Addie Smith v. Zion Travelers Missionary Baptist Church

• Court: Missouri Court of Appeals
• Decided: December 24, 2024
• Docket: ED112647
• Status: Published

Opinion

In the Missouri Court of Appeals Eastern District DIVISION THREE

ADDIE SMITH, ) No. ED112647 ) Appellant, ) Appeal from the Circuit Court ) of St. Louis County v. ) Cause No. 21SL-CC03757 ) ZION TRAVELERS MISSIONARY ) BAPTIST CHURCH, ) Honorable Bruce F. Hilton ) Respondent. ) Filed: December 24, 2024

Introduction

Addie Smith (Smith) appeals from the judgment of the trial court denying her

motion to amend the pleadings in her petition for damages against Zion Travelers

Missionary Baptist Church (the Church) and granting summary judgment in favor of the

Church. We reverse both of the trial court’s orders denying Smith’s motion to amend her

petition and granting the motion for summary judgment, and we remand for further

proceedings in accordance with this opinion.

Background and Procedure

In 2021, Smith filed a petition for damages against the Church under a theory of

premises liability. Smith asserted that there was a defective threshold leading into the

Church in a location frequently used by invitees, and that on May 5, 2019, Smith sustained serious injuries, including multiple facial fractures and broken teeth, after she “collided

with a broken and defective threshold of the entrance and fell.” She was 96 years old at

the time of the injury. She further asserted the Church knew or should have known about

the defective doorway threshold but failed to use ordinary care to keep its premises safe

for invitees or to warn of the danger.

After a period of discovery, the Church filed a motion for summary judgment,

asserting, first, Smith could not prove all the elements of her claim, in that the undisputed

facts established Smith did not fall as a result of a defective threshold and she did not

collide with a defective doorway threshold. Rather, the Church attached Smith’s

deposition, in which she testified that, as she was exiting the church through a doorway

using her cane, the door swung closed unexpectedly, knocking her to the ground and

causing her injuries.

Smith filed a response and objection to the Church’s statement of uncontroverted

material facts, challenging the Church’s assertion Smith did not fall as a result of a

defective threshold. Smith included the deposition of a witness (Witness), who testified

that, while he was helping Smith to her car, he saw Smith fall when her walker got caught

on the threshold, causing her to fall forward. Witness attested that, when Smith crossed

the threshold, the door was propped open and it did not close on Smith and hit her.

Nevertheless, Smith agreed she had testified in her deposition that, contrary to Witness’

testimony, she fell as a result of the door swinging closed and knocking her to the ground,

and that she did not trip. As well, regarding whether the Church knew about the dangerous

condition, Smith submitted a statement of additional facts from Witness’ deposition, in

2 which he attested the door was known to close unexpectedly when it was propped open,

and that it had previously swung closed “a few” times.

Smith also attached the deposition of Smith’s daughter (Daughter), in which she

attested that both the Church’s threshold and door were known safety issues. Regarding

the door, she testified when the door was propped open, it would “sometimes” swing

closed. Regarding the threshold, she testified “[e]veryone has problems with that when the

snow and everything is out, yes, because there is a slope.” However, Daughter agreed it

was not snowing on May 5, 2019 when Smith fell. Daughter also testified that another

church member witnessed Smith’s fall, but the record does not indicate whether this second

witness had yet been deposed. Last, Daughter testified that as a result of her fall, Smith

was unable to eat for six months, she experienced continuing reduced mobility and mental

acuity, and she began suffering from transient ischemic attacks, caused by blockages of

blood flow to the brain.

The Church scheduled a hearing on its motion for summary judgment for March

19, 2024. On March 17, 2024, Smith filed a motion to amend her petition, seeking to add

facts and allegations learned during the discovery process, specifically including

“allegations regarding the defective nature of the subject door.” Smith requested the trial

court hear arguments on her motion to amend at the scheduled March 19, 2024 hearing.

After the hearing, the trial court denied Smith’s motion to amend her petition and granted

the Church’s motion for summary judgment. In its judgment granting summary judgment

for the Church, the trial court found the testimony of Witness contradicting Smith’s

statement of how she was injured to be “implausible.” This appeal follows.

3 Discussion

Smith raises eight points on appeal. Points I-IV challenge the trial court’s denial

of her motion to amend the pleadings in her petition for damages, and Points V-VIII

challenge the trial court’s grant of summary judgment in favor of the Church. We agree

that the trial court abused its discretion in denying Smith’s motion to amend her pleadings,

and we reverse on that basis, which likewise requires a reversal of the trial court’s grant of

summary judgment.

