Adams v. Mt. Blue Health Center

1999 ME 105, 735 A.2d 478, 1999 Me. 105, 1999 Me. LEXIS 122
CourtSupreme Judicial Court of Maine
DecidedJuly 7, 1999
StatusPublished
Cited by13 cases

This text of 1999 ME 105 (Adams v. Mt. Blue Health Center) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Supreme Judicial Court of Maine primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Adams v. Mt. Blue Health Center, 1999 ME 105, 735 A.2d 478, 1999 Me. 105, 1999 Me. LEXIS 122 (Me. 1999).

Opinion

DANA, J.

[¶ 1] The employee, Floyd Adams Jr., appeals from a decision of the Workers’ Compensation Board denying his petition for an inflation adjustment. Pursuant to the law at the time of his 1990 injury, employees were entitled to an inflation adjustment for total, but not partial, incapacity benefits. 39 M.R.S.A. §§ 54-B, 55-B (1989), repealed by the Maine Workers’ Compensation Act of 1992, P.L.1991, ch. 885, § A-7. The issue is whether Adams is receiving voluntary payments of benefits *479 for total or 100% partial incapacity. The Board concluded that, notwithstanding the unavailability of work within his local community and his inability to perform full-time work in the statewide labor market, Adams has a part-time work capacity and is therefore entitled to partial, and not total, incapacity benefits. We conclude that the Board did not apply the correct legal standard for the employee’s 1990 date of injury, and, accordingly, vacate.

I. FACTS

[¶ 2] Adams suffered a work-related back injury on November 8, 1990, while employed by Mt. Blue Health Center. Except for a brief, unsuccessful return to light-duty employment in 1991, Adams has received the equivalent of total incapacity benefits since the date of his injury. Adams filed a petition for award of an inflation adjustment in October 1996, contending that he has received total incapacity benefits pursuant to former section 54-B and is, therefore, entitled to an inflation adjustment. The Board denied the petition and we granted the employee’s petition for appellate review pursuant to 39-A M.R.S.A. § 322 (Supp.1998).

II. ANALYSIS

[¶ 3] At the time of Adams’ 1990 injury, former section 54-B provided, in pertinent part:

While the incapacity for work resulting from the injury is total, the employer shall pay the injured employee a weekly compensation equal to % his average gross weekly wages, earnings or salary, ....
1. Annual adjustment. Beginning on the 3rd anniversary of the injury, weekly compensation under this section shall be adjusted annually....
2. Limitation. Any employee who has reached maximum medical improvement and is able to perform jfull-time remunerative work in the ordinary competitive labor market in the State, regardless of the availability of such work in and around his community, is not eligible for compensation under this section, but may be eligible for compensation under section 55-B....

39 M.R.S.A. § 54-B, repealed by P.L.1991, ch. 885, § A-7 (emphasis added).

[¶ 4] The term “total incapacity” has never been defined in the Act. Our opinions prior to 1987 use the term “total incapacity” to mean (1) a total physical incapacity to perform any work, either part-time or full-time, or (2) the combination of a partial physical incapacity attributable to that injury and the absence of any employment opportunity in the employee’s local community. See Curtis v. Bridge Constr. Corp., 428 A.2d 62, 64 (Me.1981); Ibbitson v. Sheridan Corp., 422 A.2d 1005, 1008-11 (Me.1980); Pelchat v. Portland Box Co., 155 Me. 226, 229-30, 153 A.2d 615, 617-18 (1959); Connelly’s Case, 122 Me. 289, 292-93, 119 A. 664, 666 (Me.1923); Ray’s Case, 122 Me. 108, 110-11, 119 A. 191, 191-92 (1922).

[¶ 5] The method of establishing entitlement to total or 100% incapacity benefits in cases involving employees with a partial physical incapacity is commonly known as the “work-search” doctrine. See Tripp v. Philips Elmet Corp., 676 A.2d 927, 928-29 (Me.1996). As we have stated, the “work-search” rule is not a particularly apt name for the doctrine because the failure to perform a work-search has never constituted ground for completely denying benefits; the doctrine is only intended to determine an employee’s entitlement to total or 100% benefits. Id. Moreover, the employee is not required to provide evidence of a “work-search” per se, to establish the unavailability of work in the local community. Id. We have held that any competent evidence, e.g., labor market surveys, may be used to establish the unavailability of work. Id.; see, e.g., Poltras v. R.E. Glidden Body Shop. 430 A.2d 1113, 1120 (Me.1981); Warren v. Vinalhaven *480 Light & Power Co., 424 A.2d 711, 714-15 (Me.1981).

[¶ 6] Prior to 1987, it had not been necessary to distinguish between total and 100% partial incapacity, because, as a practical matter, there was no real difference between these benefits. After 1987, with the enactment of the durational limit to partial incapacity benefits (i.e., 400 weeks) and the repeal of the inflation adjustment for partial benefits, it became necessary to determine whether an employee’s maximum incapacity benefits fell within the total incapacity statute, section 54-B, or the partial incapacity statute, section 55-B. See P.L.1987, ch. 559, Pt. B, § 30, repealed by P.L.1991, ch. 885, § A-7. 1

[¶ 7] In this case, the Board has interpreted section 54-B to apply only to cases of total physical incapacity. Pursuant to the Board’s interpretation, when a partially incapacitated employee establishes the unavailability of any employment in the local community due to the injury, the employee is entitled to 100% partial incapacity pursuant to the partial incapacity statute, 39 M.R.S.A. § 55-B, repealed by P.L.1991, ch. 885, § A-7. Because Adams demonstrated a physical work capacity to perform part-time work, the Board concluded that he was not entitled to total incapacity benefits pursuant to section 54-B, but because he had established the unavailability of any work within his local community, he was entitled to 100% partial incapacity benefits pursuant to section 55-B.

8] Relying on the limitation in subsection 54-B(2), however, Adams contends that partially incapacitated employees, even those actually earning part-time post-injury wages, may be entitled to total incapacity benefits whenever they are unable to perform full-time remunerative work in the statewide labor market. The Board rejected this interpretation, stating: “By this logic, an employee who is [... performing] a significant amount of part-time [work] would be entitled to total workers’ compensation benefits pursuant to former § 54-B.” We agree with the Board that the actual receipt of post-injury wages precludes an award of total incapacity benefits. See Dunkin Donuts of America, Inc. v. Watson,

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Bluebook (online)
1999 ME 105, 735 A.2d 478, 1999 Me. 105, 1999 Me. LEXIS 122, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/adams-v-mt-blue-health-center-me-1999.