Adkins v. St. Clair County Sheriff's Department

CourtDistrict Court, S.D. Illinois
DecidedMarch 15, 2022
Docket3:20-cv-00601
StatusUnknown

This text of Adkins v. St. Clair County Sheriff's Department (Adkins v. St. Clair County Sheriff's Department) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, S.D. Illinois primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Adkins v. St. Clair County Sheriff's Department, (S.D. Ill. 2022).

Opinion

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS

CARJUAN D. ADKINS,

Plaintiff,

v. Case No. 20-cv-601-NJR

RICHARD WATSON, DELANCEY MOORE, III, JANELLE BLOODWORTH, BONNIE JONES, CHARLES GERMAINE, PATRICK FULTON, RICHARD SMITH, and DR. MARCOWITZ,

Defendants.

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER

ROSENSTENGEL, Chief Judge: This matter is before the Court on motions for summary judgment filed by Dr. David Marcowitz1, Bonnie Jones, and Janelle Bloodworth (Docs. 77, 78) and Richard Watson, Delancey Moore, Richard Smith, Patrick Fulton, and Charles Germaine (Doc. 87). Plaintiff Carjuan Adkins filed responses to the motions (Docs. 88 and 92, respectively). Dr. Marcowitz, Jones, and Bloodworth filed a reply (Doc. 91). On March 8, 2022, the Court held an evidentiary hearing. PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND On June 23, 2020, Adkins, who at the time of filing his original Complaint was a pretrial detainee at the St. Clair County Jail, filed a Complaint that was later labeled by

1 Dr. David Marcowitz has identified himself by his proper name. The Clerk of Court is DIRECTED to CORRECT the docket to reflect Dr. Marcowitz’s proper name. the Court as “virtually incoherent” and “loosely based in reality” (Doc. 6, p. 2). The Court dismissed the Complaint and assigned counsel to help Adkins draft an Amended

Complaint (Id. at p. 3). Adkins, now represented by counsel, filed a First Amended Complaint (Doc. 15) and subsequently filed a Second Amended Complaint (Doc. 40). Adkins’s Second Amended Complaint (Doc. 40) alleges that on January 9, 2020, he was arrested and transferred to the St. Clair County Jail (Id. at p. 4). At the time of his arrest, he was experiencing symptoms associated with a psychiatric or psychotic disorder, including difficulty speaking, inability to focus, hallucinations, paranoia,

memory loss, and mood swings (Id.). Although he experienced these symptoms on multiple occasions during his detention, Dr. Marcowitz and Bloodworth deemed him fit for confinement and failed to provide him with further care (Id. at p. 5). Adkins also alleges that on May 4, 2020, he passed out in the dayroom (Id. at p. 6). Moore and Germaine approached Adkins and kicked him before transporting him to the

infirmary in a wheelchair (Id.). While transporting him, the officers spun Adkins around in circles in the wheelchair and dumped him on the floor of the infirmary (Id.). On May 6, 2020, Adkins was informed that he had to leave the infirmary, but he was unable to move because he had not eaten in two days. Bonnie Jones forcefully applied a nasal spray and sprayed an unknown medication in his nostrils (Id.). Fulton and Smith then jumped

on Adkins and tased him (Id.). They also punched him in the back of his head (Id.). He was then taken to the “Quiet Room” where he was held down and tased again (Id.). Adkins’s Second Amended Complaint alleges that following Counts: Count 1: Eighth Amendment deliberate indifference claim against Dr. Marcowitz and Bloodworth.

Count 2: Eighth Amendment excessive force claim against Moore, Germaine, Jones, Fulton, and Smith.

Count 3: Monell claim against Sheriff Watson for establishing an official policy and/or acquiescing to an unofficial custom of correctional officers using excessive force to subdue detainees.

