NOTICE: This opinion is subject to modification resulting from motions for reconsideration under Supreme Court Rule 27, the Court’s reconsideration, and editorial revisions by the Reporter of Decisions. The version of the opinion published in the Advance Sheets for the Georgia Reports, designated as the “Final Copy,” will replace any prior version on the Court’s website and docket. A bound volume of the Georgia Reports will contain the final and official text of the opinion.
In the Supreme Court of Georgia
Decided: January 5, 2026
S25A1220. ADAMS v. THE STATE.
LAND, Justice.
Tony Adams, Jr. was convicted of malice murder and other
crimes in relation to the stabbing and shooting death of his mother,
Belinda Woodson. 1 On appeal, Adams argues that his trial counsel
1 The crimes occurred on May 10, 2018. On July 16, 2018, a Dooly County
grand jury indicted Adams, charging him with malice murder (Count 1), felony murder (Count 2), two counts of aggravated assault (Counts 3-4), possession of a firearm during the commission of a felony (Count 5), and possession of a knife during the commission of a felony (Count 6). At a trial from October 25 through 28, 2021, a jury found Adams guilty on all counts. On November 2, 2021, the trial court sentenced Adams to serve life in prison without the possibility of parole for Count 1, a 20-year sentence for Count 4 (consecutive to Count 1), a five-year sentence for Count 5 (consecutive to Count 1), and a five-year sentence for Count 6 (consecutive to Count 4). Count 2 was vacated by operation of law. Although the trial court purported to merge Count 3 into Count 2 for sentencing purposes, it should have instead been merged into Count 1 because Count 2 was vacated. However, we decline to correct the error because a correction would have no impact on Adams’s sentence. See Williams v. State, 316 Ga. 147, 153 (2023) (where “the trial court’s incorrect nomenclature did not affect [a]ppellant’s sentence,” “there is no sentencing error to correct”). Adams filed a timely motion for new trial on November 1, 2021, which rendered constitutionally ineffective assistance by failing to
properly investigate Adams’s competency to stand trial, failing to
raise an insanity defense, and stating during Adams’s direct
examination in front of the jury “Are you for real here today? Are
you expecting us to believe all this nonsense?” Adams also argues
that the trial court erred by denying his motion to conduct a post-
judgment competency hearing. For the reasons that follow, we
affirm in part, vacate in part, and remand the case for resentencing.
The evidence presented at trial showed that Adams lived with
Woodson and her husband, Tyrone Woodson (“Tyrone”). Tyrone
testified that, on the morning of May 10, 2018, while he was at work,
he got a call from Woodson about Adams “acting up.” He advised
Woodson to call the police and ask that Adams “be removed from the
house.” Woodson told Tyrone that she spoke with the police but they
was later amended through new counsel on July 30, 2024. Following a hearing on January 14, 2025, the trial court denied the motion for new trial, as amended, on April 14, 2025. Adams timely filed a notice of appeal on April 21, 2025. This case was docketed to the August 2025 term of this Court and submitted for a decision on the briefs. 2 “said nothing could be d[one] about it that day.”2 Tyrone came home
at lunch, thought “everything was all right” between Woodson and
Adams, and then returned to work.
Tyrone further testified that, when he arrived home around
7:30 p.m., things at the house were “like normal.” But then Adams
broke a window in his room, and Woodson became upset and called
the police. Around 10:20 p.m., two officers came to the house, but
Adams was not removed. 3
After the officers left, Tyrone went into the primary bedroom,
and Woodson brought him a sandwich. Woodson went back towards
the kitchen, and then there was a “commotion.” Tyrone testified that
Woodson ran back into the bedroom, tripped, and fell on the bedroom
2 An officer testified that Woodson came into the Vienna police station
around 10:30 a.m. that morning “to make a complaint” about Adams and said that she “wanted [Adams] to leave.” The officer went to the house and spoke with Adams, who seemed “calm.” He advised Woodson that, since Adams had been living at the house, his removal was “a matter that [Woodson] had to go talk to the Magistrate Court Judge on.” He testified that no threats had been made and that, when he left the house, neither Woodson nor Adams seemed upset. 3 These officers testified that they spoke to Woodson and Adams and
concluded that they could not “force [Adams] to leave” because there was “no intent to commit a crime when he broke the window.” When the officers left, “[t]here was no sign of aggression” and nobody was “threatening anybody.” 3 floor. Adams, who was “running behind” Woodson, got “on her back,
like trying to stab her.” Adams stabbed Woodson twice before Tyrone
was able to take the knife from him. Tyrone “thought for sure that
[Woodson] had r[u]n out the door,” because he no longer saw her and
she was not answering him. 4 Adams ran towards his room and then
back towards Tyrone, so Tyrone ran out the front door. As he did,
Tyrone heard “two or three” gunshots.5
Across the street at a neighbor’s house, Irving Young, Evokeyo
Lundy, and Joseph Smith were outside in the yard. Lundy testified
that he heard a woman “scream out,” the men heard gunshots, and
Tyrone came running out of his house towards them. Tyrone told the
men to call the police because Adams had either “killed himself or
he killed his mother.” Adams then ran out of the house after Tyrone,
holding a gun and calling out, “pop, I got this. I got this.” Tyrone
“took off running again” towards another neighbor’s house. Tyrone
told the second neighbor that he had taken a knife from Adams
4Woodson instead had gone into the bathroom; the water was still running when investigators arrived at the scene. 5 Tyrone testified that, to his knowledge, there were no guns in the house.
