Adams v. Gaudet

515 F. Supp. 1086, 1981 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 12327, 30 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 1258
CourtDistrict Court, W.D. Louisiana
DecidedMay 27, 1981
DocketCiv. A. 760922
StatusPublished
Cited by8 cases

This text of 515 F. Supp. 1086 (Adams v. Gaudet) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, W.D. Louisiana primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Adams v. Gaudet, 515 F. Supp. 1086, 1981 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 12327, 30 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 1258 (W.D. La. 1981).

Opinion

OPINION

VERON, District Judge.

This matter was originally filed by the named plaintiffs, Johnnie Adams, Wilbert D. Rochelle, Melton Alfred, Margaret Oscar and Arthur Lewis, individually and as a class action claiming a broad range of allegedly discriminatory employment practices of the Jefferson Davis Parish School Board. All of the originally named plaintiffs were certified teachers employed by the Jefferson Davis Parish School Board who were serving in various professional capacities within the Jefferson Davis Parish School System. Subsequently by amended complaints, Hilda Beloney, a lunchroom worker, Dazzetta Thorne, an applicant for a clerical position, and Jessie Allison, a teacher-coach, were added as named plaintiffs. The action was brought pursuant to Title VII of the Civil Rights Acts of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000c, 1 as amended, with the original named plaintiffs having filed charges with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) alleging discrimination on the basis of race. Plaintiff Margaret *1094 Oscar also alleged discrimination on the basis of sex. This suit was also instituted pursuant to 42 U.S.C. Sections 1981 2 and 1983 3 and jurisdiction was invoked pursuant to 28 U.S.C. Sections 1343(3), (4), 2201, 1331, and the 14th Amendment to the United States Constitution.

In general, as this Court found in its ruling of October 11,1977, plaintiffs asserted in their complaints that they represented the class of all employees or potential employees of defendants (the individual school board members were also sued in their individual and official capacities) who have been or will be discriminated against because of their race. It was claimed that the alleged discrimination took the form of refusal to hire certain black applicants as well as the refusal to elevate various faculty members, clerical employees, members of coaching staffs, etc. to higher positions solely because they are black. The plaintiffs also alleged that the defendants followed a policy that discouraged blacks from applying for employment or advancement. The plaintiffs moved for class certification, a hearing was held, and this Court conditionally certified a class as follows:

“All present and former black employees and all black applicants as of or at any time after August 30,1975, of the Jefferson Davis Parish School Board in any clerical, supervisor, principal, coach (including assistant coaches), music teacher and lunchroom manager job classifications.”

The original complaint of plaintiffs was filed on August 31, 1976. The originally named plaintiffs had filed charges of discrimination with the EEOC on or about August 26, 1976 and amended their original complaint on January 11, 1977 alleging that on November 15, 1976 they, that is, Johnnie Adams,. Melton Alfred, Margaret Oscar, Wilbert D. Rochelle and Arthur Lewis, received the statutory notice of right to sue from the United States Department of Justice.

The defendants thereafter moved for partial summary judgment dismissing any claims of the plaintiffs or of the plaintiff class which arose prior to August 31, 1975 which were brought pursuant to 42 U.S.C. Sections 1981 or 1983 and any claims which may have been alleged which arose more than 180 days prior to the date of the filing of plaintiffs’ charges with the EEOC. In addition defendants moved that all claims for relief in the nature of back-pay or other monetary damages were barred by the passage of the statute of limitations for any claim that arose prior to August 31, 1975. The Court granted the defendants’ motion for partial summary judgment. This matter was then set down for trial and trial commenced on September 10, 1980 and concluded on September 24, 1980.

Plaintiffs allege that they were victims of purposeful racial discrimination (disparate treatment) and also that the employment policies of the Jefferson Davis School Board had a disproportionate exclusionary impact (disparate impact) upon them as blacks. 4 *1095 In deciding the merits of those allegations, we will first review the law applicable to plaintiffs’ claims of purposeful racial discrimination and then apply that law to the evidence presented in connection with the various positions which plaintiffs claim they were denied because of their race. We will then consider plaintiffs’ claims that the employment procedures used by the defendants had a disproportionate exclusionary impact on blacks.

I. PURPOSEFUL DISCRIMINATION

(Disparate Treatment)

To establish a prima facie case of purposeful racial employment discrimination under Title VII the Supreme Court has held that a plaintiff must present evidence from which an inference may be drawn that he was denied a job because of his race. See McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 93 S.Ct. 1817, 36 L.Ed.2d 668 (1971). While the McDonnell Douglas decision acknowledged that the proof necessary to raise such an inference will vary from case to case, the Court suggested that a plaintiff could satisfy his initial burden with evidence showing “(i) that he belongs to a racial minority, (ii) that he applied and was qualified for a job for which the employer was seeking applications, (iii) that despite his qualifications, he was rejected, and (iv) that after his rejection the position remained open and the employer continued to seek applicants from persons of [plaintiff’s] qualifications.” Id. at 802, 93 S.Ct. at 1824. 5

In this Circuit, if the employer has a history of racial discrimination, such history may be a component in a plaintiff’s prima facie case. In Lee v. Washington County Bd. of Education, 625 F.2d 1235 (5th Cir. *1096 1980) a case involving black public school teachers claiming that they were denied promotions because of their race, the court held that proof of an immediate past history of racial discrimination would alone be sufficient to shift the burden to the local school board to explain their decisions. If the history of racial discrimination was more remote in time to when the challenged decisions were made, the Lee court held that it would still be relevant evidence but that some other evidence of discrimination was necessary to establish a prima facie case. Such other evidence was provided in Lee in the form of statistics showing that few if any black teachers were promoted into certain positions from the time the school system was ordered desegregated until the time suit was filed. 6

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Bluebook (online)
515 F. Supp. 1086, 1981 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 12327, 30 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 1258, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/adams-v-gaudet-lawd-1981.