1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 9 SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 10 11 ADELQUIN D., Case No.: 24-cv-2023-SBC
12 Plaintiff, ORDER AFFIRMING FINAL 13 v. DECISION OF THE COMMISSIONER OF SOCIAL 14 FRANK BISIGNANO, Commissioner of Social Security,1 SECURITY 15 Defendant. 16
17 On October 29, 2024, Plaintiff Adelquin D.2 initiated this action seeking judicial 18 review under 42 U.S.C. § 405(g) of the finding by Defendant Commissioner of Social 19 Security that she is no longer disabled under the Social Security Act. (Dkt. No. 1.) 20 Defendant filed the Administrative Record on January 29, 2025. (Dkt. Nos. 9-10.) Plaintiff 21 22 23 1 Pursuant to Rule 25(d) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, the Court substitutes 24 Frank Bisignano, the current Commissioner of Social Security, as the defendant in this action. 25
26 2 The Court refers to Plaintiff using only her first name and last initial pursuant to the Court’s Civil Local Rules. See Civ LR 7.1(e)(6)(b). 27 1 filed a merits brief on April 7, 2025. (Dkt. No. 13.) Defendant filed a responsive brief on 2 June 5, 2025. (Dkt. No. 17.) Plaintiff filed a reply on June 20, 2025. (Dkt. No. 18.) 3 For the following reasons, the final decision of the Commissioner is AFFIRMED. 4 I. BACKGROUND 5 A. Factual and Procedural History 6 Plaintiff was born in 1975 and is currently 51 years of age. (AR 150.)3 She has a 7 bachelor’s degree in mathematics, served in the Navy from 2009 to 2010, and held previous 8 employment as a business finance manager. (AR 1203-04.) On March 21, 2018, she was 9 found disabled as of August 30, 2017, due to primary diagnoses of depressive, bipolar and 10 related disorders and secondary diagnoses of schizophrenia spectrum and other psychotic 11 disorders, which were found to meet Listing 12.04.4 (AR 150.) On September 15, 2020, in 12 a continuing disability review, the agency determined that Plaintiff was no longer disabled 13 as of September 1, 2020. (AR 172, 187-90.) A state agency Disability Hearing Officer 14 upheld this determination upon reconsideration. (AR 206-14.) Plaintiff then requested a 15 hearing before an Administrative Law Judge (“ALJ”). (AR 225.) 16 ALJ Kevin W. Messer conducted an administrative hearing on May 18, 2023 (AR 17 113), and a supplemental hearing on December 7, 2023 (AR 84). On April 3, 2024, the 18 ALJ issued a decision concluding that Plaintiff’s disability ended on September 1, 2020. 19 (AR 16-31.) Plaintiff requested a review of the ALJ’s decision; the Appeals Council denied 20 21 22 3 “AR” refers to the Administrative Record filed on January 29, 2025. (Dkt. Nos. 9- 23 10.) The Court’s citations to the AR use the page references on the original document rather 24 than the page numbers designated by the Court’s Case Management/Electronic Case Filing system (“CM/ECF”). For all other documents, the Court’s citations are to the page numbers 25 affixed by CM/ECF. 26 4 See 20 C.F.R. Pt. 404, Subpt. P, App. 1, Listing 12.04 (depressive, bipolar and 27 1 the request on September 30, 2024. (AR 1-7.) Plaintiff then commenced this action 2 pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 405(g). 3 II. LEGAL STANDARDS 4 A. Qualifying for Disability Benefits 5 The Commissioner employs a five-step analysis outlined in 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520 to 6 determine whether a claimant is disabled within the meaning of the Social Security Act. 7 See 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520; see also Tackett v. Apfel, 180 F.3d 1094, 1098–99 (9th Cir. 8 1999) (describing five steps). At step one, the Commissioner determines whether the 9 claimant is engaging in substantial gainful activity. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(a)(4)(i). At step 10 two, the agency considers the medical severity of the impairment. Id. § 404.1520(a)(4)(ii). 11 At step three, the Commissioner determines whether the impairment meets or equals one 12 of a list of specific impairments described in the regulations. Id. § 404.1520(a)(4)(iii). At 13 step four, the agency considers whether the claimant is able to perform their past relevant 14 work. Id. § 404.1520(a)(4)(iv). At the last step, step five, the Commissioner evaluates the 15 claimant’s ability to perform other work. Id. § 404.1520(a)(4)(v). 