’Brien was identified as the guardian ad litem (GAL) for Child. See N.T., 2/14/25, at 4.
We note that trial courts must “appoint counsel to represent the child in an involuntary TPR proceeding[.]” 23 Pa.C.S. § 2313(a). “[W]here [a trial] court has appointed a GAL/Counsel to represent both the child’s best interests and legal interests, appellate courts should review sua sponte whether the [trial] court made a determination that those interests did not conflict[,]” as “a single attorney cannot represent a child’s best and legal interest if those interests conflict.” In re K.M.G., 240 A.3d 1218, 1235-36 (Pa. 2020) (citing In re T.S., 192 A.3d 1080, 1082 (Pa. 2018)). An attorney serving as GAL “representing a child’s best interests can properly fulfill the role of Section 2313(a) counsel where . . . the child at issue is too young to be able to express a preference as to the outcome of the proceedings.” T.S., 192 A.3d 1092. In other words, for a “child [who] is very young and pre-verbal, there can be no conflict between the child’s legal interests and his or her best interests” and, accordingly, Section 2313(a)’s mandate “is satisfied where the court has appointed [a GAL] who represents the child’s best interests during such proceedings.” Id. at 1092-93.
(Footnote Continued Next Page)
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entered a decree involuntarily terminating Mother’s parental rights. See Trial
Ct. Order, 2/21/25.
Mother timely filed a notice of appeal and a simultaneous concise
statement of errors complained of on appeal pursuant to Pa.R.A.P.
1925(a)(2)(i). The trial court complied with Pa.R.A.P. 1925(a).
On appeal, Counsel has filed an Anders/Santiago brief that identifies
the following issue: “Did the trial court err when it terminated the parental
rights of [Mother] pursuant to the Adoption Act and specifically 23 Pa.C.S. §
2511?” Anders/Santiago Brief at 7 (some formatting altered).
When faced with an Anders/Santiago brief, this Court must first
examine counsel’s request to withdraw before reviewing the merits of any
possible underlying issues. See In re X.J., 105 A.3d 1, 3 (Pa. Super. 2014).
As this Court has stated:
To withdraw pursuant to Anders, counsel must:
1) petition the court for leave to withdraw stating that, after making a conscientious examination of the record, counsel has determined that the appeal would be frivolous; 2) furnish a copy of the [Anders] brief to the [appellant]; and 3) advise the [appellant] that he or she has the right to
Although it is unclear whether Attorney O’Brien served as both GAL and Section 2313(a) counsel or whether the trial court determined that there was no conflict between Child’s best and legal interests, we nevertheless apply the T.S. presumption that Child’s preferred outcome in the TPR proceedings could not be ascertained due to Child’s very young age and minimal verbal ability. See T.S., 192 A.3d at 1092-93. Accordingly, we conclude that Section 2313(a)’s mandate was satisfied in the proceedings below. See 23 Pa.C.S. § 2313(a); K.M.G., 240 A.3d at 1235-36; T.S., 192 A.3d at 1092-93.
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retain private counsel or raise additional arguments that the [appellant] deems worthy of the court’s attention.
With respect to the third requirement of Anders, that counsel inform the appellant of his or her rights in light of counsel’s withdrawal, this Court has held that counsel must “attach to their petition to withdraw a copy of the letter sent to their client advising him or her of their rights.”
In re J.D.H., 171 A.3d 903, 907 (Pa. Super. 2017) (citations and quotation
marks omitted); see also X.J., 105 A.3d at 4 (explaining that under Anders,
counsel must send their client a letter which advises the client of his or her
right to “(1) retain new counsel to pursue the appeal; (2) proceed pro se on
appeal; or (3) raise any points that the appellant deems worthy of the court’s
attention in addition to the points raised by counsel in the Anders brief”
(citations omitted and some formatting altered)); In re X.S., 555 EDA 2020,
2020 WL 4386767, at *2 (Pa. Super. filed July 31, 2020) (unpublished mem.)
(striking counsel’s Anders brief and ordering counsel to send a new letter to
the mother where counsel’s letter failed to inform the mother of her right to
raise any additional points she deemed worthy of this Court’s attention).4
Additionally, counsel must file a brief that meets the following
requirements established by the Pennsylvania Supreme Court in Santiago:
(1) provide a summary of the procedural history and facts, with citations to the record; (2) refer to anything in the record that counsel believes arguably supports the appeal; (3) set forth counsel’s conclusion that the appeal is frivolous; and (4) state ____________________________________________
4 See Pa.R.A.P. 126(b) (providing that unpublished non-precedential decisions
of the Superior Court filed after May 1, 2019, may be cited for their persuasive value).
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counsel’s reasons for concluding that the appeal is frivolous. Counsel should articulate the relevant facts of record, controlling case law, and/or statutes on point that have led to the conclusion that the appeal is frivolous.
X.J., 105 A.3d at 3-4 (citation omitted).
Here, Counsel has filed an application for leave to withdraw stating that
he “conscientiously examin[ed] the record” and “concluded that an appeal
would be frivolous.” Appl. to Withdraw, 8/15/25, at 2. Counsel has also
provided this Court with a certificate of service demonstrating that he served
Mother with a copy of his Anders/Santiago brief and application for leave to
withdraw, and the following letter to Mother, which states in its entirety:
Enclosed, please find a copy of the Anders Brief and Application to Withdraw as Counsel. In the event you have any disagreements with my brief, you must immediately either proceed on your own or retain private counsel to immediately file either a brief in support of your position, or a response to my request to withdraw as counsel. You have the right to proceed immediately.
I strongly encourage you to file immediately, as you have not filed anything as of yet. Please reach out to me if you have any questions.
Counsel’s Letter to Mother, 8/15/25 (some formatting altered).
Mother did not file a response to Counsel’s petition to withdraw.
Here, Counsel’s letter did not inform Mother of her right to raise any
additional arguments that she deemed worthy of this Court’s attention.
Compare Counsel’s Letter to Mother, 8/15/25 with J.D.H., 171 A.3d at 907
and X.J., 105 A.3d at 4. Accordingly, Counsel has failed to fully comply with
the requirements of Anders and Santiago. See J.D.H., 171 A.3d at 907;
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X.J., 105 A.3d at 4; see also X.S., 2020 WL 4386767, at *2. We are
therefore constrained to deny the petition to withdraw and direct Counsel to
send a new letter to Mother. Within ten days of the date of this decision,
Counsel shall inform Mother by letter that she has the right to retain new
counsel or proceed pro se on appeal, as well as the right to raise any
arguments that Mother deems worthy of this Court’s attention, in addition to
the issues that Counsel addressed in the Anders/Santiago brief. See X.J.,
105 A.3d at 4; see also X.S., 2020 WL 4386767, at *2. Thereafter, Counsel
may file a new Anders/Santiago brief and petition to withdraw with this
Court, including a copy of the new letter to Mother. Mother shall then have
forty-five days from the date that Counsel files a new Anders/Santiago brief
to file her own brief, either pro se or by new counsel, if she so chooses.
Petition to withdraw denied with instructions. Panel jurisdiction
retained.
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