4 because Adams was “sticking his mama.” Tyrone placed the knife in
a bag, gave it to the neighbor, and told him to call the police.
Meanwhile, Smith attempted to talk to Adams and tried to calm him
down. Lundy testified that Adams then “aim[ed] the gun … and
sho[t] himself” in the arm before returning to his house.
At 11:02 p.m., the two officers who responded to the earlier call
about the broken window responded to a report of “shots fired” at
Woodson’s house. Adams ran up to the patrol cars to speak with the
officers, who noticed that Adams had “a piece of clothing wrapped
around his left arm.” Adams told them that Woodson “had tried to
stab him, and he took the knife from her. … when he took the knife,
she shot him in the arm, and he took the gun away from her.” Adams
then told one of the officers that “when he took the gun, he done
what needed to be done, and she was dead.” The other officer
handcuffed Adams and placed him in the back of his patrol vehicle.
He then went inside the house to check on Woodson and found her
lying face down on the floor between the bedroom and bathroom with
a gun by her left hand. Woodson was pronounced dead at the scene,
5 and a medical examiner testified at trial that Woodson’s cause of
death was multiple gunshot and sharp force wounds.
An investigator who responded to the scene testified that the
blood stain around Woodson’s body indicated that she was standing
in the door between the bathroom and bedroom when she was killed.
He recovered a Jiminez Arms 9mm firearm from Woodson’s hand
and noted that the direction in which the firearm was laying did not
“look right” and made “no sense for someone who held a gun in that
hand.” The investigator located several cartridge casings and bullets
inside the bedroom and hallway, as well as a cartridge casing and
some blood stains on a table in Young’s yard.6 In Adams’s bedroom,
the investigator found a gun box containing a box of 9mm
ammunition, which matched the make and caliber involved in the
shooting, as well as a safe box containing a “bunch of knives.” 7 He
6 A firearms examiner testified that the seven 9mm cartridge casings
recovered from the scene – including the one from Young’s yard – and the four bullets – including the one removed from Woodson’s body – were all fired from the Jiminez Arms 9mm pistol. 7 Fingerprints were lifted from the box of ammunition, and the crime lab
confirmed that two of the fingerprints were Adams’s. 6 also noted a “blood drip trail” that had been left by someone who had
traveled from Young’s yard into Woodson’s bedroom.
Adams was taken to the Dooly County Jail, where he was
advised of his rights pursuant to Miranda v. Arizona, 384 US 436
(1966), and subsequently interviewed by law enforcement. The
investigator who interviewed Adams testified that Adams could
read and write, did not appear to be under the influence of any drugs
or alcohol, and was responsive to the questions asked during the
interview. Adams initially claimed that Woodson came from the
kitchen with a knife, that he took it and “stabbed her … a few times”
before she ran back towards the bathroom and shot him in the arm
as he was standing in the hallway. Adams then “got the gun” from
Woodson and shot her several times. He claimed that he never shot
the gun outside.
Later, when confronted with the ballistics evidence, Adams
eventually conceded that Woodson did not shoot him. He then
admitted that he shot himself in the arm outside in the neighbor’s
yard, returned to his house, and then placed the gun in Woodson’s
7 hand because he needed “some type of … defense in [his] way.”
Adams testified in his own defense at trial, where he again
admitted to stabbing and shooting Woodson. Following these
admissions, his trial counsel inquired into Adams’s motive. Adams
testified that there was a “situation between me, my mother, and
the money that was with my mother” and that he “was setup. … my
mother activated the anger in me.” He claimed that he was not
“there in the spirit” when he killed Woodson, that his “body had a
criminal in it” and committed the crimes, and that he could not
remember the situation. Adams attributed his actions to the fact
that he had previously been “hit with needles and blood” and was
“drug-abused and date raped.” When asked why he shot himself in
the arm, Adams stated it was because of a “clear possession.