16 B. Decisions of Continuing Disability 17 After a person is found to be entitled to disability benefits, the Commissioner is 18 required to periodically review whether continued entitlement to such benefits is 19 warranted. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1594(a). Such a person is no longer entitled to benefits when 20 substantial evidence demonstrates (1) “there has been any medical improvement in the 21 individual’s impairment” and (2) “the individual is now able to engage in substantial 22 gainful activity.” 42 U.S.C. § 423(f)(1)(A)-(B). To determine whether there has been 23 medical improvement, an ALJ is required to “‘compare the current medical severity’ of the 24 claimant’s impairment to the medical severity of the impairment ‘at the time of the most 25 recent favorable medical decision that [the claimant] w[as] disabled.’” Attmore v. Colvin, 26 827 F.3d 872, 873 (9th Cir. 2016) (citing 20 C.F.R. § 404.1594(b)(7)). 27 1 The Commissioner follows an eight-step evaluation process outlined in 20 C.F.R. § 2 404.1594 to make a determination of continuing disability. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1594(f). At 3 step one, the Commissioner determines whether the claimant is engaging in substantial 4 gainful activity. Id. § 404.1594(f)(1). At step two, the agency determines whether the 5 impairment meets or equals the severity of an impairment listed in the regulations. Id. § 6 404.1594(f)(2). At step three, the Commissioner determines whether medical improvement 7 has occurred. Id. § 404.1594(f)(3). At step four, the agency determines whether medical 8 improvement is related to the claimant’s ability to work. Id. § 404.1594(f)(4). At step five, 9 if needed, the Commissioner must determine if an exception to medical improvement 10 applies. Id. § 404.1594(f)(5).5 At step six, the agency determines whether all the claimant’s 11 current impairments are severe. Id. § 404.1594(f)(6). At step seven, the Commissioner 12 considers whether the claimant can perform their past relevant work. Id. § 404.1594(f)(7). 13 At the final step, step eight, the agency evaluates the claimant’s ability to perform other 14 work. Id. § 404.1594(f)(8). 15 C. Judicial Review of an ALJ’s Decision 16 Section 405(g) of the Social Security Act allows unsuccessful applicants to seek 17 judicial review of a final agency decision of the Commissioner. 42 U.S.C. § 405(g). The 18 scope of judicial review is limited, however, and a decision denying benefits will be set 19 aside “only if it is not supported by substantial evidence or is based on legal error.” 20 Ferguson v. O’Malley, 95 F.4th 1194, 1199 (9th Cir. 2024) (citations omitted). Substantial 21 evidence means “‘more than a mere scintilla but less than a preponderance; it is such 22 relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion.’” 23 Sandgathe v. Chater, 108 F.3d 978, 980 (9th Cir. 1997) (quoting Andrews v. Shalala, 53 24
25 26 5 A step five finding is required only if the Commissioner concludes at step three that there has been no medical improvement or at step four that the medical improvement is not 27 1 F.3d 1035, 1039 (9th Cir. 1995)); see also Biestek v. Berryhill, 587 U.S. 97, 103, 139 S. 2 Ct. 1148, 1154, 203 L. Ed. 2d 504 (2019) (“[W]hatever the meaning of ‘substantial’ in 3 other contexts, the threshold for . . . evidentiary sufficiency [under the substantial evidence 4 standard] is not high.”). The court must consider the entire record, including the evidence 5 that supports and detracts from the Commissioner’s conclusions. Desrosiers v. Sec’y 6 Health & Human Servs., 846 F.2d 573, 576 (9th Cir. 1988). If the evidence supports more 7 than one rational interpretation, the court must uphold the ALJ’s decision. Burch v. 8 Barnhart, 400 F.3d 676, 679 (9th Cir. 2005); Ford v. Saul, 950 F.3d 1141, 1154 (9th Cir. 9 2020). The district court may affirm, modify, or reverse the Commissioner’s decision. 