Adams v. S. H. Bolinger & Co.

75 So. 218, 141 La. 493, 1917 La. LEXIS 1519
CourtSupreme Court of Louisiana
DecidedApril 16, 1917
DocketNo. 21883
StatusPublished
Cited by4 cases

This text of 75 So. 218 (Adams v. S. H. Bolinger & Co.) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Supreme Court of Louisiana primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Adams v. S. H. Bolinger & Co., 75 So. 218, 141 La. 493, 1917 La. LEXIS 1519 (La. 1917).

Opinions

PROYOSTY, J.

Plaintiff was one of the crew of the defendant company’s railroad construction and repair train on the defendant company’s logging railroad. The men rode on the locomotive and tender in going to and returning from their work. On the day of the accident that has given rise to this suit, the train and tender and four flat cars, loaded with steel rails and wooden cross-ties, stopped at one of the camps of the defendant company in the woods, where there was a commissary store, to wait until a Shay engine, which was on a branch road that connected with the main line at this point, should come and remove some empty ears that stood in the way on the main line. The men got off of the train, and loitered around, and, meantime, as it was near the dinner hour, ate their dinner from out of their pails. The weather was somewhat cold, and a drizzling rain was falling. When the Shay engine came in sight, and the foreman, Arnold, gave the signal for all to get on the train, plaintiff was seated on a cross-tie at a fire which some one had built about 50 feet from the locomotive and about 30 feet from the track. When plaintiff reached the train it was in motion, and he was running. He grabbed the handhold of the tender to get on; his foot slipped from the step-, and went upon the rail, and was crushed.

[1] The step was old, shaky, and loose, with an inward movement, and it was lower at one end than at the other, it having been in a wreck and been knocked backward; and to this defective condition plaintiff attributes the accident.

This defectiveness is contested by defendant, but is overwhelmingly shown; and it was unquestionably one of the contributing causes of the accident; and we agree with plaintiff that to have left in this condition this step which the men had to be constantly using for getting on and off of the train constituted negligence on the part of the defendant company, a violation of the rule which requires the employer to furnish the employs a safe place and safe appliances. The defect had existed 'amply long enough for defendant to have had knowledge of it.

Had the train been stationary, the slipping off of the foot would not have been attended with any serious consequences; hence the train’s being in motion was another of the contributing causes of the accident; and defendant invokes the rule that to attempt to get on or off of a moving train is negligence barring recovery for injuries resulting therefrom.

[2] We have not been referred to any case where this rule has been applied to trainmen or to workmen expected to get on or off of a construction train without unnecessary loss of time, and we have found none in the limited research we have been able to make; but for such employés as for passengers it is more dangerous to get on or off of a train when in motion than when stationary, and is therefore an imprudence, unless induced by some good reason, and hence the rule ought to apply to them as well as to passengers.

However, the rule not being an arbitrary one, but founded on the imprudence of the act, its applicability to any particular case must necessarily depend upon whether under the circumstances of the particular case, the act was consistent with ordinary prudence. No one would doubt the rashness of an infirm old person attempting to board or get off of an express train under full headway ; whereas hardly any one we imagine would deem it imprudent for an athletic young brakem-an to get on or off of a slowly moving train. The rule and its limitations [497]*497are very fully and lucidly stated in 5 R. C. L. 36, and we find in Thompson oh Neg., § 2856, the following statement of it with a qualification apposite to this ease:

“It may be said here that whether or not it will be deemed negligence for a person to attempt to board a train, after it has started to move from the station, will depend upon the speed at which the train is moving, the physical condition of the passenger himself, and other surrounding circumstances. It is well known that trainmen habitually board their trains after they commence to move, and that passengers frequently do so; and it would seem to follow, from the mere consideration of this fact, that negligence cannot be imputed to such an act as a matter of law.”

The question of negligence vel non on the part of the plaintiff will have, then, to be determined from the circumstances of the case.

Plaintiff was 27 years old, and in good health. Of his agility he says: “I didn’t see anybody any quicker than I was.” He attributes his having had to run and his having reached the train only after it was in motion to the shortness of the time allowed the men for getting on. Defendant says that he was slow in leaving the fire. The train was hacking away from the fire, and was to go only far enough to clear the switch so as to. let the Shay engine get on the main line between it and the empty cars. If it was moving very slowly when plaintiff reached it, and he had lost no time after receiving the order to get on, but had hurried, his act in attempting to board it while it was moving would certainly not be negligence. If, on the other hand, plaintiff was slow in leaving the fire, as defendant contends, and the train had already attained some speed when plaintiff reached it, the act of plaintiff in attempting to board it would have been imprudent, and negligent, and would bar recovery. And there is also the question as to whether plaintiff knew that the step was defective.

We will now reproduce the testimony on these points, bringing together, in doing so, the parts that belong together, and substituting whenever occasion may require the noun for the pronoun, leaving out nothing that could change the sense or impart a different complexion.

It will be understood that the head of the train was towards the fire, and that the train backed when it moved, in other words, moved away from the fire, so that to the distance which plaintiff had to travel for reaching the tender .must be added the length of the locomotive and whatever distance, if any, the tender had moved before he reached it.

“Mr. Dave Arnold, the foreman, he was down ahead of the train, and he said, ‘All right, boys; come on.’ He jumped up, and said, ‘All right, boys; come- on;’ and I saw his band in the air, and I knew what he meant, and the engineer and all of us ran, and Mr. Knight, who was my side partner, was a little ahead of me, and he got on just as it started. The engineer was between me and the engine, standing between me and the engine, on the ground. He ran and got on the train and never sat down, but just grabbed the throttle and turned it on at once. Q. How soon after he got up in the cab was it before he put the engine in motion? A. Not over two seconds, because he never sat down. Q. When you looked around and saw Mr. Arnold, your foreman, what was be doing with his hand? A. He was giving the signal to the engineer and to all of us; it meant for us to go to work. Q. How soon after that highball was given was it before you started to the engine? A. Just as soon as I could get there. You can have an idea about how quick you can move — well, just as quick as I could. Q. Then tell just what you did when you got to the engine? What did you do? A. I ran up and. caught hold of the handholds and put my right foot on the step, and the step was loose and gave under the engine, and my foot slipped off. Q. Did you know at that time that this step was defective? A. No, sir; not until after I was hurt. Q. Had any of the steel gang gotten on this train ahead of you? A. Yes, sir; Mr.

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Cite This Page — Counsel Stack

Bluebook (online)
75 So. 218, 141 La. 493, 1917 La. LEXIS 1519, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/adams-v-s-h-bolinger-co-la-1917.