Adams v. Dura Cab Corp.

Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of New York

Adams v. Dura Cab Corp.

2017 NY Slip Op 5700, 152 A.D.3d 634, 58 N.Y.S.3d 555

CourtAppellate Division of the Supreme Court of the State of New York

DecidedJuly 14, 2017

Docket2015-04638

StatusPublished

Cited by7 cases

This text of 2017 NY Slip Op 5700 (Adams v. Dura Cab Corp.) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of the State of New York primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook

Adams v. Dura Cab Corp., 2017 NY Slip Op 5700, 152 A.D.3d 634, 58 N.Y.S.3d 555 (N.Y. Ct. App. 2017).

Pincite

Opinion

In an action to recover damages for personal injuries, the *635 plaintiff appeals, as limited by his brief, from so much of an order of the Supreme Court, Kings County (Ash, J.), dated March 11, 2015, as granted that branch of the motion of the defendants Lauren Márchese and Leigh Márchese which was for summary judgment dismissing the complaint insofar as asserted against them on the ground that the plaintiff did not sustain a serious injury within the meaning of Insurance Law § 5102 (d).

Ordered that the order is reversed insofar as appealed from, on the law, with costs, and that branch of the motion of the defendants Lauren Márchese and Leigh Márchese which was for summary judgment dismissing the complaint insofar as asserted against them on the ground that the plaintiff did not sustain a serious injury within the meaning of Insurance Law § 5102 (d) is denied.

The respondents failed to meet their prima facie burden of showing that the plaintiff did not sustain a serious injury within the meaning of Insurance Law § 5102 (d) as a result of the subject accident (see Toure v Avis Rent A Car Sys., 98 NY2d 345 [2002]; cf. Gaddy v Eyler, 79 NY2d 955, 956-957 [1992]). The papers submitted by the respondents failed to adequately address the plaintiff’s claims, set forth in the bills of particulars, that he sustained a serious injury to his head under either the permanent consequential limitation of use or significant limitation of use categories of Insurance Law § 5102 (d), and that he sustained a serious injury under the 90/180-day category of Insurance Law § 5102 (d) (see Che Hong Kim v Kossoff, 90 AD3d 969, 969 [2011]; Staff v Yshua, 59 AD3d 614, 614 [2009]).

Since the respondents did not sustain their prima facie burden, it is unnecessary to determine whether the papers submitted by the plaintiff in opposition were sufficient to raise a triable issue of fact (see Winegrad v New York Univ. Med. Ctr., 64 NY2d 851, 853 [1985]; Che Hong Kim v Kossoff, 90 AD3d at 969). Therefore, the Supreme Court should have denied that branch of the respondents’ motion which was for summary judgment dismissing the complaint insofar as asserted against them on the ground that the plaintiff did not sustain a serious injury within the meaning of Insurance Law § 5102 (d).

Mastro, J.P., Rivera, Roman and Sgroi, JJ., concur.

Free access — add to your briefcase to read the full text and ask questions with AI

In an action to recover damages for personal injuries, the *635 plaintiff appeals, as limited by his brief, from so much of an order of the Supreme Court, Kings County (Ash, J.), dated March 11, 2015, as granted that branch of the motion of the defendants Lauren Márchese and Leigh Márchese which was for summary judgment dismissing the complaint insofar as asserted against them on the ground that the plaintiff did not sustain a serious injury within the meaning of Insurance Law § 5102 (d).

Ordered that the order is reversed insofar as appealed from, on the law, with costs, and that branch of the motion of the defendants Lauren Márchese and Leigh Márchese which was for summary judgment dismissing the complaint insofar as asserted against them on the ground that the plaintiff did not sustain a serious injury within the meaning of Insurance Law § 5102 (d) is denied.

The respondents failed to meet their prima facie burden of showing that the plaintiff did not sustain a serious injury within the meaning of Insurance Law § 5102 (d) as a result of the subject accident (see Toure v Avis Rent A Car Sys., 98 NY2d 345 [2002]; cf. Gaddy v Eyler, 79 NY2d 955, 956-957 [1992]). The papers submitted by the respondents failed to adequately address the plaintiff’s claims, set forth in the bills of particulars, that he sustained a serious injury to his head under either the permanent consequential limitation of use or significant limitation of use categories of Insurance Law § 5102 (d), and that he sustained a serious injury under the 90/180-day category of Insurance Law § 5102 (d) (see Che Hong Kim v Kossoff, 90 AD3d 969, 969 [2011]; Staff v Yshua, 59 AD3d 614, 614 [2009]).

Since the respondents did not sustain their prima facie burden, it is unnecessary to determine whether the papers submitted by the plaintiff in opposition were sufficient to raise a triable issue of fact (see Winegrad v New York Univ. Med. Ctr., 64 NY2d 851, 853 [1985]; Che Hong Kim v Kossoff, 90 AD3d at 969). Therefore, the Supreme Court should have denied that branch of the respondents’ motion which was for summary judgment dismissing the complaint insofar as asserted against them on the ground that the plaintiff did not sustain a serious injury within the meaning of Insurance Law § 5102 (d).

Mastro, J.P., Rivera, Roman and Sgroi, JJ., concur.

Cite This Page — Counsel Stack

Bluebook (online)

2017 NY Slip Op 5700, 152 A.D.3d 634, 58 N.Y.S.3d 555, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/adams-v-dura-cab-corp-nyappdiv-2017.

Opinion

Related

Cite This Page — Counsel Stack