42 10 U.S.C. § 405(g). The matter may also be remanded to the Social Security Administration 11 (“SSA”) for further proceedings. Id. 12 III. DISCUSSION 13 A. ALJ’s Decision 14 The ALJ identified Plaintiff’s previous March 26, 2018 decision, in which she was 15 found disabled, as the “comparison point decision” (“CPD”). (AR 18.) Applying the eight- 16 step evaluation process outlined in 20 C.F.R. § 404.1594(f) to determine whether Plaintiff’s 17 disability would continue or end, the ALJ determined at step one that Plaintiff had not 18 engaged in substantial gainful activity. (Id.) At step two, the ALJ found that since 19 September 1, 2020, Plaintiff had not had an impairment or combination of impairments 20 that met or medically equaled the severity of an impairment listed in the regulations. (Id.) 21 At this step, the ALJ employed the special technique described in the regulations to rate 22 the degree of functional limitation resulting from Plaintiff’s mental impairments. See 20 23 C.F.R. § 404.1520a(a), (b)(2). A five-point scale (none, mild, moderate, marked, and 24 extreme) is used to rate the degree of functional limitation in four broad functional areas: 25 (1) understand, remember, or apply information; (2) interact with others; (3) concentrate, 26 27 1 persist, or maintain pace; and (4) adapt or manage oneself. Id. § 404.1520a(c)(3)-(4).6 If 2 the degree of limitation is rated as “none” or “mild,” the ALJ will generally conclude that 3 the impairment is not severe, unless the evidence otherwise indicates that there is more 4 than a minimal limitation on the claimant’s ability to do basic work activities. Id. § 5 404.1520a(d)(1). The ALJ determined here that Plaintiff had a “mild” limitation in 6 understanding, remembering, or applying information; a “moderate” limitation in 7 interacting with others; a “moderate” limitation in concentrating, persisting, or maintaining 8 pace; and a “mild” limitation in adapting or managing oneself. (AR 19.) 9 At step three, the ALJ found that medical improvement occurred on September 1, 10 2020. (AR 20.) The ALJ determined at step four that Plaintiff’s medical improvement was 11 related to the ability to work because the impairment in her CPD no longer met or equaled 12 the same listing that was met at the time of the CPD. (Id.; see also 20 C.F.R. § 13 404.1594(c)(3)(i) (“If medical improvement has occurred and the severity of the prior 14 impairment(s) no longer meets or equals the same listing section used to make our most 15 recent favorable decision, we will find that the medical improvement was related to your 16 ability to work.”).) A step five finding was not required, in light of the ALJ’s step three 17 and step four findings. See 20 C.F.R. § 404.1594(f)(5). At step six, the ALJ found that 18 Plaintiff’s severe impairments as of September 1, 2020, included schizoaffective disorder, 19 bipolar type; depressive disorder; and cervicalgia. (AR 21.) 20 The ALJ next evaluated Plaintiff’s residual functional capacity (“RFC”) as of 21 September 1, 2020. (AR 21-22.) He found Plaintiff could perform medium work, subject 22 to some limitations, and could “understand, remember, and carry out simple, routine tasks; 23 [have] occasional interaction with the general public, only occasional work-related, non- 24
25 26 6 These four functional areas are known as the “paragraph B” criteria due to the manner in which they are categorized in the listing of impairments. See 20 C.F.R. Pt. 404, 27 1 personal, non-social interaction with co-workers and supervisors, and is limited to jobs 2 requiring only simple work-related decisions however can keep pace sufficient to complete 3 tasks and meet quotas typically found in unskilled work.” (AR 21-22.) 4 At step seven, the ALJ found that since September 1, 2020, Plaintiff had been unable 5 to perform her past relevant work. (AR 29.) Finally, the ALJ determined at step eight that 6 Plaintiff could perform the requirements of the representative occupations of industrial 7 cleaner; laborer, stores; and laundry laborer. (AR 30.) Therefore, the ALJ concluded that 8 Plaintiff’s disability ended on September 1, 2020, and she had not become disabled again 9 as of the date of his decision. (AR 31.) 