Addison v. Allstate Insurance

97 F. Supp. 2d 771, 2000 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 7029, 2000 WL 683616
CourtDistrict Court, S.D. Mississippi
DecidedMarch 20, 2000
DocketCiv.A. 3:99CV150LN
StatusPublished
Cited by2 cases

This text of 97 F. Supp. 2d 771 (Addison v. Allstate Insurance) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, S.D. Mississippi primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Addison v. Allstate Insurance, 97 F. Supp. 2d 771, 2000 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 7029, 2000 WL 683616 (S.D. Miss. 2000).

Opinion

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER

TOM S. LEE, District Judge.

This cause is before the court on the motion of defendant Allstate Insurance Company (Allstate), an Illinois Corporation, for summary judgment pursuant to Rule 56(c) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Plaintiff Curtis L. Addison, Jr. d/b/a Addison Auto Body Repair (Addison) has responded in opposition to the motion and has also moved the court, pursuant to Rule 56(f), to defer ruling on defendant’s summary judgment motion until plaintiffs pending motions to compel have been resolved and additional discovery has been obtained. The court, having considered the memoranda and submissions of the parties, concludes that defendant’s summary judgment motion is well taken and should be granted and that plaintiffs Rule 56(f) motion is not well taken and should be denied. 1

As noted in the court’s June 3, 1999 opinion, plaintiff, a Mississippi resident, filed this action on January 26, 1999 against Allstate and Dennis Dyse, an Allstate adjuster, in the Circuit Court of Hinds County, Mississippi asserting claims for tortious interference with business relations and violation of Miss.Code Ann. § 83-11-501 (Supp.1998). 2 Defendants timely removed the case to this court on the basis of diversity jurisdiction, arguing that Dyse had been fraudulently joined. Plaintiff then moved for remand, while Dyse moved for dismissal for failure to state a claim. The court denied plaintiffs remand motion, but granted Dyse’s motion to dismiss. Thereafter, on January 18, 2000, Allstate filed the instant motion for summary judgment, asserting that it is entitled to judgment as a matter of law since plaintiff has failed to raise a genuine issue as to any material fact with regard to either of his claims.

In his complaint, plaintiff alleges that Allstate, through its adjusters, implement *773 ed a “steering policy” that has “the purpose and effect of requiring a large percentage of its customers to utilize repair shops selected by Allstate.... ” Plaintiff contends that for years, he has operated an auto body repair shop which receives a significant portion of its income from body repair work paid for by insurance companies, such as Allstate, pursuant to collision and comprehensive insurance coverage. He alleges that because of Allstate’s priority repair option (PRO) program, according to which Allstate pre-approves and recommends certain body shops to perform repairs for its insureds, plaintiff, who is not a participant, has suffered and will continue to suffer a loss of business income. Allstate argues that plaintiffs claim for violation of Miss.Code Ann. § 83-11-501 fails as a matter of law because Allstate does not require as a condition of payment that repairs to damaged vehicles be made at particular repair shops. 3 Defendant further argues that plaintiffs claim for tor-tious interference with business relations similarly fails as a matter of law because plaintiff has neither adequately alleged damages nor demonstrated that Allstate’s actions were calculated to harm his business.

Having carefully reviewed the record, as well as the opinion recently issued by Judge Barbour in Christmon d/b/a Triple “C” Collision Repair Shop v. Allstate Ins. Co., 82 F.Supp.2d 612 (S.D.Miss.2000), a case nearly factually identical to the one before the court, the court concludes both that plaintiff has failed to raise a genuine issue as to any material fact regarding either of his claims and that additional discovery pertaining to customers who may have been “diverted by Allstate” will not enable him to do so.

As to plaintiffs allegation that Allstate has violated § 83-11-501, plaintiff has presented no evidence suggesting that Allstate or any of its agents has conditioned payment of a claim upon the utilization of the body shops participating in its PRO program. To the contrary, plaintiffs own witnesses have attested to the fact that while Allstate agents may have recommended certain participating body shops, Allstate has not conditioned payment upon having the PRO shops make the repairs to the insured’s vehicles. In fact, the affidavit testimony of plaintiffs witnesses reveals that Allstate has actually paid plaintiff to make necessary repairs for Allstate insureds who choose to have their vehicles repaired at his shop. Thus, considering that the statute unambiguously forbids only the conditioning of payment upon the selection of certain body repair shops, not the steering of insureds toward certain shops, plaintiff has failed to present evidence sufficient to withstand defendant’s summary judgment motion. 4

*774 Turning to plaintiffs tortious interference claim, the court similarly concludes that plaintiff has failed to raise a genuine issue as to any material fact, so that defendant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.

To maintain a claim for tortious interference with business relations under Mississippi law, the plaintiff must prove each of the following elements:
1. the [defendant’s] acts were intentional and willful;
2. the [defendant’s] acts were calculated to cause damage to the plaintiff[ ] in [his] lawful business;
3. the [defendant’s] acts were done with the unlawful purpose of causing damage and loss without right or justifiable cause on part of the defendant (which constitutes malice);
4. actual damage and loss resulted.

Christmon, at 615. In the case at bar, plaintiff has failed to present any evidence that defendant’s PRO program was calculated to cause damage to his business or that it was established with the unlawful purpose of causing damage and loss with no justifiable cause on behalf of the defendant. Plaintiff has offered nothing more than unsubstantiated, conclusory allegations as to defendant’s motive and attempted to persuade the court, with no supporting authority, that intent may be inferred from Allstate’s knowledge of the consequences of its program. Allstate, on the other hand, has presented evidence of a legitimate justification for its program through the affidavit of Dan James, an Allstate claims adjuster. 5 Plaintiff has thus failed to adduce evidence sufficient to create a genuine issue of material fact as to the required elements of this claim.

While the court has concluded that plaintiffs evidence is not sufficient to withstand defendant’s motion on either of his claims, plaintiff asks that the court continue the summary judgment motion in order to give him an opportunity for discovery. The court rejects this request.

As Judge Barbour noted in Christmon,

Free access — add to your briefcase to read the full text and ask questions with AI

Related

Wright ex rel. Wright v. United States
69 F. Supp. 3d 606 (S.D. Mississippi, 2014)
TREMONT LLC v. Halliburton Energy Services, Inc.
696 F. Supp. 2d 741 (S.D. Texas, 2010)

Cite This Page — Counsel Stack

Bluebook (online)
97 F. Supp. 2d 771, 2000 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 7029, 2000 WL 683616, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/addison-v-allstate-insurance-mssd-2000.