Possession. An exorcism.” Adams’s counsel then asked, “Really.
Seriously. Are you for real here today? Are you expecting us to
believe all this nonsense?” to which Adams replied, “A hundred
percent.”
1. Adams argues that his trial counsel was ineffective because
8 he failed to properly investigate Adams’s competency to stand trial,
failed to raise an insanity defense, and stated during Adams’s direct
examination in front of the jury, “Are you for real here today? Are
you expecting us to believe all this nonsense?” We are unpersuaded.
For Adams to prevail on his ineffective assistance claims, he
must show that his trial counsel performed deficiently and that the
deficiency prejudiced him. See Strickland v. Washington, 466 US
668, 687 (1984). To show deficiency, Adams must establish that his
trial counsel “performed at trial in an objectively unreasonable way
considering all the circumstances and in light of prevailing
professional norms.” Taylor v. State, 315 Ga. 630, 647 (2023)
(citation and punctuation omitted). The law “recognizes a ‘strong
presumption’ that counsel performed reasonably, and the defendant
bears the burden of overcoming this presumption.” Evans v. State,
315 Ga. 607, 611 (2023) (citation and punctuation omitted). And
“hindsight has no place in an assessment of the performance of trial
counsel, and a lawyer second-guessing his own performance with the
benefit of hindsight has no significance for an ineffective assistance
9 of counsel claim.” Taylor, 315 Ga. at 649 (citation and punctuation
omitted).
To satisfy the prejudice prong, Adams “must prove that there
is a reasonable probability that, but for his trial counsel’s deficiency,
the result of the trial would have been different.” Scott v. State, 322
Ga. 395, 400 (2025) (citation and punctuation omitted). If Adams
“fails to make a sufficient showing on either the deficiency or the
prejudice prong, we need not address the other prong.” Id. “In
reviewing a ruling on a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, we
defer to the trial court’s findings of fact unless they are clearly
erroneous, but we apply the law to the facts de novo.” Payne v. State,
314 Ga. 322, 329 (2022) (citation and punctuation omitted).
(a) Adams argues that his trial counsel rendered ineffective
assistance by failing to properly investigate his competency to stand
trial. We disagree.
On June 21, 2018, the trial court ordered a mental health
evaluation to determine Adams’s competency to stand trial. Adams
was evaluated by the Georgia Department of Behavioral Health on
10 March 21, 2019 and was found competent. The report noted that
Adams “reported a recent history of mental health symptoms” but
that the symptoms resulted from his “significant illicit drug use,”
and that Adams’s test results indicated that he was “grossly feigning
his psychiatric symptoms.” The report also stated that, although
Adams “might be experiencing some depression or anxiety related
to his current legal situation, his symptoms do not appear to be
adversely affecting his understanding of his legal situation” and
concluded that Adams had “the capacity to understand the nature
and object of the proceedings against him, comprehend his own
condition in reference to the proceedings, and … assist his attorney
in providing a proper defense.”
“The threshold for competency is easily met in most cases.”
Gray v. State, 309 Ga. 850, 855 (2020) (cleaned up). We ask whether,
at the time of trial, the defendant was “capable of understanding the
nature and object of the proceedings, comprehends his own condition
in reference to those proceedings, and is able to assist his counsel in
providing a proper defense.” Id. Generally speaking, “a trial
11 counsel’s decision to for[]go or curtail further investigation of an
accused’s mental health, even when there has been a previous
mental hospitalization, is reasonable when an expert has
determined that the defendant is fit to stand trial.” Sullivan v. State,
308 Ga. 508, 513 (2020) (cleaned up).
Here, Adams has failed to establish that it was objectively
unreasonable for trial counsel not to further investigate his
competency to stand trial. Prior to trial, Adams underwent a mental
health evaluation, and the findings not only deemed him competent
to stand trial but also concluded that he was “feigning” his
psychiatric symptoms. Although the evaluation was performed two
years before the trial, counsel testified that he “never saw or heard
or observed anything in [his] interaction with [Adams] that would
have … given [him] any reason to suspect [Adams’s] competency” to
stand trial, and Adams does not point to any evidence arising
subsequent to the report which would indicate that his mental
12 health had changed since it was issued. 8 Under these circumstances,
trial counsel did not perform deficiently in forgoing a second
competency opinion. See Sullivan, 308 Ga. at 514 (“Given this
record, even if other attorneys might have explored the mental issue
further, we cannot conclude that the investigation by and tactical
judgment of [a]ppellant’s attorney was outside the wide range of
reasonably effective assistance.” (citation and punctuation
omitted)).