“As a general rule, amendments to pleadings should be liberally allowed.” Asmus

v. Capital Region Family Practice, 115 S.W.3d 427, 432 (Mo. App. W.D. 2003); see also

Rule 55.33(a). 1 The trial court has broad discretion to allow or disallow amendments to

the pleadings, and we review a trial court’s denial of a motion to amend a pleading for an

abuse of that discretion. Soybean Merchandising Council v. AgBorn Genetics, LLC, 534

S.W.3d 822, 833 (Mo. App. W.D. 2017). An abuse of discretion occurs when the trial

court’s ruling is clearly against the logic of the circumstances and is so arbitrary and

unreasonable that it shocks the sense of justice and indicates a lack of careful consideration.

Asmus, 115 S.W.3d at 437. In reviewing the trial court’s denial of a motion to amend the

pleadings, this Court considers “whether justice is furthered or subverted by the trial court’s

decision.” Moore v. Armed Forces Bank, N.A., 534 S.W.3d 323, 328 (Mo. App. W.D.

2017) (citation omitted).

In determining whether to permit an amendment to a pleading, courts should

consider such factors as hardship to the moving party if the amendment is denied, undue

prejudice to the opposing party if the amendment is granted, the reasons the new matter

1 All rule references are to Mo. R. Civ. P. 2024, unless otherwise indicated.

4 was not included in earlier pleadings, the timeliness of the motion, bad faith by the moving

party, and whether the amendment would cure any deficiency in the pleading. Asmus, 115

S.W.3d at 433 (citing Forman v. Davis, 371 U.S. 178, 182 (1962)). Failing to consider

these elements indicates an abuse of discretion, in that it demonstrates a lack of careful

consideration. See ACLU of Missouri v. Maries County Sherriff’s Office, 688 S.W.3d

816, 819 (Mo. App. S.D. 2024) (finding abuse of discretion in trial court’s denial of motion

to amend when record indicated trial court did not consider any listed factors before

denying ACLU’s request to amend its petition); Asmus, 115 S.W.3d at 437 (citing Forman,

371 U.S. at 182)).

The trial court here gave no reason for denying Smith’s motion to amend her

pleadings. A flat denial with no justifying reason “is not an exercise of discretion; it is

merely abuse of that discretion.” Asmus, 115 S.W.3d at 437 (citing Forman, 371 U.S. at

182). Without an explanation for the ruling, this Court cannot determine whether the trial

court considered the factors it should have, and we will not speculate as to the trial court’s

basis for its decision. See id. (declining to speculate on review as to trial court’s reasons

for denial of motion to amend pleadings).

Although the Church argues that it was Smith’s burden on appeal to present a record

from which this Court can determine whether the trial court abused its discretion in denying

Smith’s motion to amend her pleadings, this argument ignores relevant caselaw on this

issue. Rather, the trial court is compelled to consider certain factors when denying a motion

to amend a petition, and failing to do so may, in itself, support a finding of an abuse of

discretion. See, e.g., ACLU, 688 S.W.3d at 819; Sloan-Odum v. Wilkerson, 176 S.W.3d

723, 726 (Mo. App. E.D. 2005) (finding abuse of discretion when record did not show trial

5 court considered critical factors in denying motion to amend pleadings); Asmus, 115

S.W.3d at 437.

Under the circumstances here, we find the trial court should have allowed Smith to

amend her petition. In determining whether the trial court abused its discretion in denying

leave to amend, this Court considers the same factors set forth in Asmus v. Capital Region

Family Practice. See Sloan-Odum, 176 S.W.3d at 725. First, and most critically, our

review of the record here shows that denying Smith’s motion to amend her petition resulted

in hardship by extinguishing Smith’s claim against the Church. See Manzer v. Sanchez,

985 S.W.2d 936, 939 (Mo. App. E.D. 1999) (court will find hardship for movant when

denial of motion to amend results in dismissal of original petition).

Smith’s original petition alleged injury from a defective threshold, and, in her

motion to amend, she requested to add facts and allegations learned during discovery

regarding the defective nature of the door. The trial court did not allow Smith to add claims

about the defective door to her petition and then granted summary judgment on the basis

that there was no genuine issue of material fact as to whether she was injured by the

defective threshold. Had the trial court allowed Smith to amend her petition to add the

defective door as an alternate theory of injury, the new claim would have defeated summary

judgment because the Church would have had to prove it was entitled to summary

judgment on Smith’s second theory of recovery. See Predovic v. Empire Dist. Elec. Co.,

603 S.W.3d 366, 370 (Mo. App. S.D. 2020) (where non-moving party alleges alternate

theories of recovery, moving party has to establish it is entitled to summary judgment on

both theories before summary judgment is appropriate). The trial court should have

considered, but did not, that the effect of its denial would be to terminate Smith’s case

6 against the Church. See Sloan-Odum, 176 S.W.3d at 726 (trial court abused its discretion

in denying motion to amend when it failed to consider “critical factor” of whether denial

precluded cause of action).