10 B. Plaintiff’s Arguments 11 Plaintiff contends that substantial evidence does not support the ALJ’s determination 12 that her disability ceased as of September 1, 2020. (Dkt. No. 13 at 5-11.) She argues that 13 the ALJ failed to “show his work” and “‘build an accurate and logical bridge’ from the 14 evidence to [his] conclusions,” resulting in a decision that fails to “provide sufficient 15 reasoning that allows [for] review.” (Id. at 6, 10.) Notably, Plaintiff challenges only the 16 ALJ’s assessment of her mental impairments. (Dkt. No. 13 at 6 n.1.) As will be discussed 17 below, Plaintiff’s arguments are without merit. 18 1. Substantial evidence supports the ALJ’s findings of medical improvement as of September 1, 2020 19
20 To determine whether there has been medical improvement, an ALJ is required to 21 “‘compare the current medical severity’ of the claimant’s impairment to the medical 22 severity of the impairment ‘at the time of the most recent favorable medical decision that 23 [the claimant] w[as] disabled.’” Attmore, 827 F.3d at 873 (citing 20 C.F.R. § 24 404.1594(b)(7)). Here, the ALJ stated the following regarding his determination that 25 Plaintiff’s medical improvement occurred on September 1, 2020: 26 27 1 The medical evidence supports a finding that, by September 1, 2020, there had been a decrease in medical severity of the impairments present at the time 2 of the CPD. 3 Since September 1, 2020, the claimant has not required emergency room or 4 hospital treatment for her mental health symptoms. This is in stark contrast to 5 the long in-patient psychiatric hospitalization at the CPD for the period from February 19, 2019, through May 14, 2019, when the claimant was found 6 incompetent to stand trial due to severe mania. 7 Progress notes document that the claimant has, for the most part, been doing 8 well once she was adherent to the prescribed psychotropic medication 9 regimen. Most mental status examinations have been unremarkable. The improvement in functioning is affirmed by attending psychiatrist Fiza Singh, 10 M.D., in a note dated May 25, 2022; [s]he opined that the claimant’s 11 functioning is “improved a great deal” since 2019. In addition, on September 26, 2022, Dr. Singh opined that the mental health treatment has been very 12 effective in reducing the claimant’s symptoms and restoring her functionality. 13 The medical improvement since September 1, 2020, is also indicated by the 14 claimant’s ability to not only care for her own needs but also those of two 15 seniors. At one time, she was taking care of her aunt and her father until her aunt moved to a senior facility. 16
17 (AR 20 [exhibit references omitted].) 18 Additionally, in finding that Plaintiff’s statements regarding the intensity, 19 persistence, and limiting effects of her symptoms were not entirely consistent with the 20 evidence in the record, the ALJ observed: 21 In July 2021, [Plaintiff] was still experiencing anxiety and paranoia which were worse at night. By November 2021, she reported no paranoia or auditory 22 hallucinations.7 Progress notes show minimal auditory hallucinations when 23 24 25 7 Plaintiff’s three-month hospitalization at Metropolitan State Hospital from February 26 to May 2019 was due to a manic episode in which “[s]he was hearing voices of demons and angels, was hyper religious.” (AR 916; see also AR 850-52.) She went to jail for three 27 1 she is taking her medications. . . . Her activities are also consistent with the improvement of her mental impairments. For example, she was doing so well 2 in May 2022 that she wanted to go back to school.8 In June 2022, she was 3 taking care of both her aunt and her father as well as volunteering. After her aunt moved to a senior facility, she has continued to care for her father. She 4 has been able to travel (went to Texas). In March 2023, one of her aunts visited 5 her from the Philippines and she was looking forward to driving up and down the [coast]. 6
7 . . . .