(b) Adams argues that trial counsel also rendered ineffective
assistance by not raising an insanity defense. We disagree.
“An attorney’s decision about which defense to present is a
question of trial strategy, and trial strategy, if reasonable, does not
constitute ineffective assistance of counsel.” Brooks v. State, 309 Ga.
630, 637 (2020) (citation and punctuation omitted). See Taylor, 315
8 Although Adams points to the testimony of a nurse at the Dooly County
Jail where Adams was incarcerated prior to trial that she referred Adams to Middle Flint Behavioral Services for a mental health evaluation where he was prescribed medication, the nurse also testified that Adams never made any comments that she perceived as “delusion[al],” that she sent him to behavioral services because he “wanted to change his name,” and that his behavior was consistent with “just being a difficult person.” 13 Ga. at 647–49 (holding that trial counsel’s decision not to raise an
insanity defense was not an objectively unreasonable trial strategy
where counsel considered a psychological report that defendant was
not suffering from a delusion at the time of the crimes, ceased
additional investigation into defendant’s mental health, and decided
against raising additional evidence that could have supported an
insanity defense).
At the hearing on Adams’s motion for new trial, trial counsel
testified that his defense theory at trial was one of self-defense.
There was some evidence presented at trial to support this theory,
including that Woodson was upset with Adams, Adams’s testimony
that Woodson stabbed and shot him, and that her body was found
with a gun. 9
Meanwhile, there was nothing in Adams’s mental health
evaluation or in trial counsel’s interactions with Adams that led
9 As noted above, however, Adams admitted to investigators during his
interview that he stabbed and shot Woodson, shot himself in the arm, and then placed the gun back in her hand. The physical evidence at the scene and several eyewitnesses corroborated this version of events. 14 counsel to believe that Adams suffered from insanity. In fact, his
mental health evaluation concluded that his mental status at the
time of Woodson’s murder was the result of intoxication, that Adams
“was able to distinguish right from wrong,” and that he “was not
operating under a delusional compulsion that overmastered his will
to commit the alleged offense.” Accordingly, trial counsel’s decision
to pursue a defense theory of self-defense instead of an insanity
defense was objectively reasonable, see Starks v. State, 283 Ga. 164,
168 (2008) (trial counsel’s decision to pursue a self-defense strategy
instead of an insanity defense was reasonable where psychiatrist
who examined defendant concluded that he was not legally insane),
and Adams’s claim of ineffective assistance therefore fails.
(c) Adams argues that his trial counsel rendered ineffective
assistance when he asked him, in front of the jury during direct
examination, “Are you for real here today? Are you expecting us to
believe all this nonsense?” We disagree.
During trial counsel’s direct examination of Adams, Adams
was asked about his motive for killing Woodson. He testified that
15 his mother “activated the anger in [him],” that he was not “there in
spirit” when he killed her, that he had previously been “drug-abused
and date raped,” and that he shot himself in the arm because of a
“possession” and “exorcism.” This led to trial counsel’s questions
indicating that Adams’s testimony was “nonsense.”
During the hearing on Adams’s motion for new trial, trial
counsel testified that he originally prepared to present a self-defense
theory at trial but agreed that he “may have had to change trial
strategies” once Adams testified that he shot and stabbed his
mother.
Even assuming that trial counsel’s comments amounted to
deficient performance, Adams has failed to show that he was
prejudiced. He merely argues that the questions “cast doubt on [his]
testimony and credibility” and were “disparaging to” his case. Even
if we accept that argument, the jury was authorized to discredit
Adams’s testimony without these questions, and there was
significant evidence that Adams killed Woodson without any valid
excuse or justification presented at trial. Thus, it is not reasonably
16 likely that counsel’s questions affected the outcome of Adams’s trial.
See Taylor, 315 Ga at 650–51 (assuming without deciding that trial
counsel’s performance was deficient, “[w]e cannot say that there is a
‘reasonable probability’ that [defendant] would have received a
lighter sentence” where evidence of defendant’s guilt, which
included his own admissions, was strong).
2. Adams also argues that the trial court erred by denying his
motion to conduct a post-judgment competency hearing to determine
whether he had been competent to stand trial. Because we conclude
that the trial court did not abuse its discretion, we reject this
argument.