(Doc. 40). LEGAL STANDARDS Summary judgment is proper if the pleadings, discovery materials, disclosures, and affidavits demonstrate no genuine issue of material fact such that [Defendants are] entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Wragg v. Village of Thornton, 604 F.3d 464, 467 (7th Cir. 2010). Lawsuits filed by inmates are governed by the provisions of the Prison Litigation Reform Act (“PLRA”). 42 U.S.C. §1997e(a). That statute states, in pertinent part, that “no action shall be brought with respect to prison conditions under section 1983 of this title, or any other Federal law, by a prisoner confined in any jail, prison, or other correctional facility until such administrative remedies as are available are exhausted.” Id. (emphasis added). The Seventh Circuit requires strict adherence to the PLRA’s exhaustion requirement. Dole v. Chandler, 438 F.3d 804, 809 (7th Cir. 2006) (noting that “[t]his circuit has taken a strict compliance approach to exhaustion”). Exhaustion must occur before the suit is filed. Ford v. Johnson, 362 F.3d 395, 398 (7th Cir. 2004). A plaintiff cannot file suit and then exhaust his administrative remedies while the suit is pending. Id. Moreover, “[t]o exhaust remedies, a prisoner must file complaints and appeals in the place, and at the time, the prison administrative rules require.” Pozo v. McCaughtry, 286 F.3d 1022, 1025

(7th Cir. 2005). Consequently, if a prisoner fails to properly utilize a prison’s grievance process, “the prison administrative authority can refuse to hear the case, and the prisoner’s claim can be indefinitely unexhausted.” Dole, 438 F.3d at 809. Under Pavey, the Seventh Circuit held that “debatable factual issues relating to the defense of failure to exhaust administrative remedies” are not required to be decided by a jury but are to be determined by the judge. Pavey v. Conley, 544 F.3d 739, 740-41(7th Cir.

2008). Thus, where failure to exhaust administrative remedies is raised as an affirmative defense, the Seventh Circuit set forth the following recommendations: The sequence to be followed in a case in which exhaustion is contested is therefore as follows: (1) The district judge conducts a hearing on exhaustion and permits whatever discovery relating to exhaustion he deems appropriate. (2) If the judge determines that the prisoner did not exhaust his administrative remedies, the judge will then determine whether (a) the plaintiff has failed to exhaust his administrative remedies, and so he must go back and exhaust; (b) or, although he has no unexhausted administrative remedies, the failure to exhaust was innocent (as where prison officials prevent a prisoner from exhausting his remedies), and so he must be given another chance to exhaust (provided that there exist remedies that he will be permitted by the prison authorities to exhaust, so that he’s not just being given a runaround); or (c) the failure to exhaust was the prisoner’s fault, in which event the case is over. (3) If and when the judge determines that the prisoner has properly exhausted his administrative remedies, the case will proceed to pretrial discovery, and if necessary a trial, on the merits; and if there is a jury trial, the jury will make all necessary findings of fact without being bound by (or even informed of) any of the findings made by the district judge in determining that the prisoner had exhausted his administrative remedies.

Id. at 742. A. St. Clair County Grievance Procedure As a pretrial detainee, Adkins was required to follow the grievance procedure set forth in the “Detainee Rules and Regulations” handbook to properly exhaust his

administrative remedies (See Doc. 87-2). The St. Clair County Jail has a two-step grievance process. The detainee must first submit a Captain’s Request/Complaint (hereinafter referred to as “complaint”) (Id. at p. 11). If the detainee does not receive a response to the complaint within 15 days, then the Jail Superintendent needs to be informed (Id.). The detainee shall submit a grievance to the shift supervisor within 24 hours after he learns

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Related

Wragg v. Village of Thornton
604 F.3d 464 (Seventh Circuit, 2010)
Hurst v. Hantke
634 F.3d 409 (Seventh Circuit, 2011)
Bobby Ford v. Donald Johnson
362 F.3d 395 (Seventh Circuit, 2004)
Pavey v. Conley
544 F.3d 739 (Seventh Circuit, 2008)
Mark Weiss v. Wayne Barribeau
853 F.3d 873 (Seventh Circuit, 2017)
Lanaghan v. Koch
902 F.3d 683 (Seventh Circuit, 2018)

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Adkins v. St. Clair County Sheriff's Department, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/adkins-v-st-clair-county-sheriffs-department-ilsd-2022.