8 The claimant’s allegation of continuing disability due to her mental and 9 physical impairments is not consistent with her activities that include her ability to care for her ill father. She prepares her own meals and does 10 household chores. She has no problems with personal care. She has a valid 11 driver’s license and is able to drive. She shops and goes to the post office. She was taking care of her aunt before her aunt moved to senior living. She takes 12 care of her father by taking him to his appointments (he does not drive). She 13 goes to Church every Sunday. She also testified that she built a fence at her house. 14
15 The claimant’s ability to frequently travel undermines her allegations that she is too functionally limited to work on a sustained basis. In November 2019, 16 she was noted to have returned from a trip to Italy. She then flew to Canada 17 and to the Philippines for the Thanksgiving holidays. She visited her family in Texas in September 2021 and then went to Canada for one month. She 18 testified that she travelled to Washington, DC. . . . 19 Since September 1, 2020, the claimant has not generally received the type of 20 medical treatment one would expect for a totally disabled individual. Since 21 22 her supervisor in her car, and “bumped” him with her car because she thought “he was a 23 villain” and heard voices that “he’s going to do harm to my family.” (AR 1201, 1343.) 24 8 Later in 2022, Plaintiff planned to attend an informational meeting on trade schools 25 for veterans, and took the pre-test required for enrollment in electrician school. (AR 1021, 26 1479.) She informed Dr. Singh that she hoped to use the remaining three years on her GI bill to further her education and new career. (AR 1479.) 27 1 September 1, 2020, the claimant has not required emergency room or inpatient hospital treatment.9 She went through the CORE [Center of Recovery 2 Education through Veterans Affairs] program from April 2021 through July 3 2022.10 Since then, she has had psychiatric medication management. The claimant’s course of treatment since September 1, 2020, has generally 4 reflected a conservative approach. 5 (AR 23, 24 [exhibit references omitted].) 6 Plaintiff contends that the ALJ failed to “show his work and articulate a logical 7 bridge” from the evidence to his conclusions. (Dkt. No. 13 at 6.) But contrary to this 8 argument, the ALJ provided more than sufficient explanation, supported by substantial 9 evidence in the record, to substantiate his findings, and the Court is easily able to discern 10 his reasoning. The ALJ was required to examine the evidence in the broader context of 11 Plaintiff’s improvement. Attmore, 827 F.3d at 877. The examples an ALJ chooses to rely 12 on in demonstrating medical improvement “must in fact constitute examples of a broader 13 development.” Attmore, 827 F.3d at 877 (citing Garrison v. Colvin, 759 F.3d 995, 1018 14 (9th Cir. 2014)). Here, the evidence relied on by the ALJ, including the medical opinions 15 and treatment notes of Plaintiff’s own treating psychiatrist, Dr. Singh, constituted 16 substantial evidence of a “broader development” of sustained improvement since 17 September 1, 2020. Garrison, 759 F.3d at 1018. 18 /// 19 /// 20 /// 21 22 23 9 The Court notes that Plaintiff presented to the psychiatry emergency department at 24 the VA on January 19, 2021, with a one-week history of insomnia. (AR 1243-46.) Her mental status examination was normal, and Plaintiff was provided a prescription 25 medication to assist with her insomnia. (AR 1246.) 26 10 “CORE is a specialty mental health clinic serving Veterans diagnosed with psychotic 27 1 2. The ALJ’s finding that Plaintiff’s disability ended on September 1, 2020, is consistent with the medical evidence 2
3 Plaintiff next argues that there was nothing in Dr. Singh’s May 25, 2022 and 4 September 26, 2022 medical opinions, which the ALJ found to be persuasive and partially 5 persuasive, respectively, reflecting that the improvement in Plaintiff’s symptoms was 6 related to her ability to work as of September 1, 2020. (Dkt. No. 13 at 7-9.) On May 25, 7 2022, Dr. Singh wrote: 8 [Plaintiff] has been under my care intermittently in the VA San Diego Healthcare System since 03/25/2015. She returned to care in 07/2019 after an 9 extended stay in a State Hospital. Since that time, she has been taking 10 medications regularly, and has been engaged in a psychosocial rehabilitation program. In my opinion, [Plaintiff’s] functioning is improved a great deal 11 since 2019. 