Adams’s trial concluded on October 28, 2021. On July 30, 2024,
as part of his amended motion for new trial, Adams moved the court
to conduct a post-judgment competency hearing. In its order denying
Adams’s motion for new trial, the trial court denied Adams’s request
for the hearing. Specifically, the trial court held:
The record before this court contains an evaluation of [Adams] two and a half years before trial that he was competent to stand trial and criminally responsible. His
17 attorney found no reason to believe he was incompetent when working with him prior to and during the trial. At present, [Adams] is some three years and five months post-trial, and the court does not believe such an inquiry at this late date would be informative.
In Cane v. State, 285 Ga. 19, 21–22 (2009), we considered
whether the trial court abused its discretion by denying appellant’s
post-trial motion that a psychiatric examination was necessary
because “his incompetency was indicated by the ‘emotional and
obsessive behavior’ he demonstrated at trial and at the hearing on
his motion for new trial regarding his ‘unreasonable’ belief that his
statements to the police had been edited.” But the appellant “did not,
either prior to or during trial, raise the issue of incompetency or seek
a hearing regarding his competency, and our examination of the
record fail[ed] to reflect anything that would have required the trial
court to make a sua sponte inquiry about it.” Id. at 22. We concluded
that the trial court did not abuse its discretion by denying
appellant’s motion. Id.
While Adams did raise an issue concerning his competency
prior to trial, the mental health evaluation declaring him competent
18 to stand trial was presented to and reviewed by the trial court.
Throughout the investigation and during the trial, Adams agreed
that he understood the proceedings against him. And Adams’s
counsel testified that he found no reason to believe that Adams was
incompetent prior to or during the trial. Even if Adams’s self-serving
testimony could have been interpreted to support his claim of
incompetence, it was within the trial court’s discretion to assess
Adams’s demeanor and other conduct at trial to determine whether
there was a question about his competency. And here, the trial court
had been presented with a mental health evaluation that opined
that Adams was largely feigning his psychiatric symptoms.
Moreover, Adams has not provided expert opinions or medical
records to counter the pre-trial competency determination. 10 Thus,
we see no abuse of discretion in the trial court’s denial of Adams’s
motion for a post-judgment competency hearing.
3. Finally, although Adams does not raise the issue on appeal,
10 As discussed above, the testimony of the nurse from the Dooly County
Jail did not support Adams’s argument that he was mentally incompetent. 19 the trial court erred when it convicted him of both malice murder
(Count 1) and aggravated assault premised on a stabbing (Count 4),
instead of merging the latter into the former. “Even when no party
raises a merger error, if we note such an error, we have the
discretion to correct it on direct appeal.” Dixon v. State, 302 Ga. 691,
696 (2017). We exercise that discretion here.
OCGA § 16-1-7(a) affords a defendant with substantive double jeopardy protection by prohibiting multiple convictions and punishments for the same offense. OCGA § 16-1-7(a)(1) prohibits a defendant from being convicted of more than one crime if one crime is included in another, and aggravated assault is included in the crime of malice murder when the former is established by proof of the same or less than all the facts.
Johnson v. State, 300 Ga. 665, 666 (2017) (cleaned up).
Adams was convicted of malice murder for the shooting death
of Woodson and of aggravated assault for stabbing her with a knife.
The medical examiner testified that Woodson’s cause of death was
multiple gunshot wounds and sharp force wounds. Although there
was an interval between the stabbing and the shooting, this was not
a case where the stabbing was a non-fatal injury. Based on the
20 evidence presented at trial, the record shows that the stabbing
contributed to the death. Because the aggravated assault conviction
was established by the same facts as the malice murder conviction,
except that the malice murder conviction also required proof of
malice aforethought, the aggravated assault conviction was
included in the malice murder conviction and merged into it. See
Douglas v. State, 321 Ga. 739, 750 (2025). As such, we hereby vacate
Adams’s conviction and sentence for Count 4.
Also, the trial court sentenced Adams to serve five years for the
possession of a knife during the commission of a felony (Count 6), to
run consecutively to the aggravated assault sentence (Count 4).
Because we are vacating the aggravated assault conviction, the
sentence on Count 6 cannot run consecutively to the sentence for
Count 4. As such, we hereby vacate the sentence pertaining to Count
6 and remand for the trial court to resentence Adams on that count,
which could run consecutively to another of the remaining counts.
See Ellington v. State, 314 Ga. 335, 346 (2022) (remanding for
resentencing because the sentence for a vacated conviction would
21 have run consecutively with two other sentences).
Judgment affirmed in part and vacated in part, and case remanded for resentencing. All the Justices concur.