Second, allowing Smith to amend her motion would not have prejudiced the

Church. The parties were still actively engaged in discovery and the case had not yet been

set for trial. See Wheelehan v. Dueker, 996 S.W.2d 780, 782 (Mo. App. E.D. 1999) (no

prejudice to non-movant would have resulted from granting movant’s motion to amend

petition when case was still in preliminary stage, discovery was not completed, and trial

was not set). Daughter’s deposition revealed that there was another witness to Smith’s fall

who had not yet been deposed, who could have helped determine how Smith sustained her

injuries. Notably, in its suggestions in opposition to Smith’s motion to amend, the Church

did not allege it would be prejudiced by the amended motion but merely argued that all its

work based on the original pleadings would be “wasted.” Wasted effort does not rise to

the level of prejudice. See Germania St., LLC v. Jackson, 509 S.W.3d 123, 126 (Mo. App.

E.D. 2016) (motion for leave to amend results in prejudice only if non-moving party is

deprived legitimate claim or defense).

Third, while we agree with the Church that Smith has not explained why she alleged

one theory of injury in her petition and a different theory of injury in her deposition, the

record does not show this reason was the basis for the trial court’s denial of the motion to

amend. Had the trial court given this reason for its denial, it might have supported the trial

court’s denial of the motion to amend the petition. See Dibrill v. Normandy Assocs., Inc.,

383 S.W.3d 77, 92 (Mo. App. E.D. 2012). However, the trial court did not provide any

basis for its decision, and we decline to speculate as to its reasons for the denial. We note

7 that neither party challenges that Smith sustained serious injuries as a result of a fall at the

Church, regardless of whether the fall was caused by Smith tripping over a threshold or

being knocked over by a door swinging shut. Missouri courts generally favor reaching a

decision on the merits on the claim, rather than disposing of the case on technical or

procedural grounds. See Asmus, 115 S.W.3d at 436 (it is more in keeping with purposes

of pleading rules to allow amendment than to “preclude amendment on a technicality

without consideration of how justice would best be served”).

As to the remaining considerations, there was no allegation that Smith’s late motion

to amend her pleadings was in bad faith. Further, although it would have been better to

bring the motion to amend her original petition immediately after Smith’s deposition in

which she alleged her injury was caused by a defective door rather than a defective

threshold, her fault in the delay did not justify denying her motion, in light of the severe

hardship caused by the denial. See Sloan-Odum, 176 S.W.3d at 726 (movant’s fault in

failure to timely file motion to amend was not sufficient to outweigh serious hardship

incurred by denial of leave to amend).

Under the circumstances, the trial court’s denial of Smith’s motion to amend her

pleadings was an abuse of discretion because it resulted in severe hardship to Smith, and

the remaining considerations, even those negative to Smith, do not outweigh that hardship.

See Manzer, 985 S.W.2d at 939. Points I-IV are granted.

In Smith’s Points V though VIII, she argues the trial court erred in granting

summary judgment in favor of the Church. Because we grant Points I-IV and remand with

instructions for the trial court to allow Smith to amend her pleadings to add an alternate

theory of recovery, we necessarily reverse the trial court’s grant of summary judgment too.

8 If the non-moving party has alleged alternate theories of recovery on the same

claim, summary judgment is only proper if the moving party has established it is entitled

to judgment as a matter of law on both theories. Predovic, 603 S.W.3d at 370; Altidor v.

Broadfield, 576 S.W.3d 272, 278 (Mo. App. E.D. 2019). In Smith’s original petition, she

asserted the dangerous condition was the threshold. In her motion to amend her petition,

she requested to be allowed to add “allegations regarding the defective nature of the subject

door.” Her motion clearly demonstrated that she intended to add an alternate theory of

recovery asserting that the door was a dangerous condition.

If the trial court had properly allowed Smith to amend her petition to include the

alternate theory of recovery that the door was a dangerous condition, the trial court would

have had to deny the Church’s motion for summary judgment, which was based solely on

the issue of whether the threshold was a dangerous condition. See Altidor, 576 S.W.3d at

278 (to be entitled to summary judgment, party moving for summary judgment must show

it is entitled to judgment as matter of law on every viable theory pled). The Church can

file another summary-judgment motion to establish it is entitled to judgment as a matter of

law on all theories pled in the amended petition after further discovery. Therefore, at this

time, the trial court’s grant summary judgment was not appropriate.

Conclusion

We reverse the trial court’s order denying Smith’s motion to amend her petition,

and we remand with instructions for the trial court to grant Smith’s motion to amend her

petition by adding a second theory of recovery. We reverse the trial court’s grant of

summary judgment in favor the Church.

9 Gary M. Gaertner, Jr., J.

Philip M. Hess, P.J., and Lisa P. Page, J., concur.