Administrative Board of the Municipal Pier of Ponce v. P. R. American Sugar Refinery, Inc.

70 P.R. 338
CourtSupreme Court of Puerto Rico
DecidedJuly 26, 1949
DocketNos. 9699, 9700, 9701
StatusPublished

This text of 70 P.R. 338 (Administrative Board of the Municipal Pier of Ponce v. P. R. American Sugar Refinery, Inc.) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Supreme Court of Puerto Rico primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Administrative Board of the Municipal Pier of Ponce v. P. R. American Sugar Refinery, Inc., 70 P.R. 338 (prsupreme 1949).

Opinion

Mr. Justice Marrero

delivered the opinion of the Court.

The three complaints filed in the above-entitled cases are substantially drafted in identical terms. The complaint in the first case avers, in brief, the following: That the plaintiff is a Board created by an ordinance of the extinct Ex-* ecutive Council of Puerto Rico with authority to operate and maintain a pier in the Municipality of Ponce and with powers similar to an ordinary commercial corporation and afterwards defined as a public service company by Act No. 70 of 1917; that since March 25, 1933 up to June 2, 1-940, both dates inclusive, the defendant shipped on different dates and by different vessels which were docked at the pier of the Municipality of Ponce, using the warehouse, loading, and unloading services of said pier, merchandise for which it had to pay the plaintiff after the services were rendered, loading charges in the sum of $52,599.42, having only paid $3,953.57 and owing the net amount of $48,645.85, which the defendant has refused to pay to the plaintiff, in spite of the fact that said amount is due and that it has been demanded to do so; and that the shipments of merchandise covered by the $48,645.85 owed were not reported by the defendant to the plaintiff, notwithstanding the fact that the former had, dur[340]*340ing all the time alleged, a permanent representative in the building located within the Municipal Pier of Ponce; for which reason said shipments were not entered and registered in the accounting books of the Municipal Pier of Ponce and the plaintiff Board was not aware of the lack of such payment until October 3, 1941, by verification and search from sources other than the Board.

Under similar allegations, in the second case the sum of $1,477.50, is claimed from Sucesión J. Serrallés, and in the third, the sum of $2,502.66 is claimed from Destilería Se-rrallés, Inc.

After the defendants requested and the plaintiff furnished several bills of particulars, the defendants filed two amended answers denying the essential averments of the complaint and alleging as special defenses that the plaintiff has no capacity to sue; that the plaintiff is estopped from claiming the amount mentioned in the complaints, since at all times, it had kept in the position of Superintendent of the Municipal Pier of Ponce, a person with authority to order and attend to everything in said pier, and especially to receive the shipment for the defendants and of all the public, to ship the cargo and render all the services for which said pier was established, to receive the payment which for those services the defendants were bound to make in accordance with the tariffs established in said pier; that the defendants had paid for the services which the Municipal Pier of Ponce had rendered to them in the period mentioned in the complaint about $300,000, without the plaintiff, or any other person, prior to April 1942, date on which the complaints were filed, having made a claim to the defendants on account of the services rendered to them by said municipal pier, inasmuch as it was the established custom and usage in said municipal pier for the public and for the persons who used it oftener, to transact and pay for the services rendered to them to the Superintendent of the pier, Rafael Torruella Cortada, a duly [341]*341appointed agent of the plaintiff to direct the activities of said pier; and that if it should appear that the Superintendent of the Municipal Pier of Ponce had not been authorized to collect for the services which said municipal pier had rendered, the plaintiff is estopped to deny the authority of its agent since said plaintiff had not notified the defendants of the revocation or limitation of the authority of said Superintendent. They also alleged that the actions brought against each of them wás barred and that the respective complaints did not state facts sufficient to constitute a cause of action.1

The cases were jointly heard at a trial which extended for many days and in which the parties introduced numerous witnesses and abundant documentary evidence. Subsequently, the court rendered judgment for the plaintiff and against the defendants adjudging the P. R. American Sugar Refinery, Inc. to pay to the plaintiff the sum of $40,650 with costs, and $4,000 as attorney’s fees; Sucesión J. Serrallés to pay $1,476,62 with costs and $150 as attorney’s fees; Des-tilería Serrallés, Inc. to pay $2,264.23 with costs and $250 as attorney’s fees.2 Prom those judgments the defendants appealed, the cases being jointly heard by us similarly as in the lower court.

Fourteen errors are assigned by the defendants to the lower court. We do not deem it necessary to discuss them together or separately. If the first three and the fifth 3 errors [342]*342were sustained, they would merely cause the reversal of the judgments and the dismissal of the complaints for lack of capacity or the reversal of the judgments and, consequently, the remanding of the case to the lower court for further proceedings. The litigation would not come to an end and nothing would be gained by it. The fourth error refers to a motion for nonsuit which was denied. We rather prefer to amply discuss the assignments which are directed to the merits of the proceedings. These are errors six to thirteen, wherein it is contended that the District Court of Ponce erred (6) in holding that-only with documentary evidence it could be authentically established that the disbursements made by the defendants reached' the hands of the Administrative Board of the Pier of Ponce through an agent authorized to receive them; (7) in holding that the procedure of payment started by the defendants was interrupted when the disbursements reached the hands of its agent, Avelino González, and that the documentary evidence of the defendants failed to show that the procedure of payment was completed by delivery to the officer or agent authorized by the plaintiff; (8) in ignoring the corroborated and uncontroverted oral evidence of the defendants on the ground that according to it, said evidence was not supported by any document; (9) in weighing the evidence and according credit to the witnesses for the defendants and in deciding as a question of law, that since some of the witnesses were employees of the defendants their testimony did not merit credence; (10) in weighing the evidence in the sense that the accounting of the plaintiff was sufficiently clear to disclose the amounts paid for the services of the pier; (11) in holding that the defendants had not paid to an authorized officer or agent of the plaintiff the sum claimed, and in holding that the superintendent of the pier, Rafael Torruella Cortada, was not authorized to collect for services rendered by the pier; (12) in weighing the evidence in connection with the fact of whether or not certain agreement reached [343]*343by the plaintiff was not notified to the defendants; and (IB) in holding that the defendants should have made such payments by checks and not in cash.

Since the foregoing errors in substance attack the weighing of the evidence by the lower court, a summary thereof is imperative. The oral and documentary evidence, as we have already indicated, is indeed abundant. Therefore, we shall set it forth briefly and fully omitting the testimony of those witnesses who contribute. little or nothing to the solution of the real problem before us.

Evidence for the plaintiff.

Justo Nieves Torres

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