Adil Hiramanek v. Cir
This text of Adil Hiramanek v. Cir (Adil Hiramanek v. Cir) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.
Opinion
NOT FOR PUBLICATION FILED UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS DEC 19 2018 MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK U.S. COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
ADIL HIRAMANEK, No. 16-73587
Petitioner-Appellant, Tax Ct. No. 14485-13
v. MEMORANDUM* COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE,
Respondent-Appellee.
Appeal from a Decision of the United States Tax Court
Submitted December 17, 2018**
Before: WALLACE, SILVERMAN, and McKEOWN, Circuit Judges.
Taxpayer Adil Hiramanek appeals pro se from the Tax Court’s order
granting the Commissioner of Internal Revenue’s motion for judgment on the
pleadings under Tax Court Rule 120(a). We have jurisdiction under 26 U.S.C.
§ 7482(a). We review de novo. Urban v. Comm’r, 964 F.2d 888, 889 (9th
* This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3. ** The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2). Cir. 1992). We affirm.
The Tax Court properly held that Hiramanek is collaterally estopped by
Hiramanek v. Commissioner (Hiramanek I), Tax Ct. No. 14912-10, which held
that the return filed by him and his former wife for 2006 was not a joint return
because it was signed under duress by his former wife. See Peck v. Comm’r, 904
F.2d 525, 527-28 (9th Cir. 1990) (requirements for collateral estoppel, or issue
preclusion, in the tax context). Contrary to Hiramanek’s contentions, the
Commissioner was not barred from arguing collateral estoppel by the doctrines of
judicial estoppel, equitable estoppel, or quasi-estoppel.
Because the prior court in Hiramanek I determined that the 2006 return was
not a joint return on account of duress, Hiramanek had no claim for innocent
spouse relief under I.R.C. § 6015, and the Tax Court properly granted the
Commissioner’s motion for judgment on the pleadings. See Ordlock v. Comm’r,
533 F.3d 1136, 1139 (9th Cir. 2008) (“To qualify for innocent spouse relief, the
taxpayer must show that the couple filed a joint return . . . .”).
The Tax Court did not err by resolving the Commissioner’s motion without
hearing oral argument. See Tax Ct. R. 50(b)(3) (as to motions, “[t]he action of the
Court may be taken with or without written response, hearing, or attendance of a
2 16-73587 party to the motion at the hearing”).
We reject as unsupported by the record Hiramanek’s contentions that the
Commissioner’s motion was filed without adequate notice or otherwise
procedurally defective, and that the Tax Court was biased.
We do not consider arguments not raised in the Tax Court. See Merkel v.
Comm’r, 192 F.3d 844, 852 n.10 (9th Cir. 1999).
Hiramanek’s “motion to grant full faith and credit” (Docket Entry No. 26) is
denied.
Hiramanek’s motion to seal (Docket Entry No. 51) is denied. See Interim
9th Cir. R. 27-13(a).
AFFIRMED.
3 16-73587
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