12 (AR 1023.) On September 26, 2022, Dr. Singh completed a “Medical Source Statement” 13 form indicating that Plaintiff’s treatment with antipsychotic and mood stabilizing 14 medication, and an antidepressant at times, had been “highly effective in reducing 15 symptoms and restoring functionality.” (AR 1313.) She indicated that Plaintiff had only 16 “no[]” or “mild” mental disorder functional limitations other than a “moderate” limitation 17 with understanding and responding to social cues. (AR 1314-15.) She anticipated that 18 Plaintiff’s impairments or treatment would cause work absences less than once a month, 19 and that Plaintiff would never be off task in the workplace due to mental health symptoms. 20 (AR 1316.) 21 Plaintiff’s argument that Dr. Singh’s opinions in 2022 do not “relate back” to her 22 condition on September 1, 2020, ignores that these opinions are consistent with Dr. Singh’s 23 treatment notes in 2020. For example, Plaintiff’s September 2, 2020 visit notes, authored 24 by a resident physician, Dr. Sloan, under Dr. Singh’s supervision, indicate that Plaintiff’s 25 last manic episode was in 2018. (AR 951.) Although Plaintiff described some “lows in her 26 mood” while traveling back home from Canada, she overcame this. (Id.) Plaintiff’s mental 27 1 status examination was normal. (AR 952.) Dr. Sloan noted that Plaintiff’s mood was stable, 2 she was tolerating medications well without side effects, and had not had any auditory 3 verbal hallucinations. (AR 953.) The testifying medical expert, Dr. Miller, relied on this 4 note to support her opinion that medical improvement occurred as of this date. (AR 96, 5 citing AR 950-54 (describing the September 2, 2020 treatment note as “the first strong 6 indicator from Dr. Singh that [Plaintiff’s] mood was stabilized”).) Similarly, Plaintiff’s 7 October 14, 2020 visit notes recounted that Plaintiff was looking for a job and was 8 interviewing for Home Depot the following day. (AR 945-46.) Plaintiff described feeling 9 anxious when she was alone but stated that going for a walk or watching TV helped to calm 10 her. (AR 946.) Plaintiff again denied having any auditory verbal hallucinations or side 11 effects from her medications. (Id.) Her mental status examination remained normal. (AR 12 946-47.) The Court finds these treatment records, as well as Dr. Miller’s opinion, are 13 consistent with the ALJ’s finding that Plaintiff’s disability ended on September 1, 2020. 14 3. Plaintiff’s medical records submitted after the ALJ’s decision do not relate to the period at issue 15
16 Plaintiff further contends that the records she submitted to the Appeals Council 17 following the ALJ’s decision undercut Dr. Singh’s September 26, 2022 opinion. (Dkt. No. 18 13 at 9.) These records are dated between May 27, 2024, and September 5, 2024. (AR 40- 19 75.) The Appeals Council determined that these records did not relate to the period at issue 20 and thus did not affect the decision about whether Plaintiff was disabled on or before April 21 3, 2024, the date of the ALJ’s decision. (AR 1-2.) In Brewes v. Comm’r Soc. Sec. Admin., 22 682 F.3d 1157 (9th Cir. 2012), the Ninth Circuit held that the administrative record includes 23 evidence submitted for the first time to the Appeals Council, and that such evidence is a 24 part of the “record as a whole.” (Id. at 1162-63.) In doing so, the circuit court observed 25 that the Commissioner’s regulations permit claimants to submit additional evidence to the 26 Appeals Council and require that it consider the evidence so long as it relates to the period 27 on or before the date of the ALJ’s decision. (Id. at 1162 (citing 20 C.F.R. § 404.970(b)).) 1 But here, the records submitted to the Appeals Council and upon which Plaintiff relies do 2 not relate to the period before the ALJ’s April 3, 2024 decision; rather, they relate to 3 Plaintiff’s condition following the ALJ’s decision. (See AR 40-83.) As set forth in the 4 regulations, “If you submit additional evidence that does not relate to the period on or 5 before the date of the [ALJ] hearing decision . . . the Appeals Council will . . . advise[] 6 you of your right to file a new application.” 20 C.F.R. § 404.970(b); see also Hudson v. 7 Bowen, 849 F.2d 433, 435 (9th Cir. 1988) (stating that the district court’s function is to 8 review the correctness of the Commissioner’s decision at the time it was made). Therefore, 9 there is no need to remand to the ALJ for consideration of these records. 10 4. The ALJ’s determination of Plaintiff’s mental RFC did not constitute a lay medical opinion 11
