Addicks v. Oregon Board of Parole

758 P.2d 357, 92 Or. App. 100
CourtCourt of Appeals of Oregon
DecidedJuly 13, 1988
Docket37943, 37945; CA A43863, A44498
StatusPublished

This text of 758 P.2d 357 (Addicks v. Oregon Board of Parole) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Court of Appeals of Oregon primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Addicks v. Oregon Board of Parole, 758 P.2d 357, 92 Or. App. 100 (Or. Ct. App. 1988).

Opinion

JOSEPH, C. J.

Petitioner seeks review of Parole Board orders rescinding a release date and setting a parole hearing date. The cases are consolidated on review. We affirm in both.

Petitioner is serving a life sentence on convictions for murder, arson and theft. He was sentenced in 1975. The legislature adopted the so-called matrix system in 1977. He had the option under OAR 255-30-002 to have the Board consider his parole under the discretionary criteria in former ORS 144.1751 and former ORS 144.1802 or under the matrix system. In 1981, [103]*103he chose to remain under the discretionary system. See Addicks v. Board of Parole, 63 Or App 409, 411, 663 P2d 1310 (1983).

On February 27, 1986, the Board met to consider petitioner’s parole, but the hearing was continued for lack of a quorum. The order noted that petitioner had chosen to remain under the discretionary system. On September 29, 1986, the Board reconvened with four of the five members present and set a parole release date of March 16, 1987, which suggests that it intended to act under the matrix. The Board, however, made none of the necessary findings required for applying the matrix. Later, the Board’s fifth member reviewed the record and voted against setting aparóle date, recommending instead that the hearing be continued, because the “[i]nmate [is] still under the discretionary system and can only have a parole hearing date on 3/16/87.” Nonetheless, the Board issued an order on November 26, 1986, setting a release date of March 16, 1987. On February 19, 1987, the Board rescinded that release date, having concluded that it had erred by “applying the wrong legal standard in setting the parole release date because the inmate is a discretionary case and should have been considered under the provisions of [former] ORS 144.175.”

At the subsequent hearing, the Board again asked petitioner to choose between the discretionary and the matrix systems. He first chose the matrix system, because he thought that the Board could not rescind its 1986 order setting the parole release date. The Board then told him that, if he chose [104]*104the matrix system, the hearing would have to be reset and that the matrix choice would be irrevocable. He then chose to remain under the discretionary system and to continue with the hearing. The Board set a parole hearing date for April 21, 1989. Petitioner argues that the Board erred in rescinding his 1987 parole release date, because the fact that he was given a parole date means that he was under the matrix system. He contends that his acceptance of that release date order demonstrated his intent to be considered under the matrix.

Before it can set a matrix release date, the Board must make findings regarding an inmate’s crime severity rating, history/risk score, guideline range and aggravation/mitigation factors. OAR 255-35-013. The Board made no findings in its November 26, 1986, order. Thus, even if it intended to evaluate petitioner under the matrix system, it did not follow the proper procedure. It had the duty to do its work properly, and that included an obligation to apply the discretionary criteria, unless petitioner had expressly exercised the other choice. The Board correctly rescinded its 1986 order. OAR 255-35-013; OAR 255-80-010(1) and (3).

Petitioner contends next that, even if he was evaluated under the discretionary system, the Board should have set a firm release date. He is wrong. See Addicks v. Board of Parole, supra, 63 Or App at 412.

In his third assignment of error, petitioner contends that the February 19,1987, rescission order is invalid, because only four members of the Board voted. The term “full membership of the Board” means “all voting members of the Board holding office and not disqualified from voting.” Larson v. State Board of Parole, 91 Or App 642, 756 P2d 674 (1988). Four members of the Board were present; one position was vacant. All the voting members holding office at the time voted to rescind the order; accordingly, the order is valid.

The last assignment is without merit, and we decline to discuss it.

Affirmed.

Free access — add to your briefcase to read the full text and ask questions with AI

Related

Addicks v. State Board of Parole
663 P.2d 1310 (Court of Appeals of Oregon, 1983)
Larson v. State Board of Parole
756 P.2d 674 (Court of Appeals of Oregon, 1988)

Cite This Page — Counsel Stack

Bluebook (online)
758 P.2d 357, 92 Or. App. 100, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/addicks-v-oregon-board-of-parole-orctapp-1988.