12 Finally, Plaintiff argues that the ALJ’s findings regarding her mental RFC “represent 13 nothing more than a lay medical opinion” and the ALJ exceeded his authority by 14 “interpreting raw medical data.” (Dkt. No. 13 at 9-10.) This argument is also without merit. 15 “It is clear that it is the responsibility of the ALJ, not the claimant’s physician, to 16 determine residual functional capacity.” Vertigan v. Halter, 260 F.3d 1044, 1049 (9th Cir. 17 2001); see also 20 C.F.R. § 404.1546(c). The RFC does not need to directly correspond to 18 a specific medical opinion; rather, “the ALJ is responsible for translating and incorporating 19 clinical findings into a succinct RFC.” Rounds v. Comm’r Soc. Sec. Admin, 807 F.3d 996, 20 1006 (9th Cir. 2015); see also Stubbs-Danielson v. Astrue, 539 F.3d 1169, 1174 (9th Cir. 21 2008) (noting the ALJ’s responsibility to weigh conflicting medical evidence and translate 22 accepted medical opinions into “concrete restrictions”). The ALJ’s RFC assessment should 23 be affirmed if the ALJ has applied the proper legal standard and his decision is supported 24 by substantial evidence in the record. Bayliss v. Barnhart, 427 F.3d 1211, 1217 (9th Cir. 25 2005). 26 In this case, the ALJ found the opinions of state agency physicians Dr. Zukowsky 27 and Dr. Amado, rendered on August 20, 2020, and January 8, 2021, respectively, to be 1 partially persuasive. (AR 25, citing AR 167-71, 966-84.) These physicians opined that 2 Plaintiff did not have a severe mental impairment and had only “mild” limitations in the 3 four functional areas constituting the paragraph B criteria. (AR 25.) In finding these 4 opinions partially persuasive, the ALJ, accounting for the other evidence of record, 5 reasonably found that Plaintiff had greater limitations than those proffered by these 6 physicians. The ALJ also reasonably found Dr. Bittleman’s opinion that Plaintiff would be 7 off task more than twenty percent of an 8-hour workday due to schizoaffective disorder 8 was not persuasive because as an internist, Dr. Bittleman was not a specialist in mental 9 health conditions. (AR 26, citing AR 1334-37.) Under the regulations, the medical opinion 10 of a medical source who has received advanced education and training to become a 11 specialist may be more persuasive about medical issues related to their area of specialty 12 than the medical opinion of a medical source who is not a specialist in the relevant area of 13 specialty. See 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520c(c)(4). 14 The ALJ found Dr. Singh’s September 26, 2022 opinion to be partially, rather than 15 fully, persuasive. He found that Dr. Singh’s opinion was consistent with evidence in the 16 record, except the ALJ determined that Plaintiff had a moderate limitation in concentrating, 17 persisting, or maintaining pace, rather than the mild limitation found by Dr. Singh. (AR 18 27-28, citing id. at 1312-17.) In other words, the ALJ again found Plaintiff’s limitation to 19 be greater than that proffered by a physician. Similarly, the ALJ found the opinion of Dr. 20 Miller, the testifying medical expert, to be partially persuasive. Dr. Miller testified that 21 Plaintiff’s medical improvement started in 2020, and Plaintiff continued to improve in 22 2021. (AR 92.) Dr. Miller opined that the reason Plaintiff had previously decompensated 23 from a high level of functioning was that she had been noncompliant with her medications. 24 (AR 93.) As of September 2, 2020, Dr. Miller believed that Plaintiff no longer had any 25 limitations in the four domains constituting the paragraph B criteria. (AR 97-98.) The ALJ 26 reasonably determined that Dr. Miller’s opinion that Plaintiff experienced significant 27 medical improvement since September 1, 2020 was supported by the record. (AR 28.) 1 || However, the ALJ, noting that Plaintiff's treatment records with Dr. Singh indicated 2 periods of exacerbation, also found that Dr. Miller’s opinion that Plaintiff had no limits 3 || with respect to the paragraph B criteria was not supported by the record. (/d.) 4 The Court finds no error with the ALJ’s analysis. The Commissioner’s regulations 5 || specifically direct the ALJ to evaluate all medical opinion evidence according to certain 6 ||factors, including its consistency with the record as a whole. See 20 C.F.R. § 7 ||404.1527(c)(4). The ALJ is also required to consider the degree to which a medical opinion 8 || 1s supported by other evidence in the record. /d. § 404.1527(c)(3). “The fulfillment of [this] 9 ||regulatory dut[y] is not tantamount to rendering a medical opinion.” King v. Comm’r Soc. 10 || Sec. Admin., No. CV-19-05669-PHX-SPL, 2020 WL 5587429, at *5 n.12 (D. Ariz. Sept. 11 || 18, 2020); see also Scott E. v. Saul, Case No. 19cv2132-RBB, 2021 WL 568788, at *7 12 || (S.D. Cal. Feb. 16, 2021). 13 In conclusion, after considering the record as a whole and evaluating both the 14 || evidence that supports and detracts from the Commissioner’s conclusion, (see Desrosiers, 15 || 846 F.2d at 576), the Court finds that substantial evidence in the record supports the ALJ’s 16 || decision. 17 IV. CONCLUSION 18 For the reasons set forth above, the final decision of the Commissioner is 19 || AFFIRMED. The Clerk is directed to issue a judgment and close this case. 20 IT IS SO ORDERED. 21 ||Dated: March 19, 2026 22 Be FG.
25 United States Magistrate Judge 26 27 28 15